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
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THUCYDIDES,

IN ENGLISH;

Chiefly from

THE TRANSLATION

OF

HOBBS OF MALMESBURY.

WITH

NOTES AND VARIOUS READINGS;

AN ANALYSIS,

AND

A COLLATION OF OTHER EDITIONS WITH THE AMENDED
TEXT OF BEKKER.

OXFORD,

H. SLATTER, AND J. VINCENT.

MDCCCXXX.



291. e. 170.

PRINTED BY J. MUNDAY, OXFORD.

ADVERTISEMENT.

IN offering the present edition of Hobbes's translation of Thucydides to the public, the Editor deems it proper to state that the whole has been carefully revised and corrected. The language of Hobbes, in many places quite obsolete, and therefore obscure, has been modernized, and, where necessary, new notes have been added. To render this more useful than former editions, a collation of the texts of Baver and other editors with that of Bekker, is inserted in the notes ; together with a new translation of passages, in which the former differ from the latter. The division of the Books into Chapters, which renders references from the Greek perfectly easy, is a great and most conspicuous improvement, and will, it is hoped, recommend the present beyond all preceding editions.

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
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1871

THUCYDIDES.

BOOK I.

The estate of Greece, derived from the remotest known antiquity thereof, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. The occasion and pretexts of this war, arising from the controversies of the Athenians with the Corinthians, concerning Corcyra and Potidæa. The Lacedæmonians, instigated by the confederates, undertake the war; not so much at their instigation, as out of envy to the greatness of the Athenian dominion. The degrees by which that dominion was acquired. The war generally decreed by the confederates at Sparta. The demands of the Lacedæmonians. The obstinacy of the Athenians, and their answer, by the advice of Pericles.

CHAP. I.

THUCYDIDES, an Athenian, wrote the war of the Peloponnesians and the Athenians,¹ as they warred against each other; beginning to write as soon as the war was on foot, with expectation it should prove a great one, and most worthy the relation of all that had been before it;² conjecturing so much, both from this, that they flourished on both sides in all manner of provision; and also because he saw the rest of Greece siding with the one or the other faction; some then presently, and some intending so to do. For this was certainly the greatest commotion that ever happened amongst the Grecians, reaching also to part of the Barbarians, and as a man may say, to most nations. For the actions that preceded this, and those again that are yet more ancient, though the truth of them, through length of time, cannot by any means clearly be discovered; yet for any argument that (looking into times far past) I have yet lit on to persuade me, I do not think they have been very great, either for matter of war or otherwise.

II. For it is evident, that that which now is called Hellas, was not of old constantly inhabited; but that, at first, there were often removals, every one easily leaving the place of his abode, to the violence always of some greater number. For whiles traffic was not, nor mutual intercourse, but with fear, neither by sea nor land; and every man so husbanded the ground, as but barely to live upon it, without any stock of riches,³ and planted nothing, (because it was uncertain when another should invade them, and carry all away, especially, not having the defence of walls,) but made account to be masters in any

¹ Ὅς ἐπολέμησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

whatsoever is estimated by money.

² Τεκμαιρόμενος.

Arist. Ethic. iv. i.

³ Περισσῆσαι χρημάτων. Χρημάτα,

place of such necessary sustenance, as might serve them from day to day, they made little difficulty to change their habitations. And for this cause, they were of no ability at all, either for greatness of cities, or other provision. But the fattest soils were always the most subject to these changes of inhabitants; as that which is now called Thessalia and Bœotia, and the greatest part of Peloponnesus (except Arcadia) and of the rest of Greece, whatsoever was most fertile. For, the goodness of the land increasing the power of some particular men, both caused seditions, whereby they were ruined at home) and withal made them more obnoxious to the insidiation of strangers. From hence it is, that Attica,¹ from great antiquity, for the sterility of the soil free from seditions, hath been inhabited ever by the same people.² And it is none of the least evidences of what I have said, that Greece, by reason of sundry transplantations, hath not in other parts received the like augmentation. For, such as by war, or sedition, were driven out of other places, the most potent of them, as to a place of stability, retired themselves to Athens; where, receiving the freedom³ of the city, they long since so increased the same in number of people, that Attica being incapable of them itself, they sent out colonies into Ionia.

III. And to me, the imbecility of ancient times is not a little demonstrated also by this [that followeth.] For before the Trojan war, nothing appeareth to have been done by Greece in common; nor indeed was it, as I think, called all by that one name of Hellas; nor before the time of Hellen, the son of Deucalion, was there any such name at all. But Pelasgicum (which was the farthest extended) and the other parts, by regions, received their names from their own inhabitants. But Hellen and his sons being strong in Phthiotis, and called in for their aid, into other cities; these cities, because of their conversing with them, began more particularly to be called Hellenes; and yet could not that name of a long time after prevail upon them all. This is conjectured principally out of Homer; for, though born long after the Trojan war, yet he gives them not any where that name in general; nor indeed to any, but those, that with Achilles came out of Phthiotis, and were the first so called. But in his poems, he mentioneth Danaans, Argives, and Achæans; nor doth he likewise use the word Barbarians; because the Grecians, as it seemeth unto me, were not yet distinguished by one common name of Hellenes, oppositely answerable unto them. The Grecians then, neither as they had that name in particular by mutual intercourse, nor after, universally so termed, did ever before the Trojan war, for want of strength and

¹ The territory of Athens, so called from Atthis, daughter of Cranaus, second king A.C. 1497.

² The Athenians were of opinion, that they had ever been the possessors of Attica, on which account they styled themselves *αὐτόχθονες*, i. e. men of the same land. Sometimes *τέττιγες*, grasshoppers; wearing golden grasshoppers in their hair. See chap. 6. These insects being supposed to be generated

from the earth.

³ They were admitted to the same privileges with free-born native citizens—a custom allowed only in the infancy of the state. Those who in latter times came to settle in Athens, (*Μέτριοι*,) though admitted by the Council of Areopagus, and entered in a public register, never actually became citizens, (*Πολίται*.)

correspondence, enter into any action with their forces joined. And to that expedition they came together, by the means of navigation, which the most part of Greece had now received.¹

IV. For Minos was the most ancient of all, that by report we know to have built a navy: and he made himself master of the now Grecian sea;² and both commanded the isles called Cyclades, and also was the first that sent colonies into most of the same, expelling thence the Carians, and constituting his own sons there for governors, and also freed the seas of pirates, as much as he could, for the better coming in (as is likely) of his own revenue.

V. For the Grecians in old time, and such Barbarians as, in the continent, lived near unto the sea, or else inhabited the islands, after once they began to cross over one to another in ships, became thieves, and went abroad under the conduct of their most puissant men, both to enrich themselves, and to fetch a maintenance for the weak; and falling upon towns unfortified, and scatteringly inhabited, rifled them, and made this the best means of their living; being a matter at that time no where in disgrace,³ but rather carrying with it something of glory. This is manifest by some that dwell on the continent, amongst whom, so it be performed nobly, it is still esteemed as an ornament. The same is also proved by some of the ancient poets, who introduce men questioning of such as sail by, on all coasts alike, whether they be thieves or not; as a thing neither scorned by such as were asked, nor upbraided by those that were desirous to know. They also robbed one another within the main land: and much of Greece useth that old custom, as the Locrians, called Ozolæ,⁴ the Acarnanians, and those of the continent in that quarter, unto this day. Moreover, the fashion of wearing iron remaineth yet with the people of that continent, from their old trade of thieving.

VI. For once they were wont throughout all Greece to go armed, because their houses were unfenced, and travelling was unsafe, and accustomed themselves, like the Barbarians, to the ordinary wearing of their armour. And the nations of Greece that live so yet, do testify that the same manner of life was anciently universal to all the rest. Amongst whom the Athenians were the first that laid by their armour, and growing civil, passed into a more tender kind of life. And such of the rich as were any thing stepped into years, laid away, upon the same delicacy, not long after, the fashion of wearing linen coats, and golden grasshoppers, which they were wont to bind up in the locks of their hair: from whence also the same fashion, by reason of their affinity, remained a long time in use amongst the ancient Ionians. But the moderate kind of garment, and conformable to the wearing of

¹ ἤδη πλείω χρώμενοι, Bekker. They came together to this expedition, now making more use of the sea. In the old edition it is τὰ πλείω χρώμενοι, for the most part making use of the sea.

² Before that time called the Carian sea.

³ Piracy in ancient times was not re-

garded as a disgraceful traffic. (See Hom. Od. ix. 254.) Herodotus mentions that Dionysius, the Phocæan, betook himself to Sicily, where he committed depredations on the Carthaginians.—B. vi. 17.*

⁴ In distinction to the other Locrians, called Opuntii and Epionemedii.

these times, was first taken up by the Lacedæmonians; amongst whom also, both in other things, and especially in the culture of their bodies, the nobility observed the utmost equality with the commons. The same were also the first, that when they were to contend in the Olympic games, stript themselves naked,¹ and anointed their bodies with ointment: whereas in ancient times, the champions did also in the Olympic games use breeches; nor is it many years since this custom ceased. Also there are to this day amongst the Barbarians, especially those of Asia, prizes propounded of fighting with fists, and of wrestling, and the combatants, about their privy parts, wear breeches in the exercise. It may likewise by many other things be demonstrated, that the old Greeks used the same form of life, that is now in force amongst the Barbarians of the present age.

VII. As for cities, such as are of late foundation, and since the increase of navigation, in as much as they have had since more plenty of riches, have been walled about, and built upon the shore; and have taken up isthmi, (that is to say, necks of land between sea and sea,) both for merchandise, and for the better strength against confiners. But the old cities, men having been in those times, for the most part, infested by thieves, are built farther up, as well in the islands as in the continent. For others also that dwelt on the sea side, though not seamen, yet they molested one another with robberies; and even to these times, those people are planted up high in the country.

VIII. But these robberies were the exercise especially of the islanders, namely, the Carians and the Phœnicians: for by them were the greatest part of the islands² inhabited. A testimony whereof, is this: the Athenians, when in this present war³ they hallowed the isle of Delos, and had digged up the sepulchres of the dead, found that more than half of them were Carians,⁴ known so to be, both by the armour buried with them, and also by their manner of burial at this day. And when the navy of Minos was once afloat, navigators had the sea more free: for he expelled the malefactors out of the islands, and in the most of them planted colonies of his own: by which means, they who inhabited the sea coasts, becoming more addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings; of whom, some grown now rich, compassed their towns about with walls. For out of desire of gain, the meaner sort underwent servitude with the mighty; and the mighty with their wealth brought the lesser cities into subjection. And so it came to pass, that rising to power, they proceeded afterwards to the war against Troy.

IX. And to me it seemeth, that Agamemnon got together that fleet, not so much for that he had with him the suitors of Helena, bound thereto by oath to Tyndareus, as for this, that he exceeded the

¹ Perhaps the cause why it was a capital crime for women to be spectators of the Olympic exercises.

² The Cyclades.

³ In the sixth year of the war. B. iii. c. 104.

⁴ The Carians having invented the

crest of the helmet, and the handle of the target, and also the drawing of images on their targets, had therefore a helmet and a buckler buried with them, and had their heads laid towards the west.

rest in power. For they that by tradition of their ancestors know the most certainty of the acts of the Peloponnesians, say, that first Pelops, by the abundance of wealth which he brought with him out of Asia to men in want, obtained such power amongst them, as though he were a stranger, yet the country was called after his name.¹ And that this power was also increased by his posterity: for Euristheus being slain in Attica, by the Heracleides,² Atreus, that was his uncle by the mother,³ (and was then abiding with him as an exiled person, for fear of his father, for the death of Chrysippus,⁴) and to whom Euristheus, when he undertook the expedition, had committed Mycenæ, and the government thereof, for that he was his kinsman; when as Euristheus came not back, (the Mycenians being willing to it, for fear of the Heracleides, and because he was an able man, and made much of the common people) obtained the kingdom of Mycenæ, and of whatsoever else was under Euristheus, for himself: and the power of the Pelopides became greater than that of the Perseides. To which greatness Agamemnon⁵ succeeding, and also far excelling the rest in shipping, took that war in hand, as I conceive it, and assembled the said forces, not so much upon favour, as by fear. For it is clear, that he himself both conferred most ships to that action, and that some also he lent to the Arcadians. And this is likewise declared by Homer, (if any think his testimony sufficient) who, at the delivery of the sceptre unto him, calleth him, of many isles, and of all Argos king. Now he could not, living in the continent, have been lord of the islands, other than such as were adjacent, which cannot be many, unless he had also had a navy. And by this expedition, we are to estimate what were those of the ages before it.

X. Now seeing Mycenæ was but a small city, or if any other of that age seem but of light regard, let not any man for that cause, on so weak an argument, think that fleet to have been less than the poets have said, and fame reported it to be. For, if the city of Lacedæmon were now desolate, and nothing of it left but the temples, and floors of the buildings, I think it would breed much unbelief in posterity long hence, of their power, in comparison of the fame. For although of five parts⁶ of Peloponnesus, it possess two,⁷ and hath the leading of the rest, and also of many confederates without; yet the city being not close built, and the temples and other edifices not costly, and because it is but scatteringly inhabited, after the ancient manner of Greece, their power would seem inferior to the report. Again, the same things happening to Athens, one would conjecture by the sight

¹ Originally called Apia, *Ἀπία* *ἔξ' Ἀπίης γαίης*. Il. i. 270.

² A race of men, whereof the founder was Hercules. This family was persecuted by Euristheus, who was of the house of Perseus, and driven into Attica, thither he following them, was slain by the Athenians.

³ Astydamia, the mother of Euristheus, was Atreus's sister.

⁴ Atreus and Thyestes, sons of Pe-

lops, at the impulsion of their mother, slew this Chrysippus, who was their half-brother, viz. by the father, and for this fact, Atreus fled to Euristheus.

⁵ The son of Atreus, heir to the power of both houses, both of the Pelopides, and of the Perseides.

⁶ Laconia, Arcadia, Argolica, Messenia, Elis.

⁷ Laconia, Messenia.

of their city, that their power were double to what it is. We ought not therefore to be incredulous, [concerning the forces that went to Troy,] nor have in regard so much the external shew of a city, as the power: but we are to think, that that expedition was indeed greater than those that went before it, but yet inferior to those of the present age; if in this also we may credit the poetry of Homer, who, being a poet, was like to set it forth to the utmost. And yet even thus it cometh short; for he maketh it to consist of twelve hundred vessels: those that were of Bœotians, carrying a hundred and twenty men apiece, and those which came with Philoctetes, fifty. Setting forth, as I suppose, both the greatest sort, and the least, and therefore of the bigness of any of the rest, he maketh in his catalogue no mention at all: but declareth, that they who were in the vessels of Philoctetes, served both as mariners and soldiers: for he writes, that they who were at the oar, were all of them archers. And for such as wrought not, it is not likely that many went along, except kings,¹ and such as were in chief authority, especially being to pass the sea with munition of war, and in bottoms without decks, built after the old and piratical fashion. So then, if by the greatest and least, one estimate the mean² of their shipping, it will appear, that the whole number of men considered, as sent jointly from all Greece, were not very many.³

XI. And the cause hereof was not so much want of men, as of wealth. For, for want of victual, they carried the lesser army, and no greater than they hoped might both follow the war, and also maintain itself. When upon their arrival they had gotten the upper hand in fight, (which is manifest, for else they could not have fortified their camp,) it appears, that from that time forward they employed not there their whole power, but that for want of victual, they betook themselves, part of them to the tillage of Chersonesus, and part to fetch in booties: whereby divided, the Trojans the more easily made that ten years' resistance; as being ever a match for so many as remained at the siege. Whereas, if they had gone furnished with store of provision, and with all their forces, eased of rapine and tillage, since they were masters of the field, they had also easily taken the city. But they strove not with their whole power, but only with such a portion of their army, as at the several occasions chanced to be present: when as, if they had pressed the siege, they had won the place, both in less time, and with less labour. But through want of money, not only they were weak matters all that preceded this enterprize; but also this, (which is of greater name than any before it,) appeareth to

¹ As Achilles, Ulysses, Ajax. *ἱερίωνες*, those on board ship who take no charge of the navigation.

² The whole number of men, estimating the ships, on an average, to carry eighty-five men apiece, which is the mean between a hundred and twenty and fifty, amounts to a hundred and two thousand, carried in these twelve hundred ships. Yet the author makes it a light matter in respect of the

present war.

³ *οὐ πολλοὶ φαίνονται ἐλθόντες*, Bekker. *ἐνεελθόντες*, Duker. When then one estimates the mean between the greatest and the least ships, not many appear to have come, considering that they were sent in common from the whole of Greece.

⁴ *τῷ αἰ παρόντι*, Bekker. *παρὰ-ρύχοντι*, Duker. They held out with that part which was always present.

be in fact beneath the fame, and report, which, by means of the poets, now goeth of it.

XII. For also after the Trojan war, the Grecians continued still their shiftings and transplantations :¹ insomuch as never resting, they improved not their power. For the late return of the Greeks from Ilium, caused not a little innovation, and in most of the cities there arose seditions, and those which were driven out built cities for themselves in other places, for those that are now called Bœotians, in the sixtieth year after the taking of Troy, expelled Arne by the Thessalians, seated themselves in that country, which now Bœotia, was then called Cadmeis. (But there was in the same a certain portion of that nation before, of whom also were they that went to the warfare of Troy.) And in the eightieth year, the Doreans, together with the Heracleides, seized on Peloponnesus. And with much ado, after long time, Greece had constant rest; and shifting their seats no longer, at length sent colonies abroad. And the Athenians planted Ionia, and most of the islands; and the Peloponnesians most of Italy, and Sicily, and also certain parts of the rest of Greece. But these colonies were all planted after the Trojan war.

XIII. But when the power of Greece was now improved, and the desire of money withal, their revenues being enlarged, in most of the cities there were erected tyrannies : (for before that time, kingdoms with honours limited, were hereditary.) And the Grecians built navies, and became more seriously addicted to the affairs of the sea. The Corinthians are said to have been the first that changed the form of shipping into the nearest to that which is now in use; and at Corinth are reported to have been made the first galleys² of all Greece. Now it is well known that Aminocles,³ the shipwright of Corinth, built four ships at Samos. And from the time that Aminocles went to Samos, until the end of this present war, are at the most but three hundred years.⁴ And the most ancient naval battle that we know of, was fought between the Corinthians⁵ and the Corcyræans, and from that battle to the same time, are but two hundred and sixty years. For Corinth, seated on an isthmus, had been always a place of traffic; because the Grecians of old, from within and without Peloponnesus, trading by land more than by sea, had no other intercourse one to another, but through the Corinthians' territory. And was also wealthy in money, as appears by the poets, who have surnamed this town the rich.⁶ And after the Grecians had commerce also by sea, then likewise having furnished themselves with a navy, they scoured the sea of pirates, and affording traffic both by sea and land, mightily increased their city in revenue of money.

¹ *κατακίζω*, Bekker. *μετακίζω*, Duker. For also after the Trojan war the Grecians (Greece) still removed their habitations, and formed colonies; not transplanted their colonies.

² *Τριήρεις*, triremes—ships of war of the galley kind, so called from three banks of oars with which they were furnished. They also carried sails, but

generally lowered them in action.

³ A. C. 705. Herod. i. 163.

⁴ By this it appears that Thucydides outlived the war.

⁵ Herod. iii. 58.

⁶ Οἱ δὲ Μυκήνας εἶχον, ἐκτίμενον πολίεθρον,

'Αρμείον τε Κόρινθον.—Il. ii. 569.

After this, the Ionians in the times of Cyrus,¹ first king of the Persians, and of his son Cambyses, got together a great navy, and making war on Cyrus, obtained for a time the dominion of that part of the sea that lieth on their own coast. Also Polycrates,² who in the time of Cambyses tyrannised in Samos, had a strong navy, wherewith he subdued divers of the islands; and amongst the rest, having won Rhenea,³ he consecrated the same to Apollo of Delos. The Phocæans⁴ likewise, when they were building the city of Marseilles, overcame the Carthaginians in a fight at sea.

XIV. These were the greatest navies extant, and yet even these, though many ages after the time of Troy, consisted, as it seems, but of a few galleys, and were made up with vessels of fifty oars, and with long boats, as well as those of former times. And it was but a little before the Median⁵ war, and death of Darius, successor of Cambyses in the kingdom of Persia, that the tyrants of Sicily,⁶ and the Corcyræans had of galleys any number. For these last⁷ were the only navies worth speaking of in all Greece, before the invasion of the Medes. And the people of Ægina, and the Athenians, had but small ones, and the most of them consisting but of fifty oars apiece; and that so lately, as but from the time that the Athenians making war on Ægina, and withal expecting the coming of the Barbarian, at the persuasion of Themistocles, built those ships which they used in that war; and these also, not all had decks.⁸

XV. Such were then the navies of the Greeks, both ancient and modern. Nevertheless, such as applied themselves to naval business, gained by them no small power, both in revenue of money, and in dominion over other people. For with their navies (especially those men that had not sufficient land where they inhabited, to maintain themselves) they subdued the islands. But as for war by land, such as any state might acquire power by, there was none at all. And such as were, were only between borderer and borderer. For the Grecians had never yet gone out with any army to conquer any nation far from home; because the lesser cities neither brought in their forces to the great ones, as subjects, nor concurred as equals, in any common enterprise; but such as were neighbours warred against each other, hand to hand. For the war of old, between the Chalcideans and the Eretrians, was it, wherein the rest of Greece was most divided, and in league with either party.

XVI. As others by other means were kept back from growing great, so also the Ionians by this, that the Persian affairs prospering,

¹ Herod. b. i.

² Herod. b. iii.

³ Rhenea, a small island of the Ægean Sea, near to Delos. B. iii. c. 104.

⁴ Inhabitants of Phocæa, in Ionia, who in the time of Tarquinius, dreading the power of Cyrus, came into the mouth of the Tyber, entered into amity with the Romans, and thence went and built the city of Massilia, in Gallia Narbonensis, now Marseilles.

⁵ Medes and Persians used here promiscuously, the Median monarchy being translated to the Persians by Cyrus the Great.

⁶ Gelon and Hiero.

⁷ Of the Corinthians, Ionians, and Phocæans.

⁸ *Kai autai ouπω ελχον δια πάσης καταστώματα*—more properly—and these were not completely decked over.

Cyrus and the Persian kingdom, after the defeat of Croesus, made war upon all that lieth from the river Halys to the sea side, and so subdued all the cities which they possessed in the continent, and Darius afterward, when he had overcome the Phœnician fleet, did the like unto them in the islands.

XVII. And as for the tyrants that were in the Grecian cities, who forecasted only for themselves, how, with as much safety as was possible, to look to their own persons, and their own families, they resided for the most part in the cities, and did no action worthy of memory, unless it were against their neighbours: for, as for the tyrants of Sicily, they were already arrived at greater power. Thus was Greece for a long time hindered, that neither jointly it could do any thing remarkable, nor the cities singly be adventurous.

XVIII. But after that the tyrants¹ both of Athens, and of the rest of Greece, where tyrannies were, were the most, and last of them, (excepting those of Sicily,) put down by the Lacedæmonians, (for Lacedæmon, after it was built by the Dorians that inhabited the same, though it hath been longer troubled with seditions than any other city we know, yet hath it had for the longest time good laws, and been also always free from tyrants. For it is unto the end of this war, four hundred years and somewhat more, that the Lacedæmonians have used one and the same government: and thereby being of power themselves, they also ordered the affairs in the other cities) [I say] after the dissolution of tyrannies in Greece, it was not long before the battle was fought by the Medes against the Athenians in the fields of Marathon.² And in the tenth year again after that, came the Barbarian,³ with the great fleet into Greece, to subdue it. And Greece being now in great danger, the leading of the Grecians that leagued in that war was given to the Lacedæmonians, as to the most potent state. And the Athenians, who had purposed so much before, and already stowed their necessaries, at the coming in of the Medes, went on ship-board and became seamen.⁴ When they had jointly beaten back the Barbarian, then did the Grecians, both such as were revolted from the king, and such as had in common made war upon him, not long after, divide themselves into leagues, one part with the Athenians, and the other with the Lacedæmonians; these two cities appearing to be the mightiest, for this had the power by land, and the other by sea. But this confederation lasted but a while; for afterwards, the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, being at variance,⁵ warred each on other, together with their several confederates. And the rest of Greece,

¹ Pisistratus and his sons expelled from Athens by the Lacedæmonians under Cleomenes, A.C. 510. Herod. v. 64.

² Battle of Marathon, 490, A.C. Herod. vi. 113.

³ Xerxes' expedition and battle of Salamis, A.C. 480. The fleet consisted of one thousand two hundred galleys, and two thousand hulks of the round manner of building. Corn. Nepos in

vitâ Themistoclis.

⁴ The Athenians being admonished by the oracle, for their safety against the Medes, to put themselves within walls of wood: Themistocles interpreting the oracle, they went into their galleys. Herod. b. vii.

⁵ This variance began upon this that Cimon having been sent for to aid the Lacedæmonians against the Helots, was sent back with his Athenians, out of

where any discord chanced to arise, had recourse presently to one of these. Insomuch, that from the war of the Medes to this present war, being continually [exercised] sometimes in peace, sometimes in war, either one against the other, or against revolted confederates, they arrived at this war, both well furnished with military provisions, and also expert, because their practice was with danger.

XIX. The Lacedæmonians governed not their confederates so as to make them tributaries,¹ but only drew them by fair means to embrace the oligarchy, convenient to their own policy. But the Athenians, having with time, taken into their hands the galleys of all those that stood out, (except the Chians and Lesbians,) reigned over them,² and ordained every of them to pay a certain tribute of money. By which means their own³ particular provision was greater in the beginning of this war, than when in their flourishing time, the league between them and the rest of Greece remaining whole, it was at the most.

XX. Such then I find to have been the state of things past, hard to be believed, though one produce proof for every particular thereof. For men receive the report of things, though of their own country, if done before their own time, all alike, from one as from another, without examination. For the vulgar sort of Athenians think, that Hipparchus was the tyrant, and slain by Harmodius and Aristogeiton; and know not that Hippias had the government, as being the eldest son of Pisistratus, and that Hipparchus and Thessalus were his brethren, and that Harmodius and Aristogeiton suspecting that some of their accomplices had that day, and at that instant, discovered unto Hippias somewhat of their treason, did forbear Hippias, as a man forewarned; and desirous to effect somewhat, though with danger, before they should be apprehended, lighting on Hipparchus, slew him near the temple called Leocorium, whilst he was setting forth the Panathenæical⁴ show. And likewise divers other things now extant, and which time hath not yet involved in oblivion, have been conceived amiss by other Grecians; as that the kings of Lacedæmon, in giving their suffrages, had not single⁵ but double votes. And that Pitonate was a band of soldiers, so called there, whereas there was never any such. So impatient of labour are the most men, in the

distrust the Lacedæmonians had of their forward spirit: which the Athenians took for a disgrace.

¹ The first part of this section is pointed differently by Bekker, and the *ἡγετον* is omitted. The Lacedæmonians indeed governed their allies, not having them subject to tribute, managing only that they should rule their cities by an oligarchy as was suitable to themselves; but the Athenians governed their allies in this way, in course of time taking over the ships of the cities (except of the Chians and Lesbians,) and commanding all to pay tribute.

² Hence it is that through all this history subjects and confederates are taken for the same thing, especially with the Athenians.

³ Of the people of Athens itself, excluding their confederates.

⁴ Panathenæa were solemnities in honor of Minerva, patroness of Athens, instituted by Erectheus or Orpheus, but renewed by Theseus, in memory of his having collected all the Athenians that lived dispersed throughout Attica, into the city of Athens. Paus. in Arcad.

⁵ Lucan seemeth to retain the same error in Harmodias.

search of truth, and embrace soonest the things that are next to hand.¹

XXI. Now he, that by the arguments here adduced, shall frame a judgment of the things past, and not believe rather, that they were such as the poets have sung, or prose-writers have composed, more delightfully to the ear than conformably to the truth, as being things not to be disproved, and by length of time, turned for the most part into the nature of fables without credit; but shall think them here searched out, by the most evident signs that can be, and sufficiently too, considering their antiquity; he, I say, shall not err. And though men always judge the present war wherein they live, to be greatest; and when it is past, admire more those that were before it; yet if they consider of this war, by the acts done in the same, it will manifest itself to be greater than any of those before mentioned.

XXII. What particular persons have spoken, when they were about to enter into the war, or when they were in it, were hard for me to remember exactly, whether they were speeches which I have heard myself, or have received at the second hand. But as any man seemed to me, that knew what was nearest to the sum² of the truth, of all that hath been uttered, to speak most agreeably to the matter still in hand, so have I made it spoken here. But of the acts themselves done in the war, I thought not fit to write all that I heard from all authors, nor such as I myself did but think to be true; but only those whereat I was myself present, and those of which with all diligence I had made particular inquiry. And yet even of those things it was hard to know the certainty, because such as were present at every action, spake not all after the same manner, but as they were affected to the parts, or as they could remember. To hear this history rehearsed, for that there be inserted in it no fables, shall be perhaps not delightful: but he that desires to look into the truth of things done, and which (according to the condition of humanity) may be done again, or at least their like, he shall find enough herein to make him think it profitable: and it is compiled rather for an everlasting possession,³ than to be rehearsed for a prize.

XXIII. The greatest action before this, was that against the Medes,⁴ and yet that, by two battles by sea, and as many by land, was soon decided. But as for this war, it both lasted long, and the harm it did to Greece was such, as the like, in the like space, had never been seen before. For neither had there ever been so many cities expunged and made desolate, what by the Barbarians, and what by the Greeks warring on one another; (and some cities there

¹ The account given in chap. xx. differs considerably from that given by Herodotus, who makes Hipparchus the elder; also respecting the government of Lacedæmon. See Herod. v. 55, vi. 56, ix. 53.

² To the analogy and fitness of what was to be said: so that though he used not their words, yet he used the argu-

ments that best might serve to the purpose, which at any time was in hand.

³ Κρίμα ἕς ἀεί.

⁴ When Xerxes invaded them, when there were fought two battles by sea, viz. one at Artimesium, and the other at Salamis; and two by land, one at Thermopylæ, and the other at Platea.

were, that when they were taken, changed their inhabitants;) nor so much banishing and slaughter, some by the war, some by sedition, as was in this. And those things which concerning former time there went a fame of, but in fact rarely confirmed, were now made credible: as earthquakes, general to the greatest part of the world, and most violent withal; eclipses of the sun, oftener than is reported of any former time; great droughts in some places, and thereby famine: and that which did none of the least hurt, but destroyed also its part, the plague. All these evils entered together with this war, which began from the time that the Athenians and Peloponnesians brake the league, which, immediately after the conquest of Eubœa,¹ had been concluded between them for thirty years. The causes why they brake the same, and their quarrels, I have therefore set down first, because no man should be to seek from what ground so great a war amongst the Grecians could arise. And the truest quarrel, though least in speech, I conceive to be the growth of the Athenian power, which putting the Lacedæmonians into fear, necessitated the war. But the causes of the breach of the league, publicly voiced, were these:

XXIV. Epidamnus is a city situate on the right hand to such as enter into the Ionian gulf; bordering upon it, are the Taulantii, Barbarians, a people of Illyris. This was planted by the Corcyræans, but the captain of the colony was one Phalius, the son of Heratoclidus, a Corinthian of the lineage of Hercules, and according to an ancient custom, called to this charge out of the metropolitan city; besides that, the colony itself consisted in part of Corinthians, and others of the Doric nation.² In process of time, the city of Epidamnus became great and populous; and having for many years together been annoyed with sedition, was by a war, as is reported, made upon them by the confining Barbarians, brought low, and deprived of the greatest part of their power. But that which was the last accident before this war, was, that the nobility, forced by the commons to fly the city, went and joined with the Barbarians, and both by land and sea robbed those that remained within. The Epidamnians that were in the town, oppressed in this manner, sent their ambassadors to Corcyra, as being their mother-city, praying the Corcyræans not to see them perish, but to reconcile unto them those whom they had driven forth, and to put an end to the Barbarian war. And this they intreated in the form of suppliants,³ sitting down in the temple of Juno. But the Corcyræans, not admitting their supplication, sent them away again without effect.

XXV. The Epidamnians now despairing of relief from the Corcyræans, and at a stand how to proceed in their present affairs, sending

¹ By the Athenians. It is a mistaken notion to suppose that the breaking of the truce was the cause of the war. Thucydides means to say, that when the war took place, the truce was at an end.

² *καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου Δωρικοῦ γένους*, Bekker. *καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ Δωρικοῦ γένους*, Duker. And some of the Corinthians

and of the rest of the Doric nation, formed the colony together.

³ Either the Epidamnians had offended the Corcyræans, or the custom was in those times to take sanctuary, not only for crimes, but for obtaining aid in extremities, tacitly disclaiming all other help save that of the gods, and those to whom they made supplication.

to Delphi, inquired at the oracle, whether it were not best to deliver up their city into the hands of the Corinthians, as of their founders and make trial what aid they should obtain from thence? And when the oracle had answered, that they should deliver it, and take the Corinthians for their leaders, they went to Corinth, and according to the advice of the oracle, gave their city to them, and declared how the first founder of it was a Corinthian, and what answer the oracle had given them, intreating their help, and that they would not stand by beholding their destruction. And the Corinthians undertook their defence, not only for the equity of the cause, (as thinking them no less their own, than the Corcyræans' colony) but also for hatred of the Corcyræans, who being their colony, yet contemned them, and allowed them not their due honour in public meetings; nor in the distribution of the sacrifice, began at a Corinthian, as was the custom of other colonies; but being equal to the richest Grecians of their time, for store of money, and strongly furnished with ammunition of war, had them in contempt. Also they sticked not sometimes to boast how much they excelled in shipping; and that Corcyræa had been once inhabited by the Phæaces,¹ who flourished in glory of naval affairs; which was also the cause, why they the rather provided themselves of a navy; and they were indeed not without power that way, for when they began this war, they had one hundred and twenty galleys.

XXVI. The Corinthians, therefore, having all these criminations against them, relieved Epidamnus willingly, not only giving leave to whosoever would, to go and dwell there, but also sent thither a garrison of Ambraciotes, Leucadians, and of their own citizens; which succours, for fear the Corcyræans should have hindered their passage by sea, marched by land to Apollonia. The Corcyræans understanding that new inhabitants and a garrison were gone to Epidamnus, and that the colony was delivered to the Corinthians, were vexed extremely at the same; and sailing presently thither with twenty-five galleys, and afterwards with another fleet, in an insolent manner commanded them both to recall those whom they had banished (for these banished² men of Epidamnus had been now at Corcyræa, and pointing to the sepulchres of their ancestors, and claiming kindred, had intreated the Corcyræans to restore them) and to send away the garrison and inhabitants sent thither by the Corinthians. But the Epidamnians gave no ear to their commandments.³ Whereupon the Corcyræans with forty galleys, together with the banished men, (whom they pretended to reduce) and with the Illyrians, whom they had joined to their part,

¹ Called Phæacia by Homer, who describes the gardens of king Alcinoüs. *Odys.* b. vii.

² *Φυγάδες*, Divers occasions force men from their country. Sentence of law which is commonly called banishment. Proscription, when the sentence is death, for which cause they fly into banishment: but those that are here meant, are such as in seditions being the weaker faction, fly for fear of being

murdered, whom I call here banished men; or might call them perhaps better outlaws or fugitives, but neither of them properly. The Florentines, and other places of Italy, that were or are democratical wherein such banishment can only happen, call themselves properly *Fuorusciti*.

³ In Thucydides' account of the disputes between Corinth, Corcyræa, and Epidamnus, we have more authentic

warred upon them ; and having laid siege to the city, made proclamation, that such of the Epidamnians as would, and all strangers might depart safely, or otherwise were to be proceeded against as enemies. But when this prevailed not, the place being an isthmus, they enclosed the city in on every side.

XXVII. The Corinthians, when news was brought from Epidamnus how it was besieged, presently made ready their army, and at the same time caused a proclamation to be made, for the sending thither of a colony, and that such as would go, should have equal and like privileges, with those that were there before : and that such as desired to be sharers in the same, and yet were unwilling to go along in person at that present, if they would contribute fifty Corinthian drachmas, might stay behind. And they were very many both that went, and that laid down their silver. Moreover, they sent to the Megareans, for fear of being stopped in their passage by the Corcyræans, to aid them with some galleys, who accordingly furnished out eight, the citizens of Pale, in Cephallenia, four. They also required galleys of the Epidaurians, who sent them five, the citizens of Hermione one, the Træzenians two, the Leucadians ten, the Ambraciotes eight. Of the Thebans and Phliasians they required money ; of the Eleans, both money and empty galleys ; and of the Corinthians themselves, there were ready thirty galleys and three thousand men of arms.

XXVIII. The Corcyræans, advertised of this preparation, went to Corinth in company of the ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians, and of the Sicyonians, whom they took with them, and required the Corinthians to recall the garrison and inhabitants which they had sent to Epidamnus, as being a city they said wherewith they had nothing to do ; or if they had any thing to allege, they were content to have the cause judicially tried in such cities of Peloponnesus as they should both agree on, and they then should hold the colony to whom the same should be adjudged. They said also, that they were content to refer their cause to the oracle at Delphi : that war they would make none ; but if they must needs have it, they should by the violence of them, be forced in their own defence, to seek out better friends¹ than those whom they already had. To this the Corinthians answered, that if they would put off with their fleet, and dismiss the Barbarians from before Epidamnus, they would then consult of the matter ; for before they could not honestly do it : because whilst they should be pleading the case, the Epidamnians should be suffering the misery of a siege. The Corcyræans replied to this, that if they would call back those men of theirs already in Epidamnus, that then they also would do as the Corinthians had required them ; or otherwise they were content to let the men on both sides stay where they were, and to suspend the war till the cause should be decided.

XXIX. The Corinthians not assenting to any of these propositions,

information concerning the proper connexion between a Grecian colony and its metropolis than is perhaps elsewhere to be found ; but we are without means of determining the exact import of the

expressions—*παραδούναι τὴν πόλιν ὡς οἰκισταῖς*, and *ἡγεμονας ποιεῖσθαι*.—*Mitford's Greece*.

¹ i. e. the Athenians.

since their galleys were manned, and their confederates present, having defied them first by a herald, put to sea with seventy-five galleys and two thousand¹ men of arms, and set sail for Epidamnus against the Corcyræans. Their fleet was commanded by Aristæus the son of Pellicas, Callicrates the son of Callias, and Timanor the son of Timanthes : and the land forces by Archetimus the son of Eurytimus, and Isarchidas the son of Isarchus. After they were come as far as Actium,² in the territory of Anactorium, (which is a temple of Apollo, and ground consecrated unto him in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia,) the Corcyræans sent a herald to them at Actium to forbid their coming on, and in the mean time manned out their fleet ; and having repaired and made fit for service their old galleys, and furnished the rest with things necessary, shipped their munition, and went aboard. The herald was no sooner returned from the Corinthians with an answer not inclining to peace, but having their galleys already manned and furnished, to the number of eighty sail, (for forty attended always the siege of Epidamnus,) they put to sea, and arranging themselves, came to a battle, in which the Corcyræans were clearly victors, and on the part of the Corinthians there perished fifteen galleys. And the same day it happened likewise, that they that besieged Epidamnus had the same rendered unto them, with conditions, that the strangers therein found should be ransomed, and the Corinthians kept in bonds till such time as they should otherwise be disposed of.

XXX. The battle being ended, the Corcyræans, after they had set up their trophy³ in Leucimna, a promontory of Corcyra, slew their other prisoners, but kept the Corinthians still in bonds. After this, when the Corinthians with their vanquished fleet were gone home to Corinth, the Corcyræans, masters now of the whole sea in those parts, went first, and wasted the territory of Leucas, a Corinthian colony, and then sailed to Cyllene, which is the arsenal of the Eleans, and burnt it, because they had, both with money and shipping, given aid to the Corinthians. And they were masters of those seas, and infested the confederates of Corinth, for the most part of that year ; till such time as in the beginning of the summer following, the Corinthians sent a fleet and soldiers into Actium, the which for the more safe keeping of Leucas, and of other cities their friends, encamped about Chimerium in Thesprotis :⁴ and the Corcyræans, both with their fleet and land soldiers, lay over against them in Leucimna. But neither part stirred against the other, but after they had laid quietly opposite

¹ Either here or before, it is likely the number has been miswritten : for a little before he says they had made ready 3000.

² A haven famous afterwards for the battle between Augustus Cæsar and Marc. Antony, which decided the fate of the Roman world—Sept. 2nd, A.C. 31—A. U. C. 723—now called Azio.

³ This was constantly done by the Greeks upon a victory. The trophies

for a victory by land were decked out with the arms they had taken—for a victory by sea, with arms also, and the wrecks of the enemy's vessels. To demolish a trophy was regarded as sacrilege, because they were always dedicated to some deity.

⁴ Thesprotis, part of the sea coast of Epirus, nearly opposite to Corcyra—Chimerium, a promontory.

all the summer, they retired in winter, both the one side and the other, to their cities.

XXXI. All this year, as well before as after the battle, the Corinthians being vexed at the war with the Corcyræans, applied themselves to the building of galleys, and to the preparing of a fleet, the strongest they were able to make, and to procure mariners out of Peloponnesus, and all other parts of Greece. The Corcyræans, having intelligence of their preparations, began to fear, and (because they had never been in league with any Grecian city, nor were in the roll of the confederates, either of the Athenians or Lacedæmonians,) thought it best now, to send to Athens, to see if they could procure any aid from thence. This being perceived by the Corinthians, they also sent their ambassadors to Athens, lest the addition of the Athenian navy, to that of the Corcyræans, might hinder them from carrying the war as they desired. And the assembly¹ at Athens being met, they came to plead against each other: and the Corcyræans spake to this effect:

The Oration of the Ambassadors of Coreyra.

XXXII. “Men of Athens, it is but justice, that such as come to
“implore the aid of their neighbours, (as now do we) and cannot pre-
“tend by any great benefit or league, some precedent merit, should,
“before they go any farther, make it appear principally, that what

¹ The people of Athens were divided into ten tribes, which presided by rotation. The year was divided into ten courses, and each tribe presided about five weeks. The tribe in course elected fifty persons to manage by their authority and in their name. These were called *Prytanes*. This being too large a number for business, they were subdivided into tens, each of these divisions presiding for a week: these were called *Proedri*. One of these *Proedri*, called *Epistates*, presided for a day, during which he was invested with the highest trust in the government, but never enjoyed the pre-eminence a second time. He kept the public seal, and the keys of the citadel and treasury: in the assembly of the people he ordered all proclamations, regulated proceedings, put the question, and declared the majority.

The assemblies of the people were of two kinds, *ordinary* and *extraordinary*; of the first kind four were regularly held during each presidency of the tribes, and at the third of them ambassadors from foreign states had public audience. The latter were occasionally convened by the presidents or by the generals of the state. Some days before hand notice was publicly given by

the senate or council of five hundred upon what subjects they were to deliberate, but this was dispensed with on sudden emergencies.

They met early in the morning at the summons of the public crier, generally in the Pnyx, a place near the citadel, so called *δια τὸ πεπικνωσθαι τοῖς λίθοις*, ἢ ταῖς καθέδραις ἢ *δια τὸ πεπικνωσθαι ἐν αὐτῇ τοῖς βουλευταῖς*, because it was filled with stones, or seats close together, or from the crowds of men in the assemblies. At the second summons they were compelled to attend. For then the proper officers ran along the forum with a rope stretched across, and rubbed over with vermillion, and all upon whom a mark was found were fined: but those who attended early and regularly, and who generally amounted to five or six thousand, received half a drachma each.

The assembly opened with the sacrifice of a young pig to Ceres, the blood of which was sprinkled round for a purification. A prayer was then pronounced aloud by the crier for the prosperity of the state, after which a curse on every citizen who did any thing to the prejudice of his country; they then proceeded to business.

“ they seek conferreth profit; or if not so, yet is not prejudicial at
 “ least, to those that are to grant it: and next, that they will be con-
 “ stantly thankful for the same. And if they cannot do this, then
 “ not to take it ill, though their suit be rejected. And the Corcy-
 “ ræans being fully persuaded that they can make all this appear on
 “ their own parts, have therefore sent us hither, desiring you to as-
 “ cribe them to the number of your confederates. Now so it is, that
 “ we have had a custom, both unreasonable in respect of our suit to
 “ you, and also for the present unprofitable to our own estate. For,
 “ having ever till now, been unwilling to admit others into league
 “ with us, we are now not only suitors for league to others, but also
 “ left destitute by that means of friends in this our war with the Co-
 “ rinthians. And that which before we thought wisdom, namely, not
 “ to enter into league with others, because we would not at the dis-
 “ cretion of others enter into danger, we now find to have been our
 “ weakness and imprudence. Wherefore, though alone we repulsed
 “ the Corinthians, in the late battle by sea, yet since they are set to
 “ invade us with greater preparation out of Peloponnesus, and the rest
 “ of Greece; and seeing with our own single power we are not able
 “ to go through; and since also the danger, in case they subdue us,
 “ would be very great to all Greece, it is both necessary that we seek
 “ the succours both of you and whomsoever else we can; and we are
 “ also to be pardoned, though we make bold to cross our former
 “ custom of not having to do with other men, proceeding not from
 “ malice, but error of judgment.

XXXIII. “ Now if you yield unto us in what we request,
 “ this coincidence on our part of need, will on your part be
 “ honourable, for many reasons. First, in this respect, that you
 “ lend your help to such as have suffered, and not to such as have
 “ committed the injustice. And next, considering that you receive
 “ into league such as have at stake their whole fortune, you shall so
 “ place your benefit, as to have a testimony of it, if ever any can be
 “ so indelible. Besides this, the greatest navy but your own, is ours:
 “ consider then, what rarer hap, and of greater grief to your enemies
 “ can befall you, than that that power which you would have prized
 “ above any money or other requital, should come voluntarily, and
 “ without all danger or cost present itself to your hands; bringing
 “ with it reputation amongst most men, a grateful mind from those
 “ you defend, and strength to yourselves. All which have not hap-
 “ pened to many at once. And few there be of those that sue for
 “ league, that come not rather to receive strength and reputation, than
 “ to confer it. If any here think that the war wherein we may do
 “ you service will not take place, he is in an error, and sees not how
 “ the Lacedæmonians through fear of you, are already in labour of
 “ the war; and that the Corinthians, gracious with them, and enemies
 “ to you, making way for their enterprize, assault us now, in the way
 “ to the invasion of you hereafter, that we may not stand amongst the
 “ rest of their common enemies, but that they may be sure before-
 “ hand, either to weaken us, or to strengthen their own estate. It
 “ must therefore be your part, we offering, and you accepting the

“ league, to begin with them, and to anticipate plotting, rather than to counterplot against them.¹

XXXIV. “ If they object injustice, in that you receive their colony, henceforth let them learn, that all colonies, so long as they receive no wrong from their mother city, so long they honour her; but when they suffer injury from her, they then become alienate; for they are not sent out to be the slaves of them that stay, but to be their equals. That they have done us the injury, is manifest; for when we offered them a judicial trial of the controversy touching Epidamnus, they chose to prosecute their quarrel rather by arms than judgment. Now let that which they have done unto us who are their kindred, serve you for some argument, not to be seduced by their demands, and made their instruments before you be aware. For he lives most secure that hath fewest benefits bestowed by him upon his enemies to repent of.

XXXV. “ As for the articles between you and the Lacedæmonians,² they are not broken by receiving us into your league, because we are in league with neither party. For there, it is said, that whosoever is confederate of neither party, may have access lawfully to either. And sure it were very unreasonable, that the Corinthians should have the liberty to man their fleet out of the cities comprised in the league, and out of any other parts of Greece, and not the least out of places in your dominion; and we be denied both the league now propounded, and also all other help from whencesoever. And if they impute it to you as a fault that you grant our request, we shall take it for a greater that you grant it not. For therein you shall reject us that are invaded, and be none of your enemies; and them who are your enemies and make the invasion, you shall not only not oppose, but also suffer to raise unlawful forces in your dominions; whereas you ought in truth, either not to suffer them to take up mercenaries in your states, or else to send us succours also, in such manner as you shall think good yourselves; but especially by taking us into your league, and so aiding us. Many commodities, as we said in the beginning, we shew unto you, but this for the greatest, that whereas they are your enemies,³ (which is manifest enough) and not weak ones, but able to hurt those that stand up against them, we offer you a naval, not a terrestrial league; and the want of one of these, is not as the want of the other; nay, rather your principal aim, if it could be done, should be, to let none at all have shipping but yourselves; or, at least, if that cannot be, to make such your friends, as are best furnished therewith.

XXXVI. “ If any man now think thus, that what we have spoken is indeed profitable, but fears, if it were admitted, the league were thereby broken, let that man consider, that his fear joined with

¹ ἡμίτερον δ' αὖ ἔργον, Bekker. ὑμίτερον δέ γ' αὖ ἔργον, Duker. It is our part, therefore, to be beforehand, since we give and you accept the alliance, and rather to be the first to plot against them, than to counterplot against them.

² The thirty years' truce entered into between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians.

³ ὅτι οἱ τε αὐτοὶ πολέμοι ἡμῖν ἦσαν, Bekker. ὑμῖν, Duker. Because they are enemies to us.

“ strength, will make his enemies fear ; and his confidence, having (if
 “ he rejects us) so much the less strength, will so much the less be
 “ feared. Let him also remember, that he is now in consultation, no
 “ less concerning Athens than Corcyra ; wherein he forecasteth none
 “ of the best (considering the present estate of affairs) that makes a
 “ question, whether against a war at hand, and only not already on
 “ foot, he should join unto it, or not, that city which with most impor-
 “ tant advantages, or disadvantages, will be friend or enemy. For it
 “ lieth so conveniently for sailing to Italy and Sicily, that it can both
 “ prohibit any fleet coming to Peloponnesus from thence, and convoy
 “ any coming from Peloponnesus thither ; and is also for divers other
 “ uses most commodious. And to comprehend all in brief, consider
 “ whether we are to be abandoned or not by this. For Greece having
 “ but three navies of any account, yours, ours, and that of Corinth, if
 “ you suffer the other two to join in one, by letting the Corinthians
 “ first seize us, you shall have to fight by sea at one time, both
 “ against the Corcyræans and the Peloponnesians ; whereas by
 “ making league with us, you shall with your fleet augmented, have
 “ to deal against the Peloponnesians alone.”

Thus spake the Corcyræans ; and after them the Corinthians thus :

Oration of the Ambassadors of Corinth.

XXXVII. “ The Corcyræans in their oration having made men-
 “ tion not only of your taking them into league, but also, that they are
 “ wronged, and unjustly warred on ; it is also necessary for us first to
 “ answer concerning both those points, and then afterwards to proceed
 “ to the rest of what we have to say, to the end you may foreknow
 “ that ours are the safest demands for you to embrace, and that you
 “ may upon reason reject the needy estate of those others. Whereas
 “ they allege in defence of their refusing to enter league with other
 “ cities, that the same hath proceeded from modesty ; the truth is,
 “ that they took up that custom, not from any virtue, but mere wick-
 “ edness ; as being unwilling to call any confederate for a witness of
 “ their evil actions, and to be put to blush by calling them. Besides,
 “ their city being by situation sufficient within itself, giveth them this
 “ point, that when they do any man a wrong, they themselves are the
 “ judges of the same, and not men appointed by consent. For going
 “ seldom forth against other nations, they intercept such, as by neces-
 “ sity are driven into their harbour. And in this consisteth their
 “ goodly pretext for not admitting confederates ; not because they
 “ would not be content to accompany others in doing evil, but because
 “ they had rather do it alone ; that where they were too strong, they
 “ might oppress ; and when there should be none to observe them, the
 “ less of the profit might be shared from them, and that they might
 “ escape the shame when they took any thing. But if they had been
 “ honest men, (as they themselves say they are) by how much the
 “ less they are obnoxious to accusation, so much the more means they
 “ have, by giving and taking what is due, to make their honesty
 “ appear.

XXXVIII. “ But they are not such, neither towards others, nor

“ towards us. For being our colony, they have not only been ever in
 “ revolt, but now they also make war upon us, and say they were not
 “ sent out to be injured by us; but we say again, that we did not
 “ send them forth to be scorned by them, but to have the leading of
 “ them, and to be regarded by them, as is fit. For our other colonies
 “ both honour and love us much, which is an argument, seeing the
 “ rest are pleased with our actions, that these have no just cause to
 “ be offended alone; and that without some manifest wrong, we
 “ should not have had colour to war against them.¹ But say we had
 “ been in an error, it had been well done in them, to have given way
 “ to our passion, as it had been also dishonourable in us to have in-
 “ sulted over their modesty. But through pride and wealth they have
 “ done us wrong, both in many other things, and also in this; that
 “ Epidamnus being ours, which whilst it was vexed with wars, they
 “ never claimed; as soon as we came to relieve it, was forcibly seized
 “ by them, and so holden.

XXXIX. “ They say now, that before they took it, they offered
 “ to put the cause to trial of judgment:² but you are not to think that
 “ such a one will stand to judgment as hath advantage, and is sure
 “ already of what he offereth to plead for; but rather he that before
 “ the trial will admit equality in the matter itself, as well as in the
 “ pleading: whereas contrarily these men offered not this specious
 “ pretence of a judicial trial, before they had besieged the city, but
 “ after, when they saw we meant not to put it up. And now hither
 “ they come, not content to have been faulty in that business them-
 “ selves, but to get you into their confederacy; no, but into their
 “ conspiracy: and to receive them in this name, that they are enemies
 “ to us. But they should have come to you then, when they were
 “ most in safety; not now, when we have the wrong, and they the
 “ danger; and when you that never partook of their power, must
 “ impart unto them of your aid; and having been free from their
 “ faults, must have an equal share from us of the blame. They should
 “ communicate their power before-hand, that mean to make common
 “ the issue of the same; and they that share not in the crimes, ought
 “ also to have no part in the sequel of them.

XL. “ Thus it appears that we come, for our parts, with arguments
 “ of equity and right;³ whereas the proceedings of these other are
 “ nothing else but violence and rapine. And now we shall shew you
 “ likewise, that you cannot receive them in point of justice. For

¹ ἐπιστρατεύομεν, Bekker. ἐπιστρα-
 τεύομεν, Duker. Nor do we make
 war upon them with a good pretence,
 unless we have received some manifest
 injury.

² λέγειν τι δοκεῖν δεῖ, Bekker. λέγειν
 τι, δοκεῖν δεῖ τηρεῖν, Duker. They say,
 indeed, that they wished before they took
 it, that it should be determined by trial,
 with respect to which we must not think,
 that he who has the advantage, and
 who challenges in a safe cause, says any

thing. In Bekker this section ends
 with τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα ἔχειν: the next
 line and a half in the old editions is al-
 together omitted by Bekker.

³ Ὡς μὲν οὖν αὐτοὶ τε μετὰ προσ-
 ηκόντων ἰγκλημάτων ἱρχόμεθα, Bekker.
 Ὡς μὲν οὖν αὐτοὶ τε μετὰ προσηκόντων
 τῶν τοῦ δικαίου κεφαλαίων ἐς ὑμᾶς ἱρ-
 χόμεθα, Duker. It is manifest then
 that we come with fitting accusations,
 but they are violent, and desirous of
 getting more than their right.

“ although it be in the articles, that the cities written with neither of the parties, may come into either of them they please; yet it holds not for such as do so, to the detriment of either; but only for those that having revolted from neither part, want protection, and bring not a war with them instead of peace to those (if they be wise) that receive them. For you shall not only be auxiliaries unto these; but to us, instead of confederates, enemies. For if you go with them, it follows, they must defend themselves, not without you. You should act most uprightly by standing out of both our ways; and if not, then by taking our parts against the Corcyræans, for between the Corinthians and you there are articles of peace, but with the Corcyræans you never had so much as a truce, and not to constitute a new law of receiving one another's rebels. For neither did we give our votes against you, when the Samians revolted, though the rest of Peloponnesus was divided in opinion: but plainly alleged, that it was reason that every one should have liberty to proceed against their own revolting confederates. And if you shall once receive and aid the doers of wrong, it will be seen, that they will come over as fast from you to us; and you will set up a law, not so much against us as against yourselves.

XLI. “ These are the points of justice we had to shew you, conformable to the law of the Grecians. And now we come to matter of advice, and claim of favour; which (being not so much your enemies as to hurt you, nor such friends as to surcharge you) we say, ought on the present occasion, to be granted us by way of requital: for when you had want of long barks against the Æginetæ, a little before the Medan war,¹ you had twenty lent unto you by the Corinthians; which benefit of ours, and that other against the Samians, when by us it was that the Peloponnesians did not aid them, was the cause both of your victory against the Æginetæ, and of the punishment of the Samians. And these things were done for you in a season, when men going to fight against their enemies, neglect all respects but of victory. For even a man's domestic affairs are ordered the worse through eagerness of present contention.

XLII. “ Which benefits considering, and the younger sort taking notice of them from the elder, be you pleased now to defend us in the like manner. And have not this thought, that though in what we have spoken there be equity, yet if the war should arise, the profit would be found in the contrary. For utility followeth those actions most wherewith we do the least wrong; besides that, the likelihood of the war, wherewith the Corcyræans frightening you, go about to draw you to injustice, is yet obscure, and not worthy to move you to a manifest and present hostility with the Corinthians; but it were rather fit for you indeed to take away our former jealousies concerning the Megareans.² For the last good turn done in season, though but small, is able to cancel an accusation of much

¹ The war concerning the statues.—Corinthians by the Athenians that aided See Herod. v. 85. Megara, is related afterwards in this

² This which was done against the first Book, chap. 105.

“ greater moment. Neither suffer yourselves to be drawn on, by the
 “ greatness of the navy which now shall be at your service, by this
 “ league ; for to do no injury to our equals, is a firmer power than that
 “ addition of strength, which (puffed up with present shews) men are to
 “ acquire with danger.

XLIII. “ And since we be come to this, which once before we
 “ said at Lacedæmon, that every one ought to proceed, as he shall
 “ think good, against his own confederates, we claim that liberty now
 “ of you ; and that you who have been helped by our votes, will not
 “ hurt us now by yours, but render like for like ; remembering that
 “ now is that occasion, wherein he that aideth us, is our greatest
 “ friend ; and he that opposeth us, our greatest enemy. And that
 “ you will not receive these Corcyræans into league against our wills,
 “ nor defend them in their injuries.¹ These things if you grant us, you
 “ shall both do as is fit, and also advise the best for the good of your
 “ own affairs.”

This was the effect of what was spoken by the Corinthians.

XLIV. Both sides having been heard, and the Athenian people
 twice assembled ; in the former assembly they approved no less of the
 reasons of the Corinthians than of the Corcyræans ; but in the latter,
 they changed their minds ; not so, as to make a league with the Cor-
 cyræans both offensive and defensive, that the friends and enemies of
 the one, should be so of the other, (for then if the Corcyræans should
 have required them to go against Corinth, the peace had been broken
 with the Peloponnesians) but made it only defensive, that if any one
 should invade Corcyra or Athens, or any of their confederates, they
 were then mutually to assist one another. For they expected, that
 even thus they should grow to war with the Peloponnesians, and were
 therefore unwilling to let Corcyra, that had so great a navy, fall into
 the hands of the Corinthians ; but rather, as much as in them lay, de-
 sired to break them one against another ; that if need required, they
 might have to do with the Corinthians and others that had shipping,
 when they should be weakened to their hands. And the island seemed
 also to lie conveniently for passing into Italy and Sicily.

XLV. With this mind the people of Athens received the Corcy-
 ræans into league ; and when the Corinthians were gone, sent ten gal-
 leys not long after to their aid. The commanders of them were Lace-
 dæmonius, the son of Cimon ; Diotimus, the son of Strombichus ; and
 Proteas, the son of Epicles ; and had orders not to fight with the Co-
 rinthians unless they invaded Corcyra, or offered to land there, or in
 some other place of theirs. Which if they did, then with all their
 might to oppose them. This they forbade because they would not
 break the peace concluded with the Peloponnesians. So these galleys
 arrived at Corcyra.

XLVI. The Corinthians, when they were ready, made towards
 Corcyra with a hundred and fifty sail, viz. of the Eleans ten, of the

¹ δέχεσθε—ἀμύνετε, Bekker. δέχθητε—ἀμύνετε, Duker. And do not receive our will, nor defend them in their in-
 these Corcyræans as your allies against juries.

Megareans twelve, of the Leucadians ten, of the Ambraciotes twenty-seven, of the Anactorians one, and ninety of their own. The commanders of these were men chosen out of the said several cities, for the several parts of the fleet which they sent in; and over those of Corinth, was Xenocleides, the son of Euthycles, with four others. After they were all come together, upon the coast of the continent over against Corcyra, they sailed from Leucas and came to Cheimerium, in the country of Thesprotis. In this place is a haven, and above it, farther from the sea, the city of Ephyre, in that part of Thesprotis, which is called Elæatis; and near unto it, disbogueth into the sea the lake Acherusia, and into that (having first passed through Thesprotis) the river Acheron, from which it taketh the name. Also the river Thyamis runneth here, which divides Thesprotis from Cestrine,¹ betwixt which two rivers, ariseth this promontory of Cheimerium. To this part of the continent came the Corinthians and encamped.

XLVII. The Corcyræans, understanding that they made against them, having ready a hundred and ten galleys under the conduct of Miciades, Æsimides, and Eurybatus, came and encamped in one of the islands called Sybota. And the ten galleys of Athens were also with them. But their land forces staid in the promontory of Leucimna, and with them a thousand men of arms of the Zacynthians that came to aid them. The Corinthians also had in the continent the aids of many Barbarians, which in those quarters have been evermore their friends.

XLVIII. The Corinthians, after they were ready, and had taken aboard three days' provision of victual, put off by night from Cheimerium intending to fight; and about break of day, as they were sailing, descried the galleys of the Corcyræans, which were also put off from Sybota, and coming on to fight with the Corinthians. As soon as they had sight one of another, they put themselves into order of battle. In the right wing² of the Corcyræans were placed the galleys of Athens; and the rest being their own were divided into three commands under the three commanders, one under each. This was the order of the Corcyræans. The Corinthians had in their right wing the galleys of Megara, and of Ambracia; in the middle, other their confederates in order; and opposite to the Athenians, and right wing of the Corcyræans, they were themselves placed with such galleys as were the best sailers, in the left.

XLIX. The standard³ being on either side lifted up, they joined battle, having on both parts both many men of arms, and many archers and slingers, but after the old fashion, as yet somewhat unskilfully appointed. The battle was not so artificially as cruelly fought, near unto the manner of a fight at land. For after they had once run their galleys up close aboard one of another, they could not for the number and throng be easily separated again, but relied for the victory especi-

¹ Cestrine, the territory of Cestria, the middlemost; the left wing, by part of Chaonia. those on the left.

² *Kîpas*, the galleys stood all one by one in a row; the right wing was formed by those on the right hand of ³ *Σημεία*, pictures or images held up, as the eagle amongst the Romans.

ally upon their men of arms, who fought where they stood, whilst their galleys remained altogether without motion. Passages through each other they made none, but fought it out with courage and strength, rather than with skill; insomuch as the battle was in every part not without much tumult and disorder. In which the Athenian galleys being always at hand where the Corcyræans were oppressed, kept the enemy in fear, but yet began no assault, because their commanders stood in awe of the prohibition of the Athenian people. The right wing of the Corinthians was in the greatest distress, for the Corcyræans with twenty galleys had made them turn their backs, and chased them dispersed to the continent; and sailing to their very camp, went on land, burnt their abandoned tents, and took away their baggage; so that in this part the Corinthians and their confederates were vanquished, and the Corcyræans had the victory. But in the left wing, where the Corinthians were themselves, they were far superior; because the Corcyræans had twenty galleys of their number, which was at first less than that of the Corinthians, absent in the chase of the enemy. And the Athenians, when they saw the Corcyræans were in distress, now aided them manifestly, whereas before they had abstained from making assault upon any. But when once they fled outright, and the Corinthians lay sore upon them, then every one fell to the business, without making difference any longer: and it came at last to this necessity, that they engaged one another, Corinthians and Athenians.

L. The Corinthians, when their enemies fled, staid not to fasten the hulls of the galleys they had sunk unto their own galleys, that so they might tow them after; but made after the men, rowing up and down to kill rather than to take alive; and through ignorance (not knowing that their right wing had been discomfited) slew also some of their own friends. For the galleys of either side being many, and taking up a large space of sea, after they were once in the medley they could not easily discern who were of the victors, and who of the vanquished party. For this was the greatest naval battle, for number of ships, that ever had been before, of Grecians against Grecians. When the Corinthians had chased the Corcyræans to the shore, they returned to take up the broken galleys and bodies of their dead, which for the greatest part they recovered and brought to Sybota, where also lay the land forces of the Barbarians that were come to aid them. This Sybota is a desert haven of Thesprotis. When they had done, they re-united themselves and made again to the Corcyræans; and they likewise with such galleys as they had fit for the sea, remaining of the former battle, together with those of Athens, put forth to meet them, fearing lest they should attempt to land upon their territory. By this time the day was far spent, and the song,¹ which they used to sing when they came to charge, was ended, when suddenly the Corinthians began to row astern:² for they had descried twenty Athenian

¹ Pæan, a hymn to Mars in the beginning of a fight: to Apollo after the victory.

² Πρύμναν ἐκρούοντο. Literally, they knocked the hind deck; a phrase elegantly applied by Thucydides to those

galleys sent from Athens to second the former ten, for fear lest the Corcyraeans (as it also fell out) should be overcome, and those ten galleys of theirs be too few to defend them.

LI. When the Corinthians therefore had sight of these galleys, suspecting that they were of Athens, and more in number than they were, by little and little they fell off.¹ But the Corcyraeans (because the course of these galleys was unto them more out of sight²) descried them not, but wondered why the Corinthians rowed astern, till at last some that saw them said they were enemies, and then retired also the Corcyraeans. For by this time it was dark, and the Corinthians had turned about the heads of their galleys, and dissolved themselves. And thus were they parted, and the battle ended in night. The Corcyraeans lying at Leucimna, these twenty Athenian galleys, under the command of Glaucon, the son of Leager, and Andocides, the son of Leogorus, passing through the midst of the floating carcasses and wreck, soon after they were descried, arrived at the camp of the Corcyraeans, in Leucimna. The Corcyraeans at first, (being night) were afraid they had been enemies, but knew them afterwards; so they anchored there.

LII. The next day, both the thirty galleys of Athens, and as many of Corcyra as were fit for service, went to the haven in Sybota, where the Corinthians lay at anchor, to see if they would fight. But the Corinthians, when they had put off from the land, and arranged themselves in the wide sea, stood quiet, not meaning of their own accord to begin the battle; both because they saw the supply of fresh galleys from Athens, and that many difficulties happened to them, both about the safe custody of their prisoners aboard, and also because being in a desert place, their galleys were not yet repaired; but rather took thought how to go home, lest the Athenians, having the peace already broken, in that they had fought against each other, should not suffer them to depart.

LIII. They therefore thought good to send before to the Athenians certain men, without privilege of heralds, to sound them, and to say in this manner:

“Men of Athens, Ye act unjustly in beginning the war, and violating the articles: for whereas we go about to right us on our enemies, ye stand in our way, and bear arms against us. If therefore ye be resolved to hinder our going against Corcyra, or what place else we please, dissolve the peace, and laying hands first upon us that are here, use us as enemies.”—Thus said they: and the Corcyraeans, as many of the army as heard them, cried out immediately to take and kill them. But the Athenians made answer thus: “Men

that retreat fighting, and still facing their enemies. It was done by running their ships backwards upon their hind decks so as to tack about.—ὡς ἐς ἐπίπλουν, Bekker. ὡς ἐπίπλουν, Duker. But it was now late, and the Pæan was sounded by them, as if for an attack, when the Corinthians sud-

denly began to row astern.

¹ ὑπανεχώρουν, Bekker. ἱπανεχώρουν, Duker. But they retreated by degrees, suspecting that there were from Athens not as many as they saw, but more.

² (viz.) More behind their backs, (ἐπίπλεον γὰρ μᾶλλον ἐκ τοῦ ἀφανοῦς.)

“ of Peloponnesus, neither do we begin the war, nor break the peace ;
 “ but we bring aid to these our confederates, the Corcyræans ; if you
 “ please therefore to go any where else, we hinder you not ; but if
 “ against Corcyra, or any place belonging to it, we will not suffer you.”

LIV. When the Athenians had given this answer, the Corinthians made ready to go home, and set up a trophy in Sybota of the continent. And the Corcyræans also, both took up the wreck, and the dead bodies, which carried every way by the waves and the wind that arose the night before, came driving to their hands ; and, as if they had had the victory, set up a trophy likewise in Sybota of the islands. The victory was thus challenged on both sides, on these grounds : the Corinthians set up a trophy, because in the battle they had the better all day, having got more of the wreck and dead bodies than the other, and taken no less than a thousand prisoners, and sunk about seventy galleys. And the Corcyræans set up a trophy, because they had sunk thirty galleys of the Corinthians, and had after the arrival of the Athenians, recovered the wreck and dead bodies that drove to them by the wind : and because the day before, on sight of the Athenians, the Corinthians had rowed astern, and gone away from them : and lastly, because when they went to Sybota the Corinthians came not out to encounter them. Thus each side claimed victory.

LV. The Corinthians in their way homeward, by deceit took Anactorium, seated in the mouth of the gulf of Ambracia, (which was common to them, and to the Corcyræans) and having put into it Corinthians only departed and went home. Of the Corcyræans eight hundred that were servants were sold, and two hundred and fifty kept prisoners, whom they used with much favour, that they might be a mean, at their return, of bringing Corcyra into the power of the Corinthians, the greatest part of these being principal men of the city. And thus was Corcyra delivered of the war of Corinth, and the Athenian galleys went from them. This was the first cause that the Corinthians had of war against the Athenians ; namely, because they had taken part with the Corcyræans in a battle by sea, against the Corinthians, with whom they were comprised in the same articles of peace.

LVI. Presently after this, it came to pass, that other differences arose between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians to induce the war. For whilst the Corinthians studied to be revenged, the Athenians, who had their hatred in jealousy, commanded the citizens of Potidæa,¹ a city seated in the isthmus of Pallene, a colony of the Corinthians, but confederate and tributary to the Athenians, to pull down that part of the wall of their city that stood towards Pallene, and to give them hostages, and also to send away, and no more receive the Epidemiurgi, [magistrates so called] which were sent unto them year by year from Corinth ; fearing, lest through the persuasion of Perdiccas,² and of the Corinthians, they should revolt, and draw to revolt with them their other confederates in Thrace.

¹ Afterwards Cassandria, taken from the Athenians by Philip of Macedon.—
 See Demost. Olynth.

² King of Macedonia.

LVII. These things against the Potidæans the Athenians had pre-contrived, presently after the naval battle fought at Corcyra. For the Corinthians and they were now manifestly at difference; and Perdiccas, who before had been their confederate and friend, now warred upon them. And the cause why he did so was, that when his brother Philip and Derdas joined in arms against him, the Athenians had made a league with them. And therefore being afraid, he both sent to Lacedæmon to negotiate the Peloponnesian war, and also reconciled himself to the Corinthians, the better to procure the revolt of Potidæa; and likewise he practised with the Chalcideans of Thrace, and with the Bottiæans, to revolt with them. For if he could make these confining cities his confederates, with the help of them he thought his war would be the easier. Which the Athenians perceiving, and intending to prevent the revolt of these cities, gave order to the commanders of the fleet, (for they were now sending thirty galleys, with a thousand men of arms under the command of Archestratus, the son of Lycomedes, and ten others, into the territories of Perdiccas) both to receive hostages of the Potidæans, and to demolish their walls; and also to have an eye to the neighbouring cities, that they revolted not.

LVIII. The Potidæans having sent ambassadors to Athens, to try if they could persuade the people not to make any alteration amongst them; by other ambassadors, whom they sent along with the ambassadors of Corinth to Lacedæmon, dealt with the Lacedæmonians at the same time, if need required, to be ready to revenge their quarrel. When after long solicitation at Athens, and no good done, the fleet was sent away against them, no less than against Macedonia; and when the magistrates of Lacedæmon had promised them, if the Athenians went to Potidæa to invade Attica, then at last they revolted, and, together with them the Chalcideans, and Bottiæans, all mutually sworn in the same conspiracy. For Perdiccas had also persuaded the Chalcideans to abandon and pull down their maritime towns, and to go up and dwell at Olynthus,¹ and that one city to make strong: and to those that removed, gave part of his own, and part of the territory of Mygdonia, about the lake Bolbe, to live on, so long as the war against the Athenians should continue. So when they had demolished their cities, and were gone up higher into the country, they prepared themselves for the war.

LIX. The Athenian galleys, when they arrived in Thrace, found Potidæa and the other cities already revolted. And the commanders of the fleet conceiving it to be impossible with their present forces to make war both against Perdiccas and the towns revolted, set sail again for Macedonia, against which they had been at first sent out, and there staying, joined with Philip and the brothers of Derdas, that had invaded the country from above.

LX. In the mean time, after Potidæa was revolted, and whilst the Athenian fleet lay on the coast of Macedonia, the Corinthians, fearing what might become of the city, and making the danger their own, sent

¹ Olynthus, a celebrated town of Macedonia, on the isthmus of the peninsula of Pallene.

unto it, both of their own city and of other Peloponnesians, which they hired to the number of a thousand and six hundred men of arms,¹ and four hundred light armed. The charge of these was given to Aristeus, the son of Adimantus, for whose sake most of the voluntaries of Corinth went the voyage: for he had been ever a great favourer of the Potidæans, and they arrived in Thrace forty days after the revolt in Potidæa.

LXI. The news of the revolt of these cities, was likewise quickly brought to the Athenian people; who hearing withal of the forces sent unto them under Aristeus, sent forth against the places revolted two thousand men of arms and forty galleys, under the conduct of Callias, the son of Calliades. These coming first into Macedonia, found there the former thousand, (who by this time had taken Therme,² and were now besieging the city of Pydna,) and staying, helped for a while to besiege it with the rest. But shortly after they took composition, and having made a necessary³ league with Perdiccas, (urged thereto by the affairs of Potidæa, and the arrival there of Aristeus) departed from Macedonia. Thence coming to Berrhæa, they attempted to take it; but when they could not do it, they turned back, and marched towards Potidæa by land. They were of their own number three thousand men of arms, besides many of their confederates; and of Macedonians that had served with Philip and Pausanias, six hundred horsemen. And their galleys seventy in number, sailing by them along the coast, by moderate journeys came in three days to Gignonus,⁴ and there encamped.

LXII. The Potidæans and the Peloponnesians under Aristeus, in expectation of the coming of the Athenians, lay now encamped in the isthmus near to Olynthus, and had the market kept for them without the city; the leading of the foot the confederates had assigned to Aristeus, and of the horse to Perdiccas; for he fell off again presently from the Athenians, and having left Iolaus governor in his place, took part with the Potidæans. The purpose of Aristeus was to have the body of the army with himself within the isthmus,⁵ therewith to attend the coming on of the Athenians, and to have the Chalcideans and their confederates without the isthmus, and also the two hundred horse under Perdiccas, to stay in Olynthus, and when the Athenians were passed by, to come on their backs, and enclose the enemy betwixt them. But Callias, the Athenian general, and the others in commission with him, sent out before them their Macedonian horsemen, and some few of their confederates to Olynthus, to stop those within from making any sally from the town, and then dislodging, marched on towards Potidæa. When they were come as far as the isthmus, and saw the enemy make ready to fight, they also

¹ The *heavy-armed*, ὀπλίται, wore a complete suit of armour, and engaged with broad shields, and long spears. The *light-armed*, ψιλοί, were designed for skirmishes and fighting at a distance. Their weapons were arrows, slings, or darts.

² Afterwards Thessalonica, and now Salonichi.

³ Or scarcely honourable; *εὐμμεχίαν ἀναγκαίαν*.

⁴ Between Macedonia and Thrace, not far from Potidæa.

⁵ Of Pallene, where they were.

did the like, and not long after joined battle. That wing wherein was Aristeus himself, with the chosen men of the Corinthians and others, put to flight that part of their enemies that stood opposite to them, and followed execution a great way. But the rest of the army of the Potidæans and Peloponnesians were defeated by the Athenians, and fled into the city.

LXIII. And Aristeus, when he came back from the execution, was in doubt what way to take, to Olynthus, or to Potidæa.¹ At last he resolved on the shortest way, and with his soldiers about him, ran as hard as he was able into Potidæa, and with much ado got in at the pier through the sea, cruelly shot at, with the loss of a few, but safety of the greatest part of his company. As soon as the battle began, they that should have seconded the Potidæans from Olynthus, (for it is at most but sixty furlongs² off, and in sight) advanced a little way to their aid; and the Macedonian horse opposed themselves likewise in order of battle to keep them back. But the Athenians having quickly gotten the victory, and the standards³ being taken down, they retired again, they of Olynthus to that city, the Macedonian horsemen to the army of the Athenians. So that neither side had their cavalry at the battle. After the battle, the Athenians erected a trophy, and gave truce to the Potidæans for the taking up of their dead. Of the Potidæans and their friends there died somewhat less than three hundred, and of the Athenians themselves one hundred and fifty, with Callias, one of their commanders.

LXIV. Presently on this the Athenians raised a wall before the city, on the part toward the isthmus, which they kept with a garrison, but the part towards Pallene they left unwall'd; for they thought themselves too small a number both to keep a guard in the isthmus, and to go over and fortify in Pallene, fearing lest the Potidæans and their confederates should assault them when they were divided. When the people of Athens understood that Potidæa was unwall'd on the part toward Pallene, not long after they sent thither one thousand and six hundred armed men, under the conduct of Phormio, the son of Asopius, who arriving in Pallene, left his galleys at Aphytis, and marching easily to Potidæa, wasted the territory as he passed through. And when none came out to bid him battle, he raised a wall before the city, on that part also that looks towards Pallene. Thus was Potidæa on both sides strongly besieged; and also from the sea, by the Athenian galleys that came up and lay before it.

LXV. Aristeus seeing the city enclosed on every side, and without hope of safety, save what might come from Peloponnesus, or some other unexpected way, gave advice to all but five hundred, taking the

¹ ὡς ὁρᾷ τὸ ἄλλο στρατεύμα, Bekker, ὡς ἐώρα, Duker. And Aristeus retiring from the pursuit, when he saw the other part of the army conquered, doubted which way he should hazard a retreat, whether to Olynthus or to Potidæa.

² About six miles.

³ The elevation of the ensigns was the signal for battle, and they were

kept up while it lasted; the depression of them was a signal to desist, or the consequence of a defeat. The depression in this instance was a proof to the Macedonian cavalry that all was over. The Athenians in their colours bore an owl, as sacred to Minerva, protectress of Athens.

opportunity of a wind, to go out by sea, that the provision might the longer hold out for the rest; and offered himself to be one of those that should remain within. But when his counsel was not followed, being desirous to settle their business, and make the best of their affairs abroad, he got out by sea, unseen by the Athenian guard, and staying amongst the Chalcideans,¹ amongst other actions of the war, laid an ambush before the city of the Hermyliaus, slew many of them, and solicited the sending of aid from Peloponnesus. And Phormio, after the siege laid to Potidæa, having with him his one thousand and six hundred men of arms, wasted Chalcidea and Bottiæa, and some small towns he took in.

LXVI. These were the quarrels between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians.² The Corinthians quarrelled with the Athenians for besieging Potidæa, and in it the men of Corinth and Peloponnesus; the Athenians with the Peloponnesians, for causing their confederate and tributary city to revolt; and for having come hither, and openly fought against them in behalf of Potidæa. Nevertheless the war brake not openly forth as yet, and they still abstained from arms; this being but a particular action of the Corinthians.

LXVII. But when Potidæa was once besieged, both for the sake of those that were within, and also for fear they should lose the place, they could no longer hold; but straightway they procured their confederates to go to Lacedæmon; and thither also they went themselves though not openly by ambassadors, for fear of the Athenians, yet with clamours and accusations against the Athenians, that they had broken the league and wronged the Peloponnesians. The Æginetæ, privily instigated them to the war as much as any; alleging that they were not permitted to govern themselves according to their own laws, as by the articles they ought. So the Lacedæmonians having called together the confederates, and whosoever else had any injustice to lay to the charge of the Athenians, in the ordinary council³ of their own state, commanded them to speak. Then presented every one his accusation, and amongst the rest the Megareans, besides many other great differences, laid open this especially: that contrary to the articles, they were forbidden the Athenian markets and havens. Last of all, the Corinthians, when they had suffered the Lacedæmonians to be incensed first by the rest, came in, and spake as follows:

Oration of the ambassadors of Corinth.

LXVIII. “Men of Lacedæmon, your own fidelity both in matter
“of estate and conversation, makes you the less apt to believe us,

¹ τὰ τε ἄλλα ξυμπολίμει, Bekker. *ιπολίμει*, Duker. And remaining amongst the Chalcideans, he both settled other affairs of war with them, and &c.

² προσεγγίνοντο ἰς ἀλλήλους, Bekker. *προεγγίνοντο*, Duker. These accusations were made in addition by the Athenians and Peloponnesians against one another.

³ Of the Ephori, and those who had

the sovereignty: that is before the aristocracy. The Ephori were in number five, annually elected by the people from their own body, and designed to be checks upon the regal power. The whole administration was lodged in their hands. The kings were only absolute in the field, at the head of the troops.

“ when we accuse others of the contrary. And hereby you gain indeed a reputation of equity, but you have less experience in the affairs of foreign states. For although we have oftentimes foretold you, that the Athenians would do us mischief, yet from time to time when we told it you, you never would take information of it; but have suspected rather, that what we spake proceeded from our own private differences. And you have, therefore, called hither these confederates, not before we had suffered, but now, when the evil is already upon us. Before whom, our speech must be so much the longer, as our objections are the greater, in that we have both by the Athenians been injured, and by you neglected. If the Athenians, lurking in some obscure place, had done these wrongs unto the Grecians, we should then have needed to prove the same before you, as to men that knew it not. But now what cause have we to use long discourse, when you see already that some are brought into servitude, and that they are contriving the like against others, especially against our confederates, and are themselves, in case war should be made against them, long since prepared for it? For otherwise they would never have taken Corcyra, and held it from us by force, nor have besieged Potidæa, whereof the one was most commodious for any action against Thrace, and the other had brought to the Peloponnesians a very great navy.

LXIX. “ And of all this, you are yourselves the authors, in that you suffered them, at the end of the Persian war, to fortify their city, and afterwards to raise their long walls, whereby you have hitherto deprived of their liberty, not only the states by them already subdued, but also your own confederates. For not he that brings into slavery, but he that being able to hinder it, neglects the same, is most truly said to do it: especially if they assume the honour to be the esteemed deliverers of Greece, as you do. And for all that, we are hardly yet come together, and indeed not yet, with any certain resolution what to do. For the question should not have been put, Whether or no we have received injury, but rather, how we are to repair it. For they that do the wrong, having consulted upon it before hand, use no delay at all, but come upon them whom they mean to oppress, whilst they be yet irresolute. And we know, not only that the Athenians have encroached upon their neighbours, but also by what ways they have done it. And as long as they think they carry it closely, through your blindness, they are the less bold. But when they shall perceive that you see and will not see, they will then press us strongly indeed. For, Lacedæmonians, you are the only men of all Greece, that sitting still defend others, not with your forces, but with promises; and you are also the only men that love to pull down the power of the enemy, not when it begins, but when it is doubled. You have, indeed, a report to be sure, but yet it is more in fame than in fact. For we ourselves know, that the Mede came against Peloponnesus from the utmost parts of the earth before you encountered him, as became your state. And also now you connive at the Athenians, who are not as the Medes, far off, but hard at hand; choosing rather to defend yourselves from their

“ invasion than to invade them ; and by having to do with them when
 “ their strength is greater, to put yourselves upon the chance of fortune. And yet we know that the Barbarians’ own error, and, in
 “ our war against the Athenians, their own oversights, more than
 “ your assistance, gave us victory. For the hope of your aid hath
 “ been the destruction of some, who relying on you, made no preparation for themselves by other means. Yet let not any man
 “ think that we speak this out of malice, but only by way of expostulation : for expostulation is with friends that err, but accusation
 “ against enemies that have done an injury.

LXX. “ Besides, if there be any that may challenge to exprobate
 “ his neighbour, we think we may best do it, especially on so great
 “ quarrels as these, whereof you neither seem to have any feeling, nor
 “ to consider what manner of men, and how different from you in
 “ every kind the Athenians are with whom you are to contend. For
 “ they love innovation, and are swift to devise, and also to execute
 “ what they resolve on : you on the contrary are only apt to save
 “ your own ; not devise any thing new, nor scarcely to attain what is
 “ necessary.¹ They again are bold beyond their strength, adventurous
 “ above their reason, and in danger still hope the best : whereas
 “ your actions are ever beneath your power, you distrust even what
 “ your judgment assures, and being in danger, never think to be delivered. They are stirrers, you studiers : they love to be abroad,
 “ and you at home the most of any. For they make account by being
 “ abroad to add to their estate ; you, if you should go forth against
 “ the state of another, would think to impair your own. They, when
 “ they overcome their enemies, advance the farthest, and when they
 “ are overcome by their enemies, fall off the least ; and as for their
 “ bodies, they use them in the service of the commonwealth, as if they
 “ were none of their own ; but their minds, when they would serve
 “ the state, are completely so. Unless they take in hand what they
 “ have once advised on, they account so much lost of their own. And
 “ when they take it in hand, if they obtain any thing, they think
 “ lightly of it, in comparison of what they expect to win by their prosecution. If they fail in any attempt, they do what is necessary
 “ for the present, and enter presently into other hopes. For they
 “ alone, both have and hope for at once, whatsoever they conceive,
 “ through their celerity in execution of what they once resolve on.
 “ And in this manner they labour and toil all their lives : what they
 “ have, they have no leisure to enjoy, for continual getting of more.
 “ Nor holiday esteem they any, but whereon they effect some matter
 “ profitable ; nor think they ease with nothing to do, a less torment
 “ than laborious business. So that in a word, to say they are men
 “ born neither to rest themselves nor suffer others, is to say the truth.

LXXI. “ Now notwithstanding, men of Lacedæmon, that this
 “ city, your adversary, be such as we have said, you still put off

¹ Atheniensium populum fama est tātorem et vix in ea, quibus fīdit incelerem et supra vires audacem esse gradientem. Liv. xlv. 23.
 ad conandum : Lacedæmoniorum cunc-

“time, not knowing that they only for the most part of their time
 “may sit still, who, though they use not their power to do injustice,
 “yet bewray a mind unlikely to swallow injuries; but placing equity
 “belike in this, that you neither do any harm to others, nor receive
 “it in defending of yourselves. But this is a thing you hardly could
 “attain, though the states about you were of the same condition.
 “But (as we have before declared) your customs are, in respect of
 “theirs, antiquated, and of necessity, as it happeneth in arts, the new
 “ones will prevail. True it is, that for a city living for the most
 “part in peace, unchanged customs are the best; but for such as be
 “constrained to undergo many matters, many devices will be needful.
 “Which is also the reason why the Athenian customs through much
 “experience, are more new to you than yours are to them. Here
 “therefore give a period to your slackness, and by a speedy invasion
 “of Attica, as you promised, relieve both Potidæa and the rest, lest
 “otherwise you betray your friends and kindred to their cruelest ene-
 “mies, and lest we and others be driven through despair to seek out
 “some other league. Which to do were no injustice, neither
 “against the gods, judges of men’s oaths, nor against men, the
 “hearers of them: for they do not break the league, who being aban-
 “doned, have recourse to others; but they that yield not their assist-
 “ance to whom they have sworn it. But if you mean to follow the
 “business seriously, we will stay; for else we should do irreligiously,
 “neither should we find any other more conformable to our manners
 “than yourselves. Therefore deliberate well on these points, and take
 “such a course, that Peloponnesus may not, by your leading, fall
 “into worse state than it was left to you by your progenitors.”

LXXII. Thus spake the Corinthians. The Athenian ambassadors, who chanced to be residing in Lacedæmon, upon their business, when they heard of this oration, thought it fit to present themselves before the Lacedæmonians, not to apologize for what they were charged with by the other cities, but to shew in general, that it was not right for them in this case to take any sudden resolution, but further time to consider. They desired to lay open the power of their city, to the elder sort, for a remembrance of what they knew already; and to the younger, for information of what they knew not: supposing that when they should have spoken, they would incline to quietness, rather than to war. And therefore they presented themselves before the Lacedæmonians, saying, that they also, if they might have leave, desired to speak in the assembly, who willed them to come in.¹ And the Athenians going in, spake to this effect:

Oration of the Ambassadors of Athens.

LXXIII. “Though our embassy was not to this end, to argue
 “against our confederates, but about such other affairs as the city was
 “pleased to employ us in; yet having heard of the great exclamation
 “against us, we came into the court, not to make answer to the cri-
 “minations of the cities, (for to plead before you here, were not to

¹ *ἔλθαι*, Bekker. *παρίσθαι*, Duker. And they desired them to come forward.

“ plead before the judges either of them or us) but that you may not
 “ be drawn away, to take the worst resolution, at the persuasion of
 “ the confederates, in matters of so great importance. And withal,
 “ touching the sum of the oration made against us, to inform you, that
 “ what we possess we have it justly, and that our city deserveth re-
 “ putation. But what need we now to speak of matters long past,
 “ confirmed more by hear-say, than by the eyes of those that are to
 “ hear us relate them? But our actions against the Persian, and such
 “ as you yourselves know as well as we, those, though it be tedious
 “ to hear them ever objected, we must of necessity recite. For when
 “ we did them, we hazarded ourselves for some benefit, of which, as
 “ you had your parts in the substance, so must we have ours, if that
 “ be any benefit, in the commemoration; and we shall make recital
 “ of them, not by way of deprecation, but of protestation, and decla-
 “ ration of what a city, in case you take ill advice, you have to enter
 “ the list withal. We therefore say, that we not only first and alone
 “ hazarded battle against the Barbarian at Marathon,¹ but also after-
 “ wards when he came again, being unable to resist him by land, em-
 “ barked ourselves, every man that was able to bear arms, and gave
 “ him battle amongst the rest, by sea at Salamis, which was the cause
 “ that prevented him sailing to Peloponnesus, and laying it waste, city
 “ after city: for against so many galleys you were not able to give
 “ each other mutual succour. And the greatest proof of this is the
 “ Persian himself, who, when his fleet was overcome, and he had no
 “ more such forces, went away in haste with the greatest part of his
 “ army.

LXXIV. “ Which being so, and it being evident that the whole
 “ state of the Grecians was embarked in their fleet, we conferred on
 “ the same the three things of most advantage; the greatest number
 “ of galleys, the most prudent commander, and the most lively cou-
 “ rage. For of four hundred² galleys in all, our own were few less
 “ than two thirds, and for commander, Themistocles; who was the
 “ principal cause that the battle was fought in the strait,³ whereby he
 “ clearly saved the whole business; and whom, though a stranger, you
 “ yourselves have honoured for it, more than any man that came unto
 “ you,⁴ and a forwardness we shewed, more adventurous than any
 “ other in this, that when none of them had aided us by land before,
 “ and the rest of the cities, as far as to our own, were brought into
 “ servitude, we were nevertheless content both to quit our city, and
 “ lose our goods, and even in that estate not to betray the common
 “ cause of the confederates, or divided from them, to be useless; but

¹ The Lacedæmonians were not present at the battle of Marathon, but arrived afterwards on the field. For the reasons which prevented them being present, and their subsequent conduct, see Herod. vi. 106, 120.

² The fleet consisted of three hundred and seventy eight ships, (Herod. viii. 48,) of which the Athenians sent one hundred and eighty. Herod. viii. 44.

³ Of Salamis.

⁴ After the battle of Salamis, the Greeks sailed to the isthmus to bestow the prize on him who had best acquitted himself. When the commanders gave in their billets, each of them had given the preference to himself, but most of them agreed to award the second place to Themistocles; clearly shewing that he deserved best of the states. Envy,

“ to put ourselves into our navy, and undergo the danger with them,
 “ and that without anger against you for not having formerly defended
 “ us in like manner. So that we may say that we have no less con-
 “ ferred a benefit upon you, than received it from you. You came
 “ indeed to aid us, but it was from cities inhabited, and that you
 “ might still keep them so, and when you were afraid, not of our
 “ danger, but your own : whereas we coming from a city no more in
 “ being,¹ and putting ourselves in danger, for a city hopeless ever to
 “ be again, saved both you, in part, and ourselves. But if we had
 “ joined the Persian, fearing, as others² did, to have our territories
 “ wasted ; or afterwards, as men lost, durst not have put ourselves
 “ into our galleys, you must not have fought with him by sea, because
 “ your fleet had been too small,³ but his affairs had succeeded as he
 “ wished.

LXXV. “ Therefore, men of Lacedæmon, we deserve not so great
 “ envy of the Grecians for our courage at that time, and for our pru-
 “ dence, and for the dominion we hold, as we now undergo. Which
 “ dominion we obtained not by violence, but because the confederates,
 “ when you yourselves would not stay out the relics of the war against
 “ the Barbarian, came in, and entreated us to take the command, of
 “ their own accord. So that at first we were forced to advance our
 “ dominion to what it is, from the nature of the thing itself, chiefly for
 “ fear, next for honour, and lastly for profit. For when we had the
 “ envy of many, and had reconquered some that had already revolted,
 “ and seeing you were no more our friends as formerly, but suspected
 “ and quarrelled with us, we held it no longer a safe course, laying
 “ by our power, to put ourselves into your danger ; for the revolts
 “ from us would all have been made to you. Nor is it any fault for
 “ men in danger, to order their affairs for the best.

LXXVI. “ For you also, men of Lacedæmon, have command
 “ over the cities of Peloponnesus, and order them to your best
 “ advantage : and had you,⁴ when the time was, by staying it out,
 “ been envied in your command, as we know well you would have
 “ been no less heavy to the confederates than we, you must have been
 “ constrained to rule imperiously, or to have fallen into danger. So
 “ that, though overcome by three of the greatest things, honour, fear,

however, prevented them from proceeding to a just declaration, and they left the point undecided. Deprived of those rewards which were his due, Themistocles immediately repaired to Lacedæmon, where he was well received. To Euribiades the crown of olive was indeed given, as first in valour ; but on Themistocles, a second crown was bestowed for wisdom : and on his return homewards, he was conducted to the frontier of Tegea by three hundred chosen Spartans,—an honour never known to have been conferred by them before. Herod. viii.

¹ The Athenians, when at the coming

of Xerxes, they betook themselves to their ships, left their city to the Persians, sending their wives and children to Egina, Salamis, and Troezen. Herod. viii.

² The Thebans.

³ They had only ten ships.

⁴ When Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, still following up the Persian war, through his own pride and insolence, drew upon himself the hatred of the confederates to such a degree, that the Lacedæmonians, calling him home, put themselves under the direction of the Athenians. A.C. 476.

“ and profit, we have both accepted the dominion delivered us, and
 “ refuse again to surrender it, we have thereby done nothing to be
 “ wondered at, nor contrary to the manner of men. Nor have we
 “ been the first to do so, but it hath been ever a thing fixed, for the
 “ weaker to be kept under by the stronger. Besides, we took the
 “ government upon us, as esteeming ourselves worthy of the same ;
 “ and of you also so esteemed, till having computed the commodity,
 “ you now fall to allegation of equity : a thing which no man that had
 “ the occasion to achieve any thing by strength, ever so far preferred,
 “ as to divert him from his profit. Those men are worthy of com-
 “ mendation, who following the natural inclination of man, in desiring
 “ rule over others, are juster, than for their power they need.¹ And
 “ therefore if another had our power, we think it would best make our
 “ own moderation appear : and yet our moderation has undeservedly
 “ incurred contempt, rather than commendation.

LXXVII. “ For though in pleas of covenants with our confede-
 rates, when in our own city we have allowed them trial by laws,
 “ equal both to them and us, the judgment hath been given against us,
 “ we have then nevertheless been reputed contentious. None of them
 “ considering that others, who in other places have dominion, and are
 “ toward their subject states less moderate than we, yet are never up-
 “ braided for it ; for they that have the power to compel, need not at
 “ all go to law. And yet these men having been used to converse
 “ with us upon equal terms, if they lose any thing they think they
 “ should not, either by sentence, or by the power of our government,
 “ they are not thankful for the much they retain, but take in worse
 “ part the little they forego, than if at first, laying law aside, we had
 “ openly taken their goods by violence ; for in that kind also they
 “ themselves cannot deny, but the weaker must give way to the
 “ stronger. And men, it seems, are more passionate for injustice than
 “ for violence ; for that coming as from an equal, seems rapine ; and
 “ the other, because from one stronger, but necessity : when they
 “ therefore suffered worse things under the Medes’ dominion, they
 “ bore it, but think ours to be rigorous ; and good reason, for to men
 “ in subjection, the present is ever the worst estate. Insomuch as you
 “ also, if you should put us down and reign yourselves, would soon
 “ find a change of the love, which they bear you now for fear of us,
 “ if you should do again as you² did for a while, when you were their
 “ commanders against the Medes. For not only your own institutions
 “ are different from those of others, but also when any one of you
 “ comes abroad [with charge,] he neither useth those of yours, nor
 “ yet those of the rest of Greece.

LXXVIII. “ Deliberate therefore on this a long time, as of a
 “ matter of great importance ; and do not upon the opinions and crimi-
 “ nations of others, procure your own trouble. Consider before you
 “ enter, how unexpected the chances of war are : for a long war, for

¹ γέγοννται, Bekker. γέγονται, Duker. Who have become juster than they need be on account of their power.

² Meaning the imperious and tyrannical command of Pausanias.

“ the most part, ends in calamity, from which we are equally far off,
 “ and which part it will light on, is to be tried with uncertainty. And
 “ men when they go to war use many times to fall first to action,
 “ which ought to come behind; and when they have already taken
 “ harm, then they fall to reasoning. But since we are neither in such
 “ error ourselves, nor find that you are, we advise you, whilst good
 “ counsel is in both our elections, not to break the peace, nor violate
 “ your oaths; but according to the articles, let the controversy be de-
 “ cided by judgment; or else we call the gods you have sworn by to
 “ witness, that if you begin the war, we will endeavour to revenge
 “ ourselves the same way that you shall walk in before us.”

LXXIX. Thus spake the Athenians. After the Lacedæmonians had heard both the complaints of the confederates against the Athenians, and the Athenians' answer, they put them every one out of the court, and consulted on the business amongst themselves. And the opinions of the greatest part concurred in this, that the Athenians had done unjustly, and ought speedily to be warred on: but Archidamus,¹ their king, a man reputed both wise and temperate, spake as follows:

Oration of Archidamus.

LXXX. “ Men of Lacedæmon, both I myself have the experience
 “ of many wars, and I see you of the same age with me, have the like;
 “ insomuch as you cannot desire this war, either through inexperience,
 “ (as many do,) nor yet as apprehending it to be profitable or safe.
 “ And whosoever shall temperately consider the war we now delibe-
 “ rate on, will find it to be no small one. For though in respect of
 “ the Peloponnesians, and our neighbour states, we have equal
 “ strength, and can quickly be upon them; yet against men, whose
 “ territory is remote, and who are also expert seamen, and with all
 “ other things excellently furnished, as money, both private and pub-
 “ lic, shipping, horses, arms, and number, more than any one part of
 “ Greece, besides, and who have many confederates paying them tri-
 “ bute; against such I say, why should we lightly undertake the war?
 “ And since we are unfurnished, whereon relying, should we make such
 “ haste to it? On our navy? But therein we are too weak. And if
 “ we will provide and prepare against them, it will require time. On
 “ our money? But therein also we are more too weak; for neither
 “ hath the state any, nor will private men readily contribute.

LXXXI. “ But, it may be, some rely on this, that we exceed
 “ them in arms, and multitude of soldiers, so that we may waste their
 “ territories with incursions. But there is much other land under their
 “ dominion, and by sea they are able to bring in whatsoever they shall
 “ stand in need of. Again, if we assay to alienate their confederates,
 “ we must aid them with shipping, because the most of them are
 “ islanders. What a war then will this of ours be? For unless we
 “ have the better of them in shipping, or take from them their revenue
 “ whereby their navy is maintained, we shall do the most hurt to our-

¹ Archidamus II. successor of Le- Zeuxidamus, Zeuxidamus having died
 tyctides, and his grandson by his son the day before his father.

“ selves. And in this case to let fall the war again, will be no honour
 “ for us, when we are chiefly thought to have begun it. As for the
 “ hope, that if we waste their country the war will soon be at an end,
 “ let that never lift us up, for I fear we shall rather transmit it to our
 “ children. For it is likely the Athenians have the spirit not to be
 “ slaves to their earth, nor as men without experience, to be asto-
 “ nished at the war.

LXXXII. “ And yet I do not advise that we should stupidly suf-
 “ fer our confederates to be wronged, and not apprehend the Athe-
 “ nians in their plots against them ; but only not yet to take up arms,
 “ but to send and expostulate with them, making no great shew nei-
 “ ther of war nor of sufferance : and in the mean time to make our
 “ provision, and make friends both of Greeks and Barbarians, such
 “ as in any place we can get, of power either in shipping or money
 “ (nor are they to be blamed, that being laid in wait for, as we are by
 “ the Athenians, take unto them not Greeks only, but also Barbarians
 “ for their safety,) and withal to set forth our own. If they listen to
 “ our ambassadors, best of all ; if not, then two or three years passing
 “ over our heads, being better appointed, we may war upon them if
 “ we will. And when they see our preparation, and hear words that
 “ import no less, they will perhaps relent the sooner, especially having
 “ their grounds unhurt, and consulting upon commodities extant, and
 “ not yet spoiled. For we must think their territory to be nothing but
 “ an hostage, and so much the more, by how much the better hus-
 “ banded. Which we ought therefore to spare as long as we may,
 “ lest making them desperate, we make them also the harder to ex-
 “ pugn. For if unfurnished as we be, at the instigation of the con-
 “ federates, we waste their territory, consider if in so doing we do not
 “ make the war both more dishonourable to the Peloponnesians, and
 “ also more difficult. For though accusations, as well against cities
 “ as private men may be cleared again, a war for the pleasure of some,
 “ taken up by all, the success whereof cannot be foreseen, can hardly
 “ with honour be let fall again.

LXXXIII. “ Now let no man think it cowardice that being many
 “ cities, we go not presently and invade that one city ; for of confede-
 “ rates that bring them in many they have more than we ; and war is
 “ not so much war of arms, as war of money, by means whereof arms
 “ are useful, especially when it is a war of land-men against sea-men.
 “ And, therefore, let us first provide ourselves with money, and not
 “ first raise the war upon the persuasion of the confederates. For we
 “ that must be thought the causes of all events, good or bad, have
 “ also reason to take some leisure in part to foresee them.

LXXXIV. “ As for the slackness and procrastination wherewith
 “ we are reproached by the confederates, be never ashamed of it ; for
 “ the more haste you make to the war, the longer you will be before
 “ you end it, in that you go to it unprovided. Besides, our city hath
 “ been ever free, and well thought of. And this which they object is
 “ rather to be called modesty proceeding upon judgment : for by that
 “ it is that we alone are neither arrogant upon good success, nor
 “ shrink so much as others in adversity. Nor are we, when men pro-

“ voke us to it with praise, through the delight thereof, moved to undergo danger, more than we think fit ourselves; nor when they sharpen us with reprehension, does the smart thereof a jot the more prevail upon us. And this modesty of ours, makes us both good soldiers and good counsellors: good soldiers, because shame begets modesty, and valour is most sensible of shame: good counsellors, because we are brought up more simply than to disesteem the laws, and by severity more modestly than to disobey them. And also, that we do not like men exceeding wise in things needless, find fault bravely with the preparation of the enemy, and in effect not assault him accordingly; but think our neighbours' cogitations like our own, and that the events of fortune cannot be discerned by a speech: and therefore always so furnish ourselves really against the enemy, as against men well advised. For we are not to build our hopes upon the oversights of them, but upon the safe foresight of ourselves. Nor must we think that there is much difference between man and man, but him only to be the best that has been brought up amongst the most difficulties.

LXXXV. “ Let us not therefore, cast aside the institutions of our ancestors, which we have so long retained to our profit; nor let us, of many men's lives, of much money, of many cities, and much honour, hastily resolve in so small a part of one day; but at leisure, which we have better commodity than any other to do, by reason of our power. Send to the Athenians about the matter of Potidæa, send about that wherein the confederates say they are injured; and the rather, because they are content to refer the cause to judgment: and one that offers himself to judgment may not lawfully be invaded as a doer of injury, before the judgment be given; and prepare withal for the war, so shall you take the most profitable counsel for yourselves, and the most formidable to the enemy.” Thus spake Archidamus. But Sthenelaidas, then one of the Ephori, stood up last of all, and spake to the Lacedæmonians in this manner:¹

Oration of Sthenelaidas.

LXXXVI. “ For my part, I understand not the many words used by the Athenians; for though they have been much in their own praises, yet they have said nothing to the contrary but that they have done injury to our confederates, and to Peloponnesus. And if they carried themselves well against the Medes then, and ill against us now, they deserve a double punishment, because they are not good as they were, and are evil, as they were not. Now are we the same we were, and mean not, if we be wise, either to connive at the wrongs done to our confederates, or defer to repair them, for the harm they suffer is not deferred. Others have much money, many galleys, and many horses; and we have good confederates, not to be betrayed to the Athenians, nor to be defended with words, for they are not hurt in words, but to be aided with all our power,

¹ *Ἐλέξεν ἐν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις*, Bekker. *Ἐλέξεν τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις*, Duker. Spoke thus in the presence of the Lacedæmonians.

“ and with speed. Let no man tell me, that after we have once received the injury, we ought to deliberate. No, it belongs rather to the doers of injury to spend time in consultation. Wherefore, men of Lacedæmon, decree the war, as becomes the dignity of Sparta; and let not the Athenians grow yet greater, nor let us betray our confederates, but in the name of the gods, proceed against the doers of injustice.”

LXXXVII. Having thus spoken, being himself Ephore, he put it to the question in the assembly of the Lacedæmonians; and saying afterwards, that he could not discern whether was the greater cry, (for they used there to give their votes, *viva voce*, and not with balls,) and desiring that it might be evident that their minds were inclined most to the war, he put it unto them again, and said, to whomsoever of you it seemeth that the peace is broken, and that the Athenians have done unjustly, let him arise and go yonder: (and withal he shewed them a certain place:) and to whomsoever it seemeth otherwise, let him go to the other side. So they arose, and the room was divided, wherein far the greater number were those that held the peace to be broken.

Then calling in the confederates, they told them, that for their own parts their sentence was, that the Athenians had done them wrong. Yet they desired to have all their confederates called together, and then to put it to the question again, that if they would, the war might be decreed by common consent. This done, their confederates went home, and so did also afterwards the Athenians, when they had despatched the business they came about. This decree of the assembly, that the peace was broken, was made in the fourteenth year² of those thirty years for which a peace had been formerly concluded, after the actions past in Eubœa.

LXXXVIII. The Lacedæmonians gave sentence that the peace was broken, and that war was to be made, not so much for the words of the confederates, as for fear the Athenian greatness should still increase: for they saw that a great part of Greece was fallen already into their hands.

LXXXIX. Now the means by which the Athenians came to the administration of those affairs by which they so raised themselves were these:

After that the Medes, overcome by sea and land, were departed, and such of them as had escaped by sea to Mycale,³ were there also utterly overthrown, Leotychides, king of the Lacedæmonians, then commander of the Grecians at Mycale, with their confederates of Peloponnesus, went home. But the Athenians, with their confederates of Ionia and the Hellespont, as many as were already revolted from

¹ *Ψῆφος*, properly lapillus, calculus. supposed.

A little stone or ball, which he who gave his vote put into a box, either on the affirmative or negative side. The Athenians used beans white and black. From the above, it would appear, that in matters of great consequence the government of the Lacedæmonians was more democratical than is generally

² A.C. 432.

³ A city and promontory of Asia Minor, opposite Samos, where the remnant of Xerxes' fleet was defeated on the 22d of September, A.C. 479, the same day that his land forces, under Mardonius, were defeated at Platœa. Herod. ix. 90.

the king,¹ staid behind and besieged Sestus, then held by the Medes, and when they had lain before it all the winter, they took it, abandoned by the Barbarians; and after this they set sail from the Hellespont, every one to his own city. And the body² of the Athenians, as soon as their territory was clear of the Barbarians, went home also, and fetched thither their wives and children, and such goods as they had, from the places where they had been put out to keep, and went about the reparation of their city and walls. For there were yet standing some pieces of the circuit of their wall, and likewise a few houses, though the most were down, which the principal of the Persians had reserved for their own lodgings.

XC. The Lacedæmonians, hearing what they went about, sent thither their ambassadors,³ partly because they would themselves have been glad that neither the Athenians nor any other had had walls; but principally, as incited thereto by their confederates, who feared not only the greatness of their navy, which they had not before, but also their courage shewed against the Persians, and entreated them not to build their walls, but rather to join with them in pulling down the walls of what cities soever without Peloponnesus had them yet standing; not discovering their meaning, and the jealousy they had of the Athenians; but pretending this, that if the Barbarian returned, he might find no fortified city to make the seat of his war, as he did of Thebes: and that Peloponnesus was sufficient for them all whereinto to retire, and from whence to withstand the war. But the Athenians, by the advice of Themistocles, when the Lacedæmonian ambassadors had so said, dismissed them presently with this answer, that they would presently send ambassadors about the business they spake of, to Lacedæmon. Now Themistocles wished them to send himself to Lacedæmon for one, and that as speedily as they could; but such as were chosen ambassadors with him, not to send away presently, but to stay them till the walls were so raised as to fight upon them from a sufficient height; and that all the men in the city in the mean time, both they and their wives and children, sparing neither private nor public edifice, that might advance the work, but pulling all down whatsoever should help to raise it. When he had thus instructed them, adding, that he would himself do the rest at Lacedæmon, he took his journey. And when he came to Lacedæmon, he went not to the state, but delaying the time, excused himself; and when any of those that were in office, asked him why he did not present himself to the state, answered, that he staid for his fellow-ambassadors, who upon some business that fell out were left behind, but he expected them very shortly, and wondered they were not already come.

XCI. Hearing this, they gave credit to Themistocles, for the love they bore him; but when others coming thence averred plainly that the wall went up, and that it was come to good height already, they

¹ Of Persia.

² Τὸ κοινόν, the state. They again made Athens the seat of their government, it being before in the fleet and

camp in an unfixed state.

³ ἡλθον πρεσβεῖα, Bekker. ἡλθον ἐκ πρεσβείαν, Duker. Came with an embassy.

had no alternative but to believe it. Themistocles, when he saw this, wished them not to be led by reports, but rather to send thither some of their own, as were honest men, and who having informed themselves, would relate the truth. Which they also did. And Themistocles sent privily to the Athenians about the same men, to take order for their stay, with as little appearance of it as they could, and not to dismiss them till their own ambassadors were returned. For by this time were arrived his companions, Abronichus, the son of Lysicles, and Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, who brought him word that the wall was of a sufficient height. For he feared lest the Lacedæmonians, when they knew the truth, would refuse to let them go. The Athenians therefore kept there those ambassadors, as it was written to them to do. Themistocles coming now to his audience before the Lacedæmonians, said plainly, "that the city of Athens was already walled, and that sufficiently for the defence of those within: and that if it shall please the Lacedæmonians, upon any occasion to send ambassadors to them, they were to send thenceforward, as to men who understood what conduced both to their own, and also to the common good of all Greece." For when they thought it best to quit their city, and put themselves into their galleys, he said they were bold to do it, without asking advice of them. And in common-council, the advice of the Athenians was as good as their advice: and now at this time, their opinion is, that it will be best, both for themselves in particular, and for all the confederates in common, that their city should be walled. For that in strength unequal, men cannot alike and equally advise for the common benefit of Greece. "Therefore," said he, "either all the confederate cities must be unwalled, or you must not think amiss of what is done by us."

XCII. The Lacedæmonians when they heard him, though they made no shew of being angry with the Athenians, for they had not sent their ambassadors to forbid them, but by way of advice, to admonish them, not to build the wall; besides they bare them affection then, for their courage shewn against the Medes, yet they were inwardly offended, because they missed their will. And the ambassadors of either side returned home without complaint.

XCIII. Thus the Athenians quickly raised their walls, the structure itself making manifest the haste used in the building. For the foundation consists of stones of all sorts; and those in some places unwrought, as they were brought to the place. Many pillars also taken from sepulchres,¹ and polished stones were piled together among the rest. For the circuit of the city was set every way farther out, and therefore hastening, they took alike whatever came next to hand. Themistocles likewise persuaded them to build up the rest of Peiræus, (for it was begun in the year that he himself was Archon² of Athens,)

¹ The walls of Athens made of chapels and tombs. Cor. Nepos in vita Themist.

² The governor of the city for that year. The number of the Archons was nine. They were annually elected by

lot, and were required to be of noble birth, of a pure Attic descent, irapproachable both in moral and political character, dutiful to their parents, and perfectly sound in body. The first of the nine was called *Ἀρχων*, by way of

as conceiving the place both beautiful, in that it had three natural havens, and that being now seamen, it would very much conduce to the enlargement of their power. For he indeed was the first man that durst tell them that they ought to take upon them the command of the sea, and withal presently helped them in the obtaining it. By his counsel, it was, that they built the wall of that breadth about Peiræus, which is now to be seen: for two carts, carrying stones, met, and passed upon it. And yet within it, there was neither rubbish nor mortar, but it was made all of great stones, cut square, and bound together with iron and lead. But for height, it was raised only to half at most of what he had intended. For he would have had it able to hold out the enemy both by the height and breadth; and that a few, and the less serviceable men might have sufficed to defend it, and the rest have served in the navy. For principally he was addicted to the sea, because (as I think) he had observed, that the forces of the king had easier access to invade them by sea than by land; and thought that Peiræus was more profitable than the city above. And oftentimes he would exhort the Athenians, that in case they were oppressed by land, they should go down thither, and with their galleys resist any enemy whatsoever. Thus the Athenians built their walls, and fitted themselves in other ways, immediately on the departure of the Medes.

XCIV. Meanwhile Pausanias, the son of Cleombrotus, was sent from Lacedæmon commander of the Greeks, with twenty galleys out of Peloponnesus. With which went also thirty sail of Athens, besides a multitude of other confederates, and making war on Cyprus, subdued the greatest part of the same: and afterwards, under the same commander, came before Byzantium, which they besieged and won.

XCV. But Pausanias being now grown insolent, both the rest of the Greeks, and especially the Ionians, who had newly recovered their liberty from the king, offended with him, came to the Athenians, requesting them for consanguinity's¹ sake to become their leaders, and to protect them from the violence of Pausanias. The Athenians, accepting the motion, applied themselves both to the defence of these, and also to the ordering of the rest of the affairs there, in such sort as should seem best to themselves. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians sent for Pausanias home, to examine him concerning such things as they had heard against him. For great crimes had been laid to his charge by the Greeks that came from thence; and his government was rather an imitation of tyranny than a command in war. And it was his lot to be called home at the same time that the confederates, all but the soldiers of Peloponnesus, out of hatred to him had turned to the Athenians. When he came to Lacedæmon, though censured for some wrongs done to private men, yet of the greatest matters he was acquitted, especially of favouring the Medes, which seemed to be the

eminence, and sometimes *Επώνυμος*, because from him the year took its denomination. The second was named *Βασιλεὺς*; the third *Πολέμαρχος*. The other six were called by one common

name, *Θεσμοθέται*. To their department pertained all the civil and religious affairs of the state.

¹ The Ionians were all colonies of the Athenians.

most evident of all. Him therefore they sent general no more, but Dorcis, and some others with him, with no great army; whose command the confederates refused, and they finding that, went their ways likewise. And after that, the Lacedæmonians sent no more, because they feared lest such as went out would prove the worse for the state, (as they had seen by Pausanias,) and also because they desired to be rid of the Persian war, conceiving the Athenians to be sufficient leaders, and at that time their friends.

XCVI. When the Athenians had thus got the command by the confederates' own accord, for the hatred they bare to Pausanias, they then set down an order which cities should contribute money for this war against the Barbarians, and which galleys. For they pretended to repair the injuries they had suffered, by laying waste the territories of the king. And then first came up among the Athenians the office of treasurers¹ of Greece, who were receivers of the tribute, (for so they called this money contributed.) And the first tribute that was taxed came to four hundred and sixty talents. The treasury was at Delos, and their meetings were kept there in the temple.

XCVII. Now using their authority at first in such manner, that the confederates lived under their own laws, and were admitted to common council; by the war, and administration of the common affairs of Greece from the Persian war to this, what against the Barbarians, what against their own innovating confederates, and what against such of the Peloponnesians as chanced always in every war to fall in, they effected those great matters following; which also I have written, both because this place has been passed over by all who have written before me, and they have either compiled the Grecian acts before the invasion of the Persians, or that invasion only; of which number is Hellanicus,² who has touched them in his Attic History, but briefly, and without exact mention of the times; and also because they carry with them a demonstration how the Athenian empire grew up.

XCVIII. And first, under the conduct of Cimon,³ son of Miltiades, they took Eion, on the river Strymon, from the Medes, by siege, and carried away the inhabitants captive. Then the isle Scyros,⁴ in the Ægean sea, inhabited by the Delopes, whom they also carried away captive, planting therein a colony of their own. They likewise made war on the Carystians, alone, without the rest of the Eubœans, and

¹ The treasurers were called ἑλληνοραμίαι; the money collected, φόρος, which in this case amounted to eighty-nine thousand one hundred and twenty-five pounds. It was not kept at Athens, lest it should seem they claimed a peculiar property in it; but in the temple of Apollo, at Delos. Afterwards, however, Athens was deemed a more convenient place for keeping it, and it was therefore removed thither. The difficult point of adjusting the quota each state was to furnish, was settled by Aristides to the satisfaction of all parties. The tax was soon afterwards raised to six

hundred, then to thirteen hundred talents.

² Hellanicus, a famous Greek historian, born at Mytilene, who wrote an account of the founders of the most remarkable cities; died A.C. 411.

³ According to Herodotus, b. vii. 107, Xerxes was king of Persia, when Eion was taken; it is more probable, however, that it was during the reign of Artaxerxes, his successor, A.C. 471.

⁴ Scyros, an island in the Ægean sea, lying over against the continent of Magnesia, between Eubœa and Lesbos.

those also after a time came in by composition. After this they warred on the revolted Naxians, and brought them in by siege. And this was the first confederate city, which, contrary to the ordinance, they deprived of their free estate; though afterwards, as it came to any of their turns, they did the like to the rest.

XCIX. Amongst other causes of revolt, the principal was their failing to bring in their tribute and galleys, and their refusing when they did so to follow the wars. For the Athenians exacted strictly, and were grievous to them, by imposing a necessity of toil, which they were neither accustomed nor willing to undergo. They were also otherwise not so gentle in their government as they had been, nor followed the war upon equal terms, and could easily bring back to their subjection such as should revolt. And of this the confederates themselves were the cause; for through this refusal to accompany the army, the most of them, that they might stay at home, were ordered to excuse their galleys with money, as much as it came to. By which means the navy of the Athenians was increased at the cost of their confederates, and themselves unprovided, and without means to make war in case they should revolt.¹

C. After this it came to pass that the Athenians and their confederates fought against the Medes both by land and water, on the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia; and on the same day the Athenians had victory in both, and took or sunk all the Phœnician fleet, to the number of two hundred galleys. After this happened the revolt of Thasus,² upon a difference about the places of trade, and about the mines they possessed in the opposite parts of Thrace. And the Athenians going thither with their fleet, overthrew them in a battle at sea, and landed in the island. But having about the same time sent ten thousand of their own and of their confederates' people to the river Strymon, for a colony to be planted in a place called then the Nine-ways, now Amphipolis, they won the said Nine-ways, which was held by the Edonians; but advancing further, toward the heart of Thrace, were defeated at Drabescus, of Edonia, by the whole power of the Thracians, that were enemies to this new-built town of the Nine-ways.

CI. The Thasians, in the mean time, being overcome in divers battles, and besieged, sought aid of the Lacedæmonians, and entreated them to divert the enemy by an invasion of Attica; which, unknown to the Athenians, they promised to do, and also had done it, but by an earthquake that then happened, were hindered. In which earthquake, their Helots,³ and of neighbouring towns the Thuriatæ and Ætheans, revolted, and seized on Ithome. Most of these Helots were

¹ ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἀπείροι, Bekker. ἀπείροι, Duker. Unprepared and inexperienced.

² A small island of the Ægean sea, a little west of the mouth of the Nestus, b. viii. 64, famous for its fertility, wines, and marbles; now Thapso. Diodorus places this revolt after the earthquake.

³ The Lacedæmonians employed the

captives, taken in war, and their posterity, in husbandry and the most servile works. They were called Helots, because the first of them so employed were captives of the town of Helos, in Laconia. They were always treated with the greatest severity; at times were wantonly butchered. See b. iv. 80. The earthquake here alluded to,

the posterity of the ancient Messenians, brought into servitude in former times; whereby also it came to pass, that they were all called Messenians. Against these the Lacedæmonians had now a war at Ithome. The Thasians in the third year of the siege, surrendered themselves to the Athenians, on condition they should rase their walls, deliver up their galleys, pay both the money in arrear, and for the future as much as they were wont; and quit both the mines and the continent.

CII. The Lacedæmonians, when the war against those in Ithome grew long, among other confederates, sent for aid to the Athenians; who also came with no small force, under the command of Cimon. They were sent for principally for their reputation in mural assaults, the long continuance of the siege, seeming to require men of ability in that way, whereby they might perhaps have got the place by force. And on this journey¹ grew the first manifest dissension between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians: for the Lacedæmonians, when they could not take the place by assault, fearing lest the audacious and innovating humour of the Athenians, whom withal they esteemed of a contrary race,² might at the persuasion of those in Ithome, cause some alteration, if they staid; dismissed them alone of all the confederates, not discovering their jealousy, but alleging that they had no farther need of their service. But the Athenians perceiving they were not sent away on good cause, but only as men suspected, made it a heinous matter; and conceiving they had deserved better at the Lacedæmonians' hands, as soon as they were gone, left the league which they had made with the Lacedæmonians against the Persian, and became confederates with their enemies, the Argives; and then both Argives and Athenians took the same oath, and made the same league with the Thessalians.

CIII. Those in Ithome, when they could no longer hold out, in the tenth year of the siege, surrendered the place to the Lacedæmonians, on condition of security to depart out of Peloponnesus, and that they should no more return; and that whosoever should be taken returning, to be the slave of him that should take him. For the Lacedæmonians had before been warned by an answer of the Pythian oracle, to let go the suppliant of Jupiter Ithometes.³ So they came forth, they, their wives, and their children. And the Athenians, for hatred they bore to the Lacedæmonians, received them, and put them into Naupactus,⁴ which city they had lately taken from the Locrians of Ozolæ. The Megareans also revolted from the Lacedæmonians, and came to the league of the Athenians, because they were held down

which took place A. C. 470, was so violent, that according to Plutarch, it demolished all the houses in Sparta, except five. The Helots rose at once to destroy those Spartans who were not buried in the ruins; but Archidamus had given the alarm. The Helots then marched off, and besieged Ithome, in Messenia, where they made a long and obstinate resistance.

¹ A. C. 469.

² The Lacedæmonians were Dorians, the Athenians, Ionians.

³ Jupiter was called Ithometes, from a temple which he had there, where games were celebrated.

⁴ A celebrated naval situation, near the entrance of the Sinus Corinthiacus, now called Enebect or Lepanto.

by the Corinthians with a war about the limits of their territories. Whereupon Megara and Pegæ were put into the hands of the Athenians, who built for the Megareans the long walls from this city to Nisæa,¹ and maintained them with a garrison of their own. And from hence chiefly grew the vehement hatred of the Corinthians to the Athenians.

CIV. Moreover, Inarus, the son of Psammetchus, an African, king of the Africans that confine on Egypt, making war from Maræa above Pharos, caused the greatest part of Egypt to rebel against king Artaxerxes;² and when he had taken the government of them upon himself, he brought in the Athenians to assist him; who chancing to be then warring on Cyprus with two hundred galleys, part their own and part their confederates, left Cyprus and went to him. And going from the sea up the Nile, after they had made themselves masters of the river, and two parts of the city of Memphis, they assaulted the third part, called the *white wall*. Within were of the Persians and Medes, such as had escaped, and of the Egyptians, such as had not revolted among the rest.

CV. The Athenians came also with a fleet to Halix, and landing their soldiers, fought by land with the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and the Corinthians had the victory. After this, the Athenians fought by sea against the fleet of the Peloponnesians at Cecryphalea,³ and the Athenians had the victory. After this again, the war of the Athenians against the Æginetæ being on foot, a great battle was fought between them by sea, off the coast of Ægina, the confederates of both being there; in which the Athenians had the victory; and having taken seventy galleys, landed their army and besieged the city under the conduct of Leocrates, the son of Stræbus. After this, the Peloponnesians desiring to aid the Æginetæ, sent over to Ægina three hundred men of arms, of those that had before aided the Corinthians and Epidaurians, and with other forces seized the top of Geranea.⁴ And the Corinthians and their confederates came down from thence to the territory of Megara, supposing that the Athenians having much of their army absent in Ægina and in Egypt, would be unable to aid the Megareans, or if they did, would be forced to rise from before Ægina. But the Athenians stirred not from Ægina; but those that remained at Athens, both young and old, under the conduct of Myronides, went to Megara; and after they had fought with doubtful victory, they parted, neither party conceiving they had the worst in the action. And the Athenians, (who, notwithstanding, had rather the better) when the Corinthians were gone away, erected a trophy. But the Corinthians having been reviled at their return by the ancient men of the city, about twelve days after came again prepared, and set up their trophy likewise, as if the victory had been theirs. Hereupon

¹ The haven and arsenal of Megara.

² Concerning the revolt of the Egyptians from the Persian monarch, see Herod. iii. 12, 15, vii. 7. Diod. Sic. b. ii.

³ Some island about Peloponnesus,

whose situation is not now known; by some supposed to be opposite Epidaurus, at six miles' distance.

⁴ A ridge of a hill, lying before the entrance into the isthmus.

the Athenians sallying out of Megara, with a huge shout, both slew those that were setting up the trophy, and charging the rest, got the victory.

CVI. The Corinthians overcome, went their way; but a good part of them being hard followed, and missing their way, lit on the inclosed ground of a private man, which, fenced with a great ditch, had no passage through; which the Athenians perceiving, opposed them at the place by which they entered, with their men of arms, and encompassing the ground with their light-armed soldiers, killed with stones those that were entered. This was a great loss to the Corinthians, but the rest of their army got home again.

CVII. About this time the Athenians began the building of their long walls, from the city down to the sea, the one reaching to the haven called Phalerus, the other to Piræus. The Phocians also making war on Boeum, Cytinium, and Erineum, towns that belonged to the Dorians,¹ of whom the Lacedæmonians are descended, and having taken one of them, the Lacedæmonians under the conduct of Nicomedes, son of Cleombrotus, in the place of Pleistoanax, son of king Pausanias,² who was yet a minor, sent to the aid of the Dorians, one thousand five hundred men of arms of their own, and of their confederates ten thousand. And when they had forced the Phocians on composition to surrender the town they had taken, they went away again. Now if they would go home by sea through the Crissæan gulf,³ the Athenians going about with their fleet, would be ready to stop them; and to pass over Geranea they thought unsafe, because the Athenians had in their hands Megara and Pegæ; for Geranea was not only a difficult passage of itself, but was also always guarded by the Athenians. They thought good therefore to stay amongst the Bœotians, and to consider which way they might most safely go through. Whilst they were there, there wanted not some Athenians that privily solicited them to come to the city, hoping to have put the people out of government, and to have demolished the long wall then in building. But the Athenians with the whole power of their city, and one thousand Argives and other confederates, as they could be gotten together, in all fourteen thousand men, went out to meet them, for there was suspicion that they came thither to depose the democracy. There also came to the Athenians certain horsemen out of Thessaly, who in the battle turned to the Lacedæmonians.

CVIII. They fought at Tanagra of Bœotia, and the Lacedæmonians had the victory, but the slaughter was great on both sides. Then the Lacedæmonians, entering the territories of Megaris, and cutting down the woods before them, returned home by way of Geranea and the Isthmus. Upon the two and sixtieth day after this battle, the Athenians under the conduct of Myronides, made a journey against

¹ The Dorians at first possessed a small country on the north side of Phocis, called Doris, or Tetrapolis from the four cities which it contained, whereof those here mentioned were three, Pindus being the fourth.

² Pausanias was not king but merely the guardian of Plistarchus, (Herod. ix. 10) whom his son Pleistoanax succeeded.

³ Gulf of Corinth.

the Bœotians, overthrew them at Oenophyta, and brought the territories of Bœotia and Phocis under their obedience; rased the walls of Tanagra; took of the wealthiest of the Locrians of Opus one hundred hostages; and finished at the same time their long walls at home. After this, Ægina also yielded to the Athenians on these conditions, that they should have their walls pulled down, should deliver up their galleys, and pay their taxed tribute for the time to come. The Athenians also under the command of Tolmides, son of Tolmæus, made a voyage about Peloponnesus, wherein they burnt the arsenal of the Lacedæmonian navy, took Chalcis,¹ a city of the Corinthians; and landing their forces in Sicyonia, overcame in fight those that made head against them.

CIX. All this while the Athenians and the confederates staid still in Egypt, and saw much variety of war. First the Athenians were masters of Egypt, and the king of Persia sent one Megabazus a Persian with money to Lacedæmon, to procure the Peloponnesians to invade Attica, and by that means to draw the Athenians out of Egypt. But when this took no effect, and money was spent to no purpose, Megabazus returned with the money he had left into Asia; and then was Megabazus, the son of Zopyrus, a Persian, sent into Egypt with great forces; who coming in by land, overthrew the Egyptians and their confederates in a battle, drove the Grecians out of Memphis, and finally enclosed them in the isle of Prosopitis. There he besieged them a year and a half, till such time as having drained the channel, and turned the water another way, he made their galleys lie aground, and the island for the most part continent, and so came over, and won the island with land soldiers.

CX. Thus was the army of the Grecians lost, after six years' war; and of many who passed through Africa, a few saved themselves in Cyrene, but the most perished. So Egypt returned to the obedience of the king, except only Amyrtæus² who reigned in the fens, for him they could not bring in, both because the fens are great, and the people of the fens, of all the Egyptians the most warlike. But Inarus, king of the Africans, and author of all this stir in Egypt, was taken by treason and crucified. The Athenians³ moreover had sent fifty galleys more to Egypt, for a supply to those that were there already; which putting in at Mendesium, one of the mouths of the Nile, knew nothing of what had happened to the rest; and being assaulted from the land by the army, and from the sea by the Phœnician fleet, lost the greatest part of their galleys, and escaped home again with the lesser part. Thus ended the great expedition of the Athenians and their confederates into Egypt.

CXI. Also Orestes, the son of Echecratidas, king of the Thessalians, driven out of Thessaly, persuaded the Athenians to restore him. And the Athenians taking with them the Bœotians and Phœceans,

¹ A city of the Corinthians, near the river Tuenas.—See Herod. b. vii. and Strabo, b. x. ² ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, Bekker. ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, Duker. But from Athens, and the other allied countries.

³ See Herod. ii. 140, iii. 15.

their confederates, made war against Pharsalus, a city of Thessaly; and were masters of the field as far as they strayed not from the army (for the Thessalian horsemen kept them from straggling) but could not win the city, nor yet perform any thing else of what they came for, but came back again without effect, and brought Orestes with them. Not long after this, a thousand Athenians went aboard the galleys that lay at Pegæ,¹ (for Pegæ was in the hands of the Athenians) under the command of Pericles, the son of Xantippus, and sailed into Sicyonia, and landing, put to flight such of the Sicyonians as made head; and then presently took up forces in Achæa, and putting over, made war on Oenias, a city of Acarnania, which they besieged; nevertheless they took it not, but returned home.

CXII. Three years after this was a truce made between the Peloponnesians and Athenians for five years; and the Athenians gave over the Grecian war, and with two hundred galleys, part their own, and part their confederates, under the conduct of Cimon, made war on Cyprus. Of these, there went sixty sail to Egypt, sent for by Amyrtæus that reigned in the fens, and the rest lay at the siege of Citium.² But Cimon there dying, and a famine arising in the army, they left Citium, and when they had passed Salamis, in Cyprus, fought at once both by sea and land, against the Phœnicians, Cyprians, and Cilicians, and having gotten the victory in both,³ returned home, and with them the rest of their fleet now come back from Egypt. After this, the Lacedæmonians took in hand the war, called the holy war; and having won the temple at Delphi, delivered the possession thereof to the Delphians. But the Athenians afterward, when the Lacedæmonians were gone, came with their army, and regaining it, delivered the possession to the Phocians.

CXIII. Some time after this, the outlaws of Bœotia having seized Orchomenus, Chæronea, and certain other places of Bœotia, the Athenians, being their enemies, made war on those places, with a thousand men of arms of their own, and as many of their confederates as came in, under the conduct of Tolmidas, the son of Tolmæus. And when they had taken Chæronea, they carried away the inhabitants captive, and leaving a garrison in the city, departed. On their return, those outlaws that were in Orchomenus, with the Locrians of Opus, and the Eubœan outlaws, and others of the same faction, set upon them at Coronea, and overcoming the Athenians in battle, some they slew, and some they took alive. Whereupon the Athenians relinquished all Bœotia, and made peace, on condition their prisoners should be released. So the outlaws and the rest returned, and lived again under their own laws.

CXIV. Not long after Eubœa revolted from the Athenians, and when Pericles had already passed over to it, with the Athenian army, news was brought him that Megara had likewise revolted,⁴ that the

¹ A city in the mountainous part of Megaris.

² A town of Cyprus, now Chitti.

³ A. C. 449.

⁴ This revolt of Megara gave rise to

that decree which excluded the Megareans from the ports and markets of Athens. See c. 139. They decreed further, though not explicitly mentioned by Thucydides, that the generals of the

Peloponnesians were about to invade Attica, and that the Megareans had slain the Athenian garrison, except such as had fled to Nisæa. Now the Megareans, when they revolted, had got to their aid the Corinthians, Epidaurians, and Sicyonians. Wherefore Pericles forthwith withdrew his army from Eubœa; and the Lacedæmonians afterward broke into Attica, and wasted the country about Eleusis and Thriasia, under the conduct of Pleistoanax,¹ son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, and coming no further on, went away. After which the Athenians passed again into Eubœa, and totally subdued it; the Hestizæans they put quite out, taking their territory into their own hands; but ordered the rest of Eubœa, according to composition made.²

CXV. Being returned from Eubœa, a short time after they made a peace with the Lacedæmonians and their confederates for thirty years, and surrendered to them Nisæa, Achaia, Pegæ, and Trœzene, for these places the Athenians held of theirs. In the sixth year of this peace, fell out the war between the Samians and Milesians concerning Priene; and the Milesians being put to the worse, came to Athens and exclaimed against the Samians; wherein also certain private men of Samos itself took part with the Milesians, out of desire to alter the form of government. Whereupon the Athenians went to Samos with a fleet of forty galleys, and set up the democracy there, and took of the Samians fifty boys and as many men for hostages; whom, when they had put into Lemnos and set a guard upon them, they came home. But certain of the Samians, (for some of them, not enduring the popular government, were fled to the continent,) entering into a league with the mightiest of them in Samos, and with Pissuthnes, the son of Hystaspes, then governor of Sardis, and levying about seven hundred auxiliary soldiers, passed over to Samos in the evening, and first set on the popular faction, and brought most of them into their power; and then stealing their hostages out of Lemnos, they revolted, and delivered the Athenian guard and such captains as were there, into the hands of Pissuthnes, and withal prepared to make war against Miletus. With these also revolted the Byzantines.

CXVI. The Athenians, when they heard of these things, sent to Samos sixty galleys, sixteen whereof they did not use, (for some of them went to Caria, to observe the fleet of the Phœnicians, and some to fetch in succours from Chios and Lesbos,) but with the forty-four that remained under the command of Pericles and nine others,³ fought with seventy galleys of the Samians, whereof twenty were such as served for transport of soldiers, as they were coming altogether from Miletus: and the Athenians had the victory. After this came a

state should swear at their election to make an incursion there twice a year.

¹ Pleistoanax for this retreat was banished from Sparta, it being supposed he had been bribed by the Athenians to quit their territory.

² A.C. 446.

³ The Athenians chose ten generals

every year, according to the number of the tribes. They were sometimes, as in the present instance, all sent on the same employ. Each in his turn was general of the day. They were frequently re-elected, and continued many years in commission, as it is obvious Pericles did.

supply of forty galleys more from Athens, and from Chios and Lesbos twenty-five. With these, having landed their men, they overthrew the Samians in battle, and besieged the city, which they inclosed with a triple wall, and shut it up by sea with their galleys. But Pericles taking with him sixty galleys out of the road, made haste towards Caunus and Caria, upon intelligence of the coming against them of the Phœnician fleet. For Stesagoras with five galleys had already gone out of Samos, and others out of other places, to meet the Phœnicians.

CXVII. Meanwhile the Samians coming suddenly forth with their fleet, and falling on the harbour of the Athenians, which was unfortified, sunk the galleys that kept watch before it, and overcame the rest in fight; insomuch that they became masters of the sea near their coast for about fourteen days together, importing and exporting what they pleased. But Pericles returning, shut them up again with his galleys; and after this, there came to him from Athens, a supply of forty sail, with 'Thucydides,' Agnon, and Phormio, and twenty with Tlepolemus and Anticles; and from Chios and Lesbos, thirty more. And though the Samians fought against these a small battle at sea, yet unable to hold out any longer, in the ninth month of the siege, they surrendered the city on composition; namely, to demolish their walls, to give hostages, to deliver up their navy, and to repay the money spent by the Athenians in the war, on days appointed.¹ And the Byzantines also yielded, on condition that they should remain subject to them, in the same manner as they had been before their revolt.

CXVIII. Now not many years after this, happened the matters before related of the Corcyræans and the Potidæans, and whatsoever other intervenient pretext of this war.² These things done by the Grecians one against another, or against the Barbarians, came to pass all within the compass of fifty years at most, from the time of the departure of Xerxes to the beginning of this present war; in which time the Athenians both assured their government over the confederates, and also much enlarged their own particular wealth. This the Lacedæmonians saw, and opposed not, save now and then a little, but as men that had ever before been slow to war without necessity, and also as they were hindered sometimes with domestic war, for the most part of the time stirred not against them, till now at last when the power of the Athenians was manifestly advanced, and they had done injury to their confederates, they could forbear no longer, but thought it necessary to take the war in hand with all diligence, and to pull down, if they could, the Athenian greatness. For which purpose, it was by the Lacedæmonians themselves decreed, that the peace was broken, and that the Athenians had done unjustly. And also having sent to

¹ Not the writer of the History.

² Samos thus reduced, which in maritime power vied with Athens herself, Pericles was received upon his return with all the honours the people could bestow on him, and was appointed to make a funeral oration for those slain

in the war.—ii. 85, A. C. 440.

³ In the fourteenth year of the league. *και ὅσα πρόφασις τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου*, Bekker. *και ὅσα πρόφασις μεταξὺ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου*, Duker. And whatever pretence was made for this war.

Delphi, and inquired of Apollo, whether they should have the better in the war or not; they received, as it is reported, this answer: that if they warred with their whole power, they should have victory, and that he himself would be on their side, both called and uncalled.

CXIX. Now when they had assembled their confederates again, they were to put the question amongst them, whether they should make war or not. And the ambassadors of the several confederates coming in, and the council set, the rest spake what they thought fit, most of them accusing the Athenians of injury, and desiring the war; as also the Corinthians, who had before entreated the cities every one severally to give their vote for the war, fearing lest Potidæa should be lost before help came, being then present, spake last of all to this effect:

Oration of the ambassadors of Corinth.

CXX. “Confederates, we can no longer accuse the Lacedæmonians, they having both decreed the war themselves, and also assembled us to do the same. For it is fit for them who have the command in a common league, as they are honoured of all before the rest, so also, administering their private affairs equally with others, to consider before the rest, of the common business. And though as many of us as have already had our turns with the Athenians, need not be taught to beware of them; yet it were good for those that dwell up in the land, and not as we, in places of traffic on the sea side, to know, that unless they defend those below, they shall with a great deal more difficulty both carry to the sea the commodities of the seasons, and again more hardly receive the benefits afforded to the inland countries from the sea; and also not to mistake what is now spoken, as if it concerned them not; but to make account, that if they neglect those that dwell by the sea, the calamity will also reach unto themselves; and that this consultation concerns them no less than us, and therefore not to be afraid to change their peace for war. For though it be the part of discreet men to be quiet, unless they have wrong, yet it is the part of valiant men when they receive injury, to pass from peace to war, and after success, from war to come again to composition: and neither to swell with the good success of war, nor suffer injury, through pleasure taken in the ease of peace. For he whom pleasure makes a coward, if he sit still, will quickly lose the sweetness of the ease that made him so. And he that in war is made proud by success, observes not that his pride is grounded upon unfaithful confidence. For though many things ill-advised, come to good effect, against enemies worse-advised; yet more, though well-advised, have fallen but badly out, against well-advised enemies. For no man comes to execute a thing, with the same confidence he premeditates it, for we deliver opinions in safety, whereas in the action itself we fail through fear.

CXXI. “As for the war, at this time we raise it, both upon injuries done us, and upon other sufficient allegations; and when we have repaired our wrongs upon the Athenians, we will also in due

“time lay it down. And it is for many reasons probable that we shall have the victory : first, because we exceed them in number ; next, because when we go to any action intimated, we shall be all of one fashion.¹ And as for a navy, wherein consists the strength of the Athenians, we shall provide it, both out of every one’s particular wealth, and with the money at Delphi and Olympia.² For taking this at interest, we shall be able to draw from them their foreign mariners, by offer of great wages : for the forces of the Athenians, are rather mercenary than domestic. Whereas our own power is less obnoxious to such accidents, consisting more in the persons of men than in money. And if we overcome them but in one battle by sea, in all probability they are totally vanquished. And if they hold out, we also shall with longer time apply ourselves to naval affairs. And when we shall once have made our skill equal to theirs, we shall surely overmatch them in courage. For the valour that we have by nature, they shall never come to by teaching ; but the experience which they exceed us in, to that must we attain by industry. And the money wherewith to bring this to pass, we must all contribute. Else it were a hard case, that the confederates of the Athenians should not stick to contribute to their own servitude ; and we should refuse to lay out our money to be revenged of our enemies, and for our own preservation, and that the Athenians take not our money from us, and even with that do us mischief.

CXXII. “We have also many other ways of war ; as the revolt of their confederates, which is the principal means of lessening their revenue ;³ the building of forts in their territory, and many other things which one cannot now foresee. For the course of war is guided by nothing less than by the points of our account, but of itself contrives most things upon the occasion. Wherein, he that complies with it, with most temper, stands the firmest ; and he that is most passionate, oftenest miscarries. Suppose we had differences each of us about the limits of our territory, with an equal adversary ; we must undergo them. But now the Athenians are a match for us all at once, and one city after another too strong for us. Insomuch that unless we oppose them jointly, and every nation and city set to it unanimously, they will overcome us asunder without labour. And know that to be vanquished, though it trouble you to hear it, brings with it no less than manifest servitude : which, but to mention as a doubt, as if so many cities could suffer under one, were very dishonourable to Peloponnesus. For it must then be thought

¹ All land soldiers, all of one manner of arming and discipline.

² It appears from this passage and some following ones, (b. i. 148, and ii. 9,) that through some revolution not particularly mentioned by Thucydides, but probably a consequence of the thirty-nine years’ truce, not only Delphi was again brought under Lacedæmonian influence, but the Phocian people

were gained to the Lacedæmonian interest, or which would operate to the same purpose, were put under oligarchical government.—*Mitford*.

³ Though this be here said in the person of a Corinthian, yet it was never thought on by any of that side, till Alcibiades put it into their heads, when he revolted from his country.

“ that we are either punished upon merit, or else that we endure it out of fear, and so appear degenerate from our ancestors; for by them the liberty of all Greece has been restored; whereas we for our parts assure not so much as our own; but claiming the reputation of having deposed tyrants in the several cities, suffer a tyrant city to be established amongst us.¹ Wherein we know not how we can avoid one of these three great faults, foolishness, cowardice, or negligence. For certainly you avoid them not, by imputing it to that which has done most men hurt, contempt of the enemy: for contempt, because it has made too many men miscarry, has got the name of foolishness.

CXXIII. “ But to what end should we object matters past, more than is necessary to the business in hand? We must now by helping the present, labour for the future. For it is peculiar to our country to attain honour by labour; and though you be now somewhat advanced in honour and power, you must not therefore change the custom; for there is no reason that what was obtained in want, should be lost by wealth. But we should confidently go in hand with the war, for many other causes, as also for this, that both the god hath by his oracle advised us thereto, and promised to be with us himself: and also for the rest of Greece, some for fear, some for profit, are ready to take our parts. Nor are you they that first break the peace, which the god, in as much as he encourages us to the war, judges violated by them; but you fight rather in defence of the same. For not he breaks the peace who takes revenge, but he who is the first invader.

CXXIV. “ So that seeing it will be every way good to make the war, and since in common we persuade the same, and seeing also that both to the cities, and to private men, it will be the most profitable course, put off no longer neither the defence of the Potidæans, who are Dorians, and besieged (which was wont to be contrary) by Ionians, nor the recovery of the liberty of the rest of the Grecians. For it is a case that admits not delay, when some of them already oppressed; and others, after it shall be known we met, and durst not right ourselves, shall shortly after undergo the like. But think, confederates, you are now at a necessity, and that this is the best advice. And therefore give your votes for the war, not fearing the present danger, but coveting the long peace proceeding from it. (For though by war grows the confirmation of peace, yet for love of ease to refuse the war, does not likewise avoid the danger.) Making account that a tyrant city set up in Greece, is set up alike over all, and reigns over some already, and the rest in intention, we shall bring it again into order by the war; and not only live for the time to come out of danger ourselves, but also deliver the already enthralled Grecians out of servitude.” Thus said the Corinthians.

¹ Τύραννον δὲ ἴωμεν ἐγκαθεστάναι πόλιν. Thucydides afterwards puts a similar expression into the mouths both of Pericles and of Cleon, when speaking to the Athenian assembly, and having in view something very different from reproach. b. ii. 63, b. iii. 37.—*Miford.*

CXXV. The Lacedæmonians, when they had heard the opinion of them all, brought the balls¹ to all the confederates present, in order; from the greatest state to the least; and the greatest part gave their votes for the war. Now after the war was decreed, though it were impossible for them to go in hand with it presently, because they were unprovided, and every state thought good without delay severally to furnish themselves with what was necessary, yet there passed not fully a year in this preparation, before Attica was invaded, and the war openly on foot.

CXXVI. In the mean time they sent ambassadors to the Athenians, with certain criminations, to the end that if they would give ear to nothing, they might have all the pretext that could be for raising the war. And first the Lacedæmonians, by their ambassadors to the Athenians, required them to banish² such as were under curse of the goddess Minerva, for pollution of sanctuary. Which pollution was thus: there had been one Cylon, an Athenian, a man who had been victor in the Olympic exercises,³ of much nobility and power amongst those of old time, and who had married the daughter of Theagenes, a Megarean, in those days tyrant of Megara. To this Cylon, asking counsel at Delphi, the god answered, that on the greatest festival day, he should seize the citadel of Athens. He therefore having got forces of Theagenes, and persuaded his friends to the enterprise, seized on the citadel at the time of the Olympic holidays in Peloponnesus, with intention of taking upon him the tyranny: esteeming the feast of Jupiter the greatest, and to touch withal on his particular, in that he had been victor in the Olympic exercises. But whether by the feast spoken of were meant the greatest in Attica, or in some other place, neither did he himself consider, nor the oracle make manifest. For there is also among the Athenians the Diasia,⁴ which is called the greatest feast of Jupiter Meilichius, and celebrated without the city; wherein, in the confluence of the whole people, many men offered sacrifices, not of living creatures, but such⁵ as was the fashion of the natives of the place. But he, supposing he had rightly understood the oracle, laid hand to the enterprise; and when the Athenians heard of it, they came with all their forces out of the fields, and lying before the citadel, besieged it.—But the time growing long, the Athenians, wearied with the siege, went most of them away, and left both the guard of the citadel, and the whole business to the nine Archons,⁶ with absolute authority to order the same as to them it should seem good. For at that time most of the affairs of the common-weal were administered by those nine Archons. Now those that were besieged

¹ See note, chap. 87.

² Excommunication extending also to posterity.

³ Κύλων ἦν Ὀλυμπιονίκης, ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναῖος, Bekker. Κύλων ἦν Ἀθηναῖος, ἀνὴρ Ὀλυμπιονίκης, Duker. There had been one Cylon a victor in the Olympic games, an Athenian.

⁴ Diasia, a feast at Athens in honour

of Jupiter, surnamed Μελίχιος, the propitious. It derived its name ἀπὸ τοῦ Διὸς, καὶ τῆς δόξης, Jupiter and misfortune; because by supplicating the deity, they obtained deliverance from evils.

⁵ Images of living creatures made of paste.

⁶ Note, chap. 93.

with Cylon, were, for want both of victual and water, in very ill estate; and therefore Cylon and a brother of his fled privily out; but the rest, when they were pressed, and some of them dead with famine, sat down as suppliants by the altar¹ in the citadel: and the Athenians, to whose charge was committed the guard of the place, raising them, upon promise to do them no harm, put them all to the sword. Also they had put to death some of those that had taken sanctuary at the altars of the severe goddesses,² as they were going away. And from this the Athenians, both they and their posterity, were called accursed³ and sacrilegious persons. Hereupon the Athenians banished those that were under the curse: and Cleomenes,⁴ a Lacedæmonian, together with the Athenians, in a sedition banished them afterwards again: and not only so, but disinterred and cast forth the bodies of such of them as were dead. Nevertheless they afterwards returned, and their race is in the city to this day.

CXXVII. Of this pollution therefore the Lacedæmonians required them to purge their city. Principally forsooth, as taking part with the gods; but knowing withal that Pericles, the son of Xantippus, was by the mother's side one of that race. For they thought, if Pericles were banished, the Athenians would the more easily be brought to yield to them. Nevertheless, they hoped not so much that he should be banished, as to bring him into the envy of the city, as if his misfortune were in part the cause of the war. For being the most powerful of his time, and having the sway of the state, he was in all things opposed to the Lacedæmonians, not suffering the Athenians to give them the least way, but enticing them to the war.

CXXVIII. Contrariwise, the Athenians required the Lacedæmonians to banish such as were guilty of breach of sanctuary at Tænarus.⁵ For the Lacedæmonians, when they had caused their Helots, suppliants in the temple of Neptune, at Tænarus, to forsake sanctuary, slew them. For which they themselves think it was that the great earthquake happened afterwards at Sparta.

Also they required them to purge their city of the pollution of sanctuary in the temple of Pallas Chalciœca, which was thus: after that Pausanias, the Lacedæmonian, was recalled by the Spartans from his charge in the Hellespont, and having been called in question by them, was absolved, though he was no more sent abroad by the state, yet he went again to Hellespont in a galley of Hermione, as a private man, without leave of the Lacedæmonians, to the Grecian war, as he gave out, but in truth to negotiate with the king, as he had before begun, aspiring to the principality of Greece. Now the benefit that he had laid up with the king, and the beginning of the whole business arose from this: when after his return from Cyprus he had taken Byzantium, when he was there the first time (which being in possession

¹ Of Minerva.

² Σεμνὰί θεαί, venerable goddesses, so called by the Athenians; by the Sicyonians Εὐμενίδες, favourable, because it was thought unlucky to mention their real names, Ἐρινύες, furies.

³ Ἐναγῆς, καὶ ἀλειήριοι.

⁴ Herod. v. 70.

⁵ Tænarus, a promontory of Laconia, the most southern point of Europe, now Metapan.

of the Medes, there were taken in it some near to the king, and of his kindred), unknown to the rest of the confederates, he sent unto the king those near ones of his which he had taken, and gave out they were run away. This he practised with one Gongylus, an Eretrian, to whose charge he had committed both the town of Byzantium and the prisoners. Also he sent letters to him, which Gongylus carried, wherein, as was afterwards known, it was thus written :

Letter of Pausanias to the King.

“ Pausanias, general of Sparta, desirous of doing thee a courtesy, sends back to thee these men, whom he has by arms taken prisoners : and I purpose, if the same seem also good to thee, to take thy daughter in marriage, and to bring Sparta and the rest of Greece into thy subjection. These things I account myself able to bring to pass, if I may communicate my counsels with thee. If therefore any of these things do please thee, send some trusty man to the sea side, by whose mediation we may confer together.”

CXXIX. These were the contents of the writing. Xerxes being pleased with the letter, sends Artabazus, the son of Pharnaces, to the sea side, with orders to take the government of the province of Dascylis, and to dismiss Megabates that was governor there before : and withal, gives him a letter to Pausanias, which he commanded him to send over with speed to Byzantium, and to shew him the seal, and well and faithfully to perform whatsoever in his affairs he should by Pausanias be appointed to do. Artabazus, after he arrived, having in other things done as he was commanded, sent over the letter, wherein was written this answer :

Letter of Xerxes to Pausanias.

“ Thus saith king Xerxes to Pausanias : for the men which thou hast saved and sent over the sea to me from Byzantium, thy benefit is laid up in our house, indelibly registered for ever : and I am also pleased with what thou hast proposed. And let neither night nor day make thee remiss in the performance of what thou hast promised me. Neither be hindered by the expense of gold and silver, or multitude of soldiers requisite, whithersoever it be needful to have them come : but with Artabazus, a good man, whom I have sent unto thee, do boldly both mine and thine own business, as shall be most fit for the dignity and honour of us both.”

CXXX. Pausanias having received these letters, as he was before in great authority for his conduct at Platæa, became now many degrees more elevated ; and could no longer endure to live after the accustomed manner of his country, but went apparelled at Byzantium after the fashion of Persia ; and when he went through Thrace, had a guard of Medes and Egyptians, and his table likewise after the Persian manner. Nor was he able to conceal his purpose, but in trifles made apparent, beforehand, the greater matters he had conceived of the future. He became moreover difficult of access, and would be in such cholerick passions toward all men indifferently, that no man might

endure to approach him : which was also none of the least causes why the confederates turned from him to the Athenians.

CXXXI. When the Lacedæmonians heard of it, they called him home the first time. And when being gone out the second time without their command in a galley of Hermione, it appeared that he continued still in the same practices ; and after he was forced out of Byzantium by siege of the Athenians, returned not to Sparta, but news came, that he had seated himself at Colonæ, of Troas, practising still with the Barbarians, and making his abode there for no good purpose : then the Ephori forbore no longer, but sent unto him a public officer with the *Scytale*,¹ commanding him not to depart from the officer ; and in case he refused denounced war against him. But he desiring as much as he could to avoid suspicion, and believing that with money he should be able to discharge himself of his accusations, returned to Sparta the second time. And first he was by the Ephori committed to ward ; (for the Ephori have power to do this to their king,) but afterwards procuring his enlargement, he came forth and exhibited himself to justice, against such as had any thing to allege against him.

CXXXII. And though the Spartans had against him no manifest proof, neither his enemies, nor the whole city, whereon to proceed to the punishment of a man both of the race of their kings, and at that present in great authority ; for Pleistarchus, the son of Leonidas, being king, and as yet a minor, Pausanias, who was his cousin-german, had the tuition of him : yet by his licentious behaviour, and affectation of the Barbarian customs, he gave much cause of suspicion that he meant not to live in the equality of the present state. They considered also that he differed in manner of life, from the discipline established : among other things, by this, that upon the Tripod at Delphi, which the Grecians had dedicated, as the best of the spoil of the Medes, he had caused to be inscribed of himself in particular, this elegiac verse :

Pausanias, Greek general, having the Medes defeated,
To Phœbus in record thereof, this gift hath consecrated.

But the Lacedæmonians then presently defaced that inscription of the Tripod, and engraved thereon by name all the cities that had joined in the overthrow of the Medes, and dedicated it so. This therefore was numbered among the offences of Pausanias, and was thought to agree with his present design, so much the rather, for the condition he was now in. They had information further, that he had

¹ *Σκυράλη*, properly a staff ; here an instrument used by the Lacedæmonians for the close conveyance of orders to their ambassadors abroad. They had two round staves of the same size, whereof the state kept one, and the person employed abroad the other ; when desirous of writing they wrapped about it a small thong of parchment, and

having thereon written, took it off again, and sent only that thong, which, wrapped likewise about the other staff, the letters joined again, and might be read. This served instead of cypher. It seems Pausanias retained his staff from the time he had charge at Byzantium.

in hand some practice with the Helots, and so he had; for he promised them not only manumission, but also freedom of the city, if they would rise with him, and co-operate in the whole business. But neither thus, upon some impeachment of the Helots, would they proceed against him, but kept the custom which they have in their own cases, not hastily to give a peremptory sentence against a Spartan without unquestionable proof. Till at length, as it is reported, purposing to send over to Artabazus his last letters to the king, he was betrayed to them by a man of Argilis, in time past his minion,¹ and most faithful to him; who being terrified with the thought, that not any of those who had been formerly sent had ever returned, got him a seal like to the seal of Pausanias, (to the end that if his jealousy were false, or that he should need to alter any thing in the letter, it might not be discovered,) and opened the letter, wherein, as he had suspected the addition of some such clause, he found himself also written down to be murdered.

CXXXIII. The Ephori, when these letters were by him shewn to them, though they believed the matter much more than they did before, yet desirous to hear somewhat themselves from Pausanias's own mouth; the man having designedly gone to Tænarus into sanctuary, and having there built a little room with a partition, in which he hid the Ephori; and Pausanias coming to him, and asking the cause of his taking sanctuary, they plainly heard the whole matter. For the man both expostulated with him, for what he had written about him, and from point to point discovered all the practice: saying, that though he had never boasted to him these and these services concerning the king, he must yet have the honour, as well as many other of his servants, to be slain. And Pausanias himself both confessed the same things, and also bade the man not to be troubled at what was past, and gave him assurance to leave sanctuary, entreating him to go on in his journey with all speed, and not to frustrate the business in hand.

CXXXIV. Now the Ephori, when they had distinctly heard him, for that time went their way, and knowing now the certain truth, intended to apprehend him in the city. It is said, that when he was to be apprehended in the street, he perceived by the countenance of one of the Ephori coming towards him, what they came for: and when another of them had by a secret beck signified the matter for good will, he ran into the close² of the temple of Pallas Chalciæca, and got in before they overtook him. Now the temple itself was hard by, and entering into a house belonging to it, to avoid the injury of the open air, there staid. They that pursued him could not then overtake him, but afterwards they took off the roof and the doors of the house, and watching a time when he was within, beset the house, and walled him up, and leaving a guard there, famished him. When they perceived him about to give up the ghost, they carried him as he was, out of the

¹ Παιδικά. Τοῦτο τινες ἐπὶ ἀγαθοῦ ground consecrated, wherein stand the
ἔρωτος, τινες δὲ ἐπὶ αἰσχροῦ λαμβάνουσι. temple, altar, and edifices for the use

² Ἱερὸν. Both the temple and the of their religion.

house, yet breathing, and being out, he died immediately.¹ After he was dead, they were about to throw him into the Cæada,² where they used to cast in malefactors,³ yet afterwards they thought good to bury him in some place thereabout: but the oracle of Delphi commanded the Lacedæmonians afterwards, both to remove the sepulchre from the place where he died, (so that he lies now in the entry of the temple, as is evident by the inscription of the pillar,) and also, as having been a pollution of the sanctuary, to render two bodies to the goddess of Chalciœca for that one. Whereupon they set up two brazen statues, and dedicated the same to her for Pausanias.

CXXXV. Now the Athenians, the god himself having judged this a pollution of sanctuary, required the Lacedæmonians to banish out of their city such as were touched with the same.

At the same time that Pausanias came to his end, the Lacedæmonians, by their ambassadors to the Athenians, accused Themistocles, that he also had Medized together with Pausanias, having discovered it by proofs against Pausanias, and desired that the same punishment might be likewise inflicted upon him. Whereunto consenting, (for he was at this time in banishment by *ostracism*,⁴ and though his ordinary residence was at Argos, he travelled to and from other places of Peloponnesus,) they sent certain men in company of the Lacedæmonians, who were willing to pursue him, with command to bring him in where-soever they could find him.

CXXXVI. But Themistocles having had notice of it beforehand, flees out of Peloponnesus into Corcyra, to the people of which city he had formerly been beneficial.⁵ But the Corcyræans, alleging that they durst not keep him there, for fear of displeasing both the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, convey him to the opposite continent: and being pursued by the men thereto appointed, asking continually which way he went, he was compelled at a straight, to turn in to Admetus, king of the Molossians, his enemy. The king himself being then from home, he became a suppliant to his wife, and by her was instructed to take their son⁶ with him, and sit down at the altar of the house. When Admetus not long after returned, he made himself known to him, and desired him, that though he had opposed him in some suit at

¹ A. C. 474.

² Cæada, a pit near Lacedæmon.

³ οὐπερ τοὺς κακοῦργους, ἐμβάλλειν, Bekker. οὐπερ τοὺς κακοῦργους ἐμβάλλειν ἐώθεισαν, Duker. And they were about to throw him into the Cæada, where also they threw malefactors.

⁴ Ὀστρακισμός, a species of banishment among the Athenians. When any person had done great services to the state, and they became apprehensive he might, by becoming a favourite, obtain too much power, they banished him for ten years. At a stated day, each citizen gave in the name of a person, wrote on a shell or piece of tile,

(Ὀστράκον) whom he desired to be sent into retirement. Six thousand of these votes were sufficient; and he who had this number, was compelled to leave Athens in ten days. During their absence their estates remained entire. Φυγή was perpetual banishment.

⁵ At the time of the Persian invasion the Corcyræans had refused to join the cause of Greece. The Grecians, therefore, afterwards designed to fall upon them, but were prevented by the remonstrances of Themistocles.

⁶ Τὸν παῖδα. Corn. Nep. in the life of Themistocles, says it was their daughter.

Athens,¹ not to revenge it on him now in the time of his flight : saying, that now being the weaker, he must needs suffer under the stronger ; whereas noble revenge is of equals on equal terms : and that he had been his adversary but in matter of profit, not of life ; whereas, if he delivered him up, (telling him withal, for what, and by whom he was followed,) he deprived him of all means of saving his life. Admetus having heard him, bade him arise together with his son, whom he held as he sat : which is the most submissive supplication that is.

CXXXVII. Not long after came the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians ; and though they alleged much to have him, yet he delivered him not, but sent him away by land to Pydna, on the other² sea, a city belonging to Alexander,³ because his purpose was to go to the king :⁴ where finding a ship bound for Ionia, he embarked, and was carried by foul weather upon the fleet of the Athenians that besieged Naxos. Being afraid, he discovered to the master, (for he was unknown who he was, and for what he fled,) and said, that unless he would save him, he meant to say, that he had hired him to carry him away for money. And that to save him, there needed no more than this, to let none go out of the ship till the weather served to be gone. To which if he consented, he would not forget to requite him according to his merit. The master did so ; and having lain a day and a night at sea, upon the fleet of the Athenians, he arrived afterwards at Ephesus. And Themistocles having liberally rewarded him with money, for he received there, both what was sent him from his friends at Athens, and also what he had put out at Argos ; he took his journey upwards, in company with a certain Persian of the low countries,⁵ and sent letters to the king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes,⁶ newly come to the kingdom, wherein was written to this purpose :

Letter of Themistocles to Artaxerxes.

“ I, Themistocles, am coming unto thee, who of all the Grecians, as long as I was forced to resist thy father that invaded me, have done your house the most damages ; yet the benefits I did him were more, after once I with safety, he with danger, was to make retreat. And both a good turn is already due to me,” (writing here, how he had forewarned him of the Grecians’ departure out of Salamis, and ascribing the then not breaking of the bridge, falsely to himself,) “ and at this time to do thee many other good services, I present myself, persecuted by the Grecians for thy friendship’s sake. But I desire to have a year’s respite, that I may declare to thee the cause of my coming myself.”

CXXXVIII. The king, as is reported, wondered what his purpose might be, and commanded him to do as he had said. In this time of

¹ Admetus had formerly negotiated an alliance at Athens, but was rejected by the influence of Themistocles.

² The Ægean sea.

³ King of Macedonia.

⁴ Of Persia.

⁵ The low countries of Asia, lying to

the Ægean sea.

⁶ Plutarch and Corn. Nepos agree with Thucydides that it was Artaxerxes to whom Themistocles fled ; but Diodorus and others say it was to Xerxes.

respite, he learned as much as he could of the language and fashions of the place, and a year after coming to the court, he was great with the king, more than ever had been any Grecian before; both for his former dignity, and the hope of Greece, which he promised to bring into his subjection; but especially for the trial he gave of his wisdom. For Themistocles was a man in whom most truly was manifested the strength of natural judgment, wherein he had something worthy admiration, different from other men. For by his natural prudence, without the help of instruction before or after, he was both of extemporary matters upon short deliberation, the best discerner, and also of what for the most part would be their issue, the best conjecturer. What he was perfect in, he was able also to explicate: and what he was unpractised in, he was not to seek how to judge of conveniently. Also he foresaw, no man better, what was best or worst in any case that was doubtful. And, to say all in few words, this man, by the natural goodness of his wit, and quickness of deliberation, was the ablest of all men, to tell what was fit to be done upon a sudden. But falling sick, he ended his life: some say he died voluntarily by poison, because he thought himself unable to perform what he had promised to the king.¹ His monument is in Magnesia, in Asia, in the marketplace: for he had the government of that country, the king having bestowed upon him Magnesia, which yielded him fifty talents² a year for his bread, and Lampsacus for his wine, for this city was in those days thought to have store of wine, and the city of Myus for his meat. His bones are said by his kindred to have been brought home by his own appointment, and buried in Attica, unknown to the Athenians; for it was not lawful to bury one there that had fled for treason. These were the ends of Pausanias the Lacedæmonian, and Themistocles the Athenian, the most famous men of all the Grecians of their time.

CXXXIX. And this is that which the Lacedæmonians did command, and were commanded in their first embassy, touching the banishment of such as were under the curse.

After this, they sent ambassadors again to Athens, commanding them to levy the siege from before Potidæa, and to suffer Ægina to be free; but principally, and most plainly telling them, that the war should not be made, in case they would abrogate the act concerning the Megareans. By which act they were forbidden both the fairs of Attica, and all ports within the Athenian dominion. But the Athenians would not obey them, neither in the rest of their commands, nor in the abrogation of that act; but recriminated the Megareans, for having tilled holy ground, and unset-out with bounds: and for receiving of their slaves that revolted. But at length, when the last ambassadors from Lacedæmon were arrived, namely, Rhampbias, Melesippus, and Agesander, and spake nothing of that which formerly they were wont, but only this, that the Lacedæmonians desire that there should be peace, which may be had, if you will suffer the Grecians to be governed by their own laws. The Athenians called an assembly,

¹ A. C. 466.² £9687 10s.

and propounding their opinions among themselves, thought good, after they had debated the matter, to give them an answer once for all. And many stood forth, and delivered their minds on either side, some for the war, and some that this act concerning the Megareans ought not to stand in their way to peace, but to be abrogated. And Pericles, the son of Xantippus, the principal man at that time of all Athens, and most sufficient both for speech and action, gave his advice in such manner as follows :

The Oration of Pericles.

CXL. “ Men of Athens, I am still not only of the same opinion, “ not to give way to the Peloponnesians, notwithstanding I know that “ men have not the same passions in the war itself, which they have “ when they are incited to it, but change their opinions with the “ events, but also I see that I must now advise the same things, or “ very near to what I have before delivered. And I require of you, “ with whom my counsel shall take place, that if we miscarry in “ ought, you will either make the best of it, as decreed by common “ consent, or if we prosper, not attribute it to your own wisdom only. “ For it falls out with the events of actions no less than with the pur- “ poses of man, to proceed with uncertainty : which is also the cause “ that when any thing happens contrary to our expectation, we use to “ lay the fault on fortune. That the Lacedæmonians, both formerly, “ and especially now, take counsel how to do us mischief, is a thing “ manifest. For whereas it is said, [in the articles] that in our mutual “ controversies, we shall give and receive trials of judgment, and in “ the mean time, either side hold what they possess, they never yet “ sought any such trial themselves, nor will accept of the same offered “ by us. They will clear themselves of their accusations, by war “ rather than by words : and come hither no more now to expostulate, “ but to command. For they command us to arise from before Poti- “ dæa, and to restore the Æginetæ to the liberty of their own laws, “ and to abrogate the act concerning the Megareans. And they that “ come last command us to restore all the Grecians to their liberty. “ Now let none of you conceive that we shall go to war for a trifle, “ by not abrogating the act concerning Megara, yet this by them is “ pretended most, and that for the abrogation of it the war shall “ stay ; nor retain a scruple in your minds, as if a small matter “ moved you to the war : for even this small matter containeth the trial “ and constancy of your resolution ; wherein if you give them way, “ you shall hereafter be commanded a greater matter, as men that for “ fear will obey them likewise in that. But by a stiff denial, you “ shall teach them plainly, to come to you hereafter on terms of more “ equality.

CXLI. “ Resolve, therefore, from this occasion, either to yield “ them obedience, before you receive damage ; or if we must have “ war, (which for my part I think is best,) be the pretence weighty or “ light, not to give way, nor keep what we possess in fear. For a “ great and a little claim, imposed by equals upon their neighbours, “ before judgment, by way of command, has one and the same virtue

“ to make subject. As for the war, how both we and they be furnished, and why we are not like to have the worse, by hearing the particulars, you shall now understand. The Peloponnesians are men that live by their labour, without money, either in particular or in common stock. Besides, in long wars, and by sea, they are without experience; for the wars which they have had one against another, have been but short, through poverty; and such men can neither man their fleets, nor yet send out their armie by land very often, because they must be far from their own wealth, and yet by that be maintained; and be besides barred the use of the sea. It must be a stock of money, not forced contributions, that support the wars, and such as live by their labour are more ready to serve the wars with their bodies than with their money. For they make account that their bodies will out-live the danger, but their money they think is sure to be spent; especially if the war, as it is likely, should last. So that the Peloponnesians and their confederates, though for one battle they be able to stand out against all Greece besides, yet to maintain a war against such as have their preparations of another kind, they are not able; inasmuch as not having one and the same counsel, they can speedily perform nothing upon the occasion: and having equality of vote, and being of several races,¹ every one will press his particular interest, whereby nothing is like to be fully executed. For some will desire most to take revenge on some enemies, and others to have their estates least wasted; and being long before they can assemble, they take the less part of their time to debate the common business, and the greater to despatch their own private affairs. And every one supposes that his own neglect of the common estate, can do little hurt,² and that it will be the care of some body else to look to that, for his own good; not observing how by these thoughts of every one in several, the common business is jointly ruined.

CXLII. “ But their greatest hinderance of all, will be their want of money, which being raised slowly, their actions must be full of delay, which the occasions of war will not endure. As for their fortifying here, and their navy, they are matters not worthy fear. For it were a hard matter for a city equal to our own, in time of peace to fortify in that manner, much less in the country of an enemy, and we no less fortified against them. And if they had a garrison here, though they might by excursions, and by the receiving of our fugitives, annoy some part of our territory: yet would not that be enough both to besiege us, and also to hinder us from sailing into their territories, and from taking revenge with our fleet, which is the thing wherein our strength lies. For we have more experience in land service by use of the sea, than they have in sea service by use of the land. Nor shall they attain the knowledge of naval affairs

¹ Of the Peloponnesians and their confederates, some were Dorians, some Æolians, and some Boeotians.

² οἷται βλάψειν, Bekker. οἷται

βλάψειν τὰ κοινὰ, Duker. And each thinks that harm will not arise from his own neglect.

“ easily. For you yourselves, though falling to it immediately upon the Persian war, have not yet attained it fully. How then should husbandmen, not seamen, whom also we will not suffer to apply themselves to it, by lying continually upon them with so great fleets, perform any matter of value? Indeed if they should be opposed but with a few ships, they might venture, encouraging their want of knowledge with store of men; but awed by many, they will not stir that way; and not applying themselves to it, will be yet more unskilful, and thereby more cowardly. For knowledge of naval matters is an art as well as any other, and not to be attended at idle times, and on the by;’ but requiring rather, that whilst it is learning, that nothing else should be done on the by.

CXLIII. “ But say they should take the money at Olympia and Delphi, and therewith, at greater wages, go about to draw from us the strangers employed in our fleet; this indeed, if going abroad both ourselves and those that dwell amongst us, we could not match them, were a dangerous matter. But now we can both do this, and (which is the principal thing) we have steersmen, and other necessary men for the service of a ship, both more and better of our own citizens, than are in all the rest of Greece. Besides that, not any of these strangers upon trial, would be found content to fly his own country; and withal upon less hope² of victory, for a few days’ increase of wages, take part with the other side. In this manner, or like to this, seems to me to stand the case of the Peloponnesians: whereas ours is both free from what in theirs I have reprehended, and has many great advantages besides. If they invade our territory by land, we shall invade theirs by sea. And when we have wasted part of Peloponnesus, and they all Attica, yet shall theirs be the greater loss. For they, unless by the sword, can get no other territory instead of that we shall destroy: whereas for us there is other land, both in the islands and continent: for the dominion of the sea is a great matter. Consider but this; if we dwelt in the islands, whether of us then were more inexpugnable? We must therefore now, drawing as near as can be to that imagination, lay aside the care of fields and villages, and not for the loss of them, out of passion give battle to the Peloponnesians, far more in number than ourselves; (for though we give them an overthrow, we must fight again with as many more: and if we be overthrown, we shall lose the help of our confederates, which are our strength; for when we cannot war on them, they will revolt;) nor bewail ye the loss of fields or houses, but of men’s bodies; for men may acquire these, but these cannot acquire men. And if I thought I should prevail, I would advise you to go out, and destroy them yourselves,³ and shew the Peloponnesians that you will never the sooner obey them for such things as these.

¹ Ἐκ παρέρργου, as a by-work.

² That is, of victory by sea, where they were to be employed.

³ εἰ ψῆμην πείσειν ὑμᾶς, αὐτοὺς ἀν ἐξελθόντας, Bekker. εἰ ψῆμην πείσειν,

ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀν ἐξελθόντας, Duker. And if I thought that I should persuade you, I would desire you to go out yourselves and destroy them.

CXLIV. “ There be many other things that give hope of victory, in case you do not, whilst you are in this war, strive to enlarge your dominion, and undergo other voluntary dangers ; for I am afraid of our own errors more than of their designs, but they shall be spoken of at another time in prosecution of the war itself. For the present let us send away these men with this answer : that the Megareans shall have the liberty of our fairs and ports, if the Lacedæmonians will also make no banishment of us, nor of our confederates, as of strangers. For neither our act concerning Megara, nor their banishment of strangers, is forbidden in the articles. Also that we will let the Grecian cities be free, if they were so when the peace was made ; and if the Lacedæmonians will also give leave to their confederates to use their freedom, not as shall serve the turn of the Lacedæmonians, but as they themselves shall every one think good. Also, that we will stand to judgment according to the articles, and will not begin the war, but be revenged on those that shall. For this is both just, and for the dignity of the city to answer. Nevertheless you must know, that of necessity war there will be ; and the more willingly we embrace it, the less pressing we shall have our enemies ; and that out of greatest dangers, whether to cities or private men, arise the greatest honours. For our fathers, when they engaged the Medes, did from less beginnings, nay, abandoning the little they had, by wisdom rather than fortune, by courage rather than strength, both repel the Barbarian, and advance this state to the height it is now at. Of whom we ought not now to come short, but rather to revenge us by all means on our enemies, and do our best to deliver the state, unimpaired by us, to posterity.”

CXLV. Thus spake Pericles. The Athenians liking his advice best, decreed as he would have them ; answering the Lacedæmonians according to his direction, both in particular as he had spoken, and generally ; that they would do nothing on command, but were ready to answer their accusations upon equal terms, by way of arbitrament. So the ambassadors went home, and after these there came no more.

CXLVI. These were the quarrels and differences on either side before the war : which quarrels began presently upon the business of Epidamnus and Corcyra. Nevertheless, there was still commerce betwixt them, and they went to each other without any herald, though not without jealousy. For the things that had passed were but the confusion of the articles, and matter of the war to follow.

THUCYDIDES.

BOOK II.

Three first years of the war. Entry of the Theban soldiers into Plataea, by the treason of some within. Their repulse and slaughter. Irruption of the Peloponnesians into Attica. Wasting of the coast of Peloponnesus by the Athenian fleet. Public funeral of the first slain. Second invasion of Attica. Plague at Athens. Ambra-ciots make war against the Amphilochoi. Plataea assaulted. Besieged. Peloponnesian fleet beaten by Phormio before the strait of the gulf of Crissa. Same fleet repaired and reinforced, and beaten again by Phormio, before Naupactus. Attempt of the Peloponnesians on Salamis. Fruitless expedition of the Thracians against the Macedonians.

YEAR I. A. C. 431. OLYMP. 87½.

CHAP. I.

THE war between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians begins now, (from the time they had no longer commerce one with another without a herald, and that having once begun it, they warred without intermission.) And it is written in order by summers and winters, as the several matters came to pass.

II. The peace, which after the winning of Eubœa, was concluded for thirty years, lasted fourteen; but in the fifteenth year, being the forty-eighth of the priesthood of Chrysis,¹ in Argos: Ænesias being Ephore at Sparta, and Pythodorus, Archon of Athens, having still two months of his government to come,² in the sixth month after the battle at Potidæa, and in the beginning of spring, three hundred and odd Thebans, (led by Pythangelus, son of Phylides, and Diemporus, son of Onetorides, Bœotian rulers,³) about the first watch of the night entered with their arms into Plataea,⁴ a city of Bœotia, and confederate of the Athenians. They were brought in, and the gates opened

¹ Priestess of Juno; by whose priesthood they reckoned their years.

² The Athenians began their years about the summer solstice.

³ Βουλευταὶ. Of these there were eleven, who had in turns the absolute command of the Bœotians in their wars. The sovereignty of Bœotia was lodged in four councils, composed of deputies sent from all the cities which composed the republic, and who sat at Thebes. See b. iv. 92, v. 37, 38. In this union Plataea was not included.

⁴ Plataea was a city and petty state

of Bœotia, on the confines of Attica. The inhabitants of it had ever been so firmly attached to the liberties of Greece, as to draw upon them the lasting rancour of the Thebans, who had joined the Persians when they invaded Greece, and persuaded them to burn Plataea, Herod. viii. 50. In the famous battle fought within their own territory, they espoused the cause of Greece, for which service they were made citizens of Athens, and were included in the public prayers offered for the prosperity of that state.

to them by Naucrides and his complices, men of Platæa, who for their own private ambition, intended both the destruction of such citizens as were their enemies, and the putting of the whole city under subjection of the Thebans. This they negotiated with Eurymachus, son of Leontiades, one of the most potent men of Thebes. For the Thebans, foreseeing the war, whilst there was yet peace, and the war not openly on foot, desired to preoccupy Platæa, which was always at variance with them. By which means they more easily entered undiscovered, there being no order taken before for a watch. And making¹ a stand in their arms in the market-place, did not, as they that gave them entrance would have had them, fall presently to the business, and enter the houses of their adversaries, but resolved rather to make favourable proclamation, and induce the cities to composition and friendship : (and the herald proclaimed, that if any man, according to the ancient custom of all the Bœotians, would enter into the same league of war with them, he should come and bring his arms to theirs,) supposing the city by this means would easily be drawn to their side.

III. The Platæans when they perceived that the Thebans were already entered, and had surprised the city, through fear and an opinion that more were entered than indeed were, (for they could not see them in the night) came to composition, and accepting the condition, rested quiet : and the rather that they had as yet done no man harm. But whilst these things were treating, they observed that the Thebans were not many, and thought that if they should set upon them, they might easily have the victory. For the Platæan commons were not willing to have revolted from the Athenians. Wherefore it was thought fit to undertake the matter; and they united themselves, by digging through the common walls between house and house, that they might not be discovered as they passed the streets. They also placed carts in the streets, without the cattle, to serve instead of a wall; and other things they put in readiness, as they severally seemed necessary for the present enterprize. When all things according to their means were ready, they marched from their houses towards their enemies; fixing their time whilst it was yet night, and a little before break of day; because they would not have to charge them, when they should be emboldened by the light, and on equal terms, but when they should by night be terrified, and inferior to them in knowledge of the places of the city. So they forthwith set upon them, and came quickly up to hand strokes.

IV. And the Thebans finding they were deceived, cast themselves into a round figure, and beat them back in that part where the assault was made; and twice or thrice repulsed them. But at last, when both the Platæans themselves charged them with a great clamour, and their wives also and families shouted and screeched from the houses, and withal threw stones and tiles among them; the night having been also very wet, they were afraid and turned their backs, and fled here and there about the city: ignorant for the most part, in the dark and

¹ Θίμενοι τὰ ὕπλα.

dirt, of the ways out, by which they should have been saved, (for this accident happened at the change of the moon,) and pursued by such as were well acquainted with the ways to keep them in, insomuch that the greatest part of them perished.¹ The gate by which they entered, and which alone was left open, a certain Platæan shut up again with the head of a javelin, which he thrust into the staple instead of a bolt : so that this way also their passage was stopped. As they were chased up and down the city some climbed the walls and cast themselves out, and for the most part died ; some came to a desert gate of the city, and with a hatchet given them by a woman, cut the staple, and got forth unseen : but these were not many, it being soon discovered : others again were slain, dispersed in several parts of the city. But the greatest part, and those especially who had cast themselves before into a ring, threw themselves into a great edifice adjoining to the wall, the doors whereof being open, they thought had been the gates of the city, and that there had been a direct way through to the other side. The Platæans seeing them now pent up, consulted whether they should burn them as they were, by firing the house, or resolve on some other punishment. At length, both these and the rest of the Thebans that were straggling in the city, agreed to yield themselves and their arms to the Platæans, at discretion. And this success had they who entered into Platæa.

V. But the rest of the Thebans that should have been there before day with their whole power, lest the surprise should not succeed with those that were in, came so late with their aid, that by the way they heard the news of what was done. Now Platæa is from Thebes seventy furlongs, and they marched the slower on account of the rain which had fallen the same night. For [the river] Asopus was swollen so high, that it was not easily passable ; so that what by the foulness of the way, and what by the difficulty of passing the river, they arrived not till some of their men were already slain and some taken prisoners. When the Thebans understood how things had gone, they lay in wait for such of the Platæans as were without ; for there were abroad in the villages both men and household-stuff, as was most likely, the evil happening unexpectedly, and in time of peace ; desiring, if they could take any prisoners, to keep them in exchange for those of theirs within, if any were saved alive. This was the Thebans' purpose. But the Platæans whilst they were yet in council, suspecting that some such thing would be done, and fearing their case without, sent a herald to the Thebans, whom they commanded to say, that what they had already done, attempting to surprise their city in time of peace, was done wickedly, and to forbid them to do any injury to those without, otherwise they would kill all those men of theirs that they had alive ; whom, if they would withdraw their forces out of their territory, they would again restore to them. Thus the Thebans say, and that the

¹ ὥστε διεφθείροντο πολλοί, Bekker.
ὥστε διεφθείροντο οἱ πολλοί, Duker. So
that many of them perished.—καὶ αἱ
πλησίον θύραι ἀνεψυγμέναι, Bekker. καὶ

αἱ θύραι ἀνεψυγμέναι, Duker ; and those
gates which were near happened to be
open.

Platæans swore it. But the Platæans confess not that they promised to deliver them presently; but upon treaty, if they should agree; but deny that they swore it. On this the Thebans went out of their territory, and the Platæans, when they had speedily taken in whatever they had in the country, immediately slew their prisoners. One hundred and eighty were taken, Eurymachus, with whom the traitors had practised, being one.

VI. When they had done they sent a messenger to Athens, and gave truce to the Thebans to fetch away the bodies of their dead, and ordered the city as was thought convenient for the present occasion.

The news of what was done, coming straightway to Athens, they instantly laid hands on all the Boeotians then in Attica, and sent an officer to Platæa to forbid their further proceeding with their Theban prisoners, till such time as they also should have advised of the matter: for they were not yet advertised of their being put to death. For the first messenger was sent away when the Thebans first entered the town; and the second when they were overcome and taken prisoners. But of what followed they knew nothing. So that the Athenians when they sent, knew not what was done, and the officer arriving, found that the men were already slain. After this, the Athenians sending an army to Platæa, victualled it, and left a garrison in it, and took thence both the women and children, and also such men as were unserviceable for the war.

VII. This action falling out at Platæa, and the peace now clearly dissolved, the Athenians prepared themselves for war; so also did the Lacedæmonians and their confederates; intending on either part to send ambassadors to the king,¹ and to other Barbarians wheresoever they had hope of succours, and contracting leagues with such cities as were not under their own command. The Lacedæmonians,² besides those galleys which they had in Italy and Sicily, of the cities that took part with them there, were ordered to furnish, proportionably to the greatness of their several cities, so many more, as the whole number might amount to five hundred sail, and to provide a sum of money assessed, and in other things not to stir farther, but to receive the Athenians, coming but with one galley at once, till such time as the same should be ready. The Athenians on the other side, surveyed their present confederates, and sent ambassadors to those places that lay about Peloponnesus, as Corcyra, Cephallenia, the Acarnanians, and Zacynthus, knowing that as long as these were their friends they might with the more security make war round about upon the coast of Peloponnesus.

VIII. Neither side conceived small matters, but put their whole strength to the war. And not without reason: for all men in the beginning of enterprises, are the most eager. Besides, there were then in Peloponnesus many young men, and many in Athens, who for want of experience, not unwillingly undertook the war. And not

¹ Of Persia, Artaxerxes Longimanus. cedæmonian party, not particularly that

² The Lacedæmonian league, or La- state.

only the rest of Greece stood at gaze,¹ to behold the two principal states in combat, but many prophecies² were told, and many sung, by the priests of the oracles, both in the cities about to war, and in others.

There was also a little before this an earthquake in Delos,³ which in the memory of the Grecians never shook before; and was interpreted for, and seemed to be a sign of what was afterwards to come to pass. And whatsoever thing then chanced of the same nature, it was all sure to be inquired after. But men's affections for the most part went with the Lacedæmonians; and the rather, because they gave out, that they would recover the liberty of the Grecians. And every man, both private and public, endeavoured⁴ as much as in him lay, both in word and deed to assist them, and thought the business so much hindered, as himself was not present at it. In such passion were most men against the Athenians, some for desire to be delivered from their government, and others for fear of falling into it. And these were the preparations and affections brought into the war.

IX. But the confederates of either party, when they began, were these: the Lacedæmonians had all Peloponnesus within the Isthmus, except the Argives and Achaïans; for these were in amity with both, save that the Pellenians at first, alone of all Achaïa, took their part; but afterwards the rest did so likewise; and without Peloponnesus, the Megareans, Locrians, Bœotians, Phocians, Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians: of whom the Corinthians, Megareans, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Eleans, Ambraciots, and Leucadians found shipping: the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, horsemen: and the rest of the cities, footmen. And these were the confederates of the Lacedæmonians. The Athenian confederates were these: the Chians, Lesbians, Platæans, Messenians⁵ in Naupactus, most of the Acarnanians, the Corcyræans, Zacynthians, and other cities their tributaries amongst those nations. Also that part of Caria which is on the sea coast, and the Dorians⁶ adjoining to them, Ionia, Hellespont, the cities bordering on Thrace, all the islands from Peloponnesus to Crete on the east, and all the rest of the Cyclades, except Melos and Thera. Of these the Chians, Lesbians, and Corcyræans found galleys, the rest footmen and money. These were their confederates and the preparation for the war on both sides.

X. The Lacedæmonians, after the business of Platæa, sent messengers presently up and down Peloponnesus, and to their confederates without, to have in readiness their forces, and such things as should be necessary for a foreign expedition, as intending the invasion of Attica.

¹ Μετέωρος ἦν.

² Δόγια, prophecies in prose. Ἦδον were sung. For those prophecies which the oracles delivered by their priests, were in verse, and were not called Δόγια, but Χρήσμοι.

³ See Herod. vi. 98.

⁴ καὶ ἰδίῳτης καὶ πόλεις, Bekker. πολίτης, Duker. And every one, both

private individuals and the whole city, endeavoured.

⁵ Messenians had a refuge given them by the Athenians at Naupactus. They had been among the rebellious subjects of Sparta.

⁶ Those who were seated in the islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Cnidus.

And when they were all ready, two thirds of the forces of every city came to the Isthmus at a day appointed. When the whole army was got together,¹ Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, general of the expedition, called together the commanders of the several cities, and such as were in authority, and most worthy to be present, and spoke unto them as follows ;

Oration of Archidamus.

XI. “ Men of Peloponnesus, and confederates, not only our fathers
“ have had many wars both within and without Peloponnesus ; but
“ we ourselves, also, such as are any thing in years, have been suffi-
“ ciently acquainted therewith : yet did we never before set forth with
“ so great a preparation as this present. And now, not only we are
“ a numerous and puissant army that invade, but the state also is
“ puissant that is invaded by us. We have reason therefore to shew
“ ourselves, neither worse than our fathers, nor short of the opinion
“ conceived of ourselves. For all Greece is up at this commotion ob-
“ serving us ; and through their hatred to the Athenians, wish that we
“ may accomplish whatever we intend. And therefore though we
“ seem to invade them with a great army, and to have much assurance
“ that they will not come out against us to battle, yet we ought not
“ for this, to march the less carefully prepared, but of every city, as
“ well the captain as the soldier, to expect always some danger or
“ other, in that part wherein he himself is placed. For the accidents
“ of war are uncertain ; and for the most part the onset begins from
“ the lesser number, and upon passion. And oftentimes the lesser
“ number, being afraid, has beaten back the greater with the more
“ ease, for that through contempt they have gone unprepared. And
“ in the land of an enemy, though the soldiers ought always to have
“ bold hearts, yet for action they ought to make their preparations, as
“ if they were afraid. For that will give them both more courage to
“ go upon the enemy, and more safety in fighting with him. But we
“ invade not now a city that cannot defend itself, but a city every way
“ well appointed. So that we must by all means expect to be fought
“ withal, though not now, because we be not yet there, yet hereafter,
“ when they shall see us in their country wasting and destroying their
“ possessions : for all men when in their own sight, and on a sudden,
“ they receive any extraordinary hurt, fall presently into choler ; and
“ the less they consider with the more stomach they assault. And
“ this is likely to hold in the Athenians somewhat more than in others ;
“ for they think themselves worthy to have the command of others,
“ and to invade and waste the territory of their neighbours, rather
“ than to see their neighbours waste theirs. Wherefore as being to
“ war against a great city, and to procure both to your ancestors and
“ yourselves, a great fame, either good or bad, as shall be the event ;
“ follow your leaders, in such sort, as above all things esteeming order
“ and watchfulness : for there is nothing in the world more comely

¹ Plutarch says that the number amounted to sixty thousand.

“ nor more safe, than when many men are seen to observe one and the same order.”

XII. Archidamus having thus spoken, and dismissed the council, first sent Melesippus, the son of Diacritus, a man of Sparta, to Athens, to try if the Athenians, seeing them now on their journey, would yet in some degree remit of their obstinacy. But the Athenians neither received him into their city, nor presented him to the state: for the opinion of Pericles had already taken place, to receive from the Lacedæmonians, neither herald nor ambassador, as long as their army was abroad. They sent him back, therefore without audience, with commandment to be out of their borders the self-same day; and that hereafter if they would any thing with them, they should return every one to his home, and send their ambassadors from thence. They sent with him also certain persons to convoy him out of the country, that no man should confer with him: who, when he came to the limits, and was to be dismissed, uttered these words: this day is the beginning of much evil unto the Grecians: and so departed. When he returned to the camp, Archidamus perceiving that they would not relent, dislodged, and marched on with his army into their territory. The Bœotians with their appointed part, and with horsemen, aided the Peloponnesians; but with the rest of their forces, went and wasted the territory of Platæa.

XIII. Whilst the Peloponnesians were coming together in the isthmus, and when they were on their march, before they brake into Attica, Pericles, the son of Xantippus, (who with nine others was general of the Athenians) when he saw they were about to break in, suspecting that Archidamus, either from private courtesy, or by command of the Lacedæmonians, to bring him into jealousy, as they had before for his sake commanded the excommunication, might oftentimes leave his lands untouched, told the Athenians beforehand in an assembly, that though Archidamus had been his guest, it was for no ill to the state, and howsoever, if the enemy did not waste his lands and houses, as well as the rest, that then he gave them to the commonwealth. And therefore desired, that for this he might not be suspected. Also he advised them concerning the business in hand, the same things he had done before, that they should make preparation for the war, and receive their goods into the city; that they should not go out to battle, but come into the city, and guard it. That they should also furnish out their navy, wherein consisted their power, and hold a careful hand over their confederates, telling them, how that in the money that came from these lay their strength, and that the victory in war consisted wholly in counsel and store of money. Further, he bade them be confident in that there was yearly coming into the state from the confederates for tribute, besides other revenue, six hundred talents, and remaining yet then in the citadel six thousand talents of silver coin; (for the greatest sum there had been, was ten thousand talents, wanting three hundred, out of which was taken that which had been expended upon the gate-houses of the citadel, and upon other buildings, and for the charges of Potidæa.) Besides, the uncoined gold and silver of private and public offerings; and all the dedicated vessels

belonging to the shews and games, and the spoils of the Persian, and other things of that nature, which amounted to no less than five hundred talents.¹ He added further, that much money might be had out of other temples without the city, which they might use. And if they were barred the use of all these, they might yet use the ornaments of gold about the goddess herself; and said that the image had about it the weight of forty talents of most pure gold, and which might all be taken off; but having made use of it for their safety, he said they were to make restitution of the like quantity again. Thus he encouraged them touching matter of money. Men of arms, he said they had thirteen thousand, besides the sixteen thousand that were employed for the guard of the city and upon the walls; (for so many at the first kept watch at the coming in of the enemy, young and old together, and strangers that dwelt amongst them, as many as could bear arms. For the length of the Phalerian wall, to that part of the circumference of the wall of the city where it joined, was thirty-five furlongs;² and that part of the circumference which was guarded, for some of it was not kept with a watch, namely, the part between the Long Walls and the Phalerian, was forty-three furlongs; and the length of the Long Walls down to Piræus, of which there was a watch only on the outmost, was forty furlongs; and the whole compass of Piræus, together with the Munychia, was sixty furlongs, whereof that part which was watched, was but half.³) He said further, they had of horsemen, counting archers on horseback, one thousand two hundred, and one thousand six hundred archers, and of galleys fit for the sea three hundred. All this and no less had the Athenians when the invasion of the Peloponnesians was first in hand, and when the war began. These and other words spake Pericles, as he used to do, for demonstration that they were likely to outlast this war.

XIV. When the Athenians had heard him, they approved of his words, and fetched into the city their wives and children, and the furniture of their houses, pulling down the very timber of the houses themselves. Their sheep and oxen they sent over to Eubœa, and the islands over against them. Nevertheless this removal, as most of them had been accustomed to the country life, grieved them very much.

XV. This custom was, from great antiquity, more familiar with the Athenians than any of the rest of Greece. For in the time of Cecrops, and the first kings down to Theseus, the inhabitants of Attica had their several burghs,⁴ and therein their common-halls,⁵ and their go-

¹ The annual tribute amounted to £116,250, calculating the talent at £193 15s. The fund remaining in the citadel was £1,162,500. They had expended in public works £716,875. All which tends to shew that Athens was at this time in a very flourishing condition.

² Thirty-five stadia, about three miles and a half. The stadium being one hundred paces, four feet, four inches and a half.

³ The compass of the walls of Athens was about twenty-two Attic miles, or nearly seventeen English. The Attic mile consisting of eight hundred and five paces; the English, one thousand and fifty-six.

⁴ Δῆμοι, little boroughs of Attica, several of which belonged to each tribe, in number seventy-four.

⁵ Πρυτανεία. Guild-halls, places where those that administered the affairs of the state met: where also some

vernors; and unless they were in fear of some danger, went not together to the king for advice, but every city administered their own affairs, and deliberated by themselves. And some of them had also their particular wars, as the Eleusinians, who joined with Eumolpus¹ against Erechtheus.² But after Theseus came to the kingdom, one who besides his wisdom, was also a man of very great power; he not only set good order in the country in other respects, but also dissolved the councils and magistracies of the rest of the towns; and assigning them all one hall, and one council-house, brought them all to live together in the city that now is, and constrained them, enjoying their own as before, to use³ this one for their city, which (now when they all paid their duties to it) grew great, and was by Theseus so delivered to posterity. And from that time to this day the Athenians keep a holiday at the public charge to the goddess, and call it *Synœcia*.⁴ That which is now the citadel, and the part which is to the south of the citadel, was before this time the city. An argument whereof is this, that the temples of the gods are all set either in the citadel itself; or, if without, yet in that quarter. As that of Jupiter Olympus, and of Apollo Pythius, and of Tellus, and of Bacchus in Lymnæ, in honour of whom the old Bacchanals⁵ were celebrated on the twelfth day of the month of Anthesterion,⁶ according as the Ionians, who are derived from Athens, do still observe them, besides other ancient temples situate in the same part. Moreover they served themselves with water for the best uses of the fountain, which now the Nine-Pipes, built so by the Tyrants, was formerly, when the springs were open, called Calliroë, and was near. And from the old custom, before marriages and other holy rites, they ordain the use of the same water to this day. And the citadel, from the ancient habitation of it, is also by the Athenians still called the city.

XVI. The Athenians therefore had lived a long time governed by laws of their own, in the country towns; and after they were brought into one, were nevertheless (both for the custom which most had, as well of the ancient time, as since, till the Persian war, to live in the country with their whole families; and also especially, for that since

for honour's sake, were allowed diet, and wherein Vesta was worshipped, and a light continually burned; so that some thence derive the name, making *πυραγίον* quasi *πυρὸς ταμίον*.

¹ King of Thrace; appointed priest of Ceres by Erechtheus, against whom he afterwards made war. In his family the priesthood remained one thousand two hundred years, though he who was appointed to the office was compelled to remain in perpetual celibacy.

² Sixth king of Athens reigned fifty years; died A. C. 1347.

³ Not that they must needs dwell in it; but make it the seat of the government, and pay their duties to it. This

caused the city to grow both populous and potent, because now the whole nation united into one city, made use of the sea, which divided, they could not have done.

⁴ *Συνολκία*, dwelling together. This feast is called *Meroïka* by Plutarch.

⁵ There were in Athens three Bacchanals, whereof this Bacchus in Lymnæ, (situated near to the city walls, and so called from some pools of water which were there,) was principal; another were the rural Bacchanals; and the third the city of Bacchanals.

⁶ This month fell about our January or February, and was the second of their winter quarter.

the Persian war, they had already repaired their houses and furniture) unwilling to remove. It pressed them likewise, and was heavily taken, besides their houses, to leave the things¹ that pertained to their religion, which, since their old form of government, were become patril, and to change their manner of life, and to be no better than banished every man his city.

XVII. After they came into Athens, there was habitation for a few, and place of retire,² with some friends or kindred. But the greatest part seated themselves in the empty places of the city, and in temples, and in all the chapels of the Heroes,³ saving in such as were in the citadel, and the Eleusinian,⁴ and other places strongly shut up. The Pelasgicon⁵ also, under the citadel, though it were a thing accursed to dwell in it, and forbidden by the end of a verse in a Pythian oracle, in these words :—" Best is the Pelasgicon empty ;" was nevertheless for the present necessity inhabited. And in my opinion this prophecy now fell out contrary to what was looked for : for the unlawful dwelling there, caused not the calamities that befel the city, but the war caused the necessity of dwelling there : which war the oracle not naming, foretold only, that it should one day be inhabited unfortunately. Many also furnished the turrets of the walls, and whatsoever other place they could any of them get. For when they were come in, the city had not place for them all : but afterwards they had the Long Walls, divided amongst them, and inhabited there, and in most parts of Piræus. Withal they applied themselves to the business of the war, levying their confederates, and making ready a hundred galleys to send about Peloponnesus. Thus were the Athenians preparing.

XVIII. The army of the Peloponnesians marching forward, came first to Oenœ,⁶ a town of Attica, the place where they intended to break in ; and encamping before it prepared with engines, and by other means, to assault the wall. For Oenœ lying on the confines between Attica and Bœotia, was walled about, and the Athenians kept a garrison in it for defence of the country, when at any time there should be war. For which cause they made preparation for the assault of it, and also spent much time about it otherwise.

And for this Archidamus was not a little taxed, being thought to have been both slow in gathering together the forces for the war, and also to have favoured the Athenians, in that he encouraged not the army to a forwardness in it. And afterwards likewise, his stay in the isthmus, and his slowness in the whole journey, was laid to his charge, but especially his delay at Oenœ : for in this time the Athenians retired into the city, whereas it was thought that the Peloponnesians

¹ Altars, chapels, household-gods.

² *Karaphynē*.

³ Men supposed to be begotten between a deity and a mortal, or such as exceed the rest of men by many degrees in magnanimity.

⁴ A temple in Athens, used with great reverence.

⁵ Pelasgicon, a place by the citadel

where the Pelasgians once fortified themselves against the Athenians, and for that cause there was laid a curse upon the habitation of it.—*Paus. in Attic.*

⁶ Oenœ, a town near Eleuthera, on the confines of Bœotia. There was another of the same name near to Marathon. See Herod. v. 74.

marching speedily, might, but for his delay, have taken them all without: so enraged was the army of Archidamus, at his stay before Oenoë. But expecting that the Athenians, whilst their territory was yet unhurt, would relent, and not endure to see it wasted, for that cause, as it is reported, he held his hand.

XIX. But afterwards, when they had assaulted Oenoë, and tried all means, but could not take it, and seeing the Athenians sent no herald to them, then at length arising from thence, about eighty days after that which happened to the Thebans who entered Plataea, the summer and corn being now at the highest, they fell into Attica; led by Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. And when they had pitched their camp, they fell to wasting of the country, first about Eleusis, and then in the plain of Thriasia, and put to flight a few Athenian horsemen at the brooks called Rheiti. After this, leaving the Ægaleon on the right hand, they passed through Cecropia¹ till they came to Acharnæ, the greatest town in Attica, of those that are called Demoi; and pitching there, both fortified their camp, and staid a great while wasting the country thereabout.

XX. Archidamus was said to have staid so long at Acharnæ, with his army in battle array, and not to have come down into the plain during this invasion, with this intention: he hoped that the Athenians flourishing in number of young men, and better furnished for war than ever they were before, would perhaps have come forth against him, and not endured to see their fields cut down and wasted; and therefore seeing they met him not in Thriasia, he thought good to try if they would come out against him stationed at Acharnæ. Besides, the place seemed to him commodious for the army to lie in; and it was thought also that the Acharnians being a great part of the city, for they were three thousand men of arms, would not have suffered the spoiling of their lauds, but rather have urged all the rest to go out and fight. And if they came not out against him at this invasion, they might hereafter more boldly both waste the campaign country, and come down even to the walls of the city. For the Acharnians, after they should have lost their own, would not be so forward to hazard themselves for the goods of other men; but there would be thoughts of sedition in one towards another in the city. These were the cogitations of Archidamus, whilst he lay at Acharnæ.

XXI. The Athenians, as long as the army of the enemy lay about Eleusis and the fields of Thriasia, had hopes it would advance no further; remembering that Pleistoanax also, the son of Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon,² when fourteen years before this war, he entered Attica with an army of the Peloponnesians as far as Eleusis and Thriasia, retired again, and came no further; for which he was banished Sparta, as thought to have gone back for money. But when they saw the army now at Acharnæ, only sixty furlongs from the city, they then thought it no longer to be endured; and when their fields were wasted, as it was likely, in their sight, (which the younger sort had never seen

¹ διὰ Κρωπίας, Bekker. διὰ Κεκροπίας, Duker; through Crokeia.

² See book i. 114.

before, nor the elder but in the Persian war,) it was taken for a horrible matter, and thought fit by all, especially by the youth, to go out, and not to endure it any longer. And holding councils apart one from another, they were at much contention, some to make a sally and some to hinder it. And the priests of the oracles giving out prophecies of all kinds, every one made the interpretation according to his own affection.¹ But the Acharnians conceiving themselves to be no small part of the Athenians, were they, who whilst their own lands were wasting, most of all urged their going out. Insomuch as the city was every way in tumult, and in choler against Pericles, remembering nothing of what he had formerly admonished them; but reviled him, because being their general he refused to lead them to the field; and imputing to him the cause of all their evil.

XXII. But Pericles seeing them enraged on account of their present loss, and ill advised, and being confident he was right touching not sallying, assembled them not, nor called any council, lest being together, they might upon passion rather than judgment commit some error; but looked to the guarding the city, and as much as he could, to keep it in quiet. Nevertheless he continually sent out horsemen to keep the scouts of the army from entering, and doing hurt to the fields near the city. And there happened at Phrygiæ a small skirmish between one troop of horse of the Athenians, with whom were also the Thessalians, and the horsemen of the Bœotians; wherein the Athenians and Thessalians had not the worse, till such time as the Bœotians were aided by the coming in of their men of arms, and then they were put to flight, and a few of the Athenians and Thessalians slain; whose bodies, notwithstanding, they fetched off the same day, without leave of the enemy; and the Peloponnesians the next day erected a trophy. This aid of the Thessalians was upon an ancient league with the Athenians, and consisted of Larissæans, Pharsalians, Paralians, Cranonians, Peirasiens, Gytonians, Pheræans. The leaders of the Larissæans were Polymedes and Aristonous, men of contrary factions in their city. Of the Pharsalians, Menon. And of the rest, out of the several cities several commanders.

XXIII. The Peloponnesians, seeing the Athenians would not come out to fight, dislodging from Acharnæ, wasted certain other villages between the hills Parnethus and Brilessus.

Whilst these were in Attica the Athenians sent the hundred galleys which they had provided, and in them a thousand men of arms, and four hundred archers about Peloponnesus, the commanders whereof were Carcinus, the son of Xenotimus, Proteas, the son of Epicles, and Socrates, the son of Antigenes, who thus furnished, weighed anchor, and went their way.

The Peloponnesians, when they had staid in Attica as long as their provision lasted, went home through Bœotia, not the way they came in; but passing Oropus, wasted the country called Peiraice, which is

¹ ὡς ἀκροῖσθαι ὡς ἕκαστος ὥρμητο, interpret as suited his individual inclination. Bekker. ὡς ἡκροῖτο ὡς ἕκαστος ὥρμητο, terest. Duker. Which each was inclined to

of the tillage of the Oropians, subjects to the people of Athens; and when they were come back into Peloponnesus, they disbanded, and went every man to his own city.

XXIV. When they were gone, the Athenians ordained watches both by sea and land, such as were to continue to the end of the war. And made a decree to take out a thousand talents of the money in the citadel, and set it by, so as it might not be spent, but the charges of the war be borne out of other monies; and made it capital for any man to move, or give his vote for the stirring of this money for any other use, but only, if the enemy should come with an army by sea to invade the city, for necessity of that defence. Together with this money, they likewise set apart a hundred galleys, and those to be every year the best, and captains to be appointed over them; which were to be employed for no other use than the money was, and for the same danger, if need should require.

XXV. The Athenians who were with the hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, and with them the Corcyreans with the aid of fifty sail more, and certain others of the confederates thereabout, among other places which they infested in their course, landed at Methone, of Laconia, and assaulted it, as being but weak and few men within. But it chanced that Brasidas, the son of Tellis, a Spartan, had a garrison in those parts, and hearing of it, succoured those of the town with a hundred men of arms; wherewith running through the Athenian army, dispersed in the fields directly towards the town, he put himself into Methone; and with the loss of few of his men in the passage, saved the place, and for this adventure, was the first that was praised at Sparta in this war.¹ The Athenians putting off from thence, sailed along the coast, and put in at Pheia of Elis, where they spent two days wasting the country, and in a skirmish overthrew three hundred choice men of the lower Elis, together with other Eleans thereabouts that came forth to defend it. But the wind arising, and their galleys being tossed by the weather in a harbourless place, the most of them embarked, and sailed about the promontory called Ichthys, into the haven of Pheia. But the Messenians and certain others that could not get aboard, went by land to the town of Pheia and rifled it: and when they had done, the galleys that now were come about took them in, and leaving Pheia, put forth to sea again: by which time a great army of Eleans was come to succour it, but the Athenians were now gone away, and wasting some other territory.

XXVI. About the same time the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys about Locris,² which were to serve also for a watch about Eubœa. Of these Cleopompus, the son of Clinias, had the conduct, and landing his soldiers in divers parts, both wasted some places of

¹ Ἀνθρώπων οὐκ ἐνόντων is the phrase used by Thucydides in first speaking of Methone. In the very next sentence he says that Brasidas ἐβόησε τοῖς ἐν τῇ χωρῇ. His meaning, therefore, was, that there were no Lacedæmonians in

the place, and consequently no soldiers, the inhabitants being all unarmed Messenians and Helots.—*Mitford*.

² That Locris, the chief city whereof was Opus, not that where the Locri Ozolæ dwell.

the sea coast, and won the town of Thronium, of which he took hostages: and overcame in fight at Alope the Locrians that came out to aid it.

XXVII. The same summer the Athenians put the Æginetæ, man, woman, and child, out of Ægina, laying to their charge, that they were the principal cause of the present war. And it was also thought the safer course to hold Ægina, being adjacent to Peloponnesus, with a colony of their own people; and not long after they sent inhabitants to the same. When the Æginetæ were thus banished, the Lacedæmonians gave them Thyrea to dwell in, and the occupation of the lands belonging to it to live on; both from hatred to the Athenians, and for the benefits received from the Æginetæ during the earthquake and insurrection of their Helots. This territory of Thyrea is on the border between Argia and Laconica, and reaches to the sea side. So some of them were placed there, and the rest dispersed into other parts of Greece.

XXVIII. Also the same summer, the first day of the month, according to the moon,¹ (at which time it seems only possible) in the afternoon, happened an eclipse of the sun; which after it had appeared in the form of a crescent, and some stars had been discerned, came afterwards again to its former brightness.

XXIX. The same summer also the Athenians made Nymphodorus, son of Pytheus, of Abdera, whose sister was married to Sitalces, and who was of great power with him, their host,² though before they took him for an enemy, and sent for him to Athens, hoping by this means to bring Sitalces, son of Teres, king of Thrace, into their league. This Teres, the father of Sitalces, was the first that advanced the kingdom of the Odrysians, above the power of the rest of Thrace. For much of Thrace consists of free states; and Tereus,³ who took to wife, out of Athens, Procne, the daughter of Pandion, was no kin to this Teres, nor of the same part of Thrace. But that Tereus was of the city of Daulia, in the country now called Phocis, then inhabited by the Thracians. (And the fact of the women concerning Itys, was done there; and by the poets, where they mention the nightingale, that bird is also called Daulias. And it is more likely that Pandion matched his daughter with this man for vicinity and mutual succour, than with the other, that was so many days' journey off, as to Odrysæ.) And Teres, which is also another name, was the first who seized on the kingdom of Odrysæ. Now Sitalces, this man's son, the Athenians got into their league, that they might have the towns lying on Thrace, and Perdiccas, to be of their party. Nymphodorus, when he came to Athens, made this league between them and Sitalces, and caused Sadocus, son of Sitalces, to be made free of Athens, and also under-

¹ *Νουμηνία κατὰ σελήνην*. The first day of the month, according to the moon, in distinction of the month civil; for their year was lunar, yet was it so exact, as that the moon changed often on the first day.

² *Πρόξενος*, i. e. the individual at whose house, and by whom public persons who came from Athens to Abdera, were to be entertained.

³ See the fable of Tereus and Procne in Ovid's *Metam.*

took to end the war in Thrace.¹ For he would persuade Sitalces to send to the Athenians a Thracian army of horsemen and targeteers. He likewise reconciled Perdiccas to the Athenians, and procured for him the restitution of Therme.² And Perdiccas presently aided the Athenians and Phormio in the war against the Chalcidæans. Thus were Sitalces, son of Teres, king of Thrace, and Perdiccas, son of Alexander, king of Macedon,³ made confederates with the Athenians.

XXX. The Athenians being yet with their hundred galleys about Peloponnesus, took Solium, a town that belonged to the Corinthians, and put the Palirenses, alone of all the Acarnanians, in possession both of the town and territory; having also by force taken Astacus⁴ from the tyrant Evarchus, they drove him thence, and joined the place to their league: from thence they sailed to Cephallenia, and subdued it without battle. This Cephallenia is an island lying over against Acarnania and Leucas, and has in it these four cities, the Pallensians, Cranians, Samæans, and Pronæans. And not long after the fleet returned to Athens.

XXXI. About the end of the autumn of this summer, the Athenians, both themselves and the strangers that dwelt amongst them, with the whole power of the city, under conduct of Pericles, son of Xantippus, invaded the territory of Megara. And those Athenians likewise that had been with the hundred galleys, about Peloponnesus, in their return, (being now at Ægina,) hearing that the whole power of the city was gone to Megaris,⁵ went and joined them. And this was the greatest army that ever the Athenians had together in one place before; the city being now in strength, and the plague not yet amongst them: for the Athenians of themselves were no less than ten thousand men of arms, besides the three thousand at Potidæa; and the strangers⁶ that dwelt amongst them, and accompanied them in this invasion, were no fewer than three thousand men of arms more, besides other great numbers of light-armed soldiers. And when they had wasted the greatest part of the country, they went back to Athens. And afterwards, year after year, during this war, the Athenians [often] invaded Megaris, sometimes with their horsemen, and sometimes with their whole army, until such time as they had won Nisæa.

XXXII. Also in the end of this summer they fortified Atalanta, an island lying upon the Locrians of Opus, desolate till then, for a garrison against thieves, which passing over from Opus, and other parts of Locris, might annoy Eubœa. These were the things done this summer, after the retreat of the Peloponnesians out of Attica.

XXXIII. The winter following, Evarchus of Acarnania, desirous to return to Astacus, prevails with the Corinthians to go thither with forty galleys, and one thousand five hundred men of arms to re-esta-

¹ The war about Potidæa.

² See b. i. ch. 61.

³ Macedon at this time was not reckoned a part of Greece, both king and people being regarded as Barbarians. Alexander, father of this Perdiccas, was obliged to plead an Argive

pedigree, before being admitted to join at the Olympic festival.—See Herod. v. 22.

⁴ Astacus, situated at the mouth of the Achelous, in Acarnania.

⁵ The territory of Megara.

⁶ Μίτροικοι.

blish him; to which he hired also certain other mercenaries for the same purpose. The commanders of this army were Euphamidas, son of Aristonymus, Timoxenus, son of Timocrates, and Eumachus, son of Chrysis. When they had re-established him, they endeavoured to draw to their party some other places on the coast of Acarnania, but missing their purpose, they set sail homewards. As they passed by the coast of Cephallenia, they disembarked in the territory of the Cranians, where, under colour of composition, they were deceived, and lost some part of their forces. For the assault made on them by the Cranians being unexpected, they got off with much ado and went home.

XXXIV. The same winter the Athenians, according to their ancient custom, solemnized a public funeral of the first slain in this war, in this manner: having set up a tent, they put into it the bones of the dead,¹ three days before the funeral, and every one brings to his own what he thinks good.² When the day comes of carrying them to their burial, certain cypress coffins are carried along in carts, for every tribe one, in which are the bones of the men of each tribe by themselves.³ There is likewise borne an empty hearse covered over, for such as appear not, nor were found among the rest when they were taken up. The funeral is accompanied by any that will, whether citizen or stranger; and the women of their kindred are also by at the burial, lamenting and mourning. Then they put them into a public monument, which stands in the fairest suburbs of the city, (in which place⁴ they have ever interred all that died in the wars, except those slain at Marathon, who, because their virtue was thought extraordinary, were buried there;) and when the earth is thrown over them, some one thought to exceed the rest in wisdom and dignity, chosen by the city, makes an oration, wherein he gives them such praises as are fit; which done, the company depart. And this is the form of that burial; and for the whole time of the war,⁵ whenever there was occasion, they observed the same. For these first, the man chosen to make the oration was Pericles, son of Xantippus, who when the time served, going out of the place of burial into a high pulpit, to be heard the farther off by the multitude about him, spake in this manner:

Funeral Oration made by Pericles.

XXXV. " Though most that have spoken formerly in this place
 " have commended the man that added this oration to the law, as
 " honourable for those that die in the wars; yet to me it seems sufficient, that they who have shewn their valour by action, should also
 " by an action have their honour, (as now you see they have, in this

¹ The custom was when a man died to burn him, and the burial afterwards was only of his bones, or ashes.

² Offerings, incense, and the rites of burial.

³ For an account of the tribes, and their augmentation by Clisthenes, see Herod. v. 66.

⁴ The tomb was in the Ceramicus, a

public walk to the north of the city.—See Cic. ad Att. i. ep. 10.—Ceramicus signifies a pottery.

⁵ By the first slain in the war, is understood either the first every year in the same war, or the several actions of this great war are counted as several wars, and the first slain in any of them had the honour of this burial.

“ their sepulture performed by the state;) and not to have the virtue
 “ of many hazarded on one, to be believed as that one shall make a
 “ good or bad oration. For, to speak of men in a just measure, is a
 “ hard matter; and though one do so, yet he shall hardly get the
 “ truth firmly believed. The favourable hearer, and he that knows
 “ what was done, will perhaps think what is spoken, short of what he
 “ would have it, and what it was; and he that is ignorant, will find
 “ somewhat on the other side, which he will think too much extolled;
 “ especially if he hear aught above the pitch of his own nature. For
 “ to hear another man praised, finds patience so long only as each
 “ man shall think he could himself have done somewhat of that he
 “ hears. And if one exceed in their praises, the hearer presently
 “ through envy thinks it false. But since our ancestors have so
 “ thought good, I also, following the same ordinance, must endeavour
 “ to be answerable to the desires and opinions of every one of you, as
 “ far forth as I can.

XXXVI. “ I will begin at our ancestors, being a thing both just
 “ and honest, that to them first be given the honour of remembrance
 “ in this kind: for they having been always the inhabitants of this
 “ region,¹ by their valour, have delivered the same to succession of
 “ posterity hitherto, in the state of liberty, for which they deserve
 “ commendation: but our fathers deserve yet more, for that besides
 “ what descended on them, not without great labour of their own, they
 “ have purchased this our present dominion, and delivered the same
 “ over to us that now are. Which in a great part also, we ourselves,²
 “ who are yet in the strength of our age here present, have enlarged;
 “ and so furnished the city with every thing, both for peace and war,
 “ as it is now all-sufficient in itself. The actions of war, whereby all
 “ this was attained, and the deeds of arms, both of ourselves and our
 “ fathers, in valiant opposition to the Barbarians, or Grecians, in their
 “ wars against us, amongst you that are well acquainted with the
 “ sum, to avoid prolixity, I will pass over. But by what institutions
 “ we arrived at this, by what form of government, and by what means
 “ we have advanced the state to this greatness, when I shall have
 “ laid open this, I will then descend to these men’s praises. For I
 “ think they are things both fit for the purpose in hand, and profitable
 “ to the whole company, both of citizens and strangers, to hear
 “ related.

XXXVII. “ We have a form of government, not fetched by imi-
 “ tation from the laws of our neighbouring states,³ nay, we are rather
 “ a pattern to others than they to us, which, because in the adminis-
 “ tration, it hath respect, not to a few, but to the multitude, is called
 “ a democracy. Wherein, though there be an equality amongst all
 “ men in point of law for their private controversies, yet in the confer-
 “ ring of dignities one man is preferred before another to public

¹ See book i. 6.

² Pericles here alludes to his having added Eubœa and Samos to the Athenian power. B. i. 114 and 116.

³ Hinting at the Lacedæmonians, whose laws were enacted by Lycurgus, in imitation of those of the Egyptians and Cretans.

“ charge; and that according to the reputation, not of his house,¹ but
 “ of his virtue, and is not put back through poverty, for the obscurity
 “ of his person, as long as he can do good service to the common-
 “ wealth. And we live not only free in the administration of the state,
 “ but also one with another, void of jealousy, touching each other’s
 “ daily course of life; not offended at any man for following his own
 “ humour, nor casting on any man censorious looks, which though
 “ they be no punishment, yet they grieve. So that conversing one
 “ with another for the private without offence, we stand chiefly in fear
 “ to transgress against the public, and are obedient always to those
 “ that govern, and to the laws, and principally to such laws as are
 “ written for protection against injury, and such unwritten, as bring
 “ undeniable shame to the transgressors.

XXXVIII. “ We have also found out many ways to give our
 “ minds recreation from labour, by public institution of games and sa-
 “ crifice for all the days of the year, with a decent pomp and furniture
 “ of the same by private men; by the daily delight whereof, we expel
 “ sadness.² We have this further, by the greatness of our city, that
 “ all things, from all parts of the earth are imported hither; whereby
 “ we no less familiarly enjoy the commodities of all other nations than
 “ our own.

XXXIX. “ Then in the studies of war, we excel our enemies in
 “ this: we leave our city open to all men, nor was it ever seen, that
 “ by the banishing³ strangers, we denied them the learning or sight of
 “ any of those things which if not hidden, an enemy might reap ad-
 “ vantage by, not relying on secret preparation and deceit, but upon
 “ our own courage in the action. They in their discipline hunt after
 “ valour presently from their youth with laborious exercise, and yet
 “ we that live remissly, undertake as great dangers as they. For ex-
 “ ample, the Lacedæmonians invade not our dominion by themselves
 “ alone, but with the aid of all the rest. But when we invade our
 “ neighbours, though we fight in hostile ground, against such as in
 “ their ground fight in defence of their own substance, yet for the
 “ most part we get the victory. Never enemy yet fell into the hands
 “ of our whole forces at once, both because we apply ourselves much
 “ to navigation, and by land also send many of our men into divers
 “ countries abroad. But when fighting with a part of it, they chance
 “ to get the better, they boast they have beaten the whole; and when
 “ they get the worse, they say they are beaten by the whole. And
 “ yet when from ease, rather than studious labour, and upon natural
 “ rather than doctrinal valour, we come to undertake any danger, we
 “ have this odds by it, that we shall not faint beforehand with the

¹ Μέρος, a part. Here meant to signify a part or family in the commonwealth. Again hinting at the Lacedæmonians, among whom none ever arrived at the supreme office, except they were of the family of the Heracidae.

² Besides the vast number of festivals celebrated at Athens with pompous

processions, costly sacrifices, and public games, the presidents in course offered up sacrifices every morning for the public good.

³ Spoken with envy towards the Lacedæmonians, who were deemed most inhospitable towards strangers.

“ meditation of future trouble, and in the action we shall appear no less confident than they that are ever toiling.

XL. “ Hence we procure admiration to our city, as well in this as in divers other things. For we also give ourselves to bravery, and yet with thrift; and to philosophy, and yet without mollification of the mind. And we use riches rather for opportunities of action, than for verbal ostentation; and hold it not a shame to confess poverty, but not to have avoided it. Moreover there is in the same men a care, both of their own and of the public affairs, and a sufficient knowledge of state matters,¹ even in those that labour with their hands. For we alone think one that is utterly ignorant therein, to be a man not that meddles with nothing, but that is good for nothing. We likewise weigh what we undertake, and apprehend it perfectly in our minds; not accounting words for a hinderance of action, but that it is rather a hinderance to action, to come to it without instruction of words before. For also in this we excel others; daring to undertake as much as any, and yet examining what we undertake; whereas with other men, ignorance makes them dare, and consideration dastards; and they are most rightly reputed valiant, who though they perfectly apprehend both what is dangerous, and what is easy, are never the more thereby diverted from adventuring. Again, we are contrary to most men in matter of bounty; for we purchase our friends, not by receiving, but by bestowing benefits. And he that bestows a good turn is ever the most constant friend, because he will not lose the thanks due to him, from him on whom he bestowed it. Whereas the friendship of him that owes a benefit is dull and flat, as knowing his benefit not to be taken for a favour, but for a debt: so that we only do good to others, not upon computation of profit, but freeness of trust.

XLI. “ In some it may be said, both that the city is in general a school of the Grecians, and that the men here have every one in particular his person disposed to most diversity of actions, and yet all with grace and decency. And that this is not now rather a bravery of words upon the occasion, than real truth, this power of the city, which by these institutions we have obtained, makes evident. For it is the only power now, found greater in proof than fame; and the only power that neither grieves the invader when he miscarries with the quality of those he was hurt by, nor gives cause to the subjected states to murmur, as being in subjection to men unworthy. For both with present and future ages we shall be in admiration for a power, not without testimony, but made evident by great arguments, and which needs not either a Homer to praise, or any other such, whose poems may indeed for the present bring delight, but the truth will afterwards confute the opinion conceived of the actions. For we have opened to us by our courage, all seas and lands, and

¹ In Athens no man so poor but was a statesman. So St. Luke, Acts xvii. 21, speaking of Athens, says, “ All the Athenians and strangers which were

“ there spent their time in nothing else “ but either to tell or to hear some new “ thing.” The true character of politicians without employment.

“ set up eternal monuments on all sides, both of the evil we have done
“ to our enemies, and the good we have done to our friends. Such is
“ the city for which these men, thinking it no reason to lose it, val-
“ antly fighting, have died. And it is fit that every man of you that
“ is left, should be like-minded, to undergo any travail for the same.

XLII. “ And I have therefore spoken so much concerning the city
“ in general, as well to shew you that the stakes between us and them,
“ whose city is not such, are not equal ; as also to make known by
“ effects the worth of these men I am to speak of, the greatest part of
“ their praises being therein already delivered. For what I have
“ spoken of the city hath by these and such as these been achieved :
“ neither would praises and actions appear so levelly concurrent in
“ many other of the Grecians, as they do in these ; the present revo-
“ lution of these men’s lives seeming to me an argument of their vir-
“ tues, noted in the first act thereof, and in the last confirmed. For
“ even such of them as were worse than the rest, do nevertheless de-
“ serve that for their valour shewn in the wars for defence of their
“ country, they should be preferred before the rest. For having by
“ their good actions abolished the memory of their evil, they have
“ profited the state thereby more than they have hurt it by their pri-
“ vate behaviour. Yet there was none of these, that preferring the
“ further fruition of his wealth, was thereby grown cowardly, or that
“ for hope to overcome his poverty at length, and to attain to riches,
“ did for that cause withdraw himself from the danger. For their
“ principal desire was not wealth, but revenge on their enemies, which
“ esteeming the most honourable cause of danger, they made account
“ through it both to accomplish their revenge, and to purchase wealth
“ withal ; putting the uncertainty of success to the account of their
“ hope : but for that which was before their eyes, relying upon them-
“ selves in the action ; and therein choosing rather to fight and die,
“ than to shrink and be saved. They fled from shame, but with their
“ bodies they stood out the battle ; and so in a moment, whilst for-
“ tune inclineth neither way, left their lives not in fear, but in opinion
“ of victory.

XLIII. “ Such were these men, worthy of their country ; and for
“ you that remain, you may pray for a safer fortune ; but you ought
“ not to be less venturously minded against the enemy ; not weighing
“ the profit by an oration only, which any man amplifying, may re-
“ count, to you that know as well as he, the many commodities that
“ arise by fighting valiantly against your enemies ; but contemplating
“ the power of the city in the actions of the same from day to day
“ performed, and thereby becoming enamoured of it. And when this
“ power of the city shall seem great to you, consider then that the
“ same was purchased by valiant men, and by men that knew their
“ duty, and by men that were sensible of dishonour when they were
“ in fight : and by such men, as though they failed of their attempt,
“ yet would not be wanting to the city with their virtue, but made
“ unto it a most honourable contribution. For having every one given
“ his body to the common-wealth, they receive in place thereof an
“ undecaying commendation, and a most remarkable sepulchre, not

“ wherein they are buried so much as wherein their glory is laid up
 “ on all occasions, both of speech and action, to be remembered for
 “ ever. For to famous men, all the earth is a sepulchre; and their
 “ virtues shall be testified, not only by the inscription in stone at home,
 “ but by an unwritten record of the mind, which more than of any
 “ monument, will remain with every one for ever. In imitation there-
 “ fore of these men, and placing happiness in liberty, and liberty in
 “ valour, be forward to encounter the dangers of war. For the mi-
 “ serable and desperate men are not they that have the most reason
 “ to be prodigal of their lives; but rather such men, as if they live,
 “ may expect a change of fortune, and whose losses are greatest if
 “ they miscarry in aught. For to a man of any spirit, death, which is
 “ without sense, arriving whilst he is in vigour, and common hope, is
 “ nothing so bitter, as after a tender life to be brought into misery.

XLIV. “ Wherefore I will not so much bewail, as comfort you
 “ the parents that are present of these men. For you know that whilst
 “ they lived, they were obnoxious to manifold calamities, whereas
 “ whilst you are in grief, they only are happy that die honourably, as
 “ these have done: and to whom it has been granted, not only to
 “ live in prosperity, but to die in it. Though it be a hard matter to
 “ dissuade you from sorrow, for the loss of that which the happiness
 “ of others, wherein you also when time was, rejoiced yourselves,
 “ shall so often bring to your remembrance; for sorrow is not for the
 “ want of a good never tasted, but for the privation of a good we
 “ have been used to; yet such of you as are of the age to have chil-
 “ dren, may bear the loss of these, in the hope of more. For the latter
 “ children will both draw on with some the oblivion of those that are
 “ slain, and also doubly conduce to the good of the city, by popula-
 “ tion and strength. For it is not likely that they should equally give
 “ good counsel to the state, that have not children to be equally ex-
 “ posed to danger in it. As for you that are past having children,
 “ you are to put the former and greater part of your life to the account
 “ of your gain, and supposing the remainder of it will be but short,
 “ you shall have the glory of these for a consolation of the same.¹
 “ For the love of honour never groweth old, nor doth that unprofitable
 “ part of our life take delight, as some say, in gathering wealth, so
 “ much as it doth in being honoured.

XLV. “ As for you that are the children or brethren of these men,
 “ I see you will have a difficult task of emulation. For every man is
 “ wont to praise the dead, so that with odds of virtue, you will hardly
 “ get an equal reputation, but still be thought a little short. For men
 “ envy their competitors in glory, while they live; but to stand out of
 “ their way, is a thing honoured with an affection free from opposition.
 “ And since I must say somewhat also of feminine virtue, for you
 “ that are now widows, I shall express it all in this short admonition.

¹ ὅσοι δ' αὖ παρηβήκατε, τὸν τε πλείονα κέρδος, ὃν εὐτυχείτε, βίον ἡγήσθε κτλ. Bekker. ὅσοι δ' αὖ παρηβήκατε, τὸν τε πλείονα, κέρδος δν, εὐτυχείτε βίον, ἡγήσθε κτλ. Duker. But as many of

you as are past having children, think that the greater part of your life, during which you were fortunate, was to your gain, and that this which remains will be short.

“ It will be much for your honour not to recede from your sex, and to give as little occasion of rumour amongst the men, whether of good or evil as ye can.¹

XLVI. “ Thus also have I, according to the prescript of the law, delivered in word what was expedient; and those that are here intreated, have in fact been already honoured; and further, their children shall be maintained till they be at man’s estate, at the charge of the city,² which hath therein propounded both to these, and them that live, a profitable garland in their matches of valour. For where the rewards of virtue are greatest, there live the worthiest men. So now having lamented every one his own, you may be gone.”

XLVII. Such was the funeral made this winter, which ending, ended the first year of this war.

YEAR II. A. C. 430. OLYMP. 87½.

In the very beginning of summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates, with two-thirds of their forces, as before, invaded Attica, under the conduct of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of Lacedæmon, and after they had encamped themselves, wasted the country about them.

They had not been many days in Attica, when the plague⁴ first began among the Athenians, said also to have seized formerly on divers other parts, as about Lemnos, and elsewhere; but so great a plague and mortality of men, was never remembered to have happened in any place before. For at first, neither were the physicians able to cure it, through ignorance of what it was, but died fastest themselves, as being the men who most approached the sick; nor did any other art of man avail. All supplications to the gods, and enquiries of oracles, and whatsoever other such means they used, proved unprofitable, inasmuch that subdued with the greatness of the evil, they gave them all over.

XLVIII. It began, by report, first in that part of Æthiopia that lies on Egypt, and thence came down to Egypt, and Africa, and to the greatest part of the territories of the king.⁵ It invaded Athens on a sudden, and touched first upon those that dwelt in Piræus: so that they reported that the Peloponnesians had cast poison into their wells, for springs there were not any in that place. But afterwards it came

¹ *καὶ ἥς ἂν ἐν’ ἐλάχιστον κτλ.* Bekker. *καὶ οἷς ἂν ἐν’ ἐλάχιστον κτλ.* Duker. For not to degenerate from your own nature, is a great glory, and of that woman of whom there is a report amongst the men in the least degree, whether for good or evil. That is to say; that woman’s glory is great, who is least talked of by the men, whether it be for her praise or dispraise.

² The law was, that they should be instructed at the public expense, and when come to age presented with a complete suit of armour, and honoured with the first seat in all public places.

³ *ὅν προσήκει ἑκαστος*, Bekker. *ὅν*

προσῆκει ἑκαστῳ, Duker; now each having lamented whom it behoves him to lament, depart.

⁴ It is worthy of remark that the same year in which the plague broke out at Athens, Rome was visited by a similar calamity.—Livy, b. iv. c. 25. The effect on the two states was very different; the Romans immediately had recourse to religious rites and sacrifices to appease the gods; while the Athenians appear to have been completely demoralised. Lucretius gives a beautiful description of this plague.

⁵ Of Persia.

up to the high city, and then they died a great deal faster. Now let every man, physician or other, concerning the ground of this sickness, whence it sprung, and what causes he thinks able to produce so great an alteration, speak according to his own knowledge; for my part, I will deliver but the manner of it, and lay open only such things as one may take his mark by, to discover the same if it come again, having been both sick of it myself, and seen others sick of the same.

XLIX. This year, by confession of all men, was of all other diseases most free. If any man were sick before, his disease turned to this; if not, yet suddenly, without any apparent cause preceding, and being in perfect health, they were taken first with an extreme ache in their heads, redness and inflammation of the eyes; and then inwardly their throats and tongues grew presently bloody, and their breath noisy and unsavoury. Upon this followed sneezing and hoarseness, and not long after, the pain, together with a mighty cough came down into the breast: and when once it was settled in the stomach,¹ it caused vomit, and with great torment came up all manner of bilious purgation, that physicians ever named. Most of them had also the hickup, which brought with it a strong convulsion, and in some ceased quickly, but in others was long before it gave over. Their bodies outwardly to the touch, were neither very hot nor pale, but reddish livid, and beflowered with little pimples and wheals; but so burned inwardly, as not to endure the lightest clothes or linen garment to be upon them, nor any thing, but mere nakedness: but rather most willingly to have cast themselves into the cold water. And many of them that were not looked to, possessed with insatiate thirst, ran to the wells, and to drink much or little was indifferent, being still as far as ever from ease and power to sleep. As long as the disease was at the height, their bodies wasted not, but resisted the torment beyond all expectation, insomuch, as most of them either died of their inward burning in nine or seven days, whilst they had yet strength; or if they had escaped that, then the disease falling down into their bellies, and causing there great exulcerations and immoderate looseness, they died many of them afterwards through weakness.² For the disease, which took first the head, began above and came down, and passed through the whole body; and he that overcame the worst of it was yet marked with the loss of his extreme parts; for breaking out both at their privy members, and at their fingers and toes, many with the loss of these escaped. There were also some that lost their eyes, and many that presently upon their recovery, were taken with such an oblivion of all things whatsoever, that they neither knew themselves, nor their acquaintance.

L. For this was a kind of sickness which far surmounted all expression of words, and both exceeded human nature, in the cruelty wherewith it handled each one, and appeared also otherwise to be none of those diseases that are bred amongst us, and that especially by this. For all, both birds and beasts, that used to feed on human

¹ *Καρδία*, here taken for the stomach. many afterwards died of weakness

² *οἱ πολλοὶ ὕστερον δι' αὐτὴν ἀσθενεία*, through it.

Bekker. *διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν*, Duker;

flesh, though many men lay abroad unburied, either came not at them, or tasting perished. An argument whereof as touching the birds, is the manifest defect of such fowl, which were not then seen, neither about the carcasses, nor any where else: but by the dogs, because they are familiar with men, this effect was seen much clearer.

LI. So that this disease, to pass over many strange particulars of the accidents that some had different from others, was in general such as I have shewn, and for other usual sicknesses, at that time no man was troubled with any. Now they died some for want of attendance, and some again with all the care and physic that could be used. Nor was there any to say, certain medicine, that applied must have helped them; for if it did good to one, it did harm to another; nor any difference of body, for strength or weakness that was able to resist it; but it carried all away, what physic soever was administered. But the greatest misery of all was, the dejection of mind, in such as found themselves beginning to be sick, for they grew presently desperate, and gave themselves over without making any resistance, as also their dying thus like sheep, infected by mutual visitation, for the greatest mortality proceeded that way. For if men forbore to visit them, for fear; then they died forlorn, whereby many families became empty, for want of such as should take care of them. If they forbore not, then they died themselves, and principally the most honest men. For out of shame they would not spare themselves, but went in unto their friends, especially after it was come to this pass, that even their domestics, wearied with the lamentations of them that died, and overcome with the greatness of the calamity, were no longer moved therewith. But those that were recovered, had much compassion both on them that died, and on them that lay sick, as having both known the misery themselves, and now no more subject to the danger. For this disease never took any man the second time, so as to be mortal. And these men were both by others counted happy, and they also themselves, through excess of present joy, conceived a kind of light hope never to die of any other sickness hereafter.

LII. Besides the present affliction, the reception of the country people and of their substance into the city, oppressed both them, and much more the people themselves that so came in. For having no houses, but dwelling at that time of the year in stifling booths, the mortality was now without all form; and dying men lay tumbling one upon another in the streets, and men half dead about every conduit through desire of water. The temples also where they dwelt in tents, were all full of those that died within them; for oppressed with the violence of the calamity, and not knowing what to do, men grew alike careless both of holy and profane things. And the laws which they formerly used touching funerals were all now broken; every one burying where he could find room. And many for want of things necessary, after so many deaths before, were forced to become impudent in the funerals of their friends. For when one had made a funeral pile, another getting before him, would throw on his dead and give it fire. And when one was burning, another would come, and having cast thereon him whom he carried, go his way again.

LIII. And the great licentiousness, which also in other kinds was used in the city, began at first from this disease. For that which a man before would dissemble, and not acknowledge to be done for voluptuousness, he durst now do freely, seeing before his eyes such quick revolution, of the rich dying, and men worth nothing inheriting their estates; insomuch as they justified a speedy fruition of their goods even for their pleasure, as men that thought they held their lives but by the day. As for pains no man was forward in any action of honour to take any, because they thought it uncertain whether they should die or not before they achieved it. But what any man knew to be delightful, and to be profitable to pleasure, that was made both profitable and honourable.¹ Neither the fear of the gods, nor laws of men, awed any man. Not the former, because they concluded it was alike to worship or not worship, from seeing that they all alike perished; nor the latter, because no man expected his life would last, till he received punishment of his crimes by judgment. But they thought there was now over their heads, some far greater judgment decreed against them; before which fell, they thought to enjoy some little part of their lives.

LIV. Such was the misery into which the Athenians being fallen were much oppressed; having not only their men killed by the disease within, but the enemy also laying waste their fields and villages without. In this sickness also, as it was not unlikely they would, they called to mind this verse, said also by the elder sort to have been uttered of old:

A Doric war shall fall, and a great plague² withal.

Now were men at variance about the word, some saying it was not *Λοιμός*, [the plague], that was by the ancients mentioned in that verse, but *Διμός*, [famine.] But on the present occasion the word *Λοιμός* deservedly obtained. For as men suffered, so they interpreted the verse. And I think, if after this, there shall ever come another Doric war, and with it a famine, they are like to recite the verse accordingly. There was also reported by such as knew, a certain answer given by the oracle to the Lacedæmonians, when they enquired whether they should make this war, or not, that if they warred with all their power, they should have the victory, and that the god³ himself would take their parts: and thereupon they thought the present misery to be a fulfilling of that prophecy. The Peloponnesians were no sooner entered Attica, than the sickness presently began, and never came to Peloponnesus, to speak of, but reigned principally in Athens, and afterwards in such other places as were most populous. And thus much of this disease.

LV. After the Peloponnesians had wasted the champaign country, they fell on the territory called Paralos, as far as to the mountain

¹ ὅ τι δὲ ἦδη τε ἡδὺν καὶ πανταχόθεν τὸ ἐς αὐτὸ κερδαλίον, Bekker. ὅ, τι δὲ ᾗδεται τε ἡδὺν καὶ πανταχόθεν ἐς αὐτὸν κερδαλίον, Duker; but whatever there was now, both pleasant and in every

way profitable for it, this was made, &c.

² Λοιμός.

³ Apollo, to whom the heathens attributed the immission of all epidemic or ordinary diseases.

Laurium,¹ where the Athenians had silver mines, and first wasted that part of it which faces Peloponnesus, and then that which lies towards Andros and Eubœa : and Pericles, who was also then general, was still of the same mind he was of in the former invasion, that the Athenians ought not to go out against them to battle.

LVl. Whilst they were yet in the plain, and before they entered into the maritime country, he furnished a hundred galleys to go about Peloponnesus, and as soon as they were ready put to sea. In these galleys he had four thousand men of arms, and in vessels then purposely first made to carry horses, three hundred horsemen. The Chians and Lesbians joined him likewise with fifty galleys. This fleet of the Athenians, when it set forth, left the Peloponnesians still in Paralos, and coming before Epidaurus, a city of Peloponnesus, wasted much of the country thereabout, and assaulting the city, hoped to take it, though without success. Leaving Epidaurus, they wasted the territories of Trœzene, Halias, and Hermione, all on the coast of Peloponnesus. Putting off from hence, they came to Prasîæ, a small maritime city of Laconia, and both wasted the territory about it, and took and rased the town itself; and having done this, came home; but found the Peloponnesians not now in Attica, but gone back.

LVII. All the while the Peloponnesians were in the territory of the Athenians, and the Athenians abroad with their fleet, the sickness both in the army and city, destroyed many, insomuch as it was said, that the Peloponnesians fearing the sickness, which they knew to be in the city, both by fugitives, and by seeing the Athenians burying their dead, went the sooner out of the country. And yet they staid there longer in this invasion than they had done before, and wasted the whole territory; for they continued in Attica almost forty days.

LVIII. The same summer Agnon, the son of Nicias, and Cleompompus, the son of Clinias, joint commanders with Pericles, with the army which he had employed before, went presently and made war on the Chalcidæans of Thrace, and against Potidæa, which was yet besieged. Arriving, they presently applied engines, and tried all means possible to take it; but neither the taking of the city, nor any thing else succeeded worthy so great preparation. For the sickness coming amongst them, afflicted them mightily indeed, and even devoured the army. And the Athenian soldiers which were there before, and in health, caught the sickness from those that came with Agnon. As for Phormio and his one thousand and six hundred, they were not now amongst the Chalcidæans; and Agnon, therefore, came back with his fleet, having, of four thousand men, in less than forty days, lost one thousand and fifty by the plague. But the soldiers who were there before staid on the place, and continued the siege of Potidæa.

LIX. After the second invasion of the Peloponnesians, the Athenians, having their fields now the second time wasted, and both the

¹ The public mines at Laurium originally belonged to private persons, but were united to the public domain by Themistocles. A great number of slaves was employed in making them, and the

revenue which they produced was very considerable. *μῆχρη Λαυρίου*, Bekker. *μῆχρη Λαυρίου ὄρους*, Duker; as far as Laurium.

sickness and war falling on them at once, changed their minds, and accused Pericles, as if by his means they had been brought into these calamities, and desired earnestly to compound with the Lacedæmonians, to whom also they sent certain ambassadors, but who returned without effect. And being then at their wits end, they kept a stir at Pericles. And he seeing them vexed with their present calamity, and doing all those things which he had before expected, called an assembly (for he was yet general,) with intention to put them again in heart, and assuaging their passion, to reduce their minds to a more calm and less dismayed temper; and standing forth he spake unto them in this manner.

Oration of Pericles.

LX. “ Your anger towards me comes not unlooked for, (for the
 “ causes of it I know) and I have therefore called this assembly to
 “ remind you, and to reprehend you for those things wherein you have
 “ either been angry with me, or given way to your adversity without
 “ reason. For I am of opinion that the public prosperity of the city
 “ is better for private men than if the private men themselves were in
 “ prosperity, and the public wealth in decay. For a private man,
 “ though in good estate, if his country come to ruin, must of necessity
 “ be ruined with it; whereas he that miscarries in a flourishing com-
 “ monwealth will much more easily be preserved. Since then the
 “ commonwealth is able to bear the calamities of private men, and
 “ every one cannot support the calamities of the commonwealth, why
 “ should not every one strive to defend it? And not as you now, as-
 “ tonished with domestic misfortune, forsake the common safety, and
 “ fall a censuring both me that counselled the war, and yourselves
 “ that decreed the same as well as I. And it is I with whom you are
 “ angry, one, as I think myself inferior to none, either in knowing
 “ what is requisite, or in expressing what I know; and a lover of my
 “ country, and superior to money. For he who has good thoughts,
 “ and cannot clearly express them, were as good to have thought
 “ nothing at all. He that can do both, and is ill affected to his
 “ country, will likewise not give it faithful counsel. And he that will
 “ do that too, yet if he be superable by money, will for that alone set
 “ all the rest to sale. Now if you followed my advice in making this
 “ war, as esteeming these virtues to be in me, somewhat above the
 “ rest, there is sure no reason I should now be accused of doing you
 “ wrong.

LXI. “ For though to such as have it in their own election, being
 “ otherwise in good estate, it were madness to make choice of war;
 “ yet when we must of necessity, either give way, and without more
 “ ado, be subject to our neighbours, or else save ourselves from it by
 “ danger, he is more to be condemned that declines the danger, than
 “ he that stands to it. For my own part, I am the man I was, and
 “ of the mind I was; but you are changed; won to the war, when
 “ you were entire, but repenting it upon the damage, and condemning
 “ my counsel, in the weakness of your own judgment. The rea-
 “ son of this is, because you feel already every one in particular,

“ that which afflicts you, but the evidence of the profit to accrue to
 “ the city in general, you see not yet. And your minds dejected
 “ with the great and sudden alteration, cannot constantly maintain
 “ what you have before resolved. For that which is sudden and un-
 “ expected, and contrary to what one has deliberated, enslaves the
 “ spirit; which by this disease principally, in the neck of the other
 “ incommunities, is now come to pass in you. But you that are born
 “ in a great city, and with education suitable; how great soever the
 “ affliction may be, ought not to shrink from it, and eclipse your re-
 “ putation (for men no less condemn those who through cowardice
 “ lose the glory they have, than hate those who through impudence,
 “ arrogate the glory they have not) but to set aside the grief of your
 “ private losses, and lay your hands to the common safety.

LXII. “ As for the toil of the war, that it may perhaps be long,
 “ and we in the end never the nearer to the victory, though that may
 “ suffice which I have demonstrated at other times, touching your
 “ causeless suspicion that way; yet this I will tell you moreover,
 “ touching the greatness of your means for dominion, which neither
 “ you yourselves seem to have ever thought on, nor I touched in my
 “ former orations, nor would I have spoken it now, but that I see
 “ your minds more than necessarily dejected. That though you take
 “ your dominion to extend only to your confederates, I affirm that of
 “ the two parts of the world of manifest use, the land and the sea,
 “ you are of the one entire masters, both of as much of it as you make
 “ use of, and also of as much more as you shall think fit. Neither
 “ is there any king or nation, of those that now are, that can impeach
 “ your navigation, with the fleet and strength you now go. So that
 “ you must not put the use of houses and lands, wherein you now
 “ think yourselves deprived of, a mighty matter, into the balance with
 “ such a power as this, nor take the loss of these things heavily in
 “ respect of it; but rather set little by them, as but a light ornament
 “ and embellishment of wealth, and think that our liberty as long as
 “ we hold that fast, will easily recover to us these things again;
 “ whereas subjected once to others, even what we possess besides
 “ will be diminished. Shew not yourselves both ways inferior to your
 “ ancestors, who not only held this, got by their own labours, not left
 “ them, but have also preserved and delivered the same to us; for it
 “ is more dishonour to lose what one possesses, than to miscarry in
 “ the acquisition of it, and encounter the enemy not only with magna-
 “ nimity, but also with disdain: for a coward may have a high mind
 “ on a prosperous ignorance, but he that is confident on judgment to
 “ be superior to his enemy, also disdains him, which is now our case.
 “ And courage, in equal fortune, is the safer for our disdain of the
 “ enemy, where a man knows what he doth. For he trusts less to
 “ hope, which is of force only in uncertainties, and more to judgment
 “ upon certainties, wherein there is a more sure foresight.

LXIII. “ You have reason besides to maintain the dignity the
 “ city has got for her dominion (in which you all triumph,) and either
 “ not decline the pains, or not also pursue the honour. And you

“ must not think the question is now of your liberty and servitude only; besides the loss of your rule over others, you must stand the danger you have contracted, by offence given in the administration of it. Nor can you now give it over, if any fearing at this present that that may come to pass, encourage himself with the intention of not to meddle hereafter, for already your government is in the nature of a tyranny, which is both unjust for you to take up, and unsafe to lay down. And such men as these, if they could persuade others to it, or lived in a free city by themselves, would quickly overthrow it. For the quiet life can never be preserved, if it be not ranged with the active, nor is it conducive to a reigning, but to a subject city, that it may safely serve.

LXIV. “ Be not therefore seduced by men of this sort, nor angry with me, (with whom yourselves decreed this war) because the enemy invading you, has done what was likely he would, if you obeyed him not. And as for the sickness, (the only thing that exceeded the imagination of all men,) it was unlooked for, and I know you hate me somewhat the more for that, but unjustly, unless when any thing falls out fortunate above your expectation, you will also dedicate to me. Evils that come from heaven you must bear necessarily, and such as proceed from your enemies valiantly; for so it has been the custom of this city to do heretofore, which custom let it not be your part to reverse: knowing that this city has a great name amongst all people, for not yielding to adversity, and for the mighty power it yet has, after the expense of so many lives, and so much labour in the war; the memory whereof, though we should now at length miscarry, (for all things are made with this law to decay again,) will remain with posterity for ever; how that being Grecians, most of the Grecians were our subjects; that we have sustained the greatest wars against them, both universally and singly, and have inhabited the greatest and wealthiest city: now this, he with the quiet life will condemn, the active man will emulate, and they that have not attained the like will envy. But to be hated and to displease, happens for the time to whosoever would have the command of others; and he does well that undergoes hatred for matters of great consequence. For the hatred lasts not, and is recompensed both with a present splendour, and an immortal glory hereafter. Since then you foresee both what is honourable for the future, and not dishonourable for the present, procure both the one and the other by your courage now. Send no more heralds to the Lacedæmonians, nor let them know that the evil present does in any way afflict you; for they whose minds least feel, and whose actions most oppose a calamity, both amongst states and private persons are the best.”

LXV. In this speech did Pericles endeavour to appease the anger of the Athenians towards himself, and withal to withdraw their thoughts from the present affliction; but they, though for the state in general, they were won, and sent to the Lacedæmonians no more, but rather inclined to the war, yet they were every one in particular,

grieved for their several losses. The poor,¹ because entering the war with little, they lost that little; and the rich, because they had lost fair possessions, together with goodly houses, and costly furniture in them in the country; but the greatest matter of all was that they had war instead of peace. And they deposed not their anger altogether, till they had fined him in a sum of money.² Nevertheless, not long after, (as is the fashion of the multitude) they made him general again, and committed the whole state to his administration. For the sense of their domestic losses was now dulled, and for the need of the commonwealth, they prized him more than any other. For as long as he was in authority in the city in time of peace, he governed the same with moderation, and was a faithful watchman of it, and in his time it was at the greatest. And after the war was on foot, it is manifest that he therein also foresaw what it could do. He lived after the war began two years and six months. And his foresight in the war was best known after his death.³ For he told them that if they would be quiet, and look to their navy, and during this war seek no further dominion, nor hazard the city itself, they should then have the upper hand. But they did contrary in all, and in such other things besides, as seemed not to concern the war, managed the state according to their private ambition and covetousness, perniciously both for themselves and their confederates. What succeeded well, the honour and profit of it came most to private men; and what miscarried was to the city's detriment in the war. The reason whereof was this, that being a man of great power both for his dignity and wisdom, and for bribes manifestly the most incorrupt, he freely controlled the multitude, and was not so much led by them as he led them. Because, having gotten his power by no evil arts, he would not humour them in his speeches, but, out of his authority, durst anger them with contradiction. Therefore whensoever he saw them out of season insolently bold, he would with his orations put them in fear; and again when they were afraid without reason, he would likewise erect their spirits and embolden them. It was in name a democratical state, but in fact, a government of the principal man. But they that came after being more equal amongst themselves, and affecting every one to be the chief, applied themselves to the people, and let go the care of the commonwealth. From whence amongst many other errors, as was likely in a great and dominant city, proceeded also the voyage to Sicily, which was not so much upon mistaking those whom they went against, as for want of knowledge in the senders of what was necessary for those that went the voyage. For through private quarrels about who should bear the greatest sway with the people, they both abated the vigour of the army, and then also first troubled the state at home with division. Being overthrown in Sicily, and having lost, besides other ammunition

¹ ὁ μὲν δῆμος ὄρι, Bekker. ὁ μὲν πτωχὸς ὄρι, Duker; the people, because setting out with little, they were deprived even of this.

² Plutarch says, authors are not agreed about the amount of the fine

laid on Pericles; some making it fifteen talents, others fifty. According to Diodorus, it was eighty. The person who urged them on to fine him was Cleon.

³ Plutarch says he died of the plague.

the greatest part of their navy, and the city being then in sedition, yet they held out three years both against their first enemies, and the Sicilians with them, and against most of their revolted confederates besides, and also afterwards against Cyrus, the king's son, who took part with, and sent money to the Peloponnesians to maintain their fleet; and never shrunk till they had overthrown themselves with private dissensions.¹ So much was in Pericles above other men at that time, that he could foresee by what means the city might easily have outlasted the Peloponnesians in this war.²

LXVI. The Lacedæmonians and their confederates made war the same summer with one hundred galleys against Zacynthus, an island lying over against Elis. The inhabitants whereof were a colony of the Achæians of Peloponnesus, but confederates of the people of Athens. There went in this fleet one thousand men of arms, and Cnemus, a Spartan, for admiral, who landing, wasted the greatest part of the territory. But they of the island not yielding, they put off again and went home.

LXVII. In the end of the same summer, Aristeus, of Corinth, and Aneristus, Nicolaus, Stratodemus, and Timagoras, of Tegea, ambassadors of the Lacedæmonians, and Polis, of Argos, a private man, as they were travelling into Asia to the king to get money of him, and to draw him into their league, took Thrace in their way, and came to Sitalces, the son of Teres, with a desire to get him also if they could, to forsake the league with Athens, and to send his forces to Potidæa, which the Athenian army now besieged, and not to aid the Athenians any longer;³ and withal to get leave to pass through his country to the other side of the Hellespont, to go, as they intended, to Pharnaces, the son of Pharnabazus, who would convoy them to the king; but the ambassadors of Athens, Learchus, the son of Callimachus, and Ameniades, the son of Philemon, then resident with Sitalces, persuaded Sadocus, the son of Sitalces, who was now a citizen of Athens, to put them into their hands, that they might not go to the king, and do hurt to the city, whereof he himself was now a member. Whereunto condescending, as they journeyed through Thrace, to take ship to cross the Hellespont, he apprehended them before they got to the ship,⁴ by such others as he sent along with Learchus and Ameniades, with command to deliver them into their hands; and they, when they had them, sent them away to Athens. When they came thither, the Athenians fearing Aristeus, lest escaping he should do them further mischief, for he was manifestly the author of all the business of Potidæa, and about Thrace, the same day put them all to death, unjudged and

¹ Thucydides does not give it as his opinion that the Sicilian expedition, which took place afterwards, was wrong in principle, but that it failed by mismanagement on the part of the promoters of the scheme.

² περιγενέσθαι τῶν Πελοποννησίων, Bekker. περιγενίσθαι τὴν πόλιν τῶν Πελοποννησίων, Duker; that he would very easily overcome the Peloponne-

sians themselves in the war.

³ καὶ παῦσαι βοηθεῖν τε αὐτοῖς. Duker. These words are omitted by Bekker; but their omission does not at all interfere with the construction of the rest of the sentence.

⁴ A vile act of Sadocus to gratify the Athenians, because they had made him free of their city.

desirous to have spoken ; and threw them into the pits, thinking it but just to take revenge of the Lacedæmonians that began it, and had slain and thrown into pits, the merchants of the Athenians and their confederates, whom they took sailing in merchants' ships,¹ about the coast of Peloponnesus. For in the beginning of the war, the Lacedæmonians slew as enemies whomsoever they took at sea, whether confederates of the Athenians, or neutral, all alike.

LXVIII. About the same time, in the end of summer, the Ambraciots, both they themselves and divers Barbarian nations by them raised, made war against Argos of Amphilochia, and the rest of that territory. The quarrel between them and the Argives arose first from hence. This Argos and the rest of Amphilochia, was planted by Amphilochus, the son of Amphiaras, after the Trojan war ; who at his return disliking the then state of Argos, built this city in the gulf of Ambracia, and called it Argos, after the name of his own country. And it was the greatest city, and had the most wealthy inhabitants of all Amphilochia. But many generations after, being fallen into misery, they communicated their city with the Ambraciots bordering upon Amphilochia. And then they first learned the Greek language now used, from the Ambraciots that lived among them. For the rest of the Amphilochians were Barbarians. Now the Ambraciots in process of time drove out the Argives, and held the city by themselves ; whereupon the Amphilochians submitted themselves to the Acarnanians, and both together called in the Athenians,² who sent thirty galleys to their aid, and Phormio for general. Phormio being arrived, took Argos by assault, and making slaves of the Ambraciots, put the town into the joint possession of the Amphilochians and Acarnanians ; and this was the beginning of the league between the Athenians and Acarnanians. The Ambraciots, therefore, deriving their hatred to the Argives from this their captivity, came in with an army partly of their own, and partly raised amongst the Chaonians, and other neighbouring Barbarians now in this war. And coming to Argos were masters of the field ; but when they could not take the city by assault, they returned, and disbanding, went every nation to his own. These were the acts of the summer.

LXIX. In the beginning of winter the Athenians sent twenty galleys about Peloponnesus, under the command of Phormio, who coming to lie at Naupactus,³ guarded the passage that none might go in or out from Corinth and the Crissæan gulf. And other six galleys under the conduct of Melesander, they sent into Caria and Lycia, as well to gather tribute in those parts, as also to hinder the Peloponnesian pirates, lying on those coasts, from molesting the navigation of such merchant ships⁴ as they expected to come to them from Phaselis, Phœnicia, and that part of the continent. But Melesander landing in Lycia with such forces of the Athenians and their confederates as he

¹ "Ὀλκαδες. Ships of the round form of building ; for the use of merchants, not for the use of war, as were galleys, and other vessels of the long form.

² καὶ προσπαρεκαλίσαντες ἀμφοτέρου

Ἀθηναίους, Bekker. προσεκαλίσαντο, Duker ; both also calling in the Athenians.

³ Lepanto.

⁴ "Ὀλκαδες.

had abroad, was overcome in battle and slain, with the loss of a part of his army.

LXX. The same winter the Potidæans unable any longer to endure the siege,¹ seeing the invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians could not make them rise, and seeing their victual failed, and that they were forced, amongst divers other things done by them for necessity of food to eat one another, propounded at length to Xenophon, the son of Euripides, Hestiodorus, the son of Aristoclides, and Phanomachus, the son of Callimachus, the Athenian commanders that lay before the city, to give the same into their hands. And they, seeing both that the army was already afflicted by lying in that cold place, and that the state had already spent two thousand talents² upon the siege, accepted of it. The conditions agreed on were these:—To depart they and their wives and children, and their auxiliary soldiers, every man with one suit of clothes, and every woman with two; and to take with them every one a certain sum of money for his charges by the way. Hereupon a truce was granted them to depart, and they went, some to the Chalcidæans, and others to other places, as they could get to. But the people of Athens called the commanders in question, for compounding without them, (conceiving that they might have gotten the city to discretion,) and sent afterwards a colony to Potidæa of their own citizens. These were the things done in this winter. And so ended the second year of this war written by Thucydides.

YEAR III. A.C. 429. OLYMP. 87½.

LXXI. The next summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates came not into Attica, but turned their arms against Platæa, led by Archidamus, son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, who having pitched his camp, was about to waste the territory thereof. But the Platæans sent ambassadors presently unto him, with words to this effect:—"Archidamus and you Lacedæmonians, you do neither justly nor worthy yourselves and ancestors, in making war upon Platæa. For Pausaniās, of Lacedæmon, the son of Cleombrotus, having together with such Grecians as were content to undergo the danger of the battle that was fought in this our territory, delivered all Greece from the slavery of the Persians, when he offered sacrifice in the market-place of Platæa to Jupiter the deliverer, called together all the confederates, and granted to the Platæans this privilege; that their city and territory should be free; that none should make unjust war against them, nor go about to subject them; and if any did, the confederates then present should do their utmost ability to revenge their quarrel. These privileges your fathers granted us for our valour and zeal in those dangers. But now do you the clean contrary, for you join with our greatest enemies, the Thebans, to bring us into subjection. Therefore calling to witness the gods then sworn by, and the gods both of your and our country, we require

¹ Socrates and Alcibiades were present at this siege.

² £387,500. Diodorus says, that before Agnon left Potidæa (see chap. 58,) more than a million talents had been expended in the siege; and this took place some months before the surrender.

“ you, that you do no damage to the territory of Plataea, nor violate those oaths; but that you suffer us to enjoy our liberty in such sort as was allowed us by Pausanias.”

LXXII. The Plataeans having thus said, Archidamus replied and said thus: “ Men of Plataea, if you would do as ye say, you say what is just. For as Pausanias has granted to you, so also be you free; and help to set free the rest, who having been partakers of the same dangers then, and being comprised in the same oath with yourselves, are now brought into subjection by the Athenians. And this so great preparation and war is only for the deliverance of them and others; of which if you will especially participate, keep your oaths at least, as we have also advised you formerly, be quiet, and enjoy your own, in neutrality receiving both sides in the way of friendship, neither side in the way of faction.”¹ Thus said Archidamus. And the ambassadors of Plataea, when they heard him, returned to the city; and having communicated his answer to the people, brought word again to Archidamus, that what he had advised was impossible for them to perform without leave of the Athenians, in whose keeping were their wives and children; and that they feared also for the whole city, lest when the Lacedæmonians were gone, the Athenians should come and take the custody of it out of their hands; or that the Thebans comprehended in the oath of receiving both sides, should again attempt to surprise it. But Archidamus, to encourage them, made this answer: “ Deliver you unto us, Lacedæmonians, your city and your houses, shew us the bounds of your territory, give us your trees by tale, and whatsoever else can be numbered, and depart yourselves whither you shall think good, as long as the war lasteth; and when it shall be ended, we will deliver it all unto you again;² in the mean time we will keep them as deposited, and will cultivate your ground, and pay you rent for it, as much as shall suffice you for your maintenance.”

LXXIII. Hereupon the ambassadors went again into the city, and having consulted with the people, made answer: “ That they would first acquaint the Athenians with it, and if they would consent they would then accept the conditions: till then, they desired a suspension of arms, and not to have their territory wasted.” Upon this he granted them so many days’ truce as was requisite for their return, and for so long forebore to waste their territory. When the Plataean ambassadors were arrived at Athens, and had advised on the matter with the Athenians, they returned to the city with this answer: The Athenians say thus: “ That neither in former times, since we were their confederates, did they ever abandon us to the injury of any, nor will they now neglect us, but give us their utmost assistance. And they conjure us by the oaths of our fathers, not to make any alienation touching the league.”

¹ καὶ τὰδε ἡμῖν ἀρκίσει, Bekker. καὶ τὰδε ἡμῖν ἀρκέσει, Duker; and this will be sufficient for us. These words are omitted by Hobbes; according to Duker—and these things please us.

² ἀποδώσομεν ὑμῖν ἃ ἂν παραλαβόμεν, Bekker. Duker omits the four last words—we will restore unto you whatever we have received from you.

LXXIV. When the ambassadors had made this report, the Plataeans resolved in their councils not to betray the Athenians, but rather to endure, if it must be, the wasting of their territory before their eyes, and to suffer whatsoever misery could befall them; and no more to go forth, but from the walls to make this answer: "That it was impossible for them to do as the Lacedæmonians had required." When they had answered so, Archidamus, the king, first made a protestation to the gods and heroes of the country, saying thus: "All ye gods and heroes, protectors of Plataea, be witnesses that we neither invade this territory, wherein our fathers, after their vows unto you, overcame the Medes, and which you made propitious for the Grecians to fight in, unjustly now in the beginning; because they have first broken the league they had sworn: nor what we shall further do will be any injury, because though we have offered many and reasonable conditions, they have yet been all refused. Assent yet also to the punishment of the beginners of injury, and to the revenge of those that bear lawful arms."

LXXV. Having made this protestation to the gods, he made ready his army for the war. And first having felled trees, he therewith made a palisado about the town, that none might go out. That done, he raised a mount against the wall, hoping with so great an army all at work at once, to have quickly taken it. And having cut down wood in the hill Cithæron, they built a frame of timber, and wattled it about on either side, to serve instead of walls, to keep the earth from falling too much away, and cast into it stones, and earth, and whatsoever else would serve to fill it up. Seventy days and nights continually they poured on, dividing the work between them for rest, in such manner, as some might be carrying whilst others took their sleep and food. And they were urged to labour by the Lacedæmonians that commanded the mercenaries of the several cities, and had the charge of the work. The Plataeans seeing the mount rise, made the frame of a wall with wood, which having placed on the wall of the city, in the place where the mount touched they built it within full of bricks, taken from the adjoining houses, demolished for that purpose; the timber serving to bind them together, that the building might not be weakened by the height. The same was also covered with hides and quilts, both to keep the timber from shot of wildfire, and those that wrought from danger. So that the height of the wall was great on one side, and the mount went up as fast on the other. The Plataeans used also this device; they brake a hole in their own wall, where the mount joined, and drew the earth from it into the city.

LXXVI. But the Peloponnesians, when they found it out, took clay, and therewith daubing hurdles of reeds, cast the same into the chink, which mouldering not, as did the earth, they could not draw it away. The Plataeans excluded here, gave over that plot, and digging a secret mine, which they carried under the mount from within the city by conjecture, fetched away the earth again, and were a long time undiscovered; so that still casting on, the mount grew still less, the earth being drawn away below, and settling over the part where it was voided. The Plataeans nevertheless, fearing that they should not

be able even thus to hold out, being few against many, devised this further : they gave over working at the high wall against the mount, and beginning at both ends of it, where the wall was low, built another wall in form of a crescent, inward to the city, that if the great wall were taken, this might resist, and put the enemy to make another mount; and by coming further in, to be at double pains, and withal more encompassable with shot. The Peloponnesians, together with the raising of the mount, brought to the city their engines of battery; one of which, by help of the mount, they applied to the high wall, wherewith they much shook it, and put the Plataeans into great fear; and others to other parts of the wall, which the Plataeans partly turned aside, by casting ropes about them, and partly with great beams, which being hung in long iron chains by either end upon two other great beams, jetting over, and inclining from above the wall like two horns, they drew up to them athwart, and where the engine was about to light, slacking the chains, and letting their hands go, they let fall with violence, to break the beak of it.

LXXVII. After this, the Peloponnesians seeing their engines availed not, and thinking it hard to take the city by any present violence, prepared themselves to besiege it. But first they thought fit to attempt it by fire, being no great city, and when the wind should rise, if they could, to burn it. For there was no way they did not think out to have gained it without expense and long siege. Having therefore brought fagots, they cast them from the mount, into the space between it and their new wall, which by so many hands was quickly filled; and then into as much of the rest of the city as at that distance they could reach: and throwing amongst them fire, together with brimstone and pitch, kindled the wood, and raised such a flame, as the like was never seen before, made by the hand of man. For, as for the woods in the mountains, the trees have indeed taken fire, but it hath been by mutual attrition, and have flamed out of their own accord. But this fire was a great one, and the Plataeans, that had escaped other mischiefs, wanted little of being consumed by this. For near the wall they could not get by a great way: and if the wind had been with it, (as the enemy hoped it might,) they could never have escaped. It is also reported that there fell much rain then, with great thunder, and that the flame was extinguished, and the danger ceased by that.

LXXVIII. The Peloponnesians, when they failed likewise of this, retaining a part of their army,¹ and dismissing the rest, inclosed the city about with a wall, dividing the circumference thereof to the charge of the several cities. There was a ditch both within and without it, out of which they made their bricks; and after it was finished, which was about the rising of Arcturus,² they left a guard for one half of the wall, (for the other was guarded by the Bœotians) and departed with the rest of their army, and were dissolved according to their cities. The Plataeans had before this, sent their wives and children, and all their unserviceable men, to Athens. The rest were besieged,

¹ καταλιπόντες τοῦ στρατοπίδου, Bekker. τοῦ στρατοῦ, Duker; retaining some part of the encampment.

² In the beginning of September.

being in number, of the Platæans themselves four hundred, of Athenians eighty, and a hundred women to dress their meat. These were all when the siege was first laid, and not more, neither free nor bond, in the city. In this manner was the city besieged.

LXXIX. The same summer, at the same time that this expedition was made against Platæa, the Athenians with two thousand men of arms of their own city, and two hundred horsemen, made war on the Chalcidæans of Thrace, and the Bottiæans, when the corn was at the highest, under the conduct of Xenophon, the son of Euripides, and two others.¹ These coming before Spartolus, in Bottiæa, destroyed the corn, and expected that the town should have been rendered by the practice of some within. But such as would not have it so, having sent for aid to Olynthus² before, there came from thence into the city for safeguard thereof, a supply both of men of arms, and other soldiers. And these issuing forth from Spartolus, the Athenians put themselves in order of battle under the town itself.³ The men of arms of the Chalcidæans, and certain auxiliaries with them, were overcome by the Athenians, and retired within Spartolus. And the horsemen of the Chalcidæans, and their light-armed soldiers, overcame the horsemen, and light-armed of the Athenians; but they had some few targeteers besides, of the territory called Crusis. When the battle was now begun, there came a supply of other targeteers from Olynthus, which the light-armed soldiers of Spartolus perceiving, emboldened both by this addition of strength, and also as having had the better before, with the Chalcidæan horse, and this new supply, charged the Athenians afresh. The Athenians hereupon retired to two companies they had left with the carriages; and as often as the Athenians charged, the Chalcidæans retired; and when the Athenians retired, the Chalcidæans charged them with their shot. Especially the Chalcidæan horsemen rode up, and charging them where they thought fit, forced the Athenians in extreme affright, to turn their backs, and chased them a great way. The Athenians fled to Potidæa, and having afterwards fetched away the bodies of their dead upon truce, returned with the remainder of their army to Athens. Four hundred and thirty men they lost, and their chief commanders all three. And the Chalcidæans and Bottiæans, when they had set up a trophy, and taken up their dead bodies, disbanded and went every one to his city.

LXXX. Not long after this, the same summer, the Ambraciots and Chaonians, desiring to subdue all Acarnania, and to make it revolt from the Athenians, persuaded the Lacedæmonians to make ready a fleet out of the confederate cities, and to send a thousand men of arms into Acarnania; saying, that if they aided them both with a fleet and a land army at once, (the Acarnanians of the sea coast being thereby disabled to assist the rest,) having easily gained Acarnania, they might be masters afterward both of Zacynthus and Cephallenia,

¹ Phanomachus and Calliades.

² πρὸς αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει, Bekker. ὑπ'

³ προπεμψάντων δὲ ἐς Ὀλυνθον, Bekker. προπεμψάντων, Duker; having sent forward to Olynthus.

αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει, Duker; against the city itself.

and the Athenians hereafter less able to make their voyages about Peloponnesus; and that there was a hope besides to take Naupactus.¹ The Peloponnesians assenting, sent thither Cnemus, who was yet admiral,² with his men of arms, in a few galleys immediately; and withal sent word to the cities about, as soon as their galleys were ready, to sail with all speed to Leucas. Now the Corinthians were very zealous in the behalf of the Ambraciots, as being their own colony. And the galleys which were to go from Corinth, Sicyonia, and that part of the coast, were now making ready; and those of the Leucadians, Anactorians, and Ambraciots, were arrived before, and stayed at Leucas for their coming. Cnemus and his one thousand men of arms, when they had crossed the sea, undescried by Phormio, who commanded the twenty Athenian galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, presently prepared for the war by land. He had in his army, of Grecians, the Ambraciots, Leucadians, Anactorians, and the thousand Peloponnesians he brought with him; and of Barbarians, a thousand Chaonians, who have no king, but were led by Photius and Nicanor, which two being of the families eligible, had now the annual government. With the Chaonians came also the Thesprotians, they also without a king.³ The Molossians and Antitanians were led by Sabylinthus, protector of Tharyps, their king, who was yet a minor. The Paravæans were led by their king Orædus; and under Orædus, served likewise, by permission of Antiochus their king, a thousand Orestians. Also Perdiccas sent thither, unknown to the Athenians, a thousand Macedonians; but these last were not yet arrived. With this army began Cnemus to march, without staying for the fleet from Corinth. And passing through Argia, they destroyed Limnæa, a town unvalled. From thence they marched toward Stratus, the greatest city of Acarnania; conceiving that if they could take this first, the rest would come easily in.

LXXXI. The Acamanians seeing a great army by land was entered their country already, and expecting the enemy also by sea, joined not to succour Stratus, but guarded every one his own, and sent for aid to Phormio. But he answered them, that since there was a fleet to be set forth from Corinth, he could not leave Naupactus without a guard. The Peloponnesians and their confederates, with their army divided into three, marched on towards the city of the Stratiens, to the end that being encamped near it, if they yielded not on parley, they might presently assault the walls. So they went on, the Chaonians and other Barbarians in the middle; the Leucadians and Anactorians, and such others as were with these, on the right hand and Cnemus, with the Peloponnesians and Ambraciots on the left; each army at great distance, and sometimes out of sight one of another.

¹ The possession of Naupactus was of the greatest consequence to the Athenians, as it gave them complete command of the Crissæan gulf.

² *Ναύαρχον ἔτι ὄντα*—the particle, *ἔτι*, yet, denotes that the office of admiral at Lacedæmon continued only for a

limited time.

³ The Thesprotians, according to Homer, were governed by kings. See *Odys. v. 115*. They had therefore either done away with regal authority, or some particular tribe of them were without kings.

The Grecians in their march kept their order, and went warily on, till they had got a convenient place to encamp in. But the Chaonians confident of themselves, and by the inhabitants of that continent accounted most warlike, had not the patience to take in any ground for a camp, but carried furiously on, together with the rest of the Barbarians, thought to have taken the town by their clamour, and to have the action ascribed only to themselves. But they of Stratus, aware of this, whilst they were yet in their way, and imagining, if they could overcome these, thus divided from the other two armies, that the Grecians also would be the less forward to come on, placed divers ambushes not far from the city, and when the enemies approached, fell upon them, both from the city, and from the ambushes at once, and putting them into affright, slew many of the Chaonians upon the place. And the rest of the Barbarians seeing these shrink, staid no longer, but fled outright. Neither of the Grecian armies had knowledge of this skirmish, because they were gone so far before to choose, as they then thought, a commodious place to pitch in. But when the Barbarians came back upon them running, they received them, and joining both camps together, stirred no more for that day. And the Stratians assaulted them not, for want of the aid of the rest of the Acarnanians, but used their slings against them, and troubled them much that way. For without their men of arms, there was no stirring for them. And in this kind the Acarnanians are held excellent.

LXXXII. When night came, Cnemus withdrew his army to the river Anapus, eighty furlongs from Stratus, and the next day fetched off the dead bodies upon truce. And whereas the city Cœniadæ was come in of itself, he made his retreat thither, before the Acarnanians should assemble with their succours: and from thence each went home. And the Stratians set up a trophy of the skirmish against the Barbarians.

LXXXIII. In the mean time the fleet of Corinth, and the other confederates, that was to set out from the Crissæan gulf, and to join with Cnemus to hinder the lower Acarnanians from aiding the upper, came not at all; but were compelled to fight with Phormio, and those twenty Athenian galleys that kept watch at Naupactus, about the same time that the skirmish was at Stratus. For as they sailed along the shore, Phormio waited on them till they were out of the strait, intending to set on them in the open sea. And the Corinthians and their confederates went not as to fight by sea, but furnished rather for the land service in Acarnania; and never thought that the Athenians with their twenty galleys, durst fight with theirs, that were seven and forty. Nevertheless when they saw that the Athenians, as themselves sailed by one shore, kept over against them on the other, and that now when they went off from Patræ,¹ in Achaia, to go over to Acarnania, in the

¹ Phormio was watching to catch them in the open sea, *ἐν τῇ ἐρύχῳ*. They were now out of the gulf, stretching across the sea; in the midst of which, Phormio came up to them and engaged, *κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν*. The sea without the capes that form the mouth of the gulf of Crissa, is a narrow sea, but it was open compared to the gulf within, and gave Phormio great advantage. By this action he obtained great glory, and Plutarch reckons it

opposite continent, the Athenians came towards them from Chalcis and the river Evenus, and also knew that they had come to anchor there the night before, they found they were then of necessity to fight, directly against the mouth of the strait. The commanders of the fleet were such as the cities that set it forth had severally appointed; but of the Corinthians these, Machon, Isocrates, and Agatharchidas. The Peloponnesians ordered their fleet so as they made of it a circle¹ as great as, without leaving the spaces so wide as for the Athenians to pass through, they were possibly able; with the stems of their galleys outward, and sterns inward, and into the midst thereof, received such small vessels as came with them; and also five of their swiftest galleys, the which were at narrow passages to come forth in whatsoever part the enemy should charge.

LXXXIV. But the Athenians with their galleys ordered one after one in file, went round them, and shrunk them up together, by wiping them ever as they past, and putting them in expectation of present fight. But Phormio had before forbidden them to fight, till he himself had given them the signal. For he hoped that this order of theirs would not last long, as in an army on land, but that the galleys would fall foul of one another, and be troubled also with the smaller vessels in the midst. And if the wind should also blow out of the gulf, in expectation whereof he so went round them, and which usually blew there every morning, he made account they would then instantly be disordered. As for giving the onset, because his galleys were more agile than the galleys of the enemy, he thought it was his own election, and would be most opportune on that occasion. When this wind was up, and the galleys of the Peloponnesians being already contracted into a narrow compass, were both ways troubled with the wind, and withal by their own lesser vessels that incumbered them; and when one galley fell foul of another, and the mariners laboured to set them clear with their poles, and through the noise they made, keeping off, and reviling each other, heard nothing, neither of their charge, nor of the galleys' direction; and for want of skill, unable to keep up their oars in a troubled sea, rendered the galley untractable to him that sat at the helm, then, and with this opportunity, he gave the signal. And the Athenians charging, drowned first one of the admiral galleys, and divers others after it,² in the several parts they assaulted; and brought them to that pass at length, that not one applying himself to the fight, they fled all towards Patræ and Dyme, cities of Achaia. The Athenians, after they had chased them, and taken twelve galleys, and slain most of the men that were in them, fell off, and went to Molycrium; and when they had there set up a trophy, and consecrated one galley to Neptune, they returned with the rest to Naupactus. The Pelopon-

among the most remarkable exploits related by Thucydides.

¹ ἐτάξαντο κύκλον τῶν νεῶν, ὡς μέγιστον κτλ. Bekker. ἐτάξαντο, κύκλον τῶν νεῶν ποιήσαντες ὡς μέγιστον κτλ. Duker. The Peloponnesians formed a

circle of their ships, as large as they were able.

² ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ πάσας. Bekker. ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας. Duker. And afterwards they destroyed all of them, wherever they attacked them.

nesians, with the remainder of their fleet, went presently along the coast of Cyllene, the arsenal of the Eleans; and thither, after the battle at Stratus, came also Cnemus from Leucas, and with him those galleys that were there, and with which this other fleet should have been joined.

LXXXV. After this, the Lacedæmonians sent unto Cnemus, to the fleet, Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron, to be of his council, with command to prepare for another better fight, and not to suffer a few galleys to deprive them of the use of the sea. For they thought this accident (especially being their first proof by sea) very much against reason; and that it was not so much a defect of their fleet as of their courage: never comparing the long practice of the Athenians with their own short study in these businesses. And therefore they sent these men thither in passion; who being arrived with Cnemus, intimated to the cities about to provide their galleys, and caused those they had before to be repaired. Phormio likewise sent to Athens, to make known both the enemy's preparation and his own former victory; and withal to will them to send speedily unto him as many galleys as they could make ready; because they were every day in expectation of a new fight. Hereupon they sent him twenty galleys, but commanded him that had the charge of them to go first into Crete. For Nicias, a Cretan of Gortys, the public host of the Athenians, had persuaded them to a voyage against Cydonia, telling them they might take it in, being now their enemy. Which he did, to gratify the Polichnitæ, that bordered upon the Cydoniataë. Therefore, with these galleys, he sailed into Crete, and, together with the Polichnitæ, wasted the territory of the Cydoniataë, where also, by reason of the winds, and weather unfit to take sea in, he wasted not a little of his time.

LXXXVI. In the mean time, whilst these Athenians were wind-bound in Crete, the Peloponnesians that were in Cyllene, in order of battle sailed along the coast to Panormus of Achaia, to which also were their land forces come to aid them. Phormio likewise sailed by the shore to Rhium Molyericum, and anchored without it, with twenty galleys, the same he had used in the former battle. Now this Rhium was of the Athenians' side, and the other Rhium in Peloponnesus lies on the opposite shore, distant from it at the most but seven furlongs of sea; and these two make the mouth of the Crissæan gulf. The Peloponnesians therefore came to anchor at Rhium of Achaia, with seventy-seven galleys, not far from Panormus, where they left their land forces. After they saw the Athenians, and had lain six or seven days one against the other, meditating and providing for the battle, the Peloponnesians not intending to put off without Rhium into the wide sea, for fear of what they had suffered by it before; nor the other to enter the strait, because to fight within they thought to be the enemy's advantage. At last, Cnemus, Brasidas, and the other commanders of the Peloponnesians, desiring to fight speedily, before a new supply should arrive from Athens, called the soldiers together, and seeing the most of them to be fearful through their former defeat, and not forward to fight again, encouraged them first with words to this effect:

Oration of Cnemus.

LXXXVII. "Men of Peloponnesus, if any of you be afraid of the battle at hand, for the success of the battle past, his fear is without ground. For you know we were inferior to them then in preparation, and set not forth as to a fight at sea, but rather to an expedition by land. Fortune likewise crossed us in many things, and somewhat we miscarried by unskilfulness, so as the loss can no way be ascribed to cowardice. Nor is it just, so long as we were not overcome by mere force, but have somewhat to allege in our excuse, that the mind should be dejected for the calamity of the event. But we must think, that though fortune may fail men, yet the courage of a valiant man can never fail, and not that we may justify cowardice in any thing, by pretending want of skill, and yet be truly valiant. And yet you are not so much short of their skill, as you exceed them in valour. And though this knowledge of theirs which you so much fear, joined with courage, will not be without a memory also, to put what they know in execution, yet without courage no act in the world is of any force in the time of danger. For fear confounds the memory, and skill without courage avails nothing. To their odds therefore of skill, oppose your odds of valour; and to the fear caused by your overthrow, oppose your being then unprovided. You have further now a greater fleet, and to fight on your own shore, with your aids at hand of men of arms: and for the most part, the greatest number, and best provided, get the victory. So that we can neither see any one cause in particular, why we should miscarry; and whatsoever were our wants in the former battle, supplied in this, will now turn to our instruction. With courage therefore, both masters and mariners follow every man in his order, not forsaking the place assigned him.¹ And for us we shall order the battle as well as the former commanders; and leave no excuse to any man of his cowardice. And if any will needs be a coward, he shall receive condign punishment, and the valiant shall be rewarded according to their merit."

LXXXVIII. Thus did the commanders encourage the Peloponnesians. And Phormio, likewise doubting that his soldiers were but faint-hearted, and observing they had consultations apart, and were afraid of the multitude of the enemy's galleys, thought good, having called them together, to encourage and admonish them upon the present occasion. For though he had always before told them, and pre-disposed their minds to an opinion that there was no number of galleys so great, which setting upon them they ought not to undertake; and also most of the soldiers had of long time assumed a conceit of themselves that being Athenians, they ought not to decline any number of galleys whatsoever of the Peloponnesians; yet when he saw that the sight of the enemy present had dejected them, he thought fit to revive their courage, and having assembled the Athenians, said thus:

¹ χώραν μὴ προλείποντες, Bekker. the first to desert the station where any
χώραν μὴ λείποντες, Duker; not being one is appointed.

Oration of Phormio.

LXXXIX. "Soldiers, having observed your fear of the enemies' number, I have called you together, not enduring to see you terrified with things that are not terrible. For first they have prepared this great number and odds of galleys, for that they were overcome before, and because they are even in their own opinions too weak for us. And next their present boldness proceeds only from their knowledge in land service, in confidence whereof, as if to be valiant were peculiar unto them, they are now come up; wherein having for the most part prospered, they think to do the same in service by sea. But in reason the odds must be ours in this, as well as it is theirs in the other kind. For in courage they exceed us not, and as touching the advantage of either side, we may better be bold now than they. And the Lacedæmonians, who are the leaders of the confederates, bring them to fight, for the greatest part, in respect of the opinion they have of us, against their wills; for else they would never have undertaken a new battle after they were once so clearly overthrown. Fear not, therefore, any great boldness on their part. But the fear which they have of you is far both greater and more certain, not only for that you have overcome them before, but also for this, that they would never believe you would go about to resist, unless you had some notable thing to put in practice upon them. For when the enemy is the greater number, as these are now, they invade chiefly upon confidence of their strength. But they that are much the fewer must have some great and sure design when they dare fight unconstrained. Wherewith these men now amazed, fear us more for our unlikely preparation, than they would if it were more proportionable. Besides many great armies have been overcome by the lesser through unskillfulness, and some also by timorousness, both which we ourselves are free from. As for the battle I will not willingly fight it in the gulf nor go in thither: seeing that to a few galleys with nimbleness and art against many without art, straitness of room is disadvantage. For neither can one charge with the beak of the galley as is fit, unless he have sight of the enemy afar off, or if he be himself over-pressed again get clear. Nor is there any getting through them, or turning to and fro at one's pleasure, which are all the works of such galleys as have their advantage in agility; but the sea fight would of necessity be the same with a battle by land, wherein the greater number must have the better. But of this I shall myself take the best care I am able. In the mean time keep you your order well in the galleys, and every man receive his charge readily, and the rather because the enemy is at anchor so near us. In the fight, have in great estimation order and silence, as things of great force in most military actions, especially in a fight by sea,¹ and charge these your enemies according to the worth of your former

¹ ὅ ἐστι τε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολεμικῶν, military actions, and not least of all in Bekker. ὥστε τὰ πολλὰ κατὰ. Duker; engagement by sea. which is advantageous, both in most

“ acts. You are to fight for a great wager, either to destroy the hope
 “ of the Peloponnesian navies, or to bring the fear of the sea nearer
 “ home to the Athenians. Again let me tell you, you have beaten
 “ them once already; and men once overcome will not come again to
 “ the danger so well resolved as before.”

XC. Thus did Phormio also encourage his soldiers. The Peloponnesians, when they saw the Athenians would not enter the gulf and strait, desiring to draw them in against their wills, weighed anchor, and betime in the morning having arranged their galleys by four and four in a rank, sailed along their own coast within the gulf, leading the way,¹ in the same order as they had lain at anchor with their right wing. In this wing they had placed twenty of their swiftest galleys, to the end that if Phormio, thinking them going to Naupactus, should for safeguard of the town sail along his own coast likewise, within the strait, the Athenians might not be able to get beyond that wing of theirs, and avoid the impression, but be enclosed by their galleys on both sides. Phormio fearing, as they expected, what might become of the town, now without guard, as soon as he saw them from anchor, against his will, and in extreme haste, went aboard, and sailed along the shore, with the land forces of the Messenians marching by to aid him. The Peloponnesians, when they saw them sail in one long file, galley after galley, and that they were now in the gulf and by the shore, which they most desired, upon one sign given, turned suddenly every one as fast as he could upon the Athenians, hoping to have intercepted them every galley. But of those, the eleven foremost, avoiding that wing, and the turn made by the Peloponnesians, got out into the open sea.² The rest they intercepted, and driving them to the shore, sunk them. The men, as many as swam not out, they slew, and the galleys, some they tied to their own, and towed them away empty, and one with the men and all in her they had already taken.³ But the Messenian succours on land, entering the sea with their arms, got aboard of some of them, and fighting from the decks recovered them again, after they were already towing away.

XCI. And in this part the Peloponnesians had the victory, and overcame the galleys of the Athenians. Now the twenty galleys that were their right wing, gave chase to those eleven Athenian galleys which had avoided them when they turned, and were got into the open sea. These flying toward Naupactus, arrived there before the

¹ δεξιὰ κίρα ἡγουμένῳ, Bekker. δεξιῶ, κίρα ἡγουμένοι, Duker; the right wing leading the way.

² It is surprising that Hobbes should be guilty of so much inadvertence, as to make eleven Athenian ships “ get out into open sea.” The Peloponnesians made their tack towards the open sea, to prevent them from getting out of the gulf, which gave opportunity to the foremost ships in the Athenian line to run away up the gulf towards Naupac-

tus, for the sake of which they thought themselves obliged, though contrary to their judgment and inclination, to come within the Capes. Had they run to sea, they never could have reached Naupactus, but would have run directly from it.—*Note to Smith's Translation.*

³ μίαν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶλον, Bekker. μίαν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀνδράσιν εἶλον ἥδη, Duker; and one they took with the men in her.

enemies all save one, and when they came under the temple of Apollo, turned their beak-heads, and put themselves in readiness for defence, in case the enemy should follow them to the land. But the Peloponnesians as they came after were singing the hymn of victory, as if they had already had the victory; and one galley which was of Leucas being far before the rest, gave chase to one Athenian galley that was behind the rest of the Athenians. Now it chanced that there lay out into the sea, a certain ship at anchor, to which the Athenian galley first coming, fetched a compass about her, and came back full but against the Leucadian galley that gave her chase, and sunk her.¹ Upon this unexpected and unlikely accident they began to fear, and having also followed the chase as being victors, disorderly, some of them let down their oars into the water, and hindered the way of their galleys, a matter of very ill consequence, seeing the enemy was so near, and staid for more company. And some of them through ignorance of the coast ran upon the shelves.

XCII. The Athenians seeing this, took heart again, and together with one clamour set upon them; who resisted not long, because of their present errors committed, and their disarray; but turned and fled to Panormus, from whence at first they set forth. The Athenians followed and took from them six galleys that were hindmost, and recovered their own which the Peloponnesians had sunk by the shore, and tied astern of theirs. Of the men some they slew, and some also they took alive. In the Leucadian galley that was sunk near the ship, was Timocrates, a Lacedæmonian, who, when the galley was lost, run himself through with his sword, and his body drove into the haven of Naupactus. The Athenians falling off, erected a trophy in the place from whence they set forth to this victory, and took up their dead and the wreck, as much as was on their own shore, and gave truce to the enemy to do the like. The Peloponnesians also set up a trophy, as if they also had the victory, in respect of the flight of those galleys which they sunk by the shore; and the galley which they had taken they consecrated to Neptune in Rhium of Achaia, hard by their trophy. After this, fearing the supply which was expected from Athens, they sailed by night into the Crissæan gulf and to Corinth, all but the Leucadians. And those Athenians with twenty galleys out of Crete that should have been with Phormio before the battle, not long after the going away of the galleys of Peloponnesus arrived at Naupactus; and the summer ended.

XCIII. But before the fleet gone into the Crissæan gulf and to Corinth was dispersed, Cnemus and Brasidas, and the rest of the commanders of the Peloponnesians, in the beginning of winter, instructed by the Megareans, thought good to make an attempt upon Piræus, the haven of the Athenians. Now it was without guard or bar, and that on very good cause, considering how much they ex-

¹ ἡ Ἀττικὴ ναὺς φθάσασα, Bekker. which the Athenian ship being first to
φθάσασα καὶ περιπλεύσασα, Duker. sail, struck the Leucadian galley that
Now there chanced to be out at sea a pursued her, and sunk her.
merchant ship, lying at anchor, round

ceeded others in the power of their navy. And it was resolved that every mariner with his oar,¹ his cushion, and one thong² for his oar to turn in, should take his way by land from Corinth to the other sea that lies to Athens, and going with all speed to Megara, launch forty galleys out of Nisæa, the arsenal of the Megareans which then were there, and sail presently into Piræus. For at that time there neither stood any galleys for a watch before it, nor was there any imagination that the enemies would on such a sudden come upon them. For they durst not have attempted it openly, though with leisure; nor if they had had any such intention could it but have been discovered. As soon as it was resolved on they set presently forward, and arriving by night, launched the said galleys of Nisæa, and set sail, not now towards Piræus, as they intended, fearing the danger; and a wind was also said to have risen that hindered them, but towards a promontory of Salamis, lying out towards Megara.

Now there was in it a little fort, and underneath in the sea lay three galleys that kept watch, to hinder the importation and exportation of any thing to or from the Megareans. This fort they assaulted, and the galleys they towed empty away after them. And being come upon the Salaminians unawares, wasted also other parts of the island.

XCIV. By this time the fires³ signifying the coming of enemies were lifted up towards Athens, and affrighted them more than any thing that had happened in all this war; for they in the city thought the enemies had been already in Piræus; and they in Piræus thought the city of the Salaminians had been already taken,⁴ and that the enemy would instantly come into Piræus; which had they not been afraid, nor been hindered by the wind, they might also easily have done. But the Athenians, as soon as it was day, came with the whole strength of the city into Piræus, and launched their galleys, and embarking in haste and tumult, set sail towards Salamis, leaving for the guard of Piræus, an army of foot. The Peloponnesians, upon notice of those succours, having now overrun most of Salamis, and taken many prisoners, and much other booty, besides the three galleys from the fort of Budorus, went back in all haste to Nisæa. And somewhat they feared the more, for that their galleys had lain long in the water, and were subject to leaking. And when they came to Megara, they went thence to Corinth again by land. The Athenians likewise, when they found not the enemy at Salamis, went home; and from that time forward looked better to Piræus, both for the shutting of the ports, and for their diligence otherwise.

XCV. About the same time, in the beginning of the same winter, Sitalces an Odrysian, the son of Teres king of Thrace, made war upon Perdiccas the son of Alexander king of Macedonia, and upon

¹ It may be hence gathered, that in the galleys of old there was but one man to one oar.

² Τροπῶν, a piece of leather wherein their oar turned.

³ Fires lifted up, if they were steady and unmoved, signified the approach of

friends; if waved to and fro, of enemies.

⁴ τὴν τε Σαλαμῖνα ὑρῆσθαι, Bekker. τὴν τε Σαλαμινίων πόλιν ὑρῆσθαι, Duker; and they in Piræus thought that Salamis was taken.

the Chalcidæans bordering on Thrace, upon two promises; one of which he required to be performed to him, and the other he was to perform himself.¹ For Perdiccas had promised somewhat unto him for reconciling him to the Athenians, who had formerly oppressed him with war, and for not restoring his brother Philip to the kingdom, which was his enemy, which he never paid him; and Sitalces himself had covenanted with the Athenians, when he made league with them, that he would end the war which they had against the Chalcidæans of Thrace. For these causes, therefore, he made this expedition, and took with him both Amyntas the son of Philip, with purpose to make him king of Macedonia, and also the Athenian ambassadors then with him for that business, and Agnon, the Athenian commander. For the Athenians ought also to have joined with him against the Chalcidæans, both with a fleet, and with as great land forces as they could provide.

XCVI. Beginning therefore with the Odrysians, he levied first those Thracians that inhabit on this side the mountains Æmus and Rhodope, as many as were of his own dominion, down to the shore of the Euxine sea and the Hellespont. Then beyond Æmus he levied the Getæ and all the nations between the river Ister and the Euxine sea. The Getæ and people of those parts are borderers upon the Scythians, and furnished as the Scythians are, all archers on horseback. He also drew forth many of those Scythians that inhabit the mountains, and are free states, all sword men, and are called Dii, the greatest part of whom are on the mountain Rhodope; whereof some he hired, and some went as volunteers. He levied also the Agrians and Leæans, and all other the nations of Pæonia, in his own dominion. These are the utmost bounds of his dominion, extending to the Graæans and Leæans, nations of Pæonia,² and to the river Strymon; which rising out of the mountain Scomius, passeth through the territories of the Graæans and Leæans, who make the bounds of his kingdom toward Pæonia, and are subject only to their own laws. But on the part that lieth to the Triballians, who are also a free people, the Trerians make the bound of his dominion and the Tilatæans. These dwell on the north side of the mountain Scomius, and reach westward as far as to the river Oscius, which comes out of the same hill as Nestus and Hebrus, a great and desert hill adjoining to Rhodope.

XCVII. The dimension of the dominion of the Odrysians by the sea side, is from the city Abdera to the mouth of the Ister, in the Euxine sea; and is the nearest way, a sail four days and as many nights for a round ship,³ with a continual fore-wind. By land likewise the nearest way, it is from the city Abdera to the mouth of the Ister, eleven days' journey for an expeditious footman. Thus it lay in respect of the sea.

¹ δύο προσχίσεις, Bekker. διὰ δύο προσχίσεις, Duker; of two promises, wishing one to be performed to him, and the other himself to perform.

² μίχρη Γραίων Παίωνων, Bekker. μίχρη Γραίων και Λαίων Παίωνων, Duker; to the Graæans of Pæonia.

³ Νηὶ στρογγύλῃ, a ship that uses only sails of the round form of building, and serving for burthen, in distinction to galleys, and all other vessels of the long form of building, serving for the wars.

Now for the continent; from Byzantium to the Lemæans, and to the river Strymon, (for it reaches this way farthest into the main land,) it is for the like footman thirteen days' journey.¹ The tribute they received from all the Barbarian nations, and from the cities of Greece, in the reign of Seuthes, (who reigned after Sitalces, and made the most of it,) was in gold and silver, by estimation, four hundred talents² by year. And presents of gold and silver came to as much more: besides vestures, both wrought and plain, and other furniture, presented not only to him, but also to all the men of authority, and Odrysian nobility about him. For they had a custom, which also was general to all Thrace, contrary to that of the kingdom of Persia, to receive rather than to give: and it was there a greater shame to be asked and deny, than to ask and go without. Nevertheless they held this custom long, by reason of their power; for without gifts, there was nothing to be got done amongst them; so that this kingdom arrived thereby to great power: for of all the nations of Europe that lie between the Ionian gulf³ and the Euxine sea, it was, for revenue of money, and other wealth, the mightiest; though indeed for strength of an army and multitudes of soldiers, the same be far short of the Scythians: for there is no nation, not to say of Europe, but neither of Asia, that are comparable to this, or that as long as they agree, are able one nation to another, to stand against the Scythians; and yet in matter of council and wisdom in the present occasions of life, they are not like to other men.

XCVIII. Sitalces therefore, king of this great country, prepared his army, and when all was ready, set forward, and marched towards Macedonia. First through his own dominion, then over Cercine, a desert mountain dividing the Sintians from the Pæonians, over which he marched the same way himself had formerly made with timber, when he made war against the Pæonians. Passing this mountain out of the country of the Odrysians, they had on their right hand the Pæonians, and on the left the Sintians and Medes, and beyond it they came to the city of Doberus, in Pæonia. His army as he marched diminished not any way, except by sickness, but increased by the accession of many free nations of Thrace that came in uncalled, in hope of booty. Insomuch as the whole number is said to have amounted to no less than fifteen thousand men, whereof the most were foot, the horse being a third part, or thereabouts; and of the horse the greatest part were the Odrysians themselves, and the next most the Getæ: and of the foot, those swordmen, a free nation, that came down to him out of the mountain Rhodope, were most warlike. The rest of the promiscuous multitude were formidable only for their number.

XCIX. Being altogether at Doberus, they made ready to fall in from the hill's side into the lower Macedonia, the dominion of Perdiccas: for there are in Macedonia the Lyncestians and Helimiots, and

¹ (ταύτη γὰρ διὰ πλείστον ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἄνω ἐγίγνετο,) Bekker. (ταύτη γὰρ διὰ πλείστον ἀπὸ θαλάσσης ἄνω) ἐγίγνετο κτλ, Duker. But for the continent, from Byzantium to the Lemæans, and the

Strymon, (for here it is the greatest distance up from the sea,) for an expedition man it is thirteen days' journey.

² £78,940.

³ The Adriatic sea.

other high-land nations, who though they be confederates, and in subjection to the other, yet have their several kingdoms by themselves. But of that part of the now Macedonia which lies toward the sea, Alexander, the father of this Perdiccas and his ancestors the Temenidæ,¹ who came out of Argos, were the first possessors, and reigned in the same; having first driven out of Pieria the Pierians, (who afterwards seated themselves in Phagres and other towns beyond Strymon, at the foot of Pangæus; from which cause that country which lies at the foot of Pangæus, and bends toward the sea, is called the gulf of Pieria to this day,) and out of that which is called Bottia, the Bottiæans, that now border upon the Chalcidæans. They possessed besides a certain narrow portion of Pæonia, near the river Axios, reaching from above down to Pella, and to the sea. Beyond Axios they possess the country called Mygdonia, as far as the Strymon, from whence they have driven out the Edonians. Furthermore they drove the Eordians out of the territory, now called Eordia, (of whom the greatest part perished, but there dwell a few of them yet about Physca) and the Almopians out of Almopia. The same Macedonians subdued also other nations, and hold them yet, as Anthemus, Grestonia, and Bisaltia, and a great part of the Macedonians themselves. But the whole is called Macedonia, and was the kingdom of Perdiccas, son of Alexander, when Sitalces came to invade it.

C. The Macedonians, unable to stand in the field against so huge an army, retired all within their strong holds and walled towns, as many as the country afforded, which were not many then; but were built afterwards by Archelaus, son of Perdiccas, when he came to the kingdom, who then also laid out the highways straight, and took order both for matter of war, as horses and arms, and for other provision, better than all the other eight kings² that were before him. The Thracian army arising from Doberus, invaded that territory first, which had been the principality of Philip, and took Eidomene by force; but Gortynia, Atalanta, and some other towns he had yielded to him for the love of Amyntas, the son of Philip, who was then in the army. They also assaulted Europus, but could not take it. Then they went on further into Macedonia, on the part that lies on the left hand of Pella and Cyrrhus; but within these, into Bottiæa and Pieria they entered not, but wasted Mygdonia, Grestonia, and Anthemus. Now the Macedonians had never any intention to make head against them with their foot, but sending out their horsemen, which they had procured from their allies of the higher Macedonia, they assaulted the Thracian army in such places, where few against many, they thought they might do it with most convenience; and where they charged none was able to resist them, being both good horsemen, and well armed with breast-plates; but enclosed by the multitude of the enemy, they

¹ The kings of Macedonia are called ἀπόγονοι Τημενοῦ, by Herod. viii. 137. Temenus obtained the kingdom of Argos at the return of the Heraclidæ.—See also Herod. v. 22, and ix. 44.

² Herod. (viii. 139,) gives the names

of these kings: 1. Perdiccas, the founder of the kingdom; 2. Aræus, (or Argæus); 3. Philip; 4. Eropus; 5. Alcetas; 6. Amyntas; 7. Alexander; 8. Perdiccas.

fought against manifest odds of number: so that in the end they gave it over, esteeming themselves too weak to hazard battle against so many.

CI. After this, Sitalces gave way to a conference with Perdiccas touching the motives of this war. And forasmuch as the Athenians were not arrived with their fleet, (for they thought not that Sitalces would have made the journey,) but had sent ambassadors to him with presents, he sent a part of his army against the Chalcidæans and the Bottiæans, wherewith having compelled them within their walled towns, he wasted and destroyed their territory. Whilst he staid in these parts, the Thessalians southward, and the Magnetians and the rest of the nations subject to the Thessalians, and all the Grecians as far as Thermopylæ, were afraid he would have turned his forces upon them, and stood on their guard. And northward those Thracians that inhabit the champaign country beyond Strymon, namely, the Panæans, Odomantians, Droans, and Dersæans, all of them free states, were afraid of the same. He gave occasion also to a rumour, that he meant to lead his army against all those Grecians that were enemies to the Athenians, as called in by them to that purpose, by virtue of their league. But whilst he staid, he wasted the Chalcidæan, Bottiæan, and Macedonian territories; and when he could not effect what he came for, and his army both wanted victual, and was afflicted with the coldness of the season, Seuthes, the son of Sparadocus,¹ his cousin-german, and of greatest authority next himself, persuaded him to make haste away. Now Perdiccas had dealt secretly with Seuthes, and promised him his sister in marriage, and money with her: and Sitalces, at the persuasion of him, after the stay of full thirty days, whereof he spent eight at Chalcidæa, retired with his army with all speed to his own kingdom. And Perdiccas shortly after gave to Seuthes his sister Stratonica in marriage, as he had promised. This was the issue of this expedition of Sitalces.

CII. The same winter, after the fleet of the Peloponnesians was dissolved, the Athenians that were at Naupactus, under the conduct of Phormio, sailed along the coast to Astacus, and disembarking, marched into the inner parts of Acarnania. He had in his army four hundred men of arms that he brought with him in his galleys, and four hundred more Messenians. With these he put out of Stratus, Corontæ, and other places, all those whose fidelity he thought doubtful. And when he had restored Cynes, the son of Theolytus, to Corontæ, they returned again to their galleys. For they thought they should not be able to make war against the Ceniadæ, (who only of all Acarnania are the Athenians' enemies) in respect of the winter. For the river Achelous, springing out of the mountain Pindus, and running through Dolopia, and through the territories of the Agræans, and the Amphilocheians, and through most part of the champaign of Acarnania, passing above by the city of Stratus, and falling into the sea by the city of the Ceni-

¹ ὑπὸ Σεύθου τοῦ Σπαρδάκου, Bekker. τοῦ Σπαράδοκου, Duker; he is persuaded by Seuthes, the son of Spardacus.

² ἐς θάλασσαν δ' ἐξίει, Bekker. ἐς θάλασσαν διεξίει, Duker; and going out into the sea near the Ceniadæ.

ades, which also it moateth about with fens, by the abundance of water, maketh it hard lying there for an army in time of winter. Also most of the islands Echinadæ lie just over against Cœnia, hard by the mouth of Achelous. And the river being a great one, continually heapeth together the gravel; insomuch that some of those islands are become continent already, and the like in short time is expected by the rest. For not only the stream of the river is swift, broad, and turbidous; but also the islands themselves stand thick, and because the gravel cannot pass, are joined one to another, lying in and out, not in a direct line, nor so much as to give the water its course directly forward into the sea. These islands are all desert, and but small ones. It is reported that Apollo, by his oracle, did assign this place for an habitation to Alcmaeon, the son of Amphiraus, at such time as he wandered up and down for the killing of his mother; telling him, that he should never be free from the terrors that haunted him till he had found out, and seated himself in such a land, as when he slew his mother, the sun had never seen, nor was then land, because all other lands were polluted by him. Hereupon being at a nonplus, as they say, with much ado he observed this ground congested by the river Achelous, and thought there was enough cast up to serve his turn already, since the time of the slaughter of his mother, after which it was now a long time that he had been a wanderer. Therefore seating himself in the places about the Cœniades, he reigned there, and named the country after the name of his son Acarnas. Thus goes the report, as we have heard it, concerning Alcmaeon.

CIII. But Phormio and the Athenians leaving Acarnania, and returning to Naupactus in the very beginning of the spring, came back to Athens, and brought with them such galleys as they had taken, and the free men they had taken prisoners, in their fights at sea, who were again set at liberty by exchange of man for man. So ended that winter, and the third year of the war written by Thucydides.

THUCYDIDES.

BOOK III.

Attica invaded by the Peloponnesians. Mitylenians revolt, and are received by the Peloponnesians at Olympia into their league. Athenians send Paches to Mitylene to besiege it. Part of the besieged Plataeans escape through the fortifications of the enemy. Commons of Mitylene armed by the nobility for a sally on the enemy, deliver the town to the Athenians. Residues of the Plataeans yield to the besiegers, and are put to the sword. Proceedings upon the Mitylenians, and their punishment. Sedition in Corcyra. Laches sent by the Athenians into Sicily. And Nicias into Melos. Demosthenes fights against the Ætolians unfortunately, and afterwards against the Ambraciots fortunately. Pythadorus sent into Sicily to receive the fleet from Laches. This in other three years of this war.

YEAR IV. A. C. 428. OLYMP. 88-1.

CHAP. I.

THE summer following, the Peloponnesians and their confederates at the time when corn was at the highest, entered with their army into Attica, under the conduct of Archidamus, the son of Zeuxidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, and there set them down, and wasted the territory about. And the Athenian horsemen, as they were wont, fell upon the enemy where they thought fit, and kept back the multitude of light-armed soldiers, from going out before the men of arms, and infesting the places near the city. And when they had staid as long as their victual lasted, they returned, and were dissolved according to their cities.

II. After the Peloponnesians were entered Attica, Lesbos immediately, all but Methymne, revolted from the Athenians; which, though they would have done before the war, (but the Lacedæmonians would not then receive them) yet even now they were forced to revolt sooner than they had intended to do. For they staid to have first straitened the mouth of their haven with dams of earth, to have finished their walls, and their galleys then in building, and to have gotten in all that was to come out of Pontus, as archers, and victual, and whatsoever else they had sent for. But the Tenedians, with whom they were at odds, and the Methymnæans, and of the Mitylenians themselves, certain particular men, upon faction, being hosts to the Athenians, made known unto them, that the Lesbians were forced to go all into Mitylene; that by the help of the Lacedæmonians, and their kindred the Bœotians, they hastened all manner of provision necessary for a revolt, and that unless it were presently prevented, all Lesbos would be lost.¹

¹ For an account of the origin of this war, see Aristot. Polit. v. 4.

III. The Athenians (afflicted with the disease, and with the war now on foot, and at the hottest,) thought it a dangerous matter that Lesbos, which had a navy, and was of strength entire, should thus be added to the rest of their enemies; and at first received not the accusations, holding them therefore the rather feigned, because they would not have had them true. But after, when they had sent ambassadors to Mitylene, and could not persuade them to dissolve themselves, and undo their preparation, they then feared the worst, and would have prevented them. And to that purpose suddenly sent out the forty galleys made ready for Peloponnesus, with Cleippides, son of Deinias, and two other commanders. For they had been advertised that there was a holiday of Apollo Maloeis to be kept without the city, and that to the celebration thereof, the Mitylenians were accustomed to come all out of the town; and they hoped making haste, to take them there unawares. And if the attempt succeeded, it was well; if not, they might command the Mitylenians to deliver up their galleys, and to demolish their walls; or they might make war against them if they refused. So these galleys went their way. And ten galleys of Mitylene, which then chanced to be at Athens, by virtue of their league to aid them, the Athenians staid, and cast into prison the men that were in them. In the mean time a certain man went from Athens into Eubœa by sea, and then by land to Geræstus, and finding there a ship ready to put off, having the wind favourable, arrived in Mitylene three days after he set forth from Athens, and gave them notice of the coming of the fleet. Hereupon they not only went not out to Maloeis, as was expected, but also stopped the gaps of their walls and ports, where they were left unfinished, and placed guards to defend them.

IV. When the Athenians, not long after, arrived and saw this, the commanders of the fleet delivered to the Mitylenians what they had in charge, which not hearkened to, they presently fell to the war. The Mitylenians unprovided, and compelled to a war on such a sudden, put out some few galleys before the haven to fight: but being driven in again by the galleys of Athens, they called to the Athenian commanders to parley; desiring, if they could, upon reasonable conditions, to get the galleys for the present sent away. And the Athenian commander allowed the conditions, he also fearing they should be too weak to make war against the whole island. When a cessation of arms was granted, the Mitylenians, amongst others, sent to Athens one of those that had given intelligence there of their design; and had repented him after of the same, to try if they could persuade them to withdraw their fleet from them, as not intending any innovation. Withal they sent ambassadors at the same time to Lacedæmon, undiscovered by the fleet of the Athenians, which was riding at anchor in Malea,¹ to the north of the city; being without any confidence of their success at Athens. And these men, after an ill voyage, through the wide sea, arriving at Lacedæmon, negotiated the sending of aid from thence.

¹ This Malea, according to the scholiast, seems not to be the promontory of Malea, which lies to the south of Mitylene, but some other nearer place, on the north side of the city.

V. But when their ambassadors were come back from Athens without effect, the Mitylenians and the rest of Lesbos, save only Methymne, (for these, together with the Imbrians, Lemnians, and some few other their confederates, aided the Athenians) prepared themselves for the war. And the Mitylenians, with the whole strength of the city, made a sally upon the Athenian camp, and came to a battle; wherein though the Mitylenians had not the worse, yet they lay not that night without the walls, nor durst trust to their strength, but retiring into the town, lay quiet there, expecting to try their fortune with the accession of such forces as (if any came) they were to have from Peloponnesus. For there were now come into the city, one Meleas, a Laconian, and Hermæondas, a Theban, who having been sent out before the revolt, but unable to arrive before the coming of the Athenian fleet, secretly after the end of the battle, entered the haven in a galley, and persuaded them to send another galley along with them, with other ambassadors to Sparta; which they did.

VI. But the Athenians, much confirmed by this the Mitylenians' cessation, called in their confederates, who, because they saw no assurance on the part of the Lesbians, came much sooner in than it was thought they would have done; and riding at anchor to the south of the city, fortified two camps, on either side one, and brought their galleys before both the ports, and so quite excluded the Mitylenians from the use of the sea. As for the land, the Athenians held so much only as lay near their camps, which was not much: and the Mitylenians and other Lesbians that were now come to aid them, were masters of the rest. For Malea served the Athenians for a station only for their galleys, and to keep their market in. And thus proceeded the war before Mitylene.

VII. About the same time of the same summer, the Athenians sent likewise thirty galleys to Peloponnesus, under the conduct of Asopius, the son of Phormio. For the Acarnanians had desired them to send some son or kinsman of Phormio for general into those parts. These, as they sailed by, wasted the maritime country of Laconia, and then sending back the greatest part of his fleet to Athens, Asopius himself, with twelve galleys, went on to Naupactus. And afterwards having raised the whole power of Acarnania, he made war upon the Ceniades, and both entered with his galleys into the river Achelous, and with his land forces wasted the territory. But when the Ceniades would not yield, he disbanded his land forces, and sailed with his galleys to Leucas, and landed his soldiers on the territory of Nericum; but in going off, was by those of the country that came out to defend it, and by some few of the garrison soldiers there, both himself and part of his company slain. And having, upon truce, received from the Leucadians, their dead bodies, they went their ways.

VIII. Now the ambassadors of the Mitylenians that went out in the first galley having been referred by the Lacedæmonians to the general meeting of the Grecians at Olympia, to the end they might determine of them, together with the rest of the confederates, went to Olympia accordingly. It was that Olympiad¹ wherein Dorieus of

¹ Olympiad 88.

Rhodes was the second time victor. And when, after the solemnity, they were set in council, the ambassadors spake to them in this manner :

Oration of the ambassadors of Mitylene.

IX. “ Men of Lacedæmon and confederates, we know the received custom of the Grecians : for they that take into league such as revolt in the wars, and relinquish a former league, though they like them as long as they have profit by them, yet accounting them but traitors to their former friends, they esteem the worse of them in their judgment. And to say the truth this judgment is not without good reason, when they that revolt, and they from whom the revolt is made, are mutually like-minded and affected, and equal in provision and strength, and no just cause of their revolt given. But now between us and the Athenians it is not so. Nor let any man think the worse of us, for that having been honoured by them in time of peace, we have now revolted in time of danger.

X. “ For the first point of our speech, especially now we seek to come into league with you, shall be to make good the justice and honesty of our revolt. For we know there can be neither firm friendship between man and man, nor any communion between city and city to any purpose whatsoever, without a mutual opinion of each other's honesty, and also a similitude of customs otherways : for in the difference of minds is grounded the diversity of actions. As for our league with the Athenians, it was first made when you gave over the Median war, and they remained to prosecute the relics of that business : yet we entered not such a league, as to be their helpers in bringing the Grecians into the servitude of the Athenians, but to set free the Grecians from the servitude of the Medes. And as long as they led us as equals, we followed them with much zeal ; but when we saw they remitted their enmity against the Medes, and led us to the subjugation of the confederates, we could not then but be afraid. And the confederates, through the multitude of distinct councils, unable to unite themselves for resistance, fell, all but ourselves and the Chians, into their subjection ; and we having still our own laws, and being in name a free state, followed them to the wars ; but so, as by the examples of their former actions, we held them not any longer for faithful leaders. For it was not probable, when they had subdued those, whom together with us they took into league, but that, when they should be able, they would do the like also by the rest.

XI. “ It is true, that if we were now all in liberty, we might be the better assured that they would forbear to innovate ; but since they have under them the greatest part already, in all likelihood they will take it ill to deal on equal terms with us alone ; and the rest yielding, to let us only stand up as their equals : especially when by how much they are become stronger by the subjection of their confederates, by so much the more are we become desolate. But the equality of mutual fear, is the only band of faith in leagues ; for he that hath the will to transgress, yet when he hath not the odds of strength, will abstain from coming in. Now the reason why they

“ have left us yet free, is no other, but that they may have a fair colour to lay upon their domination over the rest : and because it hath seemed unto them more expedient to take us in by policy than by force. For therein they made use of us for an argument, that having equal vote with them, we would never have followed them to the wars, if those against whom they led us had not done the injury. And thereby also they brought the stronger against the weaker, and reserving the strongest to the last, made them the weaker, by removing the rest. Whereas, if they had begun with us, when the confederates had had both their own strength, and a side to adhere to, they had never subdued them so easily. Likewise our navy kept them in some fear, lest united and added to yours, or to any other, it might have created them some danger. Partly also we escaped by our observance towards their commons and most eminent men from time to time. But yet we still thought we could not do so long, considering the examples they have shewed us in the rest, if this war should not have fallen out.

XII. “ What friendship then or assurance of liberty was this, when we received each other with alienated affections ? When, whilst they had wars, they for fear courted us, and when they had peace, we for fear courted them ? And whereas in others, good will assureth loyalty, in us it was the effect of fear : so it was more for fear than love, that we remained their confederates ; and whomsoever security should first embolden, he was first likely by one means or other to break the league. Now if any man think we did unjustly to revolt upon the expectation of evil intended, without staying to be certain whether they would do it or not, he weigheth not the matter aright. For if we were as able to contrive evil against them, and again to defer it, as they can against us, being thus equal, what needed us to be at their discretion ? But seeing it is in their hands to invade at pleasure, it ought to be in ours to anticipate.

XIII. “ Upon these pretensions, therefore, and causes, men of Lacedæmon and confederates, we have revolted ; the which are both clear enough for the hearers to judge upon, that we had reason for it, and weighty enough to affright and compel us to take some course for our own safety ; which we would have done before, when, before the war, we sent ambassadors to you about our revolt, but could not, because you would not then admit us into your league. And now when the Boeotians invited us to it we presently obeyed. Wherein we thought we made a double revolt, one from the Grecians, in ceasing to do them mischief with the Athenians, and helping to set them free ; and another from the Athenians, in breaking first, and not staying to be destroyed by them hereafter. But this revolt of ours hath been sooner than was fit, and before we were provided for it. For which cause also the confederates ought so much the sooner to admit us into the league, and send us the speedier aid, thereby the better at once both to defend those you ought to defend, and to annoy your enemies. Whereof there was never better opportunity than at this present : for the Athenians being both with the sickness and their great expenses consumed, and their navy

“divided part upon your own coasts, and part upon ours, it is not likely they should have many galleys to spare, in case you again this summer invade them both by sea and land; but that they should either be unable to resist the invasion of your fleet, or be forced to come off from both our coasts. And let not any man conceive that you shall herein, at your own danger, defend the territory of another. For though Lesbos seem remote, the profit of it will be near you. For the war will not be (as a man would think) in Attica, but there from whence cometh the profit to Attica. This profit is the revenue they have from their confederates, which, if they subdue us, will still be greater. For neither will any other revolt, and all that is ours will accrue unto them; and we shall be worse handled besides, than those that were under them before. But aiding us with diligence, you shall both add to your league a city that hath a great navy (the thing you most stand in need of), and also easily overthrow the Athenians by subduction of their confederates; because every one will then be more confident to come in, and you shall avoid the imputation of not assisting such as revolt unto you. And if it appear that your endeavour is to make them free, your strength in this war will be much the more confirmed.

XIV. “In reverence, therefore, of the hopes which the Grecians have reposed in you, and of the presence of Jupiter Olympius, in whose temple here we are in a manner suppliants to you, receive the Mitylenians into league, and aid us. And do not cast us off, who, though as to the exposing of our persons, the danger be our own, shall bring a common profit to all Greece if we prosper, and a more common detriment to all the Grecians, if through your inflexibleness we miscarry. Be you therefore men, such as the Grecians esteem you, and our fears require you to be.”

XV. In this manner spake the Mitylenians. And the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, when they had heard and allowed their reasons, decreed not only a league with the Lesbians, but also again to make an invasion into Attica. And to that purpose the Lacedæmonians appointed their confederates there present, to make as much speed as they could with two parts of their forces into the isthmus; and they themselves being first there, prepared engines in the isthmus for the drawing up of galleys, with intention to carry the navy from Corinth to the other sea that lies towards Athens, and to set upon them both by sea and land. And these things diligently did they. But the rest of the confederates assembled but slowly, being busied in the gathering in of their fruits, and weary of warfare.

XVI. The Athenians perceiving all this preparation to be made, upon an opinion of their weakness, and desirous to let them see they were deceived, as being able without stirring the fleet at Lesbos, easily to master the fleet that should come against them out of Peloponnesus, manned out one hundred galleys, and embarked therein generally both citizens, except those of the degree of *Pentacosimedimni*,¹ and horse-

¹ Solon divided the people of Athens those who were worth five hundred into four ranks: the first consisted of medimns of liquid and dry commodities,

meu, and also strangers that dwelt amongst them; and sailing to the isthmus, made a shew of their strength, and landed their soldiers in such parts of Peloponnesus as they thought fit. When the Lacedæmonians saw things so contrary to their expectation, they thought it false, which was spoken by the Lesbian ambassadors; and esteeming the action difficult, seeing their confederates were not arrived, and that news was brought of the wasting of the territory near their city, by the thirty galleys formerly sent about Peloponnesus by the Athenians, went home again; and afterwards prepared to send a fleet to Lesbos, and intimated to the cities rateably to furnish forty galleys, and appointed Alcidas, who was to go thither with them, for admiral. And the Athenians, when they saw the Peloponnesians gone, went likewise home with their hundred galleys.

XVII. About the time that this fleet was out, they had surely the most galleys in action, besides the beauty of them, that ever they had at once. But in the beginning of the war they had as good galleys, and also more in number. For one hundred attended the guard of Attica, Eubœa, and Salamis, and another hundred were about Peloponnesus, besides those at Potidæa, and in other places; so that in one summer they had in all two hundred and fifty. And this together with Potidæa, was it that most exhausted their treasure. For the men of arms¹ that besieged the city had each of them two drachmas a day, one for himself and another for his man, and were three thousand in number that were sent thither at first, and remained to the end of the siege; besides one thousand and six hundred more, that went with Phormio, and came away before the town was won. And the galleys had all the same pay. In this manner was their money consumed and so many galleys employed, the most indeed that ever they had manned at once.

XVIII. About the same time that the Lacedæmonians were in the isthmus, the Mitylenians marched by land, both they and their auxiliaries against Methymne, in hopes of having it betrayed to them; and having assaulted the city, when it succeeded not the way they looked for, they went thence to Antissa, Pyra, and Eresus; and after they had settled the affairs of those places, and made strong their walls, returned speedily home. When these were gone, the Methymnæans likewise made war upon Antissa, but beaten by the Antissæans, and some auxiliaries that were with them, they made haste again to Methymne, with the loss of many of their soldiers. But the Athenians being advertised hereof, and understanding that the Mitylenians were

and who were called Πεντακοσιομήδισται. The second, of those who had three hundred medimns, or were able to keep a horse, and who were called ἑκτάδα τελοῦντες. In the third were ranked those who possessed two hundred medimns, and who were termed Ζωγῖται. In the fourth, all the rest, termed ὀφῆτες, who were not capable of bearing any office in the government, but who had a vote in all public assem-

blies.

¹ Ὀπλίται; a man of arms had double pay for himself and for a servant. The drachma was worth about seven-pence three farthings. Pericles was the first that introduced the custom of paying soldiers at Athens. What sum they in general daily received it is difficult to determine, it being increased or diminished as occasion required.

masters of the land, and that their own soldiers there were not enough to keep them in, sent thither about the beginning of autumn, Paches, the son of Epicurus, with one thousand men of arms of their own city, who supplying the place of rowers themselves, arrived at Mitylene, and ingirt it with a single wall. Save that in some places, stronger by nature than the rest, they only built turrets, and placed guards in them. So that the city was every way strongly besieged both by sea and land; and the winter began.

XIX. The Athenians standing in need of money for the siege, both contributed themselves and sent thither two hundred talents,¹ of this their first contribution, and also despatched Lysicles and four others with forty-two galleys, to levy money amongst the confederates.² But Lysicles, after he had been to and fro, and gathered money in divers places, as he was going up from Myus through the plains of Mæander, in Caria, as far as the hill Sandius, was there set upon by the Carians and Anæitians, and with a great part of his soldiers, was himself slain.

XX. The same winter the Plataeans, (for they were yet besieged by the Peloponnesians and Bœotians,) pressed now with want of victual, and hopeless of relief from Athens, and no other means of safety appearing, took counsel, both they and the Athenians that were besieged with them, at first all to go out, and if they could to pass over the wall of the enemy by force. The authors of this attempt were Theænetus, the son of Timidas,³ a soothsayer, and Eupolpidas,⁴ the son of Daimachus, one of their commanders. But half of them afterwards somehow or other, on account of the greatness of the danger, shrunk from it again. But two hundred and twenty or thereabouts, voluntarily persisted to go out in this manner; they made them ladders fit for the height of the enemies' wall; the wall they measured by the lays of brick on the part toward the town, where it was not plastered over; and divers men at once numbered the lays; whereof though some missed, yet the greatest part took the reckoning just; especially numbering them often, and at no great distance, but where they might easily see the part to which their ladders were to be applied; and so by guess of the thickness of one brick took the measure of their ladders.

XXI. As for the wall of the Peloponnesians, it was thus built: it consisted of a double circle, one towards Plataea, and another outward in case of an assault from Athens. These two walls were distant one from the other about sixteen feet; and that sixteen feet of space which was betwixt them, was disposed and built into cabins for the watchmen, which were so joined and continued one to another, that the

¹ £38,750.

² καὶ αὐτοὶ ἰσχυροκόντες κτλ. Bekker has altered the pointing of this sentence; in his edition it stands thus: Both they themselves then for the first time made a contribution of two hundred talents, and sent also to their allies twelve ships, with Lysicles and

four others as commanders, to levy money.

³ Tolmidas.—Bekker.

⁴ Eupompidas.—Bekker. Τολμίδας, Bekker. Τιμίδας, Duker. Εὐπομπίδας, Bekker. Εὐπολπίδας, Duker. Tolmidas and Eupompidas.

whole appeared to be one thick wall with battlements on either side. At every ten battlements stood a great tower of a just breadth to comprehend both walls, and reach from the utmost to the inmost front of the whole, so that there was no passage by the side of a tower, but through the midst of it. And such nights as there happened any storm of rain they used to quit the battlements of the wall, and to watch under the towers as being not far asunder, and covered beside over head. Such was the form of the wall wherein the Peloponnesians kept their watch.

XXII. The Platæans, after they were ready, and had attended a tempestuous night, and withal moonless, went out of the city, and were conducted by the same men that were the authors of the attempt. And first they passed the ditch that was about the town, and then came up close to the wall of the enemy, who, because it was dark, could not see them coming: and the noise they made as they went could not be heard for the blustering of the wind. And they came on besides at a good distance one from the other, that they might not be betrayed by the clashing of their arms; and were but lightly armed, and not shod but on the left foot, for the more steadiness in the wet. They came thus to the battlements in one of the spaces between tower and tower, knowing that there was now no watch kept there. And first came they that carried the ladders, and placed them to the wall; then twelve lightly armed only with a dagger and a breast-plate went up, led by Ammeas, the son of Coræbus, who was the first that mounted; and they that followed him went up, into either tower six. To these succeeded others lightly armed, that carried the darts, for whom they that came after carried targets at their backs, that they might be the more expedite to get up, which targets they were to deliver to them when they came to the enemy. At length, when most of them were ascended, they were heard by the watchmen that were in the towers: for one of the Platæans taking hold of the battlements, threw down a tile, which made a noise in the fall,¹ and presently there was an alarm; and the army ran to the wall, for in the dark and stormy night they knew not what the danger was. And the Platæans that were left in the city came forth withal, and assaulted the wall of the Peloponnesians on the opposite part to that where their men went over. So that though they were all in a tumult in their several places, yet not any of them that watched durst stir to the aid of the rest, nor were able to conjecture what had happened. But those three hundred² that were appointed to assist the watch, upon all occasions of need, went without the wall, and made towards the place of the clamour. They also held up the fires, by which they used to make known the approach of enemies towards Thebes. But then the Platæans likewise held out many other fires from the wall of the city, which for that purpose they had before prepared, to render the fires of the enemy insignificant: and that the Thebans apprehending the matter otherwise than

¹ δοῦπον ἐποίησε, Bekker. ψόφον hundred where the author relates the
ἐποίησε, Duker. Sounded. laying of the siege; but it must be un-

² There is no mention of these three understood.

it was, might forbear to send help till their men were over, and had recovered some place of safety.

XXIII. In the mean time those Plataeans who having scaled the wall first, and slain the watch, were now masters of both the towers, not only guarded his passages by standing themselves in the entries,¹ but also applying ladders from the wall to the towers, and conveying many men to the top, kept the enemies off with shot, both from above and below. In the mean space the greatest number of them having reared to the wall many ladders at once, and beaten down the battlements, passed quite over between the towers, and ever as any of them got to the other side, they stood still upon the brink of the ditch without, and with arrows and darts kept off those that came by the outside of the wall to hinder their passage. And when the rest were over, then last of all, and with much ado, came they also down to the ditch which was in the two towers. And by this time the three hundred that were to assist the watch came and set upon them, and had lights with them; by which means the Plataeans that were on the further brink of the ditch discerned them the better from out of the dark, and aimed their arrows and darts at their most disarmed parts. For, standing in the dark, the lights of the enemy made the Plataeans the less discernible. Insomuch as these last passed the ditch, though with difficulty and force. For the water in it was frozen over, though not so hard as to bear, but watery, and such as when the wind is at east rather than at north; and the snow which fell that night, together with so great a wind as that was, had very much increased the water, which they waded through with scarcely their heads above. But yet the greatness of the storm was the principal means of their escape.

XXIV. From the ditch the Plataeans in troop took the way towards Thebes, leaving on the left hand the Temple of Juno, built by Androcates,² both for that they supposed they would least suspect the way that led to their enemies: and also because they saw the Peloponnesians with their lights pursue that way which, by mount Cithæron and the Oakheads,³ led to Athens. The Plataeans, when they had gone six or seven furlongs, forsook the Theban way, and turned into that which led towards the mountain to Erythræ, and Hysiaë, and having gotten the hills, escaped through to Athens, being two hundred and twelve persons of a greater number: for some of them returned to the city before the rest went over; and one of their archers was taken upon the ditch without. And so the Peloponnesians gave over the pursuit, and returned to their places. But the Plataeans that were within the city, knowing nothing of the event, and those that turned back having told them that not a man escaped, as soon as it was day sent a herald to entreat a truce for the taking up of their dead bodies; but when they knew the truth, they gave it over. And thus these men of Plataea passed through the fortification of their enemies, and were saved.

¹ ἐνσάντες αὐτοὶ ἐφύλασσον, Bekker. αὐτοὶ ἐνσάντες ἐφύλασσον, Duker; both standing in the passages of the turrets themselves, guarded so that no one should bring assistance through them.

² See Herod. ix. 25.

³ See b. ii. 24. Herod. vi. 106; ix. 15.

XXV. About the end of the same winter, Salæthus, a Lacedæmonian, was sent in a galley to Mitylene,¹ and coming first to Pyrrha, and thence going to Mitylene by land, entered the city by the dry channel of a certain torrent which had a passage through the wall of the Athenians, undiscovered. And he told the magistrates that Attica should again be invaded, and that the forty galleys which were to aid them were coming; and that himself was sent before both to let them know it, and withal to give order in the rest of their affairs. Hereupon the Mitylenians grew confident, and hearkened less to composition with the Athenians. And the winter ended, and the fourth year of this war written by Thucydides.

YEAR V. A. C. 427. OLYMP. 88½.

XXVI. In the beginning of the summer, after they had sent Alcidas away with the forty-two² galleys, whereof he was admiral, unto Mitylene, both they and their confederates invaded Attica; to the end that the Athenians, troubled on both sides, might the less send supply against the fleet now gone to Mitylene. In this expedition Cleomenes was general, instead of Pausanias, the son of Pleistoanax, who being king, was yet in minority, and Cleomenes was his uncle by the father. And they now cut down both what they had before wasted and began to grow again, and also whatsoever else they had before pretermitted. And this was the sharpest invasion of all but the second. For whilst they staid to hear news from their fleet at Lesbos, which by this time they supposed to have been arrived, they went abroad and destroyed most part of the country. But when nothing succeeded according to their hopes, and seeing their corn failed, they retired again, and were dissolved according to their cities.

XXVII. The Mitylenians, in the mean time, seeing the fleet came not from Peloponnesus, but delayed the time, and their victuals failed, were constrained to make their composition with the Athenians upon this occasion. Salæthus, when he also expected these galleys no longer, armed the commons of the city who were before unarmed, with intention to have made a sally upon the Athenians; but they, as soon as they had gotten arms, no longer obeyed the magistrates, but holding assemblies by themselves, required the rich men either to bring their corn to light, and divide it amongst them all, or else they said they would make their composition by delivering up the city to the Athenians.

XXVIII. Those that managed the state, perceiving this, and unable to hinder it, knowing also their own danger in case they were excluded out of the composition, they all jointly agreed to yield the city to Paches and his army, with these conditions, to be proceeded withal at the pleasure of the people of Athens; and to receive the army into the city, and that the Mitylenians should send ambassadors to Athens about their own business; and that Paches, till their return, should neither put in bonds, nor make slave of, nor slay any Mityle-

¹ Bekker in this place, as well as through the rest of the history, puts Mytilene, instead of Mitylene. *Μυτι-*

λήνη, Bekker. *Μιτυλήνη*, Duker.

² It should be forty.

nian. This was the effect of that composition. But such of the Mitylenians as had principally practised with the Lacedæmonians, being afraid of themselves when the army was entered the city, durst not trust to the conditions agreed on, but took sanctuary at the altars. But Paches, having raised them upon promise to do them no injury, sent them to Tenedos, to be in custody there till the people of Athens should have resolved what to do. After this he sent some galleys to Antissa, and took in that town, and ordered the affairs of his army as he thought convenient.

XXIX. In the mean time those forty galleys of Peloponnesus which should have made all possible haste, trifled away the time about Peloponnesus, and making small speed in the rest of their navigation, arrived at Delos unknown to the Athenians at Athens. From thence sailing to Icarus and Myconum, they got first intelligence of the loss of Mitylene. But to know the truth more certainly, they went thence to Embatus, in Erythræa. It was about the seventh day after the taking of Mitylene, that they arrived at Embatus, where understanding the certainty, they went to counsel about what they were to do upon the present occasion, and Teutiplus, an Elean, delivered his opinion to this effect:

XXX. “Alcidas, and the rest that have command of the Peloponnesians in this army, it were not amiss, in my opinion, to go to Mitylene, as we are, before advice be given of our arrival. For in all probability we shall find the city, in respect they have but lately won it, very weakly guarded, and to the sea, where they expect no enemy, and we are chiefly strong, not guarded at all. It is also likely that their land soldiers are dispersed, some in one house and some in another, carelessly as victors. Therefore, if we fall upon them suddenly, and by night, I think, with the help of those within, if any be left there that will take our part, we may be able to possess ourselves of the city. And we shall never fear the danger if we but think this, that all stratagems of war whatsoever are no more, but such occasions as this, which if a commander avoid in himself and take the advantage of them in the enemy, he shall for the most part have good success.”

XXXI. Thus said he, but prevailed not with Alcidas. And some others, fugitives of Ionia, and those Lesbians that were with him in the fleet, gave him counsel, that seeing he feared the danger of this, he should seize some city of Ionia, or Cume, in Æolia, that having some town for the seat of the war, they might from thence force Ionia to revolt; whereof there was hope, because the Ionians would not be unwilling to see him there. And if they could withdraw from the Athenians this their great revenue, and withal put them to maintain a fleet against them, it would be a great exhausting of their treasure. They said besides, that they thought they should be able to get Pisuthnes to join with them in the war. But Alcidas rejected this advice likewise, inclining rather to this opinion, that since they were come too late to Mitylene, they were best to return speedily into Peloponnesus.

XXXII. Whereupon putting off from Embatus, he sailed by the

shore to Myonnesus of the Teians, and there slew most of the prisoners he had taken by the way. After this he put in at Ephesus, and thither came ambassadors to him from the Samians of Anæa, and told him that it was but an ill manner of setting the Grecians at liberty, to kill such as had not lifted up their hands against him, nor were indeed enemies to the Peloponnesians; but confederates to the Athenians by constraint. And that unless he gave over that course, he would make few of the enemies his friends; but many now friends to become his enemies. Wherefore upon these words of the ambassadors, he set the Chians, and some others, all that he had left alive, at liberty. For when men saw their fleet they never fled from it, but came unto them as to Athenians; little imagining that the Athenians being masters of the sea, the Peloponnesians durst have put over to Ionia.

XXXIII. From Ephesus, Alcidas went away in haste, indeed fled; for he had been descried by the Salaminia and the Paralos,¹ (which by chance were then in their course for Athens,) whilst he lay at anchor about Icaros,² and fearing to be chased kept the wide sea, meaning with his will to touch no land, till he came to Peloponnesus. But the news of them came to Paches and the Athenians from divers places, and from Erythræa; for the cities of Ionia being unwall'd, were extremely afraid lest the Peloponnesians sailing by without intention to stay, should have pillaged them as they passed. But the Salaminia and the Paralos having seen him at Icaros, brought the news themselves. And Paches thereupon made great haste after, and followed him as far as the island Patmos;³ but when he saw he could not reach him he came back again, and thought he had a good turn, seeing he could not overtake those galleys upon the wide sea, that the same were not compelled by being taken in some place near land to fortify themselves, and so to give him occasion with guards and galleys to attend them.

XXXIV. As he came by in his return, he put in at Notium, a city of the Colophonians, into which the Colophonians came and inhabited, after the town above,⁴ through their own sedition, was taken by Itamænes and the Barbarians. This town was taken at the time when Attica was the second time invaded by the Peloponnesians. They then that came down and dwelt in Notium, falling again into sedition, the one part having procured some forces, Arcadians and Barbarians of Pissuthnes, kept them in a part of the town which they had severed from the rest with a wall; and there with such of the Colophonians of the high town as being of the Medan faction entered with them, they governed the city at their pleasure: and the other part which went out from these, and were the fugitives, brought in Paches. He when he

¹ These vessels seem to have been the packets or yachts of the state.— Their force was small compared to that of ships of war, as they were chiefly designed for expedition. They were navigated only by free-born citizens of Athens, who, besides receiving more pay, deemed it a greater honour to serve on board these vessels.

² Icaros, according to Bekker; commonly put Klaros.

³ Patmos, according to Bekker: commonly put Latmos, the island: but there is no mention of such an island by any of the geographers.

⁴ The city of Colophon, two miles higher into the land.

had called out Hippias, captain of the Arcadians, that were within the said wall, with promise if they should not agree, to set him safe and sound within the wall again; and Hippias was thereupon come to him, committed him to custody, but without bonds; and withal assailing the wall on a sudden when they expected not, took it, and slew as many of the Arcadians and Barbarians as were within. And when he had done, brought Hippias in again according as he had promised. But after he had him there, laid hold on him, and caused him to be shot to death; and restored Notium to the Colophonians, excluding only such as had Medized. Afterwards the Athenians sent governors to Notium of their own, and having gathered together the Colophonians out of all cities whatsoever, seated them there under the law of the Athenians.

XXXV. Paches, when he came back to Mitylene, took in Pyrrha and Eressus; and having found Salæthus, the Lacedæmonian, hid in Mitylene, apprehended him, and sent him, together with those men he had put in custody at Tenedos, and whomsoever else he thought author of the revolt, to Athens. He likewise sent away the greatest part of his army, and with the rest staid and settled the state of Mitylene, and the rest of Lesbos, as he thought convenient.

XXXVI. These men, and Salæthus with them, being arrived at Athens, the Athenians slew Salæthus presently, though he made them many offers, and amongst other to get the army of the Peloponnesians to rise from before Platæa, (for it was yet besieged;) but upon the rest they went to council, and in their passion decreed to put them to death; not only those men there present, but also all the men of Mitylene that were of age, and to make slaves of the women and children; laying to their charge the revolt itself, that they revolted, not being in subjection as others were: and withal the Peloponnesian fleet which durst enter Ionia to their aid, had not a little aggravated that commotion. For by that it seemed that the revolt was not made without much premeditation. They therefore sent a galley to inform Paches of their decree, with command to put the Mitylenians presently to death. But the next day they felt a kind of repentance in themselves, and began to consider what a great and cruel decree it was, that not the authors only, but the whole city should be destroyed. Which when the ambassadors of the Mitylenians that were there present, and such Athenians as favoured them, understood, they wrought with those that bare office to bring the matter again into debate; wherein they easily prevailed as to them also it was well known that the most of the city were desirous to have means to consult of the same anew. The assembly being presently met, amongst the opinions of divers others, Cleon¹ also, the son of Cleænetus, who in the former assembly had won to have them killed, being of all the citizens most violent, and with the people at that time far the most powerful, stood forth and said in this manner:

¹ The cruelty and baseness of Cleon's disposition is fully shewn in this speech. Cicero styles him a turbulent but eloquent Athenian. See also the Knights of Aristophanes, where he is severely attacked.

Oration of Cleon.

XXXVII. "I have often on other occasions thought a democracy
 "incapable of dominion over others; but most of all now for this
 "your repentance concerning the Mitylenians. For through your
 "own mutual security and openness, you imagine the same also in
 "your confederates, and consider not that when at their persuasion
 "you commit an error or relent on compassion, you are softened thus
 "to the danger of the commonwealth, not to the winning of the affec-
 "tions of your confederates. Nor do you consider that your govern-
 "ment is a tyranny, and those that be subject to it are so against
 "their wills, and are continually plotting against you, and obey you
 "not for any good turn, which to your own detriment you shall do
 "them, but only because you exceed them in strength and for no good
 "will. But the worst mischief of all is this, that nothing we decree
 "shall stand firm, and that we will not know, that a city with the
 "worse laws, if immoveable, is better than one with good laws not
 "binding; and that a plain wit accompanied with modesty, is more
 "profitable to the state than dexterity with arrogance; and that the
 "more ignorant sort of men do for the most part better regulate a
 "commonwealth, than they that are wiser. For these love to appear
 "wiser than the laws, and in all public debates to carry the victory,
 "as the worthiest things wherein to shew their wisdom; from whence
 "most commonly proceedeth the ruin of the states they live in.
 "Whereas the other sort mistrusting their own wits, are content to be
 "esteemed not so wise as the laws, and not able to carp at what is
 "well spoken by another; and so making themselves equal judges,
 "rather than contenders for mastery, govern a state for the most part
 "well. We, therefore, should do the like, and not be carried away
 "with combats of eloquence and wit, to give such counsel to your
 "multitude, as in our own judgment we think not good.

XXXVIII. "For my own part, I am of the opinion I was before;
 "and I wonder at these men that have brought this matter of the
 "Mitylenians in question again, and thereby cause delay, which is
 "the advantage only of them that do the injury. For the sufferer by
 "this means comes upon the doer with his anger dulled; whereas re-
 "venge, the opposite of injury, is then greatest when it follows pre-
 "sently. I wonder also what he is that shall stand up now to con-
 "tradict me, and shall think to prove that the injuries done us by the
 "Mitylenians are good for us, or that our calamities are any damage
 "to our confederates. For certainly he must either trust in his elo-
 "quence, to make you believe that that which was decreed was not
 "decreed; or, moved with lucre, must with some elaborate speech
 "endeavour to seduce you. Now of such matches [of eloquence] as
 "these, the city giveth the prizes to others, but the danger that thence
 "proceedeth she herself sustaineth. And of all this you yourselves
 "are the cause, by the evil institution of these matches, in that you
 "use to be spectators of words and hearers of actions, beholding fu-
 "ture actions in the words of them that speak well as possible to
 "come to pass; and actions already past in the orations of such as

“ make the most of them, and that with such assurance as if what you saw with your eyes, were not more certain than what you hear related.¹ You are excellent men for one to deceive with a speech of a new strain, but backward to follow any tried advice; slaves to strange things, contemners of things usual. You would every one chiefly give the best advice; but if you cannot, then you will contradict those that do. You would not be thought to come after with your opinion; but rather if any thing be acutely spoken, to applaud it first, and to appear ready apprehenders of what is spoken, even before it be out; but slow to preconceive the sequel of the same. You would hear, as one may say, somewhat else than what our life is conversant in; and yet you sufficiently understand not that, that is before your eyes. And to speak plainly, overcome with the delight of the ear, you are more like spectators, sitting to hear the contentions of sophisters, than men that deliberate about the state of a commonwealth.

XXXIX. “ To put you out of this humour, I say that the Mitylenians have done us more injury than ever did any one city. For those that have revolted through the over-hard pressure of our government, or have been compelled to it by the enemy, I pardon; but they that were islanders, and had their city walled, so as they needed not fear our enemies, but only by sea; in which case also they were armed for them with sufficient provision of galleys; and they that were permitted to have their own laws, and whom we principally honoured, and yet have done thus; what have they done but conspired against us, and rather warred upon us than revolted from us, (for a revolt is only of such as suffer violence,) and joined with our bitterest enemies to destroy us? This is far worse than if they had warred against us for increasing their own power. But these men would neither take example by their neighbours’ calamity, who are, all that revolted, already subdued by us, nor could their own present felicity make them afraid of changing it into misery. But being bold against future events, and aiming at matters above their strength, though below their desires, have taken arms against us, and preferred force before justice. For no sooner they thought they might get the victory, but immediately, though without injury done them, they rose against us. But with cities that come to great and unexpected prosperity it is usual to turn insolent. Whereas most commonly that prosperity which is attained according to the course of reason, is more firm than that which cometh unhopd for. And such cities, as one may say, do more easily keep off an adverse, than maintain a happy fortune. Indeed we should not formerly have done any honour more to the Mitylenians, than to the rest of our confederates; for then they had never come to this degree of insolence. For it is natural to men to condemn those that

¹ οὐ τὸ δρασθὲν πιστότερον—τῶν λόγων καλῶς ἐπιτιμησάντων, Bekker. οὐ τὸ θεαθὲν πιστότερον—τῶν λόγων καλῶς ἐπιτιμησάντων, Duker. And as to actions already past, not considering that more creditable which they had seen done, than that which was heard from those who in their speeches put a high value on them.

“ observe them, and to have in admiration such as will not give them way. Now, therefore, let them be punished according to their wicked dealing; and let not the fault be laid upon a few, and the people be absolved; for they have all alike taken arms against us. And the commons, if they had been constrained to it, might have fled hither, and have recovered their city afterwards again. But they, esteeming it the safer adventure to join with the few, are alike with them culpable of the revolt. Have also in consideration your confederates; and if you inflict the same punishment on them that revolt upon compulsion of the enemy, that you do on them that revolt of their own accord, who think you will not revolt, though on light pretence; seeing that speeding they win their liberty, and failing, their case is not incurable? Besides, that against every city we must be at a new hazard both of our persons and fortunes. Wherein with the best success we recover but an exhausted city, and lose that wherein our strength lieth, the revenue of it; but mis-carrying, we add these enemies to our former; and must spend that time in warring against our own confederates, which we needed to employ against the enemies we have already.

XL. “ We must not, therefore, give our confederates hope¹ of pardon, either impetrable by words, or purchaseable by money, as if their errors were but such as are commonly incident to humanity. For these did us not an injury unwillingly, but wittingly conspired against us; whereas it ought to be involuntary whatsoever is pardonable. Therefore both then at first, and now again I maintain, that you ought not to alter your former decree, nor to offend in any of these three most disadvantageous things to empire, pity, delight in plausible speeches, and lenity. As for pity, it is just to shew it on them that are like us, and will have pity again; but not upon such as not only would not have had pity upon us, but must also of necessity have been our enemies for ever hereafter. And for the rhetoricians that delight you with their orations, let them play their prizes in matters of less weight, and not in such wherein the city for a little pleasure, must suffer a great damage, but they for their well speaking, must well have.² Lastly, for lenity, it is to be used towards those that will be our friends hereafter, rather than towards such, as being suffered to live, will still be as they are, not a jot the less our enemies. In sum, I say only this, that if you follow my advice, you shall do that, which is both just in respect of the Mitylenians, and profitable for yourselves; whereas, if you decree otherwise, you do not gratify them, but condemn yourselves. For if these have justly revolted, you must unjustly have had dominion over them. Nay, though your dominion be against reason, yet if you resolve to hold it, you must also, as a matter conducing thereunto, against reason punish them; or else you must give your dominion over, that you may be good without danger. But if you con-

¹ *οἰκονν δὲ προθεῖναι*, Bekker. *προσθεῖναι*, Duker. We must not therefore hold forth, &c.

² Meaning that the orators are bribed

and hired to give counsel to the commonwealth, according to the desire of other states.

“sider what was likely they would have done to you, if they had prevailed, you cannot but think them worthy the same punishment; nor be less sensible you that have escaped, than they that have conspired; especially they having done the injury first. For such as do an injury without precedent cause, persecute most, and even to the death, him they have done it to; as jealous of the danger his remaining enemy may create him. For he that is wronged without cause, and escapeth, will commonly be more cruel, than if it were against any enemy on equal quarrel. Let us not therefore betray ourselves,¹ but in contemplation of what you were near suffering, and how you once prized above all things else, to have them in your power, requite them now accordingly. Be not softened at the sight of their present estate, nor forget the danger that hung over our own heads so lately: give not only unto these their deserved punishment, but also unto the rest of our confederates a clear example, that death is their sentence, whensoever they shall rebel. Which when they know, you shall the less often have occasion to neglect your enemies, and fight against your own confederates.”

XLI. To this purpose spake Cleon. After him, Diodotus,² the son of Eucrates, (who also in the former assembly opposed most the putting of the Mitylenians to death,) stood forth, and spake as followeth:

Oration of Diodotus.

XLII. “I will neither blame those who have propounded the business of the Mitylenians, to be again debated, nor commend those that find fault with often consulting in affairs of great importance. But I am of opinion that nothing is so contrary to good counsel as these two, *haste* and *anger*; whereof the one is ever accompanied with madness, and the other with want of judgment. And whosoever maintains, that words are not instructors to deeds, either he is not wise, or does it upon some private interest of his own. Not wise, if he think that future and not apparent things, may be demonstrated otherwise than by words: interested, if desiring to carry an ill matter, and knowing that a bad cause will not bear a good speech, he go about to deter his opposers and hearers by a good calumniation. But they, of all others, are most intolerable, that when men give public advice, will accuse them also of bribery. For if they charge a man with no more but ignorance, when he had spoken in vain, he might yet depart with the opinion of a fool. But when they impute corruption also, if his counsel take place, he is still suspected, and if it do not take place, he shall be held not only a fool, but also void of honesty. The commonwealth gets no good

¹ μή οὖν προδίδται γίνεσθαι ἑμῶν αὐτῶν, Bekker. ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, Duker; be not then traitors to yourselves.

² This is the only place in history where Diodotus is mentioned. A brother of Nicias was named Eucrates, (Lys. or. pro fil. Eucr.) and the manner

in which family names were usually distributed among the Greeks would favour the supposition, that the father of Diodotus may have been brother of Niceratus, the father of Nicias.—*Mitford.*

“ by such courses ; for through fear hereof it will want counsellors,
 “ and the state would do their business for the most part well, if this
 “ kind of citizens were they that had least ability in speaking ; for
 “ they should then persuade the city to the fewer errors. For a good
 “ statesman should not go about to terrify those that contradict him,
 “ but rather to make good his counsel upon liberty of speech. And a
 “ wise state ought not, either to add unto, or on the other side, to
 “ derogate from the honour of him that giveth good advice ; nor yet
 “ punish, nay, nor disgrace the man whose counsel they receive not.
 “ And then, neither would he that lighteth on good advice, deliver
 “ any thing against his own conscience, out of ambition of further
 “ honour, and to please the auditory ; nor he that doth not, covet
 “ thereupon by gratifying the people some way or other, that he also
 “ may endear them.

XLIII. “ But we do here the contrary, and besides, if any man be
 “ suspected of corruption, though he give the best counsel that can be
 “ given, yet through envy, for this uncertain opinion of his gain, we
 “ lose a certain benefit to the commonwealth. And our custom is to
 “ hold good counsel given suddenly no less suspected than bad. By
 “ which means, as he that gives the most dangerous counsel must get
 “ the same received by fraud, so also he that gives the most sound
 “ advice, is forced by lying to get himself believed. So that the com-
 “ monwealth is it alone, which by reason of these suspicious imagina-
 “ tions, no man can possibly benefit, by the plain and open way,
 “ without artifice. For if any man shall do a manifest good unto the
 “ commonwealth, he shall presently be suspected of some secret gain
 “ unto himself in particular. We therefore, that in the most import-
 “ ant affairs, and amidst these jealousies, do give our advice, have
 “ need to foresee farther than you that look not far ; and the rather
 “ because we stand accountable for our counsel, and you are to ren-
 “ der no account of your hearing it. For if the persuader and the
 “ persuaded had equal harm, you would be the more moderate judges.
 “ But now, according to the passion that takes you, when at any time
 “ your affairs miscarry, you punish the sentence of that one only that
 “ gave the counsel, not the many sentences of your own, that were in
 “ fault as well as his.

XLIV. “ For my own part, I stood not forth with any purpose of
 “ contradiction, in the business of the Mitylenians, nor to accuse any
 “ man. For we contend not now, if we be wise, about the injury
 “ done by them, but about the wisest counsel for ourselves. For how
 “ great soever be their fault, yet I would never advise to have them
 “ put to death, unless it be for our profit ; nor yet would I pardon
 “ them, though they were pardonable, unless it be good for the com-
 “ monwealth. And in my opinion, our deliberation now is of the fu-
 “ ture, rather than of the present. And whereas Cleon contends, that
 “ it will be profitable for the future, to put them to death, in that it
 “ will keep the rest from rebelling, I contending likewise for the
 “ future, affirm the contrary. And I desire you not to reject the profit
 “ of my advice, for the fair pretexts of his, which agreeing more with
 “ your present anger against the Mitylenians, may quickly perhaps

“ win your consent. We plead not judicially with the Mitylenians, so as to need arguments of equity, but we consult of them, which way we may serve ourselves of them to our most advantage hereafter.

XLV. “ I say therefore that death hath been in states ordained for a punishment of many offences, and those not so great, but far less than this. Yet encouraged by hope, men hazard themselves. Nor did any man ever yet enter into a practice, which he knew he could not go through with. And a city when it revolteth, supposeth itself to be better furnished either of themselves, or by their confederates, than it is, or else it would never take the enterprise in hand. They have it by nature, both men and cities, to commit offences; nor is there any law that can prevent it. For men have gone over all degrees of punishment, augmenting them still, in hope to be less annoyed by malefactors; and it is likely that gentler punishments were inflicted of old, even upon the most heinous crimes; but that in tract of time, men continuing to transgress, they were extended afterwards to the taking away of life; and yet they still transgress. And therefore either some greater terror than death must be devised, or death will not be enough for coercion. For poverty will always add boldness to necessity; and wealth, covetousness to pride and contempt. And the other [middle] fortunes, they also through human passion, according as they are severally subject to some insuperable one or other, impel men to danger. But *hope* and *desire* work this effect in all estates. And this as the leader, that as the companion; this contriving the enterprise, that suggesting the success: are the cause of most crimes that are committed: and being least discerned, are more mischievous than evils seen. Besides these two, fortune also puts men forward as much as any thing else: for presenting herself sometimes unlooked-for, she provoketh some to adventure, though not provided as they ought for the purpose; and specially cities, because they venture for the greatest matters, as liberty and dominion over others; and amongst a generality, every one, though without reason, somewhat the more magnifies himself in particular. In a word, it is a thing impossible, and of great simplicity to believe, when human nature is earnestly bent to do a thing, that by force of law, or any other danger, it can be diverted.

XLVI. “ We must not therefore, relying on the security of capital punishment, decree the worst against them, nor make them desperate, as if there were no place to repent, and as soon as they can to cancel their offence. For observe, if a city revolted should know it could not hold out, it would now compound, whilst it were able both to pay us our charges for the present, and our tribute for the time to come. But the way that Cleon prescribes, what city, think you, would not provide itself better than this did, and endure the siege to the very last, if to compound late and soon be all one? And how can it be but detriment to us, to be at the charge of long sieges, through their obstinacy, and when we have taken a city, to find it exhausted, and to lose the revenue of it for the future? And this

“ revenue is the only strength we have against our enemies. We are not then to be exact judges in the punishment of offenders, but to look rather how by their moderate punishment we may have our moderate cities, such as they may be able to pay us tribute; and not think to keep them in awe by the rigour of laws, but by the providence of our own actions. But we, to the contrary, when we recover a city, which having been free, and held under our obedience by force, hath revolted justly, think now that we ought to inflict some cruel punishment upon them; whereas we ought rather, not mightily to punish a free city revolted, but mightily to look to it before it revolt, and to prevent the intention of it: but when we have overcome them, to lay the fault upon as few as we can.

XLVII. “ Consider also, if you follow the advice of Cleon, how much you shall offend likewise in this other point. For in all your cities, the commonalty are now your friends, and either revolt not with the few, or if they be compelled to it by force, they presently turn enemies to them that caused the revolt; whereby, when you go to war, you have the commons of the adverse city on your side. But if you shall destroy the commonalty of the Mitylenians, which did neither partake of the revolt, and as soon as they were armed, presently delivered the city into your hands, you shall first do unjustly to kill such as have done you service, and you shall effect a work besides, which the great men do every where most desire. For when they have made a city to revolt, they shall have the people presently on their side; you having foreshewn them by the example that both the guilty and not guilty must undergo the same punishment. Whereas, indeed, though they were guilty, yet we ought to dissemble it, to the end that the only party (now our friend) may not become our enemy. And for the assuring of our dominion, I think it far more profitable voluntarily to put up an injury, than justly to destroy such as we should not. And that same, both *justice and profit of revenge*, alleged by Cleon, can never possibly be found together in the same thing.

XLVIII. “ You, therefore, upon knowledge that this is the best course, not upon *compassion* or *lenity*, (for neither would I have you won by that) but upon consideration of what hath been advised) be ruled by me, and proceed to judgment at your own leisure, against those whom Paches hath sent hither as guilty, and suffer the rest to enjoy their city. For that will be both good for the future, and also of present terror to the enemy. For he that consulteth wisely is a sorer enemy than he that assaulteth with the strength of action unadvisedly.”

XLIX. Thus spake Diodotus. After these two opinions were delivered, the one most opposite to the other, the Athenians were at contention which they should decree, and at the holding up of hands they were both sides almost equal: but yet the sentence of Diodotus prevailed. Whereupon they presently in haste sent away another galley, lest not arriving before the former, they should find the city already destroyed. The first galley set forth before the second a day and a night. But the Mitylenian ambassadors having furnished this

latter with wine and barley cakes, and promised them great rewards if they overtook the other galley, they rowed diligently, at one and the same time both plying their oars and taking their refection of the said barley cakes, steeped in wine and oil; and by turns part of them slept and the other part rowed. It happened also that there blew no wind against them; and the former galley making no great haste, as going on so sad an errand, whereas the latter proceeded in the manner before-mentioned, arrived indeed first, but only so much, as Paches had read the sentence, and prepared to execute what they had decreed. But presently after came in the other galley, and saved the city from being destroyed. So near were the Mitylenians to the danger.

L. But those whom Paches' had sent home, as most culpable of the revolt, the Athenians, as Cleon had advised, put to death; being in number somewhat above a thousand. They also rased the walls of Mitylene, and took from them all their galleys. After which they imposed on the Lesbians no more tribute, but having divided their land (all but that of the Methymnæans) into three thousand parts, three hundred of those parts, of the choicest land, they consecrated to the gods. And for the rest, they sent men by lot out of their own city to possess it, of whom the Lesbians, at the rent of two minæ² of silver yearly upon a lot, had the land again to be husbanded by themselves. The Athenians took in all such towns also as the Mitylenians were masters of in the continent, which were afterwards made subjects to the people of Athens. Thus ended the business touching Lesbos.

LI. The same summer, after the recovery of Lesbos, the Athenians under the conduct of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, made war on Minoa, an island³ adjacent to Megara. For the Megareans had built a tower in it, and served themselves of the island for a place of garrison. But Nicias desired that the Athenians might keep their watch upon Megara, in that island, as being nearer, and no more at Budorus and Salamis; to the end that the Peloponnesians might not go out thence with their galleys undescried, nor send out pirates, (as they had formerly done) and to prohibit the importation of all things to the Megareans by sea. Wherefore, when he had first taken two towers that stood out from Nisæa, with engines applied from the sea, and so made a free entrance for his galleys between the island and the firm land, he took it in with a wall also from the continent, in that part where it might receive aid by a bridge over the marshes, for it was not far distant from the main land. And that being in a few days finished, he built a fort in the island itself, and leaving there a garrison, carried the rest of his army back.

LII. It happened also about the same time of this summer, that the Platæans having spent their victual, and being unable longer to hold out, yielded their city in this manner to the Peloponnesians. The

¹ Of Paches no further mention is made by Thucydides, though in the reduction of Lesbos he had greatly benefited his country. Plutarch, however, mentions, that at his return he was called to account for his conduct during his

command; and finding he was about to be condemned, he slew himself in court. See *Lives of Aristides and Nicias*.

² £6 9s. 2d.

³ Strabo, ix. p. 391, makes it a promontory.

Peloponnesians assaulted the walls, but those within were unable to fight. Whereupon the Lacedæmonian commander, perceiving their weakness, would not take the place by force, (for he had command to that purpose from Lacedæmon, to the end that if they should ever make peace with the Athenians, with conditions of mutual restitution of such cities as on either side had been taken by war, Platæa, as having come in of its own accord, might not be thereby recoverable) but sent a herald to them, who demanded, whether or no they would give up their city voluntarily into the hands of the Lacedæmonians, and take them for their judges, with power to punish the offenders, but none without form of justice. So said the herald : and they (for they were now at the weakest) delivered up the city accordingly. So the Peloponnesians gave the Platæans food for certain days, till the judges, which were five, should arrive from Lacedæmon. And when they were come, no accusation was exhibited, but calling them man by man, they asked of every one only this question : “ Whether they had done to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates in this war “ any good service ? ” But the Platæans having sued to make their answer more at large, and having appointed Astymachus, the son of Asopolaus, and Lacon, the son of Aeimnestus, who had been heretofore the host of the Lacedæmonians, for their speakers, said as follows :

Oration of the Platæans.

LIII. “ Men of Lacedæmon, relying upon you, we yielded up our city, not expecting to undergo this, but some more legal manner of proceeding, and we agreed not to stand to the judgment of others, (as now we do) but of yourselves only ; conceiving we should so obtain the better justice. But now we fear we have been deceived in both. For we have reason to suspect, both that the trial is capital, and you, the judges, partial. Gathering so much, both from that, that there hath not been presented any accusation to which we might answer, and also from this, that the interrogatory is short, and such as, if we answer to it with truth, we shall speak against ourselves ; and be easily convinced, if we lie. But since we are on all hands in a strait, we are forced (and it seems our safest way) to try what we can obtain by pleading. For, for men in our case, the speech not spoken may give occasion to some to think, that spoken, it had preserved us. But besides other inconveniencies, the means also of persuasion go ill on our side ; for if we had not known one another, we might have helped ourselves by producing testimony in things you knew not. Whereas now all that we shall say, will be before men that know already what it is. And we fear not that you mean, because you know us inferior in virtue to yourselves, to make that a crime ; but lest you bring us to a judgment already judged, to gratify somebody else.

LIV. “ Nevertheless we will produce our reasons of equity against the quarrel of the Thebans, and withal make mention of our services done, both to you and to the rest of Greece, and make trial, if by any means we can persuade you. As to that short interrogatory,

“ ‘ Whether we have any way done good in this present war to the
 “ ‘ Lacedæmonians and their confederates or not ? ’ If you ask us as
 “ ‘ enemies, we say, that if we have done them no good, we have also
 “ ‘ done them no wrong. If you ask us as friends, then we say that
 “ ‘ they rather have done us the injury, in that they made war upon us.
 “ ‘ But in the time of the peace, and in the war against the Medes, we
 “ ‘ behaved ourselves well ; for the one, we brake not first, and in the
 “ ‘ other, we were the only Bœotians that joined with you for the delivery
 “ ‘ of Greece.’ For though we dwell up in the land, yet we fought by
 “ ‘ sea at Artemisium, and in the battle fought in this our own territory
 “ ‘ we were with you ; and whatsoever dangers the Grecians in those
 “ ‘ times underwent, we were partakers of all, even beyond our strength.
 “ ‘ And unto you Lacedæmonians in particular, when Sparta was in
 “ ‘ greatest affright after the earthquake, upon the rebellion of the
 “ ‘ Helots, and seizing of Ithome,’ we sent the third part of our power
 “ ‘ to assist you, which you have no reason to forget.

LV. “ Such then we shewed ourselves in those ancient and most
 “ ‘ important affairs. It is true, we have been your enemies since, but
 “ ‘ for that you are to blame yourselves : for when oppressed by the
 “ ‘ Thebans we sought league of you, you rejected us, and bade us go
 “ ‘ to the Athenians that were nearer hand, yourselves being far off :’
 “ ‘ nevertheless, you neither have in this war, nor were to have suffered
 “ ‘ at our hands any thing that misbecame us. And if we denied to
 “ ‘ revolt from the Athenians, when you bade us, we did you no injury
 “ ‘ in it : for they both aided us against the Thebans, when you shrunk
 “ ‘ from us ; and it was now no more any honesty to betray them :
 “ ‘ especially having been well used by them, and we ourselves having
 “ ‘ sought their league, and been made denizens also of their city.
 “ ‘ Nay, we ought rather to have followed them in all their commands
 “ ‘ with alacrity. When you, or the Athenians, have the leading of the
 “ ‘ confederates, if evil be done, not they that follow are culpable, but
 “ ‘ you that lead to the evil.

LVI. “ The Thebans have done us many other injuries ; but this
 “ ‘ last, which is the cause of what we now suffer, you yourselves know
 “ ‘ what it was. For we avenged us but justly of those that in time of
 “ ‘ peace, and upon the day of our novilunial⁴ sacrifice, had surprised
 “ ‘ our city ; and by the law of all nations it is lawful to repel an
 “ ‘ assailing enemy ; and therefore there is no reason you should punish
 “ ‘ us now for them. For if you shall measure justice by your and their
 “ ‘ present benefit in the war, it will manifestly appear, that you are not
 “ ‘ judges of the truth, but respecters only of your profit. And yet if
 “ ‘ the Thebans seem profitable to you now, we and the rest of the
 “ ‘ Grecians were more profitable to you then, when you were in greater
 “ ‘ danger. For though the Thebans are now on your side when you
 “ ‘ invade others, yet at that time when the Barbarian came in to im-
 “ ‘ pose servitude on all, they were on his. It is but justice, that with

¹ See Herod. vi. 108.

² Book i. 101.

³ Herod. vi. 108.

⁴ Bk. ii. 4. Plataea occupied by the Thebans, τελευτώντος τοῦ μηνός.

“ our present offence (if we have committed any) you compare our
 “ forwardness then; which you will find both greater than our fault,
 “ and augmented also by the circumstance of such a season, when it
 “ was rare to find any Grecian that durst oppose his valour to Xerxes’
 “ power; and when they were most commended, not who with safety
 “ helped to further his invasion, but who adventured to do what was
 “ most honest, though with danger. But we being of that number,
 “ and honoured for it amongst the first, are afraid lest the same shall
 “ be now a cause of our destruction, as having chosen rather to follow
 “ the Athenians justly, than you profitably. But you should ever
 “ have the same opinion, in the same case; and think this only to be
 “ profitable, that doing what is useful for the present occasion, you
 “ reserve withal a constant acknowledgment of the virtue of your good
 “ confederates.

LVII. “ Consider also that you are an example of honest dealing
 “ to the most of the Grecians.¹ Now if you shall decree otherwise
 “ than is just, (for this judgment of yours is conspicuous) you that be
 “ praised against us that be not blamed, take heed that they do not
 “ dislike that good men should undergo an unjust sentence, though at
 “ the hands of better men; or that the spoil of us that have done the
 “ Grecians service, should be dedicated in their temples. For it will
 “ be thought a horrible matter that Platæa should be destroyed by the
 “ Lacedæmonians, and that you, whereas your fathers in honour of
 “ our valour, inscribed the name of our city on the Tripode at Delphi,
 “ should now blot it out of all Greece to gratify the Thebans. For
 “ we have proceeded to such a degree of calamity, that if the Medes
 “ had prevailed, we must have perished then; and now the Thebans
 “ have overcome us again in you, who were before our greatest
 “ friends, and have put us to two great hazards, one before of famish-
 “ ing if we yielded not, and another of a capital sentence.² And we
 “ Platæans, who even beyond our strength have been zealous in the
 “ defence of the Grecians, are now abandoned, and left unrelieved by
 “ them all.

LVIII. “ But we beseech you for those gods’ sakes, in whose
 “ names once we made a mutual league, and for our valour’s sake
 “ shewn in the behalf of the Grecians, to be moved towards us, and
 “ (if at the persuasion of the Thebans, you have determined aught
 “ against us) to change your minds, and reciprocally to require at the
 “ hands of the Thebans this courtesy, that whom you ought to spare,
 “ they would be contented not to kill, and so receive an honest benefit
 “ in recompense of a wicked one, and not to bestow pleasure upon
 “ others, and receive wickedness upon yourselves in exchange. For
 “ though to take away our lives be a matter quickly done, yet to
 “ make the infamy of it cease will be work enough. For being none
 “ of your enemies, but well-willers, and such as have entered into the

¹ It does not appear by any thing in this war that the Lacedæmonians deserved any reputation for justice; on the contrary, they appear by this, and other actions, not to have valued justice

at all, when it crossed their own interest or passion.

² νῦν δὲ θανάτου κρίνεσθαι, Bekker. θανάτου δίκην κρίνεσθαι, Duker; and now to be adjudged *worthy* of death.

“ war upon constraint, you cannot put us to death with justice. Therefore if you will judge uncorruptly, you ought to secure our persons, and to remember that you received us by our own voluntary submission, and with hands upheld, (and it is the law among Grecians not to put such to death;) besides that, we have from time to time been beneficial to you: for look upon the sepulchres of your fathers, whom slain by the Medes, and buried in this territory of ours,¹ we have yearly honoured at the public charge, both with vestments and other rites;² and of such things as our land hath produced, we have offered unto them the first fruits of it all, as friends in an amicable land, and confederates use to do to those that have formerly been their fellows in arms. But now by a wrong sentence, you shall do the contrary of this. For consider this: Pausanias, as he thought, interred these men in amicable ground, and amongst their friends: but you, if you slay us, and of Plataea make Thebais, what do you but leave your fathers and kindred deprived of the honours they now have, in an hostile territory, and amongst the very men that slew them? And moreover put into servitude that soil whereon the Grecians were put into liberty; and make desolate the temples wherein they prayed when they prevailed against the Medes; and destroy the patril sacrifices which were instituted by the builders and founders of the same?

LIX. “ These things are not for your glory, men of Lacedæmon, nor to violate the common institutions of Greece, and wrong your progenitors, nor to destroy us that have done you service, for the hatred of another, when you have received no injury from us yourselves. But to spare our lives, to relent, to have a moderate compassion, in contemplation not only of the greatness of the punishment, but also of who we are that must suffer, and of the uncertainty where calamity may light, and that undeservedly; which we (as becometh us, and our need compelleth us to do) cry aloud unto the common gods of Greece to persuade you unto; producing the oath sworn by your fathers, to put you in mind; and also we become here, sanctuary men, at the sepulchres of your fathers, crying out upon the dead, not to suffer themselves to be in the power of the Thebans, nor to let their greatest friends be betrayed into the hands of their greatest enemies; remembering them of that day, upon which, though we have done glorious acts in their company, yet we are in danger at this day of most miserable suffering. But to make an end of speaking, which is, as necessary, so most bitter to men in our case, because the hazard of our lives cometh so soon after, for a conclusion we say, that it was not to the Thebans that we rendered our city, (for we would rather have died of famine, the most base perdition of all other,) but we came out on trust in you. And it is but justice, that if we cannot persuade you, you should set us again in the estate we were in, and let us undergo the danger at our own election. Also we require you, men of Lacedæmon, not only not to deliver us Plataeans who have been most zealous in the ser-

¹ Herod. ix. 83. ² For an account of this yearly festival, see Plut. in Aristid.

“vice of the Grecians, especially being sanctuary men, out of your own hands, and your own trust, into the hands of our most mortal enemies, the Thebans, but also to be our saviours, and not to destroy us utterly, you that set at liberty all other Grecians.”

LX. Thus spake the Platæans. But the Thebans, fearing lest the Lacedæmonians might relent at their oration, stood forth and said, that since the Platæans had had the liberty of a longer speech (which they thought they should not) than for answer to the question was necessary, they also desired to speak: and being commanded to say on, spake to this effect:

Oration of the Thebans.

LXI. “If these men had answered briefly to the question, and not both turned against us with an accusation, and also out of the purpose, and wherein they were not charged, made much apology and commendation of themselves in things unquestioned, we had never asked leave to speak; but as it is, we are to the one point to answer, and to confute the other, that neither the faults of us, nor their own reputation may do them good, but your sentence may be guided by hearing of the truth of both. The quarrel between us and them arose at first from this, that when we had built Platæa last of all the cities of Bœotia, together with some other places, which, having driven out the promiscuous nations we had then in our dominion, they would not, as was ordained at first, allow us to be their leaders, but being the only men of all the Bœotians that transgressed the common ordinance of the country, when they should have been compelled to their duty, they turned unto the Athenians, and together with them did us many evils, for which they likewise suffered as many from us.

LXII. “But when the Barbarian invaded Greece, then, say they, that they of all the Bœotians only also Medized not. And this is the thing wherein they both glory most themselves, and most detract from us. Now we confess they Medized not, because also the Athenians did not. Nevertheless when the Athenians afterwards invaded the rest of the Grecians, in the same kind then of all the Bœotians they only Atticized. But take now into your consideration withal, what form of government we were in, both the one and the other, when we did this. For then had we our city governed neither by an oligarchy, with laws common to all, nor by a democracy, but the state was managed by a few with authority absolute, than which there is nothing more contrary to laws and moderation, nor more approaching unto tyranny. And these few, hoping yet, further, if the Medes prevailed, to increase their own power, kept the people under, and furthered the coming in of the Barbarian. And so did the whole city, but it was not then master of itself; nor doth it deserve to be upbraided with what it did when they had no laws, but were at the will of others. But when the Medes were gone, and our city had laws, consider now when the Athenians attempted to subdue all Greece, and this territory of ours with the rest, wherein through sedition they had gotten many places already,

“ whether by giving them battle at Coronæ¹ and defeating them, we
 “ delivered not Bœotia from servitude then, and do not also now with
 “ much zeal assist you in the asserting of the rest; and find not more
 “ horses, and more provision of war, than any of the confederates
 “ besides. And so much be spoken by way of apology to our
 “ Medizing.

LXIII. “ And we will endeavour to prove now, that the Grecians
 “ have been rather wronged by you, and that you are more worthy of
 “ all manner of punishment. You became, you say, confederates and
 “ denizens of Athens, for to be righted against us; against us then
 “ only the Athenians should have come with you, and not you with
 “ them have gone to the invasion of the rest; especially when if the
 “ Athenians would have led you whither you would not, you had the
 “ league of the Lacedæmonians made with you against the Medes,
 “ (which you so often objected) to have resorted unto; which was
 “ sufficient not only to have protected you from us, but which is the
 “ main matter, to have secured you to take what course you had
 “ pleased. But voluntarily, and without constraint, you rather chose
 “ to follow the Athenians. And you say it had been a dishonest
 “ thing to have betrayed your benefactors: but it is more dishonest,
 “ and more unjust by far, to betray the Grecians universally, to whom
 “ you have sworn, than to betray the Athenians alone; especially
 “ when these go about to deliver Greece from subjection, and the
 “ other to subdue it. Besides, the requital you make the Athenians
 “ is not proportionable, nor free from dishonesty; for you, as you say
 “ yourselves, brought in the Athenians to right you against injuries,
 “ and you co-operate with them in injuring others. And howsoever
 “ it is not so dishonest to leave a benefit unrequited, as to make such
 “ a requital, as though justly due, cannot be justly done.

LXIV. “ But you have made it apparent, that even then it was
 “ not for the Grecians’ sake that you alone of all the Bœotians
 “ Medized not, but because the Athenians did not; yet now, you
 “ that would do as the Athenians did, and contrary to what the
 “ Grecians did, claim favour of these, for what you did for the others’
 “ sake. But there is no reason for that; but as you have chosen the
 “ Athenians, so let them help you in this trial. And produce not the
 “ oath of the former league, as if that should save you now; for you
 “ have relinquished it, and contrary to the same, have rather helped
 “ the Athenians to subdue the Æginetæ, and others, than hindered
 “ them from it. And this you not only did voluntarily, and having
 “ laws the same you have now, and none forcing you to it as there
 “ did us, but also rejected our last invitation, a little before the shut-
 “ ting up of your city to quietness and neutrality. Who can, there-
 “ fore, more deservedly be hated of the Grecians in general than you,
 “ that pretend honesty to their ruin? And those acts wherein for-
 “ merly, as you say, you have been beneficial to the Grecians, you
 “ have now made apparent to be none of yours, and made true proof

¹ See b. i. 113.

more justly hated by the Grecians than
 you?

² *τινες ἀν ὑμῶν κτλ*, Bekker. *τινες*
ἀν οὖν ὑμῶν κτλ, Duker. Who can be

“ of what your own nature inclines you to. For with Athenians you have walked in the way of injustice. And thus much we have laid open touching our involuntary Medizing, and your voluntary Atticizing.

LXV. “ And for this last injury you charge us with, (namely, the unlawful invading of your city in time of peace, and of your new moon sacrifice) we do not think, no not in this action, that we have offended so much as you yourselves. For though we had done unjustly if we had assaulted your city, or wasted your territory as enemies, of our own accord; yet when the prime men of your own city, both for wealth and nobility, willing to discharge you of foreign league, and conform you to the common institutions of all Bœotia, did of their own accord call us in, wherein lieth the injury then? For they that lead transgress rather than they that follow. But as we conceive, neither they nor we have transgressed at all. But being citizens as well as you, and having more to hazard, they opened their own gates, and took us into the city as friends, not as enemies, with intention to keep the ill-affected from being worse, and to do right to the good: taking upon them to be moderators¹ of your councils, and not to deprive the city of your persons; but to reduce you into one body with the rest of your kindred; and not to engage you in hostility with any, but to settle you in peace with all.

LXVI. “ And for an argument that we did not this as enemies, we did harm to no man; but proclaimed, that if any man were willing to have the city governed after the common form of all Bœotia, he should come to us. And you at first came willingly, and were quiet; but afterwards when you knew we were but few, though we might seem to have done somewhat more than was fit, without the consent of your multitude, you did not by us as we did by you, first innovate nothing in fact, and then with words persuade us to go forth again, but contrary to the composition assaulted us. And for those men you slew in the affray, we grieve not so much, (for they suffered by a kind of law,) but to kill those that held up their hands for mercy, whom taken alive, you afterwards had promised to spare, was not this horrid cruelty? You committed in this business three crimes one in the neck of another: first, the breach of the composition, then the death of our men that followed, and thirdly the falsifying of your promise,² to save them if we did no hurt to any thing of yours in the fields. And yet you say we are the transgressors, and that you for your parts deserve not to undergo a judgment. But it is otherwise. And if these men judge aright, you shall be punished now for all your crimes at once.

LXVII. “ We have herein, men of Lacedæmon, been thus large both for your sakes and ours. For yours to let you see, that if you

¹ Συμφωνισται. This word perhaps

used by Thucydides, in allusion to the magistrates at Athens so called, who were ten in number, and whose business it was to take care that the young men behaved with moderation and so-

briety.

² ψευθεῖσαν ὑπόθεσιν, Bekker. ὑπόσχεσιν, Duker; and the falsifying the agreement which you had made to us, that you would not kill them.

“condemn them it will be no injustice; for ours that the equity of our revenge may the better appear. Be not moved with the recital of their virtues of old, if any they had,¹ which though they ought to help the wronged, should double the punishment of such as commit wickedness, because their offence doth not become them. Nor let them fare ever the better for their lamentation or your compassion, when they cry out upon your fathers’ sepulchres, and their own want of friends. For we on the other side affirm, that the youth of our city suffered harder measure from them and their fathers, partly slain at Coronea, in bringing Bœotia to your confederation, and partly alive and now old, and deprived of their children, make far juster supplication to you for revenge. And pity belongs to such as suffer undeservedly; but on the contrary, when men are worthily punished, as these are, it is to be rejoiced at. And for their present want of friends, they may thank themselves: for of their own accord they rejected the better confederates. And the law has been broken by them, without precedent wrong from us, in that they condemned our men spitefully, rather than judicially; in which point we shall now come short of requiting them; for they shall suffer legally, and not as they say they do, with hands upheld from battle, but as men that have put themselves upon trial by consent. Maintain, therefore, O Lacedæmonians, the law of the Grecians against these that have transgressed it, and give to us who have suffered contrary to the law, the just recompense of our alacrity in your service. And let not the words of these give us a repulse from you: but set up an example to the Grecians, by presenting to these men a trial, not of words but of facts:² which if they be good, a short narration of them will serve the turn; if ill, long florid orations do but veil them. But if such as have the authority as you have now, would collect the matter to a head, and according as any man should make answer thereto, so proceed to sentence, men would be less in search of fair speeches, wherewith to excuse the foulness of their actions.”

LXVIII. Thus spake the Thebans. And the Lacedæmonian judges conceiving their interrogatory to stand well, namely whether they had received any benefit by them or not, in this present war, for they had indeed intreated them both at other times, according to the ancient league of Pausanias after the Median war to stand neutral; and also a little before the siege, the Plataeans had rejected their proposition of being common friend to both sides, according to the same league, taking themselves in respect of these their just offers, to be now discharged of the league, and to have received evil at their hands, caused them one by one to be brought forth, and having asked them again the same question, whether they had any way benefitted the Lacedæmonians, and their confederates in this present war or no; as they answered, no, led them aside and slew them, not exempting any.³

¹ εἰ τις ἄρα καὶ ἐγένετο, Bekker. οὐ λόγων τούτοις ἀγῶνας, Duker; not εἰτινες ἄρα καὶ ἐγένοντο, Duker; if indeed making a contest of words, but of facts. deed there was any one at all. ² The Lacedæmonians deemed the

³ οὐ λόγων τούτοις ἀγῶνας κτλ. Bekker. Plataeans to be ἐκπονδοί. Those who

Of the Plateans themselves they slew no less than two hundred. Of Athenians who were besieged with them twenty-five. The women they made slaves; and the Thebans assigned the city for a year or thereabouts, for an habitation to such Megareans as in sedition had been driven from their own, and to all those Plateans, who living were of the Theban faction. But afterwards pulling it all down to the very foundation, they built an hospital in the place near the temple of Juno,¹ of two hundred feet diameter, with chambers on every side in circle, both above and below;² using therein the roofs and doors of the Plateans' buildings; and of the rest of the stuff that was in the city wall, as brass and iron, they made bedsteads, and dedicated them to Juno, to whom also they built a stone chapel of one hundred feet over. The land they confiscated, and ~~set~~ ^{gave} it to farm afterwards for ten years to the Thebans. So far were the Lacedæmonians alienated from the Plateans, especially or rather altogether for the Thebans' sake, whom they thought useful to them in the war now on foot. So ended the business at Plataea, in the fourscore and thirteenth year after their league made with the Athenians.³

LXIX. The forty galleys of the Peloponnesians, which having been sent to aid the Lesbians, fled as has been related through the wide sea, chased by the Athenians, and tossed by storms on the coast of Crete, came thence dispersed to Peloponnesus, and found thirteen galleys, Leucadians and Ambraciots, in [the haven of] Cyllene, with Brasidas, the son of Tellis, come thither to be of council with Alcidas. For the Lacedæmonians, seeing they failed of Lesbos, determined, with their fleet augmented, to sail to Corcyra, which was in sedition, there being but twelve Athenian galleys about Naupactus, that they might be there before the supply of a greater fleet should come from Athens. So Brasidas and Alcidas employed themselves in that.

LXX. The sedition in Corcyra began on the coming home of those captives which were taken in the battles by sea at Epidamnus,⁴ and released afterwards by the Corinthians at the ransom, as was said, of eighty talents, for which they had given security to their hosts; but in fact, because they had persuaded the Corinthians they would put Corcyra into their power. These men going from man to man, solicited the city to revolt from the Athenians. And two galleys being now

were connected with them by political or social compact, were by the Greeks termed *ἑσπονδοί*, by which they meant those with whom they had poured out wine to the gods, or with whom they had made a compact sanctified by this ceremony. Those who were bound by no compact, or who had forfeited their claim to the benefit of a compact once existing, they called *ἑσπονδοί*, out of compact, or outlaws.

¹ Concerning the building of this temple, see Plutarch—Aristides.

² *διακοσίων ποδῶν πανταχῇ, κύκλῳ*, Bekker. *διακοσίων ποδῶν, πανταχῇ κύκλῳ*, Duker; they built a hospital

near the temple of Juno, of two hundred feet on every side, with chambers in a circle above and below.

³ The city of Plataea, having after this remained in ruins for the space of forty years, was restored on the peace of Antalcidas, A.C. 387; and again destroyed by the Thebans three years before the battle of Leuctra, A.C. 374. Philip, according to Pausanias, rebuilt it, after the battle at Chæronea, A.C. 338. According to Plutarch, it was rebuilt by Alexander when he got possession of Asia.

⁴ Book i. 55.

come in, one of Athens, another of Coriuth, with ambassadors from both those states, the Corcyræans, on audience of them both, decreed to hold the Athenians for their confederates, on articles agreed on; but withal to remain friends to the Peloponnesians, as they had formerly been. There was one Peithias, voluntary host¹ of the Athenians, and who had been principal magistrate of the people; him these men called to judgment, and laid to his charge a practice to bring the city to the servitude of the Athenians. He again being acquitted, called in question five of the wealthiest of the same men, saying they had cut certain stakes² in the ground belonging to the temples both of Jupiter and of Alcimus,³ upon every one of which there lay a penalty of a stater.⁴ And the cause going against them, they took sanctuary in the temples, that the sum being great, they might pay it by portions, as they should be taxed. But Peithias (for he was also of the senate) obtained that the law should proceed. These five being by the law excluded the senate, and understanding that Peithias, as long as he was a senator, would cause the people to hold for friends and foes, the same that were so to the Athenians, conspired with the rest, and armed with daggers, suddenly broke into the senate house, and slew both Peithias and others, as well private men as senators, to the number of about sixty; but a few of Peithias's faction escaped to the Athenian galley that yet lay in the harbour.

LXXI. When they had done this, and called the Corcyræans to an assembly, they told them that what they had done was for the best, and that they should not now be in bondage to the Athenians. And for the future they advised them to be quiet, and to receive neither party with more than one galley at once; and to take them for enemies if they were more. And when they had spoken, forced them to decree it accordingly. They also presently sent ambassadors to Athens, both to shew that it was fit for them to do what they had done, and also to dissuade such Corcyræans as were fled thither of the other faction, from doing any thing to their prejudice, lest the matter should fall into a relapse.

LXXII. When these arrived, the Athenians apprehended both the ambassadors themselves, as seditious persons, and also all those Corcyræans whom they had there prevailed with; and sent them to custody in Ægina. In the mean time, on the coming in of a galley of Corinth with ambassadors from Lacedæmon, those that managed the state assailed the commons, and overcame them in fight. And night coming on, the commons fled to the citadel, and the higher parts of

¹ The *πρόξενοι*, who entertained strangers, were generally appointed to that office by the king or the people, according as the government was monarchical or democratical; but if the individual did it of his own accord, he was called *ἰδιωτοπρόξενος*.

² *Χάρακας*, stakes, either for vine props, which are particularly called *χάρακας*, or for other profane use.—The sacred groves were regarded as

peculiarly holy. The Athenians inflicted capital punishment on those who took the smallest piece of wood from the grove of the Heroes.

³ Generally written Alcimus, king of Corcyra, then called Phœacia, by whom Ulysses was hospitably entertained. Hom. Od. vii.

⁴ The stater aureus was worth about 16s. 1½d. The stater Cizecens and stater Philippi about 18s. 1d.

the city, where they rallied themselves, and encamped, and made themselves masters of the Hyllaic haven. But they [the nobility] seized on the market-place, where most of them dwelt, and on the haven on the side toward the continent.

LXXIII. The next day they skirmished a little with shot,¹ and both parts sent abroad to the villages to solicit the slaves with promise of liberty to take their parts. And the greatest part of the slaves took part with the commons; and the other side had an aid of eight hundred men from the continent.

LXXIV. The next day but one they fought again, and the people had the victory, having the odds both in strength of places, and number [of men.] And the women also manfully assisted them, throwing tiles from the houses, and enduring the tumult even beyond their sex. The few began to fly about twilight, and fearing lest the people should even with their shout take the arsenal, and so come on and put them to the sword, to stop their passage, set fire on the houses in circle about the market-place, and on others near it. Much goods of merchants were hereby burnt, and the whole city, if the wind had risen and carried the flame that way, had been in danger of being destroyed. When the people had got the victory, the Corinthian galley stole away, and most of the auxiliaries got over privily to the continent.

LXXV. The next day Nicostratus, son of Diotrophes, an Athenian commander, came in with twelve galleys and five hundred Measian men of arms from Naupactus, and both negotiated a reconciliation, and induced them (to the end they might agree) to condemn ten of the principal authors of the sedition, (who presently fled) and to let the rest alone, with articles both between themselves, and with the Athenians, to esteem friends and enemies, the same as the Athenians did. When he had done this, he would have been gone, but the people persuaded him before he went to leave behind him five of his galleys, the better to keep their adversaries from stirring, and to take as many of theirs, which they would man with Corcyræans, and send with him. To this he agreed, and they made a list of those that should embark, consisting altogether of their enemies. But these fearing to be sent to Athens, took sanctuary in the temple of Castor and Pollux; but Nicostratus endeavoured to raise them, and spake to them, to encourage them: but when he could not prevail, the people (arming themselves on pretence that their diffidence to go along with Nicostratus proceeded from some evil intention) took away their arms out of their houses, and would also have killed some of them, such as they chanced on, if Nicostratus had not hindered them. Others also, when they saw this, took sanctuary in the temple of Juno, in all above four hundred. But the people fearing some innovation, got them by persuasion to rise, and conveying them to the island that lies over against the temple of Juno, sent them their necessities thither.

LXXVI. The sedition standing in these terms, the fourth or fifth

¹ Ἡκροβολίσαντο, skirmished with arrows, darts, stones, and the like missile weapons.

day after the putting over of these men to the island, arrived the Peloponnesian fleet from Cyllene, where since their voyage out of Ionia, they had lain at anchor, to the number of three and fifty. Alcidas had the command of these, as before, and Brasidas came with him as a counsellor. And having first put in at Sybota, a haven of the continent, they came the next morning by break of day toward Corcyra.

LXXVII. The Corcyræans being in great tumult and fear, both of the seditious within, and of the invasion without, made ready three-score galleys, and still as any of them were manned, sent them out against the enemy; whereas the Athenians had advised them to give them leave to go forth first, and then the Corcyræans to follow after with the whole fleet together. When their galleys came forth thus thin, two of them presently turned to the enemy, and in others, they that were aboard, were together by the ears among themselves, and nothing was done in due order. The Peloponnesians seeing their confusion, opposed themselves to the Corcyræans with twenty galleys only, the rest they set in array against the twelve galleys of Athens, whereof the Salaminia and the Paralos were two.

LXXVIII. The Corcyræans having come disorderly up, and by few at once, were on their part in much distress; but the Athenians, fearing the enemy's number, and doubting to be environed, would never come up to charge the enemy where they stood thick, nor would set upon the galleys that were placed in the midst, but charged one end of them, and drowned one of their galleys: and when the Peloponnesians afterwards had put their fleet into a circular figure, they then went about and about it, endeavouring to put them in disorder; which they that were fighting against the Corcyræans perceiving, and fearing such another chance as befel them formerly at Naupactus, went to their aid, and uniting themselves, came upon the Athenians all together. But they retiring, rowed astern, intending that the Corcyræans should take that time to escape in; they themselves meanwhile going as leisurely back as possible, and keeping the enemy still a-head. Such was this battle, which ended about sunset.

LXXIX. The Corcyræans fearing lest the enemy in pursuit of their victory, should have come directly against the city,¹ or take aboard the men which they had put over into the island, or do them some other mischief, fetched back the men to the temple of Juno again, and guarded the city. But the Peloponnesians, though they had won the battle, durst not invade the city, but having taken thirteen of the Corcyræan galleys, went back to the continent from whence they had set forth. The next day they came not to the city, no more than before, although it was in great tumult and affright: and though also Brasidas, as it is reported, advised Alcidas to it, but had not equal authority; but only landed soldiers at the promontory of Leucimna, and wasted their territory.

LXXX. Meanwhile the people of Corcyra, fearing extremely lest those galleys should come against the city, not only conferred with

¹ ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν, ὡς κρατοῦντες, οἱ Corcyræans fearing lest the enemy, πολέμιοι, Bekker. ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν ὡς since they were victorious, sailing κρατοῦντες οἱ πολέμιοι, Duker. The against their city, should either, &c.

those in sanctuary, and with the rest, how the city might be preserved, but also induced some of them to go aboard. For notwithstanding the sedition, they manned thirty galleys [in expectation that the fleet of the enemy should have entered.] But the Peloponnesians having been wasting their fields till about noon, went their ways again. Within night the Corcyræans had notice by fires of threescore Athenian galleys coming towards them from Leucas, which the Athenians, upon intelligence of the sedition, and of the fleet to go to Corcyra under Alcidas, had sent to aid them, under the conduct of Eurymedon, son of Thucles.

LXXXI. The Peloponnesians, therefore, as soon as night came, sailed speedily home, still keeping the shore, and causing their galleys to be carried over at the isthmus of Leucas, that they might not come in sight as they went about. But the people of Corcyra hearing of the Attic galleys coming in, and the going off of the Peloponnesians, brought to the city those Messenians,¹ which before were without, and appointing the galleys which they had furnished to come about into the Hyllaic haven, whilst accordingly they went about, slew all the contrary faction they could lay hands on, and also afterwards threw overboard out of the same galleys all they had before persuaded to embark, and so went thence. And coming to the temple of Juno, they persuaded fifty of those that had taken sanctuary to refer themselves to a legal trial; all of whom they condemned to die. But the most of the sanctuary men, that is, all those who were not induced to stand to trial by law, when they saw what was done, there killed one another in the temple: some hanged themselves on trees; every one, as he had means, made away with himself. And for seven days together that Eurymedon staid there with his threescore galleys, the Corcyræans did nothing but kill such of their city as they took to be enemies, laying to their charge a practice to have everted the popular government. Amongst whom, some were slain on private hatred, and some by their debtors, for the money which they had lent them. All forms of death were then seen, and (as in such cases it usually falls out) whatever had happened at any time, happened also then, and more. For the father slew his son, men were dragged out of the temples, and then slain hard by; and some, immured in the temple of Bacchus, died within it. So cruel was this sedition, and seemed so the more, because it was of these the first.

LXXXII. For afterwards all Greece, so to say, was in commotion; and quarrels arose every where between the patrons of the commons, that sought to bring in the Athenians, and the few that desired to bring in the Lacedæmonians. Now in time of peace they could have had no pretence, nor would have been so forward to call them in; but being war, and confederates to be had for either party, both to hurt their enemies, and strengthen themselves, such as desired alteration, easily got them to come in. And many and heinous things happened in the cities through this sedition, which though they have been before, and shall be ever, as long as human nature is the same,

¹ That came with Nicostratus.

yet they are more calm, and of different kinds, according to the several conjunctures.¹ For in peace and prosperity, as well cities as private men, are better minded, because they are not plunged into necessity of doing *any thing* against their will; but war taking away the affluence of daily necessities, is a most violent master, and conforms most men's passions to the present occasion. The cities, therefore, being now in sedition, and those that fell into it later, having heard what had been done in the former, they far exceeded the same in newness of conceit, both for the art of assailing, and for the strangeness of their revenges. The received value of names imposed for signification of things was changed to arbitrary: for inconsiderate boldness was counted true-hearted manliness; provident deliberation, a handsome fear; modesty, the cloak of cowardice; to be wise in every thing, to be lazy in every thing. A furious suddenness was reputed a point of valour. To re-advise for the better security was held for a fair pretext of tergiversation. He that was fierce was always trusty; and he that contraried such a one, was suspected. He that did insidiate, if it took, was a wise man; but he that could smell out a trap laid, a more dangerous man than he: but he that had been so provident as not to need to do the one or the other, was said to be a dissolver of society, and one that stood in fear of his adversary. In brief, he that could outstrip another in doing of evil act, or that could persuade another thereto, that never meant it, was commended. To be kin to another was not to be so near as to be of his society, because these were ready to undertake any thing, and not to dispute it. For these societies² were not made upon prescribed laws of profit, but for rapine, contrary to the laws established. And as for mutual trust amongst them, it was confirmed not so much by divine law³ as by the communication of guilt. And what was well advised of their adversaries, they received with an eye to their actions, to see whether they were too strong for them or not, and not ingenuously. To be revenged was in more request than never to have received injury. And for oaths (when any were) of reconciliation, being administered in the present for necessity, were of force to such as had otherwise no power: but upon opportunity, he that first durst, thought his revenge sweeter by the trust, than if he had taken the open way. For they did not only put to account the safeness of that course, but having circumvented their adversary by fraud, assumed to themselves withal a mastery in point of wit. And dishonest men for the most part are sooner called able, than simple men honest. And men are ashamed of this title, but take a pride in the other. The cause of all this is desire of rule, out of avarice and ambition, and the zeal of contention⁴ from those two proceeding. For such as were of authority in the cities, both of the one and the other faction, preferring under decent titles, one the political equality of the multitude, the other the moderate aristocracy,

¹ Μετάβολαι τῶν ξυντυχιῶν, changes of the state of things. seems to have been in use then as now.

³ By oath.

² The uniting of companies under certain laws, for the more profitable managing of their trades and arts, reigns in two adversaries whilst they contend, or eagerness in striving.

⁴ Φιλονεικία, properly that spite which reigns in two adversaries whilst they contend, or eagerness in striving.

though in words they seemed to be servants of the public, they made it in effect but the prize of their contention. And striving by whatsoever means to overcome, both ventured on most horrible outrages, and prosecuted their revenges still further, without regard of justice, or the public good, but limiting them, each faction, by their own appetite : and stood ready, whether by unjust sentence, or with their own hands, when they should get power, to satisfy their present spite. So that neither side made account to have any thing the sooner done for religion [of an oath], but he was most commended that could pass a business against the hair with a fair oration. The neutrals of the city were destroyed by both factions ; partly because they would not side with them, and partly for envy that they should so escape.

LXXXIII. Thus was wickedness on foot in every kind, throughout all Greece, by the occasion of their sedition. Sincerity (whereof there is much in a generous nature) was laughed down. And it was far the best course to stand diffidently against each other, with their thoughts in battle array, which no speech was so powerful, nor oath terrible enough to disband. And being all of them, the more they considered, the more desperate of assurance, they rather contrived how to avoid a mischief, than were able to rely on any man's faith. And for the most part, such as had the least wit had the best success ; for both their own defect, and the subtlety of their adversaries, putting them into a great fear to be overcome in words, or, at least, in pre-insidiation, by their enemy's great craft, they therefore went roundly to work with them, with deeds. Whereas the other, not caring though they were perceived, and thinking they needed not to take by force what they might do by plot, were thereby unprovided, and so the more easily slain.

LXXXIV. In Corcyra then were these evils for the most part committed first ; and so were all other, which either such men as have been governed with pride, rather than modesty, by those on whom they take revenge, were like to commit in taking it ; or which such men as stand upon their delivery from long poverty, out of covetousness, (chiefly to have their neighbour's goods) would, contrary to justice, give their voices to : or which men, not for covetousness, but assailing each other on equal terms, carried away with the unruliness of their anger, would cruelly and inexorably execute. And the common course of life being at that time confounded in the city, the nature of man, which is wont even against law to do evil, got now above the law, shewed itself with delight, to be too weak for passion, too strong for justice, and enemy to all superiority. Else they would never have preferred revenge before innocence, nor lucre (whensoever the envy of it was without power to do them hurt) before justice. And for the laws common to all men in such cases, (which, as long as they be in force, give hope to all that suffer injury) men desire not to leave them standing, against the need a man in danger may have of them, but by their revenges on others, to be beforehand in subverting them.

LXXXV. Such were the passions of the Corcyraeans first of all other Grecians, towards one another in the city. And Eurymedon and the Athenians departed with their galleys. Afterwards such of

the Corcyraeans as had fled, (for there escaped about five hundred of them) having seized their forts in the continent, impatronized themselves of their own territory on the other side, and from thence came over and oppressed the islanders, and did them much hurt; and there grew a great famine in the city. They likewise sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon and Corinth, concerning their reduction; and when they could get nothing done, having got boats, and some auxiliary soldiers, they passed a while after, to the number of about six hundred, into the island. Where, when they had set fire on their boats, that they might trust to nothing but to make themselves masters of the field, they went up to the hill Istone, and having there fortified themselves with a wall, infested those within, and were masters of the territory.

LXXXVI. In the end of the same summer, the Athenians sent twenty galleys to Sicily,¹ under the command of Laches, the son of Melanopus, and Charæadas, the son of Euphiletus: for the Syracusians and the Leontines were now warring against each other. The confederates of the Syracusians were all the Doric cities, (except the Camarinaeans) which also in the beginning of this war were reckoned in the league of the Lacedæmonians, but had not yet aided them; of the Leontines were the Chalcidic cities, with Camarina. And in Italy the Locrians were with the Syracusians; but the Rhegians, according to their consanguinity, took part with the Leontines. Now the confederates of the Leontines, in respect of their ancient alliance with the Athenians, as also for that they were Ionians, obtained of the Athenians to send them galleys, for that the Leontines were deprived by the Syracusians of the use both of the land and sea. And so the people of Athens sent aid unto them, pretending propinquity, but intending both to hinder the transportation of corn from thence into Peloponnesus, and also to taste the possibility of taking the states of Sicily into their own hands. These arriving at Rhegium, in Italy, joined with the confederates, and began the war; and so ended this summer.

LXXXVII. The next winter the sickness fell on the Athenians again, (having indeed never totally left them, though there was some intermission,) and continued above a year after. But the former lasted two years; so that nothing more afflicted the Athenians, or impaired their strength:² for those that died of it, of men of arms enrolled,³ were no less than four thousand four hundred, of horsemen, three hundred, of the other multitude, innumerable. There happened also at the same time many earthquakes, both in Athens and in Eubœa, and also amongst the Bœotians, and in Bœotia, chiefly at Orchomenus.

LXXXVIII. The Athenians and Rhegians that were in Sicily, made war the same winter on the islands called the islands of Æolus, with thirty galleys. For in summer it was impossible to war on them

¹ Before this time the Athenians had sent an expedition to Sicily, under the command of Lamponius, to the assistance of the Catanæi; though no mention of this circumstance is made by Thucydides.

² ὥστε Ἀθηναίων γε μὴ εἶναι, Bekker. Ἀθηναίων, Duker; so that there was not any thing which more afflicted the power of the Athenians than this.

³ Ἐκ τῶν τάξεων.

for the shallowness of the water. These islands are inhabited by the Liparæans, a colony of the Cnidiens, and dwell in one of the same islands, no great one, called Lipara, and thence they go forth, and husband the rest, Didyme, Strongyle, and Hiera. The inhabitants of those places have an opinion, that in Hiera, Vulcan exercised the craft of a smith :¹ for it is seen to send forth abundance of fire in the day-time, and of smoke in the night. These islands are adjacent to the territory of the Siculi² and Messenians, but were confederates of the Syracusians. When the Athenians had wasted their fields, and saw they would not come in, they put off again, and went to Rhegium. And so ended this winter, and the fifth year of this war, written by Thucydides.

YEAR VI. A.C. 426. OLYMP. 88-2.

LXXXIX. The next summer the Peloponnesians and their confederates came as far as the isthmus, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, intending to have invaded Attica; but by reason of the many earthquakes that then happened, they turned back, and the invasion proceeded not. About the same time, Eubœa being then troubled with earthquakes, the sea came in at Orobæ, on the part which then was land, and being impetuous withal, overflowed most part of the city, whereof part it covered, and part it washed down, and made lower in the return; so that it is now sea, which before was land. And the people, as many as could not prevent it by running up into the higher ground, perished. Another inundation like unto this happened in the isle of Atalanta,³ on the coast of Locris of the Opuntians, and carried away part of the Athenians' fort there, and of two galleys that lay on dry land, it brake one in pieces. Also there happened at Peparethos⁴ a certain rising of the water, but it brake not in. And a part of the wall, the Town-house,⁵ and some few houses besides, were overthrown by the earthquakes. The cause of such inundation, for my part, I take to be this; that the earthquake where it was very great, did there send off the sea, and the sea returning there on a sudden, caused the water to come on with greater violence. And it seemeth unto me, that without an earthquake, such an accident could never happen.

XC. The same summer, divers others, as they had several occasions, made war in Sicily. So also did the Sicilians⁶ amongst themselves, and the Athenians with their confederates. But I will make mention only of such most memorable things as were done either by the confederates there with the Athenians, or against the Athenians

¹ Lipara is by some represented to have been the place in which Vulcan exercised his art. See Virg. *Æn.* viii. 416.

² Σικελοί. There are in Thucydides mentioned Σικελοί and Σικελιώται, whereof this latter is the name of the inhabitants of Sicily in general; the former, are only those that were of that name anciently in Italy, and coming

over to Sicily, gave that name to the island.

³ See book ii. 32.

⁴ A small island on the coast of Macedonia, about twenty miles in circumference. See Livy, xxviii. 5, and xxxi. 58.

⁵ Τὸ πρυτανεῖον.

⁶ Σικελιώται.

by the enemy. Charœades, the Athenian general, being slain by the Syracusians, Laches, who was now the sole commander of the fleet, together with the confederates, made war on Mylæ of the Messenians. There were in Mylæ two companies of Messenians, in garrison, which also laid a certain ambush for those that came from the fleet. But the Athenians and their confederates both put to flight those that were in ambush, with the slaughter of most of them, and also assaulting their fortification, forced them on composition both to render the citadel, and to go along with them against Messena. After this, on the approach of the Athenians and their confederates, the Messenians compounded likewise, and gave them hostages, and such other security as was requisite.

XCI. The same summer the Athenians sent thirty galleys about Peloponnesus, under command of Demosthenes,¹ the son of Alcisthenes, and Procles, the son of Theodorus; and sixty galleys more, with two thousand men of arms, to Melos, commanded by Nicias, the son of Niceratus. For the Athenians, in respect that the Melians² were islanders, and yet would neither be their subjects nor of their league, intended to subdue them. But when on the wasting of their fields they still stood out, they departed from Melos, and sailed to Oropus, in the opposite continent; where having arrived within night, the men of arms left the galleys, and marched presently by land to Tanagra, in Bœotia. To which place, on a sign given, the Athenians that were in the city [of Athens] came also forth, with their whole forces, led by Hipponicus, the son of Callias, and Eurymedon, the son of Thucles, and joined them; and pitching their camp, spent the day in wasting the territory of Tanagra, and lay there the night following. The next day they defeated in battle such of the Tanagreans as came out against them, and also certain succours sent them from Thebes; and when they had taken up the arms of those that were slain, and erected a trophy, they returned back, the one part to Athens, the other to their fleet. And Nicias, with his sixty galleys, having first sailed along the coast of Locris, and wasted it, came home likewise.

XCII. About the same time the Peloponnesians erected the colony of Heraclea in Trachinia, with this intention: the Meliensians in the whole contain these three parts: Paralians, Hierensians,³ and Trachinians. Of these the Trachinians being afflicted with war from the Cœtæans their borderers, thought at first to have joined themselves to the Athenians; but fearing that they would not be faithful to them, they sent to Lacedæmon, choosing for their ambassador Tisamenus. And the Dorians, who are the mother nation⁴ to the Lacedæmonians, sent their ambassadors likewise with him, with the same requests.

¹ This Demosthenes is by the celebrated orator of the same name ranked amongst the greatest men of his country.

² Μηλῖοι. The Μηλιεῖς mentioned in chap. 92, are not islanders, but a people of Thessaly, near the Melian

gulf.

³ Ἱερῆς. These people are made mention of by no other writer. Perhaps so called because they received the *primitiæ* sent to Apollo from the Dodonæi.

⁴ Book i. 107.

For they also were infested with war from the same Ceteans.¹ On audience of these ambassadors, the Lacedæmonians concluded to send out a colony, both intending the reparation of the injuries done to the Trachinians and to the Dorians; and conceiving withal, that the town would stand very commodiously for their war with the Athenians, as they might thereby have a navy ready, where the passage was but short, against Eubœa; and it would much further their conveyance of soldiers into Thrace. And they had their mind wholly bent to the building of the place. First therefore they asked counsel of the oracle in Delphi; and the oracle having bidden them do it, they sent inhabitants thither, both of their own people, and of the neighbours about them, and gave leave also to any that would to go thither out of the rest of Greece, except to the Ionians, Achæians, and some few other nations. The conductors of the colony were three Lacedæmonians; Leon, Alcidas, and Damagon: who taking it in hand, built the city, which is now called Heraclea,² from the very foundation; distant from Thermopylæ forty furlongs, and from the sea twenty. Also they made houses for galleys to lie under, beginning close to Thermopylæ, against the very strait, that they might have them more defensible.

XCIII. The Athenians, when this city was peopled, were at first afraid, and thought it set up especially against Eubœa; because from thence to Cenæum [a promontory] of Eubœa, the passage is but short. But it fell out afterwards otherwise than they imagined, for they had no great harm by it. The reason was this: the Thessalians who had the towns of those parts in their power, and upon whose ground it was built, afflicted these new planters with a continual war, till they had worn them out, though they were many indeed in the beginning, for being the foundation of the Lacedæmonians, every one went thither boldly, conceiving the city to be an assured one, and chiefly the governors themselves, sent thither from Lacedæmon, undid the business, and dispeopled the city by frightening most men away, for that they governed severely, and sometimes also unjustly, by which means their neighbours more easily prevailed against them.

XCIV. The same summer, and about the same time that the Athenians staid in Melos, those other Athenians that were in the thirty galleys about Peloponnesus, slew first certain garrison soldiers in Ellomenus,³ of Leucadia, by ambushment; and afterwards with a greater fleet, and with the whole power of the Acarnanians, who followed, (all but the Cœniades) and with the Zacynthians and Cephalenians, and fifteen galleys of the Corcyræans, made war against Leucas. The Leucadians, though they saw their territory wasted both without the isthmus, and within, where the city of Leucas stands, and the temple of Apollo, yet they durst not stir, because of the number of the enemy. And the Acarnanians entreated Demosthenes, the Athenian general, to wall them up, conceiving that they might easily be expunged by a siege, and desiring to be rid of a city their continual

¹ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐφθείροντο, Bekker. πολ- guish it from other cities of the same
ιμῶ ἐφθείροντο, Duker; for they also name. See b. v. 51.

were infested by the Ceteans.

² Called also Trachinea, to distin- ³ A place mentioned by no other
guish it from other cities of the same writer.

enemy. But Demosthenes was persuaded at the same time by the Messenians, that seeing so great an army was together, it would be honourable for him to invade the Ætolians, principally, as being enemies to Naupactus: and that if these were subdued, the rest of the continent thereabouts would easily be added to the Athenian dominion. For they alleged, that though the nation of the Ætolians were great and warlike, yet their habitation was in villages unwall'd, and those at great distances; and were but light-armed, and might therefore with no great difficulty be all subdued before they could unite themselves for defence. And they advised him to take in hand first the Apodotians; next the Ophionians, and after them the Eurytians, which are the greatest part of Ætolia, reported to be of a most strange language, and to eat raw flesh; for these being subdued, the rest would easily follow.

XCV. But he, induced by the Messenians, whom he favoured, and especially because he thought, without the forces of the Athenians, with the confederates only of the continent, and with the Ætolians, to invade Bœotia by land, going first through the Locri Ozolæ, and so to Cytinium of Doris, having Parnassus on the right hand, till the descent thereof into the territory of the Phoceans, which people, for the friendship they ever bore to the Athenians, would he thought be willing to follow his army, and if not might be forced, and upon the Phocians borders Bœotia. Putting off therefore with his whole army against the minds of the Acarnanians from Leucas, he sailed to Solium by the shore, and there having communicated his conceit with the Acarnanians, when they would not approve of it, because of his refusal to besiege Leucas, he himself with the rest of his army, Cephallenians, Zacynthians, and three hundred Athenians, the soldiers of his own fleet, (for the fifteen galleys of Corcyra were now gone away) warred on the Ætolians having Ceneon, a city of Locris, for the seat of war. Now these Locrians, called Ozolæ, were confederates of the Athenians, and were to meet them with their whole power in the heart of the country. For being confiners on the Ætolians, and using the same manner of arming, it was thought it would be of great utility in the war, to have them in their army; for that they knew their manner of fight, and were acquainted with the country. Having lain the night with his whole army in the temple of Jupiter Nemeius,¹ wherein the poet Hesiod is reported by them that dwell thereabout to have died,² foretold by an oracle that he should die in Nemea, in the morning betimes he dislodged and marched into Ætolia.

XCVI. The first day he took Potidania, the second Crocylum, the third Tichium; here he staid, and sent the booty to Eupalium, in Locris. For he purposed, when he had subdued the rest, to invade the Ophionians afterwards, (if they submitted not,) in his return to Naupactus. But the Ætolians knew of this preparation when first resolved on; and when the army was entered, they were united into a mighty army to make head; so that the farthest off of the Ophionians,

¹ Ἱερόν. The whole consecrated ground wherein the temple stood, not the church only. ² Concerning the death of Hesiod, see Plut. in Diocl. Conviv.

that reach out to the Melian gulf, the Bomians and Callians came in with their aids.

XCVII. The Messenians gave the same advice to Demosthenes as before; and alleging that the conquest of the Ætoliens would be easy, willed him to march with all speed against them, village after village, and not to stay until they were all united, and in order of battle against him, but to attempt always the place which was next to hand. He, persuaded by them, and confident of his fortune, because nothing had crossed him hitherto, without tarrying for the Locrians that should have come in with their aids, (for his greatest want was of darters light-armed,) marched to Ægitium,¹ which approaching, he won by force, the men having fled secretly out, and encamped on the hills above it: for it stood in a mountainous place, about eighty furlongs from the sea. But the Ætoliens, (for by this time they were come with their forces to Ægitium,) charged the Athenians and their confederates, and running down upon them, some one way, some another, from the hills, plied them with their darts. And when the army of the Athenians assaulted them, they retired; and when it retired, they assaulted. So that the fight for a good while was nothing but alternate chase and retreat; and the Athenians had the worst in both.

XCVIII. Nevertheless, as long as their archers had arrows and were able to use them, (for the Ætoliens, because they were not armed, were put back still with the shot,) they held out. But when on the death of their captain, the archers were dispersed, and the rest were wearied, having a long time continued the said labour of pursuing and retiring, and the Ætoliens continually afflicting them with their darts, they were forced at length to fly; and lighting into hollows without issue, and into places with which they were not acquainted, were destroyed. For Chromon, a Messenian, who was their guide for the ways, was slain. And the Ætoliens pursuing them still with darts, slew many of them quickly, whilst they fled, being swift of foot, and without armour. But the most of them missing their way, and entering a wood which had no passage through, the Ætoliens set it on fire, and burnt it about them. All kinds of shifts to fly, and all kinds of destruction, were that day in the army of the Athenians. Such as remained, with much ado got to the sea, and to Ceneon, a city of Locris, from whence they first set forth. There died very many of the confederates, and a hundred and twenty men of arms of the Athenians; that was their number, and all of them able men. These men of the very best died in this war: Procles also was there slain, one of the generals. When they had received the bodies of their dead from the Ætoliens under truce, and were got again to Naupactus, they returned with the fleet to Athens. But Demosthenes was left about Naupactus and those parts, being afraid of the Athenian people, for the loss that had happened.

XCIX. About the same time the Athenians that were on the coast of Sicily, sailing to Locris, and landing, overcame such as made head; and took in Peripolium, situate on the river Halex.

¹ No mention of this place by any of the ancient geographers.

C. The same summer the Ætolians, having sent their ambassadors, Tolophus, an Ophionian, Boriades, an Eurytanean, and Tisander, an Apodotian, to Corinth and Lacedæmon, persuaded them to send an army against Naupactus, for having harboured the Athenians. And the Lacedæmonians towards the end of autumn, sent them three thousand men of arms of their confederates; of which five hundred were of Heraclea, the new-built city of Trachinæ. The general of the army was Eurylochus, a Spartan, with whom Macarius and Menedæus went also along, Spartans likewise.

CI. When the army was assembled at Delphi, Eurylochus sent a herald to the Locrians of Ozolæ, both because their way lay through them to Naupactus, and also because he desired to make them revolt from the Athenians. Of all the Locrians the Amphissians co-operated with him most, as standing most in fear of the enmity of the Phocians. And they first giving hostages, induced others, who likewise were afraid of the coming in of the army, to do the like: the Myonians first, being their neighbours, (for this way is Locris of most difficult access,) then the Ipnians, Messapians, Tritæans, Challæans, Tolophonians, Hessians, and the Ceantheans. All these went with them to the war. The Olpæans gave them hostages, but followed not the army. But the Hyeans would give them no hostages till they had taken a village of theirs called Polis.

CII. When every thing was ready, and he had sent the hostages to Cytinium in Doris, he marched with his army towards Naupactus, through the territory of the Locrians. And as he marched he took Ceneon, a town of theirs, and Eupalium, because they refused to yield. When they were come to the territory of Naupactus, the Ætolians being there already to join them, they wasted the fields about, and took the suburbs of the city, being unfortified. Then they went to Molycrium, a colony of the Corinthians, but subject to the people of Athens, and took that. Now Demosthenes, the Athenian, (for ever since the Ætolian business he abode about Naupactus,) having been pre-advertised of this army, and afraid to lose the city, went amongst the Acarnanians, and with much ado, (because of his departure from before Leucas,) persuaded them to relieve Naupactus; and they sent along with him in his galleys one thousand men of arms, which entering, were the preservation of the city; for there was danger, the walls being of a great compass, and the defendants few, that else they should not have been able to make them good. Eurylochus, and those with him, when they perceived that those forces were entered, and that it was impossible to take the city by assault, departed thence not to Peloponnesus, but to Æolis, now called Calydon, and to Pleuron, and to other places thereabouts, and also to Proschion in Ætolia. For the Ambraciots coming to them persuaded them to undertake, together with themselves, the enterprise against Argos, and the rest of Amphilochia and Acarnania, saying withal that if they could overcome these, the rest of that continent would enter into the league of the Lacedæmonians. Whereunto Eurylochus assenting, and dismissing the Ætolians, lay quiet in those parts with his army, till the Ambra-

ciots being come with their forces before Argos, he should have need to aid them. And so this summer ended.

CIII. The Athenians that were in Sicily in the beginning of winter, together with the Grecians of their league, and as many of the Siculi¹ as having obeyed the Syracusians by force, or being their confederates before, had now revolted, warred jointly against Nessa,² a town of Sicily, the citadel whereof was in the hands of the Syracusians; and they assaulted the same, but when they could not win it, they retired. In the retreat the Syracusians that were in the citadel sallied out upon the confederates that retired later than the Athenians, and charging, put a part of the army to flight, and killed not a few. After this Laches and the Athenians landed some time at Locris, and overcame in battle, by the river Caicinus, about three hundred Locrians, who with Proxenus, the son of Capaton, came out to make resistance; and when they had stripped them of their arms, departed.

CIV. The same winter also the Athenians hallowed the isle of Delos, by the admonition indeed of a certain oracle. For Pisistratus also, the tyrant, hallowed the same before, not all, but only so much as was within the prospect of the temple.³ But now they hallowed it all over in this manner: they took away all sepulchres of such as had died there before; and for the future made an edict that none should be suffered to die, nor any woman to bring forth child in the island; but when they were near the time, either of the one or the other, they should be carried over to Rhenea. This Rhenea is so little a way distant from Delos, that Polycrates,⁴ the tyrant of Samos, who was once of great power by sea, and had the dominion of the other islands, when he won Rhenea, dedicated the same to Apollo of Delos, tying it to Delos with a chain. And now after the hallowing of it, the Athenians instituted the keeping every fifth year of the Delian games.⁵ There had also in old time been great concourse in Delos, both of Ionians and of the islanders round about. For they then came to see the games, with their wives and children, as the Ionians do now the games at Ephesus.⁶ There were likewise matches set of bodily exercise and of music; and the cities severally set forth dances. That things were so is principally declared by Homer, in these verses of his hymn to Apollo:⁷

¹ Σικελοί.

² Nessa, rather Inessa. The inhabitants he calls Inessæ, lib. vi. 94.

³ Herod. i. 64.

⁴ Herod. b. iii.

⁵ For a long account of these games, instituted by Theseus, see Potter's Arch. Græc. b. ii. chap. 9.

⁶ At the feast of Diana.

⁷ As there is a considerable difference made by Bekker in the verses taken from Homer in this section, it may be better to give a literal translation of them, as they stand in his edition: "But when in Delos, O Phœbus, thou art especially delighted in thy mind,

"there the long-coated Ionians assemble together with their children and wives, at thy way; there remembering pugilism, and dance, and song, they delight thee, when they appoint a contest. But come, may Apollo with Diana be propitious, and all ye farewell; and hereafter remember me, when any other wretched one of mortal men comes here and inquires, 'O damsels, what man was it, the sweetest of bards, who dwelt here, and with whom ye were most delighted?' do ye all answer kindly, 'a blind man, and he dwells in rugged Chios.'"

But thou, Apollo, takest most delight
 In Delos. There assemble in thy sight,
 The long-coat Ions, with their children dear,
 And venerable bedfellows; and there,
 In matches set, of buffets, song, and dance,
 Both shew thee pastime, and thy name advance.

That there were also matches of music, and that men resorted thither to contend therein, he again makes manifest in these verses of the same hymn. For after he has spoken of the Delian dance of the women, he ends their praise with these verses, wherein also he makes mention of himself:

But well: let Phœbus and Diana be
 Propitious; and farewell you each one;
 But yet remember me when I am gone:
 And if of earthly men you chance to see
 Any toil'd pilgrim, that should ask you, Who,
 O damsels, is the man that living here,
 Was sweet'est in song, and that most had your ear?
 Then all, with a joint murmur, thereunto
 Make answer thus; a man depriv'd of seeing:
 In th' isle of sandy Chios is his being.

So much has Homer witnessed touching the great meeting, and solemnity celebrated of old in the isle of Delos. And the islanders and the Athenians, since that time have continued still to send dancers along with their sacrificers; but the games and things of that kind were worn out, as is likely by adversity, till now that the Athenians restored the games, and added the horse-race, which was not before.

CV. The same winter the Ambraciots, according to their promise made to Eurylochus, when they retained his army, made war on Argos, in Amphilochia, with three thousand men of arms, and invading Argia, took Olpæ,¹ a strong fort on a hill by the sea side, which the Acarnanians had fortified, and used for the place of their common meetings for matters of justice, and distant from the city of Argos, also on the sea side, about twenty-five furlongs. The Acarnanians, with part of their forces, came to relieve Argos, and with the rest encamped in that part of Amphilochia which is called Crenæ, to watch the Peloponnesians with Eurylochus, that they might not pass through to the Ambraciots without their knowledge; and sent to Demosthenes, who had been leader of the Athenians in the expedition against the Ætolians, to come to them and be their general. They sent also to the twenty Athenian galleys that chanced to be then on the coast of Peloponnesus, under the conduct of Aristoteles, son of Timocrates, and Hierophon, son of Antimnestus. In like manner the Ambraciots at Olpæ sent a messenger to the city, [of Ambracia] desiring them to come to their aid with their whole power; fearing that those with Eurylochus would not be able to pass by the Acarnanians, and so they should be either forced to fight alone, or else have an unsafe retreat.

¹ Now *Forte Castro*.

CVI. But the Peloponnesians with Eurylochus, when they understood that the Ambraciots were come to Olpæ, dislodging from Proschion, went with all speed to assist them. And passing over the Achelous, marched through Acarnania, which by reason of the aids sent to Argos, was now disfurnished; on their right hand they had the city of Stratus, and that garrison; on the left, the rest of Acarnania. Having passed the territory of the Stratians, they marched through Phytise, and again by the utmost limits of Medeon, then through Limnæa; then they went into the territory of the Agræans, which are out of Acarnania, and their friends; and getting to the hill Thyamus, which is a desert hill, they marched over it, and came down to Argia, when it was now night, and passing between the city of the Argives, and the Acarnanians that kept watch at the wells, came unseen and joined the Ambraciots at Olpæ.

CVII. When they were all together, they sat down about break of day at a place called Metropolis, and there encamped. And the Athenians not long after with their twenty galleys arrived in the Ambracian gulf, to the aid of the Argives. To whom also came Demosthenes with two hundred Messenian men of arms, and threescore Athenian archers. The galleys lay at sea before the hill on which stands the fort of Olpæ. But the Acarnanians, and those few Amphilocheians, (for the greatest part of them the Ambraciots kept back by force) that were come already together at Argos, prepared themselves to give the enemy battle, and chose Demosthenes, with their own commanders, general of the whole league. He when he had brought them up near to Olpæ, there encamped. There was between them a great hollow, and for five days together they stirred not; but the sixth day both sides put themselves into array for battle. But Demosthenes (for the army of the Peloponnesians reached a great way beyond the other, for indeed it was much greater;) fearing to be encompassed, placed an ambush in a certain hollow way, and fit for such a purpose, of armed and unarmed soldiers, in all to the number of four hundred, which in that part where the number of the enemies over-reached, should in the heat of the battle rise out of ambush, and charge them on their backs. When the battles were in order on either side, they came to blows. Demosthenes with the Messenians, and those few Athenians that were there, stood in the right wing; and the Acarnanians, as they could one after another be put in order, and those Amphilocheian darters which were present made up the other. The Peloponnesians and Ambraciots were ranged promiscuously, except the Mantineans: they stood together, most of them in the left wing, but not in the utmost part of it, for Eurylochus and those with him, made the extremity of the left wing against Demosthenes and the Messenians.

CVIII. When they were in fight, and the Peloponnesians with that wing over-reached, and had encircled the right wing of their enemies, those Acarnanians that lay in ambush coming in at their backs, charged them, and put them to flight, so that they endured not the first brunt; and besides caused the greatest part of the army through fright to run away. For when they saw that part of it defeated which

was with Eurylochus, which was the best, they were a great deal the more afraid. And the Messenians that were in that part of the army with Demosthenes pursuing them, despatched the greatest part of the execution. But the Ambraciots in the right wing on that part had the victory, and chased the enemy to the city of Argos; but in their retreat, when they saw the greatest part of the army vanquished, the rest of the Acarnanians setting upon them, they had much ado to recover Olpæ in safety; and many of them were slain, whilst they ran to it out of array and disorder; save only the Mantineans; for these made a more orderly retreat than any part of the army. And so this battle ended, having lasted till the evening.

CIX. The next day, Menedaius (Eurylochus and Macarius being now slain,) taking the command upon him, and not finding how, if he staid, he should be able to sustain a siege, wherein he should both be shut up by land, and also with those Attic galleys by sea; or if he should depart, how he might do it safely, had speech with Demosthenes and the Acarnanian captains, both about a truce for his departure, and for receiving the bodies of the slain. And they delivered to them their dead; and having erected a trophy, took up their own dead, about three hundred; but for their departure they would make no truce openly, nor to all; but secretly Demosthenes with his Acarnanian fellow-commanders, made a truce with the Mantineans and with Menedaius, and the rest of the Peloponnesian captains, and men of most worth, to be gone as speedily as they could; with purpose to disguard the Ambraciots, and multitude of mercenary strangers, and withal to use this as a means to bring the Peloponnesians into hatred with the Grecians of those parts, as men that had treacherously advanced their particular interest. Accordingly they took up their dead and buried them as fast as they could; and such as had leave consulted secretly touching how to be gone.

CX. Demosthenes and the Acarnanians had now intelligence that the Ambraciots from the city of Ambracia, according to the message sent to them before from Olpæ, which was, that they should bring their whole power through Amphilochia to their aid, were already on their march, ignorant of what passed here, to join with those at Olpæ. And hereupon he sent a part of his army presently forth to beset the ways with ambushment, and to pre-occupy all places of strength, and prepared withal to encounter with the rest of his army.

CXI. In the mean time the Mantineans, and such as had part in the truce, going out on pretence to gather pot-herbs, and fire-wood, stole away by small numbers, and as they went did indeed gather such things as they pretended to go forth for; but when they were got far from Olpæ, went faster away. But the Ambraciots and others that came forth in the same manner, but in greater troops, seeing the others go quite away, were eager to be gone likewise, and ran outright, desiring to overtake those that were gone before. The Acarnanians at first thought they had gone all without truce alike, and pursued the Peloponnesians, and threw darts at their own captains for forbidding them, and for saying that they went away under truce, as thinking themselves betrayed. But at last they let go the Mantineans

and Peloponnesians, and slew the Ambraciots only. And there was much contention and ignorance which was an Ambraciot, and which a Peloponnesian. So they slew about two hundred of them, and the rest escaped into Agræis, a bordering territory, where Salynthius, king of the Agræans, and their friend, received them.

CXII. The Ambraciots out of the city [of Ambracia] were come as far as Idomene. Idomene are two high hills, to the greater whereof came first undiscovered that night they whom Demosthenes had sent before from the camp, and seized it. But the Ambraciots got first to the lesser, and there encamped the same night. Demosthenes, after supper, in the twilight, marched forward with the rest of the army, one half whereof he himself took with him for the assault of the camp, and the other he sent about through the mountains of Amphilochia. And next morning before day he invaded the Ambraciots, yet in their lodgings, and knowing not what was the matter, but thinking rather that they had been some of their own company. For Demosthenes had placed the Messenians on purpose in the foremost ranks, and commanded them to speak to them as they went in the Doric dialect, and to make the sentinels secure; especially seeing their faces could not be discerned, it being yet night. Wherefore they put the army of the Ambraciots to flight at the first onset, and slew many on the place. The rest fled as fast as they could towards the mountains. But the ways being beset, and the Amphilochians well acquainted with their own territories, and armed but lightly against men in armour, unacquainted, and utterly ignorant which way to take, they lit into hollow ways, and to the places forelaid with ambushes, and perished. And having been put to all manner of shift for their lives, some fled towards the sea, and when they saw the galleys of Athens sailing by the shore, this accident concurring with their defeat, swam to them, and chose rather in their present fear to be killed of those in the galleys¹ than by the Barbarians, and their most mortal enemies, the Amphilochians. The Ambraciots with this loss came home a few of many in safety to their city. And the Acarnanians having taken the spoil of the dead, and erected their trophies, returned unto Argos.

CXIII. The next day there came a herald from those Ambraciots who fled from Olpæ to Agræis, to demand leave to carry away the bodies of those dead who were slain after the first battle, when without truce they went away together with the Mantineans, and with those that had truce. But when the herald saw the armours of those Ambraciots that came from the city, he wondered at the number. For he knew nothing of this last blow, but thought they had been the armours of those with them. Then one asked him what he wondered at, and how many he thought there were slain? For he that asked him the question thought on the other side that he had been a herald sent from those at Idomene; and he answered about two hundred. Then he that asked, replied and said, "Then these are not the armours of them, but of above a thousand." "Then," said he again, "they

¹ ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν, εἰ δὲ διαφθαρεῖναι, Bekker. ἐν ταῖς ναυσὶν ἢ δὲ διαφθαρεῖναι, Duker; thinking in their immediate

terror, that it was better for them to be destroyed by those in the ships, if they must be destroyed, than, &c.

"belong not to them that were in the battle with us." The other answered, "Yes, if you fought yesterday in Idomene." "But we fought not yesterday at all, but the other day in our retreat." "But we yet fought yesterday, with those Ambraciots that came from the city to aid the rest." When the herald heard that, and knew that the aid from the city was defeated, he burst out into *ahmees*;¹ and astonished with the greatness of the present loss, forthwith went his way without his errand, and required the dead bodies no further. For this loss was greater than in the like number of days happened to any one city of Greece in all this war. I have not written the number of the slain, because it was said to be such, as is incredible for the quantity of the city. But this I know, that if the Acarnanians and Amphilocheians, as Demosthenes and the Athenians would have had them, would have subdued Ambracia, they might have done it even with the shout of their voices; but they feared now that if the Athenians possessed it, they would prove more troublesome neighbours to them than the other.

CXIV. After this, having bestowed the third part of the spoils upon the Athenians, they distributed the other two parts according to the cities. The Athenians' part was lost by sea. For those three hundred complete armours which are dedicated in the temples in Attica, were picked out for Demosthenes himself, and he brought them away with him. His return was withal the safer for this action, after his defeat in Ætolia.² And the Athenians that were in the twenty galleys returned to Naupactus. The Acarnanians and Amphilocheians, when the Athenians and Demosthenes were gone, granted truce at the city of the Ceniades to those Ambraciots and Peloponnesians that were fled to Salynthius, and the Agræans to retire, the Ceniades being gone over to Salynthius³ and the Agræans likewise. And for the future the Acarnanians and Amphilocheians made a league with the Ambraciots for an hundred years upon these conditions: "That neither the Ambraciots with the Acarnanians should make war against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians with the Ambraciots against the Athenians. That they should give mutual aid to one another's country. That the Ambraciots should restore whatsoever towns or bordering fields they held of the Amphilocheians; and that they should at no time aid Anactorium, which was in hostility with the Acarnanians." And upon this composition the war ended.⁴ After this the Corinthians sent a garrison of about three hundred men of arms of their own city to Ambracia, under the con-

¹ Ἀνομιώξας.

² τὴν τῆς Αἰτωλίας ξυμφορὰν, Bekker. τὴν ἐν Αἰτωλίᾳ ξυμφορὰν, Duker; after the event of Ætolia, or, after what had happened in Ætolia.

³ — μετανέστησαν παρὰ Σαλύνθιον. In Duker's edition there is added καὶ Ἀγραίους.

⁴ — ἡ δὲ πόλις Ἀμφιλόχων, Bekker. πόλιν, Duker; and that the Ambraciots should restore whatever towns

they had, or hostages of the Amphilocheians.

⁵ The conduct of the Acarnanians on this occasion is deserving of much commendation. It tended much to maintain quiet among the Grecian republics, and to fix on them that character of benevolence and uprightness by which they were long honourably distinguished, and respected throughout the Greek nation. See Polyb. b. 4.—*Mitford*.

duct of Xenocides, the son of Euthycles; who with much difficulty passing through Epirus, at length arrived. Thus passed the business in Ambracia.

CXV. The same winter the Athenians in Sicily invaded Himeræa by sea, aided by the Sicilians,¹ who invaded the skirts of the same by land. They sailed also to the islands of Æolus. Returning afterwards to Rhegium, they found there Pythodorus, the son of Isolochus, the Athenian general, with certain galleys come to receive charge of the fleet commanded by Laches. For the Sicilian confederates had sent to Athens, and persuaded the people to assist them with a greater fleet. For though the Syracusians were masters by land, yet seeing they hindered them but with few galleys from the liberty of the sea, they made preparation, and were gathering together a fleet with intention to resist them. And the Athenians furnished out forty galleys to send to Sicily, conceiving the war there would the sooner be at an end, and desiring withal to train their men in naval exercise. Therefore Pythodorus, one of the commanders, they sent presently away with a few of those galleys, and intended to send Sophocles, the son of Sostratides, and Eurymedon, the son of Thucles, with the greatest number afterwards. But Pythodorus having now the command of Laches' fleet, sailed in the end of winter to a certain garrison of the Locrians, which Laches had formerly taken and overthrown in a battle there by the Locrians, retired.

CXVI. The same spring there issued a great stream of fire² out of the mountain Ætna, as it had also done in former times, and burned part of the territory of the Catanæans that dwell at the foot of Ætna,³ which is the highest mountain in Sicily. From the last time that the fire broke out before to this time, it is said to be fifty years. And it has now broken out thrice in all, since Sicily was inhabited by the Grecians. These were the things that came to pass this winter. And so ended the sixth year of this war, written by Thucydides.

¹ Σικελιώται.

² Πύραξ τοῦ πυρός, a stream of fire; and was a kind of melted stone, gushing out of the sides of the mountain.

³ οἱ ἐπὶ τῇ Αἴτνῃ, Bekker. ὑπὸ τῇ

Αἴτνῃ, Duker; who dwell over against mount Ætna.

THUCYDIDES.

BOOK IV.

Seventh, eighth, and ninth years of the war. Athenians take and fortify Pylos, in Laconia. Lacedæmonians, to recover it, put over four hundred of their best men into the island Sphacteria; whom the Athenians, having overcome the Lacedæmonian fleet, there besiege. Athenians and Syracusians fight in the strait of Messina. Cleon rashly engages to take or kill the Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria within twenty days, and by good fortune performs it. Sedition ceases in Corcyra. Nicias invades Peloponnesus. Sicilians agreeing, take from the Athenians their pretences of sailing on that coast with their fleet. Athenians take Nisæa, but fail of Megara. Overthrow of the Athenians at Delium. Cities on the confines of Thrace, on the coming of Brasidas, revolt to the Lacedæmonians. Truce for a year.

YEAR VII. A. C. 425. OLYMP. 88- $\frac{1}{2}$.

CHAP. I.

THE spring following, when corn began to be in the ear, ten galleys of Syracuse, and as many of Locris, went to Messina, in Sicily, called in by the citizens themselves, and took it; and Messina revolted from the Athenians. This was done chiefly by the Syracusians, who saw the place to be commodious for invasion of Sicily, and feared lest the Athenians, some time or other hereafter, making it the seat of war, might come with greater forces, and invade them from thence; but partly by the Locrians, as being in hostility with the Rhegians, and desirous to make war on them on both sides. The Locrians had now also entered the lands of the Rhegians with their whole power; both because they would hinder them from assisting the Messenians, and because they were solicited thereto by the banished men of Rhegium, that were with them. For they of Rhegium had been long in sedition, and were unable for the present to give them battle, for which cause they the rather also now invaded them. And after they had wasted the country, the Locrians withdrew their land forces, but their galleys lay still at the guard of Messina, and more were setting forth to lay in the same harbour, to make the war on that side.

II. About the same time of the spring, and before corn was at full growth, the Peloponnesians and their confederates, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians, invaded Attica, and there lay and wasted the country about. And the Athenians sent forty galleys to Sicily, the same which they had provided before for that purpose, and with them the other two generals, Eurymedon and Sophocles. For Pythodorus, who was the third in that commission, was arrived in Sicily before. To these they gave com-

mandment also, to take order as they went by, for the state of those Corcyræans that were in the city, and were pillaged by the outlaws in the mountain: and threescore galleys of the Peloponnesians were gone out to take part with those in the mountain; who because there was a great famine in the city, thought they might easily be masters of the state. To Demosthenes also (who ever since his return out of Acarnania had lived privately¹) they gave authority, at his own request, to make use of the same galleys,² if he thought good so to do, about Peloponnesus.

III. As they sailed by the coast of Laconia, and had intelligence that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Corcyra already, Eurymedon and Sophocles hasted to Corcyra; but Demosthenes willed them to put in first at Pylos,³ and when they had done what was requisite there, then to proceed in their voyage. But whilst they denied to do it, the fleet was driven into Pylos by a tempest that then arose by chance. And presently Demosthenes required them to fortify the place, (alleging that he came with them for no other purpose,) shewing how there was great store of timber and stone, and that the place itself was naturally strong and desert, both it, and a great deal of the country about. For it lies from Sparta about four hundred furlongs, in the territory that belonging once to the Messenians, is called by the Lacedæmonians Coryphasion. But they answered him, that there were many desert promontories in Peloponnesus, if they were minded to put the city to charges in taking them in. But there appeared to Demosthenes a great difference between this place and other places; because there was here a haven, and the Messenians, the ancient inhabitants thereof, speaking the same language the Lacedæmonians did, would both be able to annoy them much by excursions from thence, and be also faithful guardians of the place.

IV. When he could prevail neither with the generals nor with the soldiers, having also at last communicated the same to the captains of companies,⁴ he gave it over, till at last the weather not serving to be gone, there came upon the soldiers lying idle, a desire, occasioned by dissension, to wall in the place of their own accord. And falling in hand with the work, they performed it, not with iron tools to hew

¹ "Ὅντι ἰδιώτῃ. We are not accurately informed of the nature of the joint commands, so usual in the Athenian and other Grecian services. Thucydides sufficiently marks that there was a gradation, though the inferiors appear to have had some controlling power. The commission given to Demosthenes was of a different kind.—*Mitford*.

² The same galleys which were sent to the assistance of the Acarnanians against the Ambraciots, and which, on the defeat of the Ambraciots, were conducted back to Athens by Demosthenes. See b. iii. 107, 114.

³ Pylos, now Navarino, was a town

of Messenia, situated on the western coast of the Peloponnesus, opposite the island Sphacteria. It was erected on the promontory called Coryphasion.

⁴ Ταξίαρχοι. These officers seem to be nearly the same with captains of a company, as their command was over about one hundred men. There were also officers of a higher class, called by the same name, in number ten, one appointed by each tribe, whose business it was to order the marches and encampments, to take care of provisions, and punish military offences. But the former seems to have been those alluded to here.

stone, but picked out such stones as they thought good, and afterwards placed them as they would severally fit. And for mortar where it needed, for want of vessels, they carried it on their backs, with their bodies inclining forward, so as it might best lie, and their hands clasped behind to stay it from falling: making all possible haste to prevent the Lacedæmonians, and to finish the most assailable parts before they came to succour it. For the greatest part of the place was strong by nature, and needed no fortifying at all.

V. The Lacedæmonians were that day celebrating a certain holiday, and when they heard the news, set lightly by it, conceiving, that whosoever it should please them to go thither, they should find them either already gone, or easily take the place by force. They were somewhat also retarded by reason that their army was in Attica. The Athenians having in six days finished the wall to the land, and in the places where there was most need, left Demosthenes with five galleys to defend it, and with the rest hastened on in their course for Corcyra and Sicily.

VI. The Peloponnesians that were in Attica, when they were advertised of the taking of Pylos, returned speedily home. For the Lacedæmonians, and Agis their king, took this accident of Pylos to concern their own particular. And the invasion was withal so early (corn being yet green) that the most of them were scantied with victual; the army was also much troubled with the weather, which was colder than for the season; so as for many reasons it fell out, that they returned sooner now than at other times they had done; and this invasion was the shortest, for they continued in Attica in all but fifteen days.

VII. About the same time, Simonides, an Athenian commander, having drawn a few Athenians together out of the garrisons, and a number of the confederates of those parts, took the city of Eion,¹ in Thrace, a colony of the Mendæans, that was their enemy, by treason; but was presently again driven out by the Chalcidæans and Bottiæans that came to succour it, and lost many of his soldiers.

VIII. When the Peloponnesians were returned out of Attica, they of the city of Sparta,² and of the next neighbouring towns, went presently to the aid of Pylos; but the rest of the Lacedæmonians came slower on, being newly come from the former expedition. Nevertheless they sent about to the cities of Peloponnesus to require their assistance with all speed at Pylos; and also to their threescore³ galleys that were at Corcyra. Which, transported over the isthmus of Leucas, arrived at Pylos unseen by the Athenian galleys lying at Zacynthus.⁴ And by this time their army of foot was also there. Whilst the Peloponnesian galleys were coming toward Pylos, Demosthenes sent two galleys secretly to Eurymedon and the Athenian fleet at Zacynthus in all haste, to tell them that they must come presently to him, as the place was in danger of being lost. And according as Demosthenes' message imported, the fleet made haste. The Lacedæ-

¹ Herod. vii. 25, 112; viii. 118.

² Οἱ Σπαρτιάται, the word *Spartans*, used in an emphatical sense, meaning the noblest persons in the community.

³ According to Diodorus, forty-five.

⁴ Concerning Zacynthus, see *Livy*, xvi. 24. It was formerly called *Hyrie*, now Zante. See also b. ii. 66.

monians in the mean time prepared to assault the fort both by sea and land; hoping easily to win it, being a thing built in haste, and not many men within it. And because they expected the coming of the Athenian fleet from Zacynthus, they had a purpose, if they took not the fort before, to bar up the entries of the harbour. For the island called Sphacteria lying just before, and very near to the place, maketh the haven safe, and the entries strait; one of them nearest to Pylos, and to the Athenian fortification, admitting passage for no more but two galleys in front; and the other, which lieth against the other part of the continent, for not above eight or nine. The island, by being desert, was all wood, and untrodden, in bigness about fifteen furlongs over. Therefore they determined, with their galleys thick set, and with the beakheads outward, to stop up the entries of the haven. And because they feared the island, lest the Athenians, putting men into it, should make war upon them from thence, they carried over men of arms into the same, and placed other likewise along the shore of the continent. For by this means the Athenians at their coming should find the island their enemy, and no means of landing in the continent. For the coast of Pylos itself, without these two entries, being to the sea harbourless, would afford them no place from whence to set forth to the aid of their fellows. And they, in all probability, might by siege, without battle by sea, or other danger, win the place, seeing there was no provision of victual within it, and that the enemy took it but on short preparation. Having thus resolved, they put over into the island their men of arms, out of every band by lot, some also had been sent over by turns; but they which went over now last, and were left there, were four hundred and twenty, besides the Helots that were with them. And their captain was Epitadas, the son of Molobrus.

IX. Demosthenes, when he saw the Lacedæmonians bent to assault him, both from their galleys, and with their army by land, prepared also to defend the place. And when he had drawn up his galleys, all that were left him, to the land, he placed them athwart the fort, and armed the mariners that belonged to them with bucklers, though bad ones, and for the greatest part made of osiers. For they had no means in a desert place to provide themselves with arms. Those they had, they took out of a piratical boat of thirty oars, and a *light-horseman*¹ of the Messenians, which came by, by chance. And the men of arms of the Messenians were about forty, which he made use of amongst the rest. The greatest part, therefore, both of armed and unarmed, he placed on the parts of the wall toward the land which were of most strength, and commanded them to make good the place against the land forces if they assaulted it; and he himself with sixty men of arms, chosen out of the whole number, and a few archers, came forth of the fort to the sea side, in that part where he most expected their landing. Which part was of troublesome access, and stony, and lay to the wide sea. But because their wall was there the

¹ Κάλης. In ancient times, the long *μονήρεις*, and *κέλητες*, from the name ships had only one bank of oars; of a single horse.
whence they were sometimes called

weakest, he thought they would be drawn to adventure for that. For neither did the Athenians think they should ever have been mastered with galleys, which caused them to make the place to the sea-ward the less strong; and if the Peloponnesians should by force come to land, they made no other account but the place would be lost. Coming therefore in this part to the very brink of the sea, he put in order his men of arms, and thus encouraged them :

Oration of Demosthenes to his Soldiers.

X. " You that participate with me in the present danger, let not
 " any of you in this extremity, go about to seem wise, and reckon
 " every peril that now besetteth us; but let him rather come up to
 " the enemy with little circumspection, and much hope, and look for
 " his safety by that. For things that are come once to a pinch, as
 " these are, admit not debate, but a speedy hazard. And yet if we
 " stand it out, and betray not our advantages with fear of the number
 " of the enemy, I see well enough that most things are with us. For
 " I make account the difficulty of their landing makes for us; which,
 " as long as we abide ourselves, will help us; but if we retire, though
 " the place be difficult, yet when there is none to impeach them, they
 " will land well enough. For whilst they are in their galleys, they
 " are most easy to be fought withal, and in their disembarking being but
 " on equal terms, their number is not greatly to be feared; for though
 " they be many, yet they must fight but by few, for want of room to
 " fight in. And for an army to have odds by land, is another matter
 " than when they are to fight from galleys, where they stand in need
 " of so many accidents to fall out opportunely from the sea. So that
 " I think their great difficulties do but set them even with our small
 " number. And for you, that be Athenians, and by experience of
 " disembarking against others, know, (that if a man stand it out, and do
 " not for fear of the sousing of a wave, or the menacing approach of
 " a galley, give back of himself, he can never be put back by vio-
 " lence;) I expect that you should keep your ground, and by fighting
 " it out upon the very edge of the water, preserve both yourselves and
 " the fort."

XI. On this exhortation of Demosthenes, the Athenians took better heart, and went down, and arranged themselves close by the sea. And the Lacedæmonians came and assaulted the fort, both with their army by land, and with their fleet, consisting of three and forty galleys, in which was admiral, Thrasymelidas, the son of Cratesicles, a Spartan; and he made his approach where Demosthenes had expected him. So the Athenians were assaulted on both sides, both by sea and by land. The Peloponnesians dividing their galleys into small numbers, because they could not come near with many at once, and resting between, assailed them by turns; using all possible valour and mutual encouragement, to put the Athenians back, and gain the fort.

¹ ἀποβάντες δὲ ἐν τῇ ἴσῳ. Bekker but when they have disembarked, they has materially altered the pointing of will be on an equality with us: their this sentence. For whilst they are in number, however, we need not be too their ships, they are very easy to resist, much afraid of.

Most eminent of all the rest was Brasidas : for having the command of a galley, and seeing other captains of galleys and steersmen,¹ the place being hard of access, when there appeared sometimes possibility of putting ashore, to be afraid, and tender of breaking their galleys, he would cry out to them, saying, they did not well for sparing of wood, to let the enemy fortify in their country. And to the Lacedæmonians he gave advice, to force landing with the breaking of their galleys ; and prayed the confederates, that in requital of many benefits, they would not stick to bestow their galleys at this time upon the Lacedæmonians, and running them ashore, to use any means whatsoever to land, and to get into their hands both the men in the isle, and the fort.

XII. Thus he urged others ; and having compelled the steersman of his own galley to run her ashore, he came to the ladders,² but attempting to get down, was by the Athenians put back, and after he had received many wounds, swooned, and falling on the ledges³ of the galley, his buckler tumbled over into the sea, which brought to land, the Athenians took up, and used afterwards in the trophy which they set up for this assault. Also the rest endeavoured with much courage to come on land ; but the place being ill to land in, and the Athenians not budging, they could not do it. So that at this time fortune came so much about, that the Athenians fought from the land, Laconic land, against Lacedæmonians in galleys ; and the Lacedæmonians from their galleys fought against the Athenians, to get landing in their own now hostile territory. For at that time there was an opinion far spread that these were rather landmen, and expert in battle of foot ; and that in maritime and naval actions the other excelled.

XIII. This day then, and a part of the next, they made sundry assaults, and after that gave over. And the third day they sent out some galleys to Asine⁴ for timber wherewith to make engines, hoping with engines to take that part of the wall that looks into the haven ; which, though it were higher, yet the landing to it was easier. In the mean time arrive the forty Athenian galleys from Zacynthus ; for there were joined with them certain galleys of the garrison of Naupactus, and four of Chios. And when they saw both the continent and the island full of men of arms, and that the galleys that were in the haven would not come forth, not knowing where to cast anchor, they sailed for the present to the isle of Prote,⁵ being near, and desert, and there lay for that night. The next day, after they had put themselves in order, they put to sea again, with purpose to offer them battle, if the other would come forth into the wide sea against them, if not to enter the haven upon them. But the Peloponnesians neither came out against them, nor had stopped up the entries of the haven, as they had

¹ Τριηράρχοι καὶ κυβερνήται, answering precisely to our terms, captains and masters.

² Ἀποβάθραι, ladders or planks to disembark by.

³ Περὶ ξειψεία, *Fori*. The place on the outside of the galley for soldiers to stand and fight on, between the rowers

and the water. So called because void of rowers.

⁴ Asine, a city of Laconia. See Strabo, book viii.

⁵ Prote, an island over against Mes-senia, not far from Pylos, now called *Prodene*.

before determined, but lying still on the shore, manned out their galleys, and prepared to fight, if any entered into the haven itself, which was no small one.

XIV. The Athenians understanding this, came in violently upon them at both the mouths of the haven, and most of the Lacedæmonian galleys, which were already set out, and opposed them, they charged, and put to flight. And in following the chase, which was but short, they brake many of them, and took five, whereof one with all her men in her; and they fell in also with them that fled to the shore; and the galleys which were but in mauning out, were torn and rent before they could put off from the land. Others they tied to their own galleys, and towed them away empty. Which the Lacedæmonians perceiving, and extremely grieved with the loss, because their fellows were hereby intercepted in the island, came in with their aid from the land, and entering armed into the sea, took hold of the galleys with their hands to have pulled them back again; every one conceiving the business to proceed the worse, wherein himself was not present. So there arose a great affray about the galleys, and such as was contrary to the manner of them both. For the Lacedæmonians, out of eagerness and out of fear, did (as one may say) nothing else but make a sea-fight from the land; and the Athenians, who had the victory, and desired to extend their present fortune to the utmost, made a land-fight from their galleys. But at length having wearied and wounded each other, they fell asunder; and the Lacedæmonians recovered all their galleys, save only those which were taken at the first onset. When they were on both sides retired to their camps, the Athenians erected a trophy, delivered to the enemy their dead, and possessed the wreck, and immediately went round the island with their galleys, keeping watch on it, as having intercepted the men within it. The Peloponnesians in the mean time, that were in the continent, and were by this time assembled there with their succours from all parts of Peloponnesus, remained upon the place at Pylos.

XV. As soon as the news of what had passed was related at Sparta, they thought fit, as the loss was great, to send the magistrates down to the camp to determine, on view of the state of their present affairs there, what they thought requisite to be done.¹ These, when they saw there was no possibility to relieve their men, and were not willing to put them to the danger either of suffering by famine, or of being forced by multitude,² concluded amongst themselves to take truce with the Athenian commanders, as far as concerned the particulars of Pylos, if they also would be content, and to send ambassadors to Athens about agreement, and to endeavour to fetch off their men as soon as they could. The Athenian commanders accepting their proposition, the truce was made in this manner:

¹ βουλευέν παραχρήμα ὁρῶντας, Bekker. βουλευέν πρὸς τὸ χρήμα ὁρῶντας, Duker. It seemed fit to them to send the magistrates down to the camp to look into the affairs, and immediately consult whatever should seem expedient.

² βιασθέντας κρατηθῆναι, Bekker.—

βιασθέντας, ἢ κρατηθέντας, Duker. And when they saw that it was impossible to assist their men, and were not willing to leave it to the hazard that they should suffer any thing through hunger, or that they should be conquered; being oppressed by numbers.

Articles of Truce.

XVI. “ That the Lacedæmonians should deliver up not only those
“ galleys wherein they fought, but also bring to Pylos, and put into
“ the Athenians’ hands, whatsoever vessels of the long form¹ of
“ building were any where else in Laconia.

“ That they should not make any assault upon the fort, neither by
“ sea nor land. That the Athenians should permit the Lacedæmo-
“ nians that were in the continent, to send over to those in the island,
“ a portion of ground corn, agreed on, to wit, to every one two Attic
“ Chœnics² of meal, and two Cotyles³ of wine, and a piece of flesh;
“ and to every of their servants half that quantity.

“ That they should send this, the Athenians looking on, and not
“ send over any vessel by stealth.

“ That the Athenians should nevertheless continue guarding the
“ island, provided that they landed not in it: and should not invade
“ the Peloponnesian army neither by land nor sea.

“ That if either side transgressed in any part thereof, the truce was
“ then immediately to be void, otherwise to hold good till the return
“ of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors from Athens.

“ That the Athenians should convoy them in a galley unto Athens
“ and back. That at their return the truce should end, and the Athe-
“ nians should restore them their galleys, in as good estate as they
“ had received them.”

Thus was the truce made, and the galleys were delivered to the
Athenians, to the number of about threescore; and the ambassadors⁴
were sent away, who arriving at Athens, said as followeth:

Oration of the Lacedæmonian Ambassadors.

XVII. “ Men of Athens, the Lacedæmonians have sent us hither
“ concerning our men in the island, to see if we can persuade you to
“ such a course, as being most profitable for you, may in this misfor-
“ tune, be the most honourable for us, that our present condition is
“ capable of. We will not be longer in discourse than standeth with
“ our custom, being the fashion with us,⁵ where few words suffice,
“ there indeed not to use many; but yet to use more, when the occa-
“ sion requireth that by words we should make plain that which is to
“ be done in actions of importance. But the words we shall use, we
“ pray you to receive not with the mind of an enemy, nor as if we
“ went about to instruct you as men ignorant, but for a remembrance
“ to you of what you know, that you may deliberate wisely therein.

¹ Out of this and other places it ap-
pears, that the shipping of those times
was of two forms, long and round. The
long, which principally used the oar,
served for the wars; the round, which
used only the sail, served for merchants’
uses and transportation of provision.
Of the first sort were all galleys, whe-
ther of one, two, or three, or more tiers
of oars; of the latter were the ships
called *Ὀλκίδες*.

² *Χοῖνιξ*, a measure of about three
English pints.

³ *Κοτύλη*, a quarter of a Chœnic.

⁴ The name of the chief of the em-
bassy, Archeptolemus, is not mentioned
by Thucydides, but is given by Aris-
tophanes, *Equit.* v. 794.

⁵ Brevity of speech was so customary
and natural to the Laconians, that it
grew into a proverb.

“ It is now in your power to assure your present good fortune with reputation, holding what you have with the addition of honour and glory besides ; and to avoid that which befalleth men upon extraordinary success, who through hope aspire to greater fortune, because the fortune they have already came unhopèd for. Whereas they that have felt many changes of both fortunes, ought indeed to be most suspicious of the good. So ought your city and ours especially, upon experience, in all reason to be.

XVIII. “ Know if by seeing this present misfortune fallen on us, who being of greatest dignity of all the Grecians, come to you to ask that which before we thought chiefly in our own hands to give. And yet we are not brought to this through weakness, nor through insolence upon addition of strength, but because it succeeded not with the power we had, as we thought it should, which may as well happen to any others as to ourselves. So that you have no reason to conceive, that for your power and purchases, fortune also must be, therefore, always yours. Such wise men as safely reckon their prosperity in the account of things doubtful, do most wisely also address themselves towards adversity ; and not think that war will so far follow and no further, as one shall please more or less to take it in hand ; but rather so far as fortune shall lead it. Such men also seldom miscarrying, because they be not puffed up with the confidence of success, choose then principally to give over, when they are in their better fortune. And so it will be good for you, men of Athens, to do with us ; and not if rejecting our advice, you chance to miscarry, as many ways you may, to have it thought hereafter that all your present successes were but mere fortune. Whereas, on the contrary, it is in your hands, without danger, to leave a reputation to posterity both of strength and wisdom.

XIX. “ The Lacedæmonians call you to a peace, and end of the war, giving you peace and alliance, and much other friendship and mutual familiarity, requiring for the same, only those their men that are in the island ; though also we think it better for both sides, not to try the chance of war, whether it fall out that by some occasion of safety offered, they escape by force, or being expunged by siege, they should be more in your power than they be. For we are of this mind, that great hatred is most safely cancelled, not when one that having beaten his enemy, and got much the better in the war, brings him through necessity to take an oath, and to make peace on unequal terms ; but when having it in his power lawfully so to do if he please, he overcome him likewise in goodness, and, contrary to what he expects, be reconciled to him on moderate conditions.¹ For in this case his enemy being obliged not to seek revenge as one that had been forced, but to requite his goodness, will, for shame, be the more inclined to the conditions agreed on. And naturally to those

¹ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς καὶ ἀπερῆ αὐτὸ νικήσας, Bekker. πρὸς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς, καὶ ἀπερῆ αὐτὸς νικήσας, Duker. But if, when it was in his power to do this, having obtained it both with reference

to the equity of the measure, and by his own valour, he has been reconciled on moderate terms, beyond what was to be expected.

“ that relent of their own accord men give way reciprocally with content; but against the arrogant they will hazard all, even when in their own judgments they be too weak.

XX. “ But for us both, if ever it were good to agree, it is surely so at this present, and before any irreparable accident be interposed. Whereby we should be compelled, besides the common, to bear you a particular eternal hatred, and you be deprived of the commodities we now offer you. Let us be reconciled while matters stand undecided, and whilst you have gained reputation and our friendship, and we not suffered dishonour, and but indifferent loss. And we shall not only ourselves prefer peace before war, but also give a cessation of their miseries to all the rest of the Grecians, who will acknowledge it rather from you than us. For they make war not knowing whether side began; but if an end be made, which is now for the most part in your hands, the thanks will be yours. And by decreeing the peace, you may make the Lacedæmonians your sure friends, in as much as they call you to it, and are therein not enforced, but gratified. Wherein consider how many commodities are like to ensue; for if we and you go one way, you know the rest of Greece, being inferior to us,¹ will honour us in the highest degree.”

XXI. Thus spake the Lacedæmonians, thinking that in times past the Athenians had coveted peace, and been hindered of it by them, and that being now offered, they would gladly accept of it. But they having these men intercepted in the island, thought they might compound at pleasure, and aspired to greater matters. To this they were set on for the most part by Cleon, the son of Cleænetus, a popular man at that time, and of greatest sway with the multitude. He persuaded them to give this answer: “ That they in the island ought first to deliver up their arms, and come themselves to Athens, and when they should be there, if the Lacedæmonians would make restitution of Nisæa, and Pegæ, and Trœzene, and Achaia, (which they had not won in war, but had received by former treaty, when the Athenians being in distress, and at that time in more need of peace than now, yielded them up into their hands) then they should have their men again, and peace should be made for as long as they both should think good.”

XXII. To this answer they replied nothing, but desired that commissioners might be chosen to treat with them, who by alternate speaking and hearing might quietly make such an agreement as they could persuade each other unto. But then Cleon came mightily upon them, saying he knew before that they had no honest purpose, and that the same was now manifest, in that they refused to speak before the people, but sought to sit in consultation only with a few; and

¹ Τὰ μέγιστα τιμήσει. Will give us highest honour. Conveying to the understanding of the wiser sort of the hearers, the consideration of tyrannizing the rest of Greece; for by the highest honour he means tyranny, but avoiding

the envy of the word; because if he had said it plainly, the confederates would see that they who termed themselves the deliverers of Greece would now, out of private interest, be content to join with the Athenians to tyrannize it.

willed them if they had ought to say that was real, to speak it before them all. But the Lacedæmonians finding, that although they had a mind to make peace with them upon this occasion of adversity, yet it would not be fit to speak in it before the multitude, lest speaking and not obtaining, they should incur calumny¹ with their confederates, and seeing withal that the Athenians would not grant what they sued for upon reasonable conditions, they went back again without effect.

XXIII. On their return presently the truce at Pylos was at an end, and the Lacedæmonians, according to agreement, demanded restitution of their galleys. But the Athenians laying to their charge an assault made on the fort contrary to the articles, and other matters of no great importance, refused to render them; standing on this, that it was said that the accord should be void, on the least transgression of the same. But the Lacedæmonians denying it, and protesting this detention of their galleys for an injury, went their ways and betook themselves to the war. So the war at Pylos was on both sides renewed with all their power, the Athenians going every day about the island with two galleys, one one way, another another, (but they lay at anchor about it every night with their whole fleet, except on that part towards the open sea, and that only when it was windy; and from Athens there came a supply of twenty galleys to guard [the island,] so that they were in all seventy.) But the Lacedæmonians made assaults on the fort, watching every opportunity that should present itself to save their men.

XXIV. Whilst these things passed, the Syracusians and their confederates in Sicily adding to those galleys that lay in garrison at Messina the rest of the fleet which they had prepared, made war out of Messina, instigated thereto chiefly by the Locrians, as enemies to the Rhegians, whose territory they had also invaded with their whole forces by land; and seeing the Athenians had but a few galleys present, and hearing that the greater number which were to come to them were employed in the siege of the island,² desired to try with them a battle by sea; for if they could get the better with their navy, they hoped, lying before Rhegium, both with their land forces on the field side, and with their fleet by sea, easily to take it into their hands, and thereby strengthen their affairs. For Rhegium, a promontory³ of Italy, and Messina, in Sicily, lying near together, they might both hinder the Athenians from lying there at anchor against them, and make themselves masters of the strait. This strait is the sea between Rhegium and Messina, where Sicily is nearest to the continent, and is that which is called Charybdis,⁴ where Ulysses is said to have

¹ Viz. for buying peace at the cost of the confederates' subjection; for the thing they durst not propound before the people was this, that by the amity of these two great states, the rest of Greece would be forced to serve them; which they touched also but obscurely in the last words of their oration, as I have noted before.

² Sphacteria.

³ Rhegium, now *Rheggio*, being a promontory, and probably derived from *Ῥήγνυμι*, to break, makes it not unlikely that Sicily was once a part of Italy, and there broken off by some earthquake, but yet Scylla is nearer to Sicily than Rhegium is.

⁴ Charybdis, here taken for the name of the whole strait, is but a part near to Messina, between it and Pelorus,

passed through; which, because it is very narrow, and that the sea falls in there from two great mains, the Tyrrhene and Sicilian, and is rough, has therefore, not without good cause, been esteemed dangerous.

XXV. In this strait then the Syracusians and their confederates, with somewhat more than thirty galleys, were constrained in the latter end of the day to come to a sea fight, having been drawn forth about the passage of a certain boat to undertake sixteen galleys of Athens and eight of Rhegium; and being overcome by the Athenians, fell off with the loss of one galley, and went speedily each side to their own camp at Messena and Rhegium, and the night overtook them in the action. After this, the Locrians departed out of the territory of the Rhegians; and the fleet of the Syracusians and their confederates came together to anchor at Peloris,¹ and had their land forces by them. But the Athenians and Rhegians came up to them, and finding their galleys empty, fell in amongst them, and by means of a grapnel² cast into one of their galleys, they lost it, but the men swam out. On this the Syracusians went aboard, and whilst they were towed along the shore towards Messena, the Athenians came up to them again, and they opening themselves charged first, and sunk another galley; so the Syracusians passed on to the port of Messena, having had the better in their passage by the shore, and in the sea fight, which were both together in the manner declared. The Athenians, on news that Camarina should by Archias and his complices be betrayed to the Syracusians, went thither. In the mean time the Messenians with their whole power by land, and also with their fleet, warred on Naxos, a Chalcidic city,³ and their borderer. The first day having forced the Naxians to retire within their walls, they spoiled their fields; the next day they sent their fleet about into the river Acesine,⁴ which spoiled the country as it went up the river, and with their land forces assaulted the city. In the mean time many of the Siculi mountaineers came down to their assistance against the Messenians: which, when they of Naxos perceived, they took heart, and encouraging themselves with an opinion that the Leontines and all the rest of the Grecians their confederates, had come to succour them, sallied suddenly out of the city, and charged upon the Messenians, and put them to flight, with the slaughter of a thousand of their soldiers, the rest hardly escaping home. For the Barbarians fell upon them, and slew the most part of them in the highways. And the galleys that lay at Messena not long after divided themselves, and went to their several homes.⁵ Hereupon the Leontines and their confederates, together with the Athenians, marched presently against Messena, as being now weakened, and

subject to extraordinary agitation in stormy weather, but nothing to what it was, or was feigned to be, of old. Now called the strait of *Messina*.

¹ A promontory of Sicily, hard by Messena, now *Cape Faro*.

² Cast in by the soldiers on shore.

³ Of those which were founded by

the Chalcidæans of Greece, A.C. 759. There was also another town at the distance of five miles from this Naxos, which bore the same name, and was often called by contradistinction, *Tauroninium*.

⁴ By Pliny and others called *Acsine*.

⁵ Syracuse and Locris.

assaulted it; the Athenians with their fleet by the haven, and their land forces at the wall to the field. But the Messenians and certain Locrians with Demoteles, who after this loss had been left there in garrison, issuing forth and falling suddenly upon them, put a great part of the Leontines' army to flight and slew many; but the Athenians seeing that, disembarked and relieved them: and coming upon the Messenians, now in disorder, chased them again into the city. Then they erected a trophy, and put over to Rhegium. After this the Grecians of Sicily warred one upon another without the Athenians.

XXVI. All this while the Athenians at Pylos besieged the Lacedæmonians in the island; and the army of the Peloponnesians in the continent remained still upon the place. This keeping of watch was exceeding painful to the Athenians, in respect of the want they had both of corn and water; for there was no well but one, and that was in the fort itself of Pylos, and no great one. And the greatest number turned up the gravel, and drank such water¹ as they were likely to find there. They were also scanted of room for their camp; and their galleys not having place to ride in, they were forced by turns some to stay ashore, and others to take their victual, and lie off at anchor. But their greatest discouragement was the time which they had staid there longer than they had thought to have done; for they thought to have famished them out in a few days, being in a desert island, and having nothing to drink but salt water. The cause whereof were the Lacedæmonians, who had proclaimed² that any man that would, should carry in meal, wine, cheese, and all other esculents necessary for a siege, into the island, appointing for the same a great reward of silver; and if any Helot should carry in any thing, they promised him liberty. Hereupon divers with much danger imported victual; but especially the Helots, who putting off from all parts of Peloponnesus, wheresoever they chanced to be, came in at the parts of the island that lay to the wide sea. But they had a care above all, to take such a time as to be brought in with the wind. For when it blew from the sea, they could escape the watch of the galleys easily; for they could not then lie round about the island at anchor. And the Helots were nothing tender in putting ashore, for they ran their galleys on ground, valued at a price in money, and the men of arms also watched at all the landing places of the island. But as many as made attempt when the weather was calm were intercepted. There were also such as could dive that swam over into the island through the haven, drawing after them in a string bottles filled with poppy,³ tempered with honey and pounded linseed; whereof some at the first passed unseen, but were afterwards watched. So that on either part they used all possible art, one side to send over food, the other to apprehend those that carried it.

XXVII. The people of Athens being advertised of the state of their army, how it was in distress, and that victual was transported

¹ The water found by digging in the sea sands is commonly fresh, being strained and so purged of the saltness in its passage through the sand, but not

so good as farther off from the sea.

² To the people of the country about.

³ A medicine for hunger and thirst, not meat. Scholiast.

into the island, knew not what they should do to it, and feared lest winter should overtake them in their siege; fearing not only that to provide them of necessaries about Peloponnesus, and in a desert place withal, would be a thing impossible; but also that they should be unable to send forth so many things as were requisite, though it were summer; and again that the parts thereabout being without harbour, there would be no place to lie at anchor in against them, but that the watch there ceasing of itself, the men would by that means escape, or in some foul weather be carried away in the same boats that brought them meat. But that which they feared most was, that the Lacedæmonians seemed to have some assurance of them already, because they sent no more to negotiate about them. And they repented now that they had not accepted of the peace. But Cleon knowing himself to be the man suspected for hindering the agreement, said that they who brought the news reported not the truth. Whereupon they that came thence, advising them (if they would not believe it, to send to view the estate of the army, he and Theogenes were chosen by the Athenians to view it. But when he saw that he must of force either say as they said, whom he before calumniated, or saying the contrary, be proved a liar, he advised the Athenians, seeing them inclined of themselves to send thither greater forces than they had before thought to do, that it was not fit to send to view the place, nor to lose their opportunity by delay; but if the report seemed unto them to be true, they should make a voyage against those men, and glanced at Nicias, the son of Niceratus, then general,¹ upon malice, and with language of reproach. Saying it was easy if the leaders were men, to go and take them there in the island. And that himself, if he had the command would do it.

XXVIII. But Nicias, seeing the Athenians to be in a kind of tumult against Cleon, for that when he thought it so easy a matter, he did not presently put it in practice, and seeing also he had upbraided him, willed him to take what strength he would, that they could give him, and undertake it. Cleon supposing at first that he gave him this leave but in words, was ready to accept it; but when he knew he would give him the authority in good earnest, then he shrunk back and said, that not he, but Nicias, was general; being now indeed afraid, and hoping that he durst not have given over the office to him. But then Nicias again bade him do it, and gave over his command to him, for so much as concerned Pylos, and called the Athenians to witness it. They, (as is the fashion of the multitude) the more Cleon declined the voyage, and went back from his word, pressed Nicias so much the more to resign his power² to him, and cried out upon Cleon to go. Insomuch as not knowing how to disengage himself of his word, he undertook the voyage, and stood forth, saying, that he feared not the Lacedæmonians, and that he would not carry any man with him out of the city, but only the Lemnians and Imbrians that then were present, and those targeteers that were come to them from Ænos,³ and

¹ *Ἐπαρχηγός*, the magistrate to whose authority was committed the levying and mustering of soldiers.

² His power to levy soldiers.

³ Otherwise Apsynthos, an independent city of Thrace, near the mouth of the Hebrus, now Eno. See Herod. b. iv. 90; vii. 58.

four hundred archers out of other places; and with these, he said, added to the soldiers that were at Pylos already, he would within twenty days either fetch away the Lacedæmonians alive, or kill them upon the place. This vain speech moved amongst the Athenians some laughter, and was heard with great contempt of the wiser sort. For of two benefits, the one must needs fall out; either to be rid of Cleon (which was their greatest hope) or if they were deceived in that, then to get those Lacedæmonians into their hands.

XXIX. Now when he had despatched with the assembly, and the Athenians had by their voices decreed him the voyage, he joined unto himself Demosthenes, one of the commanders at Pylos, and presently put to sea. He made choice of Demosthenes for his companion, because he heard that he also of himself had a purpose to set his soldiers on land in the isle. For the army having suffered much by the straitness of the place, and being rather the besieged than the besieger, had a great desire to put the matter to the hazard of a battle; confirmed therein the more, for that the island had been burnt. For having been for the most part wood, and (by reason it had lain ever desert,) without path, they were before the more afraid, and thought it the advantage of the enemy; for assaulting them out of sight, they might annoy a very great army that should offer to come on land. For their errors being in the wood, and their preparation could not so well have been discerned; whereas all the faults of their own army should have been in sight. So that the enemy might have set upon them suddenly, in what part soever they had pleased, because the onset had been in their own election. Again, if they should by force come up to fight with the Lacedæmonians at hand in the thick woods, the fewer and skilful of the ways, he thought would be too hard for the many and unskilful. Besides, their own army being great, it might receive an overthrow before they could know of it, because they could not see where it was needful to relieve one another.

XXX. These things came into his head, especially from the loss he received in Ætolia; which in part also happened by occasion of the woods. But the soldiers, for want of room, having been forced to put in at the outside of the island to dress their dinners with a watch before them, and one of them having set fire on the wood, it burnt on by little and little, and the wind afterwards rising, the most of it was burnt before they were aware. By this accident Demosthenes the better discerning that the Lacedæmonians were more than he had imagined, having before by victual sent unto them, thought them not so many, did now prepare himself for the enterprize, as a matter deserving the Athenians' utmost care, and as having better commodity of landing in the island than before he had; and both sent for the forces of such confederates as were near, and put in readiness every other needful thing. And Cleon, who had sent a messenger before to signify his coming, came himself also with those forces which he had required unto Pylos. When they were both together, first they sent a herald to the camp in the continent, to know if they would command those in the island to deliver up themselves and their arms without battle, to be held with easy imprisonment, till some agreement were made touching the main war.

XXXI. Which when they refused, the Athenians for one day held their hands; but the next day having put aboard upon a few galleys all their men of arms, they put off in the night, and landed a little before day on both sides of the island, both from the main and from the haven, to the number of about eight hundred men of arms, and marched upon high speed towards the foremost watch of the island. For thus the Lacedæmonians lay quartered. In the foremost watch were about thirty men of arms. The midst and evenest part of the island, and about the water, was kept by Epitadas, their captain, with the greatest part of the whole number. And another part of them, which were not many, kept the last guard towards Pylos, which place to the seaward was on a cliff, and least assailable by land. For there was also a certain fort, which was old, and made of chosen, not of hewn stones, which they thought would stand them instead, in case of violent retreat. Thus they were quartered.

XXXII. Now the Athenians presently killed those of the foremost guard, (which they so ran to) in their cabins, and as they were taking arms. For they knew not of their landing, but thought those galleys had come thither to anchor in the night, according to custom, as they had been wont to do. As soon as it was morning the rest of the army¹ also landed, out of somewhat more than seventy galleys, every one with such arms as he had; being all that rowed, except only the Thalamii,² eight hundred archers, targeteers as many, all the Messenians that came to aid them, and as many of them besides, as held any place about Pylos, except only the garrison of the fort itself. Demosthenes then disposing his army by two hundred and more in a company, and in some less, at certain distances seized on all the higher grounds, to the end that the enemies compassed about on every side, might the less know what to do, or against what part to set themselves in battle, and be subject to the shot of the multitude from every part; and when they should make head against those that fronted them be charged behind; and when they should turn to those that were opposed to their flanks, be charged at once both behind and before. And which way soever they marched, the light-armed, and such as were meanliest provided of arms, following them at the back with arrows, darts, stones, and slings, who have courage enough afar off, and could not be charged, but would overcome flying, and also press the enemies when they should retire. With this design Demosthenes both intended his landing at first, and afterwards ordered his forces accordingly in the action.

XXXIII. Those that were about Epitadas, who were the greatest part of those in the island, when they saw that the foremost guard was slain, and that the army marched towards them, put themselves in array, and went towards the men of arms of the Athenians, with intent

¹ Viz. the light-armed.

² Θαλάμιοι. There were three ranks of rowers amongst the Athenians, the uppermost called Thranitæ, the second Zeugytæ, and the last Thalamitæ, or Thalamii. In the galley called a bi-

reme there were no Zeugytæ, in a trireme were all three ranks, in a quadrireme and upwards, all the middle ranks were Zeugytæ; only the uppermost were Thranitæ, and the nethermost Thalamitæ.

to charge them; for these were opposed to them in front, and the light-armed soldiers on their flanks and at their backs. But they could neither come to join with them, nor any way make use of their skill:¹ for both the light-armed soldiers kept them off with shot from either side, and the men of arms advanced not. Where the light-armed soldiers approached nearest, they were driven back, but returning they charged them afresh, being men armed lightly, and that easily got out of their reach by running, especially the ground being uneasy and rough, by having been formerly desert; so that the Lacedæmonians in their armour could not follow them.

XXXIV. Thus for a little while they skirmished one against another afar off. But when the Lacedæmonians were no longer able to run out after them where they charged, these light-armed soldiers seeing them less earnest in chasing them, and taking courage chiefly from their sight, being many times their number, and having also been used to them so much, as not to think them now so dangerous as they had done, for that they had not received so much hurt at their hands, as their subdued minds, because they were to fight against the Lacedæmonians, had at their first landing prejudged, contemned them, and with a great cry ran all at once upon them, casting stones, arrows, and darts, as to every man came next to hand. Upon this cry and assault they were much terrified, as not accustomed to such kind of fight; and withal a great dust of the woods lately burnt mounted into the air, so that by reason of the arrows and stones, that together with the dust flew from such a multitude of men, they could hardly see before them. Then the battle grew sore on the Lacedæmonians' side, for their jacks² now gave way to the arrows, and the darts that were thrown, stuck broken in them, so as they could not handle themselves, as neither seeing before them, nor hearing any direction given them, for the greater noise of the enemy; but, danger being on all sides, were hopeless to save themselves on any side by fighting.

XXXV. In the end, many of them being now wounded, for that they could not shift their ground, they made their retreat in close order, to the last guard of the island, and to the watch that was there. When they once gave ground, then were the light-armed soldiers much more confident than before, and pressed on them with a mighty noise. And as many of the Lacedæmonians as they could intercept in their retreat they slew; but the most of them recovered the fort, and together with the watch of the same, put themselves in order to defend it in all parts that were subject to assault. The Athenians following, could not now encompass and hem them in, for the strong situation of the place, but assaulting them in the face, sought only how to put them from the wall. And thus they held out a long time, the better part of a day, either side tired with the fight, and with thirst, and with the sun, one endeavouring to drive the enemy from the top, the other to keep their ground. And the Lacedæmonians defended themselves

¹ The skill of fighting a standing fight was thought a peculiar virtue of the Lacedæmonians, as the sea fight was thought to the Athenians. ² Πίλοι. A kind of quilted armour, or of stuff close beaten like felt.

easier now than before, because they were not now encompassed upon their flanks.

XXXVI. When there was no end of the business, the captain of the Messenians said to Cleon and Demosthenes, that they spent their labour there in vain, and that if they would deliver to him a part of the archers and light-armed soldiers, to get up by such a way as he himself should find out, and come behind upon their backs, he thought the entrance might be forced. And having received the forces he asked, he took his way from a place out of sight to the Lacedæmonians, that he might not be discovered; making his approach under the cliffs of the Island, where they were continual; in which part, trusting to the natural strength thereof, they kept no watch, and with much labour, and hardly unseen, came behind them; and appearing suddenly from above at their backs, both terrified the enemies with the sight of what they expected not, and much confirmed the Athenians with the sight of what they expected. And the Lacedæmonians being now charged with their shot both before and behind, were in the same case, to compare small matters with great, that they were in at Thermopylæ.¹ For then they were slain by the Persians, shut up on both sides in a narrow path. And these now being charged on both sides, could make good the place no longer, but fighting few against many, and being weak withal for want of food, were at last forced to give ground, and the Athenians by this time were also masters of all the entrances.

XXXVII. But Cleon and Demosthenes, knowing that the more they gave back, the faster they would be killed by their army, staid the fight, and held in the soldiers, desiring to carry them alive to Athens, in case their spirits were so much broken, and their courage abated by this misery, as on proclamation made, they would be content to deliver up their arms. So they proclaimed that they should deliver up their arms and themselves to the Athenians, to be disposed of as to them should seem good.

XXXVIII. On hearing thereof, most of them threw down their bucklers, and shook their hands above their heads, signifying their acceptance of what was proclaimed. Whereupon a truce was made, and they came to treat, Cleon and Demosthenes on one side, and Styphon, the son of Pharax, on the other. For of them that had command there, Epitadas, who was the first, was slain; and Hippagretes, who was chosen to succeed him, lay amongst the dead, though yet alive; and this man was the third to succeed in the command by the law,² in case the others should miscarry. Styphon, and those with him, said they would send over to the Lacedæmonians in the contingent, to know what they ought to do; but the Athenians letting none go thence, called for heralds out of the continent; and the question having been twice or thrice asked, the last of the Lacedæmonians that

¹ Herod. book vii.

² This manner of subordinating divers commanders to be chief in succession, was in those times much used. So in expeditions by sea, the *Επιστολὴς*, or

Επιστολιαφόρος, was vice-admiral, or chief commander, under the *Στόλαρχος* or *στρατηγός*. See Xenophon. Hist. Græc. ii. et v.

came over from the continent brought them this answer : “ The Lacedæmonians bid you take advice touching yourselves, such as you shall think good, provided you do nothing dishonourably.” Whereupon, having consulted, they yielded up themselves and their arms; and the Athenians attended them that day and the night following with a watch. But the next day, after they had set up their trophy in the island, they prepared to be gone, and committed the prisoners to the custody of the captains of the galleys. And the Lacedæmonians sent over a herald, and took up the bodies of their dead. The number of them that were slain and taken alive in the island was thus: there went over to the island in all four hundred and twenty men of arms; of these were sent away alive three hundred, wanting eight, the rest were slain. Of those that lived of the city of Sparta itself, one hundred and twenty. Of the Athenians there died not many, for it was no standing fight.

XXXIX. The whole time of the siege of these men in the island, from the fight of the galleys to the fight in the island, was seventy-two days; of which, for twenty days, victual was allowed to be carried to them, that is to say, in the time that the ambassadors were away that went about the peace; in the rest they were fed by such only as put in thither by stealth, and yet there was both corn and other food left in the island. For their captain, Epitadas, had distributed it more sparingly than he needed. So the Athenians and Peloponnesians departed from Pylos, and went home both with their armies. And the promise of Cleon, senseless as it was, took effect; for within twenty days he brought home the men, as he had undertaken.

XL. Of all the accidents of this war, this same fell out the most contrary to the opinion of the Grecians. For they expected that the Lacedæmonians should never, neither by famine, nor other necessity, have been constrained to deliver up their arms, but have died with them in their hands, fighting as long as they had been able; and would not believe that those that yielded were like to those that were slain: and when one afterwards of the Athenian confederates asked one of the prisoners, by way of insult, if they which were slain were valiant men; he answered, that a spindle (meaning an arrow) deserved to be valued at a high rate, if it could know who was a good man: signifying that the slain were such as the stones and arrows chanced to light on.

XLI. After the arrival of the men, the Athenians ordered that they should be kept in bonds till some agreement should be made; and if before that the Peloponnesians should invade their territory, then to bring them forth and kill them. They took order also for the settling of the garrison at Pylos. And the Messenians of Naupactus, having sent thither such men of their own as were fittest for the purpose, as to their native country, (for Pylos is in that country which belonged once to the Messenians) infested Laconia with robberies, and did them much other mischief, as being of the same language. The Lacedæmonians, not having in times past been acquainted with robberies, and such war as that, and because their Helots ran over to the enemy, fearing also some greater innovation in the country, took the matter

much to heart; and though they would not have it known to the Athenians, yet they sent ambassadors, and endeavoured to get the restitution both of the fort of Pylos, and of their men. But the Athenians aspired to greater matters; and the ambassadors, though they came often about it, were always sent away without effect. These were the proceedings at Pylos.

XLII. Presently after this, the same summer, the Athenians, with eighty galleys, two thousand men of arms of their own city, and two hundred horse, in boats built for transporting horses, made war on the territory of Corinth. There went also with them of their confederates, Milesians, Andrians, and Carystians. The general of the whole army was Nicias, the son of Niceratus, with two others. Betimes in a morning, they put in at a place between Chersonesus and Rheitus,¹ on that shore, above which stands the hill Solygius, whereon the Dorians in old time sat down, to make war on the Corinthians in the city of Corinth, that were then Æolians, and upon which there stands now a village called Solygia. From the shore where the galleys came in, this village is distant twenty furlongs, the city of Corinth sixty, and the isthmus twenty. The Corinthians having long before from Argos had intelligence that an army of the Athenians was coming against them, came all with their forces to the isthmus, save only such as dwelt without the isthmus; and five hundred garrison soldiers were absent in Ambracia and Leucadia, all the rest of military age came forth, to attend the Athenians, where they should put in. But when the Athenians had put to shore in the night unseen, and that advertisement thereof was given them by signs put up into the air, they left the one half of their forces in Cenchrea,² lest the Athenians should go against Crommyon, and with the other half made haste to meet them.

XLIII. Battus, one of their commanders, (for there were two of them present at the battle) with one squadron, went toward the village of Solygia, being an open one, to defend it; and Lycophron with the rest charged the enemy. And first they gave the onset on the right wing of the Athenians, which was but newly landed before Chersonesus, and afterwards they charged likewise the rest of the army. The battle was hot, and at handstrokes: and the right wing of the Athenians and Carystians (for of these consisted their utmost files) sustained the charge of the Corinthians, and with much ado drove them back. But as they retired, they came up (for the place was all rising ground) to a dry wall, and from thence, being on the upper ground, threw down stones at them; and after having sung the Pæan, came again close to them; whom when the Athenians abode, the battle was again at handstrokes. But a certain band of Corinthians that came in to the aid of their own left wing, put the right wing of the Athenians to flight, and chased them to the sea side. But then from their galleys they turned head again, both the Athenians and the Carystians. The

¹ *Rheitus*, or Rheiti, certain brooks of salt water, supposed to come from the sea between Attica and Eubœa, and rising in Attica to fall into the Saronian Bay, between Perœris and Eleu-

sis. See book ii. 19; and Pausanias, Attic. 37, and Corinth. 24.

² *Cenchrea*, a town of Peloponnesus, on the isthmus of Corinth, now *Kenkri*.

other part of their army continued fighting on both sides, especially the right wing of the Corinthians; where Lycophron fought against the left wing of the Athenians; for they expected that the Athenians would attempt to go to Solygia; so they held each other to it a long time, neither side giving ground.

XLIV. But in the end (for that the Athenians had horsemen, which did them great service, seeing the other had none,) the Corinthians were put to flight, and retired to the hill, where they laid down their arms, and descended no more, but there rested. In this retreat, the greatest part of their right wing was slain, and, amongst others, Lycophron, one of the generals. But the rest of the army being in this manner, neither much urged, nor retiring in much haste, when they could do no other, made their retreat up the hill, and there sat down. The Athenians, seeing them come no more down to battle, rifled the dead bodies of the enemy, and took up their own,¹ and presently erected a trophy on the place. That half of the Corinthians that lay at Cenchrea, to watch the Athenians, that they went not against Crommyon, saw not this battle, for the hill Oneius; but when they saw the dust, and so knew what was in hand, they went presently to their aid: so did also the old men of Corinth² from the city, when they understood how the matter had succeeded. The Athenians, when all these were coming upon them together, imagining them to have been the succours of the neighbouring cities of Peloponnesus, retired speedily to their galleys; carrying with them the booty, and the bodies of their dead all save two, which not finding they left. Being aboard, they crossed over to the islands on the other side, and from thence sent a herald, and fetched away those two dead bodies which they left behind. There were slain in this battle, Corinthians two hundred and twelve, and Athenians somewhat under fifty.

XLV. The Athenians putting off from the islands, sailed the same day to Crommyon, in the territory of Corinth, distant from the city a hundred and twenty furlongs; where anchoring, they wasted the fields, and staid all that night. The next day they sailed along the shore, first to the territory of Epidaurus, whereinto they made some little incursion from their galleys, and then went to Methone, between Epidaurus and Trœzene, and there took in the isthmus of Chersonesus with a wall, and placed a garrison in it, which afterwards exercised robberies in the territories of Trœzene, Halias, and Epidaurus; and when they had fortified this place, they returned home with their fleet.

XLVI. About the same time that these things were in doing, Eurymedon and Sophocles, after their departure from Pylos with the Athenian fleet towards Sicily, arriving at Corcyra, joined with those of the city, and made war on those Corcyraeans which lay encamped upon the hill Istone, and which, after the sedition had come over, and both made themselves masters of the field, and much annoyed the

¹ τοὺς τε νεκροὺς ἐσκόλευον, Bekker.

τοὺς τε ἀλλοτρίους νεκροὺς ἐσκόλευον, rinthians of military age were come
Duker; both spoiled their dead bodies, forth. c. 42.
and took away their own.

city: and having assaulted their fortification, took it. But the men all in one troop, escaped to a certain high ground, and thence made their composition, which was this: that they should deliver up the strangers that aided them; and that they themselves, having rendered their arms, should stand to the judgment of the people of Athens. Hereupon the generals granted them truce, and transported them to the island of Ptychia,¹ to be there in custody till the Athenians should send for them; with this condition, that if any one of them should be taken running away, then the truce to be broken for them all. But the patrons of the commons of Corcyra, fearing lest the Athenians would not kill them when they came thither, devise this against them. To some few of those in the island they secretly send their friends, and instruct them to say, as if forsooth, it were for good will, that it was their best course with all speed to get away, and to provide them a boat, for that the Athenian commanders intended verily to deliver them to the Corcyrean people.

XLVII. When they were persuaded to do so, and that a boat was treacherously prepared, as they rowed away, they were taken, and the truce being now broken, were all given up to the Corcyreans. It much furthered this plot, that to make the pretext seem more serious, and the agents in it less fearful, the Athenian generals gave out, that they were nothing pleased that the men should be carried home by others, whilst they themselves were to go to Sicily, and the honour of it be ascribed to those that should convoy them. The Corcyreans having received them into their hands, imprisoned them in a certain edifice, from whence afterwards they took them out by twenty at a time, and made them pass through a lane of men of arms, bound together, and receiving strokes and thrusts from those on either side, according as any one espied his enemy. And to hasten the pace of those that went slowliest on, others were set to follow them with whips.

XLVIII. They had taken out of the room in this manner and slain to the number of sixty, before they that remained knew it, (who thought they were but removed, and carried to some other place.) But when they knew the truth, some or other having told them, they then cried out to the Athenians, and said, that if they would themselves kill them, they should do it, and refused any more to go out of the room, nor would suffer, they said, as long as they were able, any man to come in. But neither had the Corcyreans any purpose to force entrance by the door, but getting up to the top of the house, uncovered the roof, and threw tiles, and shot arrows at them. They in prison defended themselves as well as they could, but many also slew themselves with the arrows shot by the enemy, by thrusting them into their throats, and strangled themselves with the cords of certain beds that were in the room, and with ropes made of their own garments rent in pieces. And having continued most part of the night, (for night overtook them in the action) partly strangling themselves by all such

¹ Ptychia, a small island near to the city of Corcyra, now called *insula Sancti Viti*.

means as they found, and partly shot at from above, they all perished. When day came, the Corcyræans laid them one across another¹ in carts, and carried them out of the city. And of their wives, as many as were taken in the fortification, they made bond-women. In this manner were the Corcyræans that kept the hill² brought to destruction by the commons. And thus ended this far-spread sedition, for so much as concerned this present war: for of other seditions there remained nothing worth the relation. And the Athenians being arrived in Sicily, whither they were at first bound, prosecuted the war there, together with the rest of their confederates of those parts.

XLIX. In the end of this summer, the Athenians that lay at Naupactus went forth with an army, and took the city of Anactorium,³ belonging to the Corinthians, and lying at the mouth of the Ambracian gulf, by treason. And when they had put forth the Corinthians, the Acarnanians held it with a colony sent thither from all parts of their own nation. And so this summer ended.

L. The next winter, Aristides, the son of Archippus, one of the commanders of a fleet which the Athenians had sent out to gather tribute from their confederates, apprehended Artaphernes, a Persian, in the town of Eion, upon the river Strymon, going from the king to Lacedæmon. When he was brought to Athens, the Athenians translated his letters out of the Assyrian language into Greek, and read them: wherein, amongst many other things that were written to the Lacedæmonians, the principal was this: that he knew not what they meant, for many ambassadors came, but they spake not the same things. If, therefore, they had any thing to say certain, they should send somebody to him with this Persian. But Artaphernes they send afterwards away in a galley, with ambassadors of their own, to Ephesus. And there encountering the news that king Artaxerxes, the son of Xerxes, was lately dead, (for about that time he died) they returned home.

LI. The same winter also the Chians demolished their new wall, by command of the Athenians, on suspicion that they intended some innovation, though they had given the Athenians their faith, and the best security they could, to let them be as they were. Thus ended this winter, and the seventh year of this war, written by Thucydides.

YEAR VIII. A.C. 424. OLYMP. 89-1.

LII. The next summer, in the very beginning, at a change of the moon, the sun was eclipsed in part; and in the beginning of the same month, happened an earthquake. At this time the Mitylenian and other Lesbian outlaws, most of them residing in the continent, with mercenary forces out of Peloponnesus, and some which they levied

¹ Φορμητῶν, properly signifies, after the manner that mats or hurdles are platted.

² Istone.

³ This city belonged to the Corcyræans and Corinthians in common; but a

little before this war the Corinthians carried away captives the men that were in it, and possessed it alone; and those Corcyræans wrought the sedition before related.

where they were, seize on Rhœtium,¹ and for two thousand Phocæan staters,² render it again, without doing other harm. After this they came with their forces to Antandros,³ and took that city also by treason. They had likewise a design to set free the rest of the cities called Actææ,⁴ which were in the occupation formerly of the Mitylenians, but subject to the Athenians; but above all the rest, Antandros, which when they had once got, (for there they might easily build galleys, because there was store of timber; and mount Ida was above their heads) they might easily issue from thence with other their preparation, and infest Lesbos, which was near, and bring into their power the Æolic towns in the continent. And this were those men preparing.

LIII. The Athenians, the same summer, with sixty galleys, two thousand men of arms, and a few horsemen, taking also with them the Milesians, and some other of their confederates, made war on Cythera,⁵ under the conduct of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, Nicostratus, the son of Diotrephe, and Autocles, the son of Tolmæus. This Cythera is an island on the coast of Laconia, over against Malea. The inhabitants are Lacedæmonians, of the same that dwell about them, and every year a magistrate, called Cytherodices,⁶ goes over to them from Sparta. They likewise sent over men of arms from time to time, to lie in garrison there, and took much care of the place. For it was the place where their ships⁷ used to put in from Egypt and Libya, and by which Laconia was the less infested by thieves from the sea, being that way only subject to that mischief. For the island lies wholly out into the Sicilian and Cretan seas.

LIV. The Athenians arriving with their army, with ten of their galleys, and two thousand men of arms of the Milesians, took a town lying to the sea, called Scandea, and with the rest of their forces, having landed in the parts of the island towards Malea, marched into the city itself of the Cytherians, lying likewise to the sea. The Cytherians they found standing all in arms prepared for them; and after the battle began, the Cytherians for a little while made resistance; but soon after turned their backs and fled to the higher part of the city; and afterwards compounded with Nicias and his fellow-commanders, that the Athenians⁸ should determine respecting them whatsoever they thought good, but death. Nicias had had some conference with certain of the Cytherians before, which was also a cause that those things which concerned the accord both now and afterwards were both the sooner, and with the more favour, despatched. For the Athenians

¹ *Rhœtium*, a city of the Hellespont, on the sea side, between Dardarum and Sigeum.

² This sum was above £1900 sterling. The Phocæan stater being worth about 10s. 9d. sterling.

³ A city of Troas, near which Æneas built his fleet after the destruction of Troy. Virg. *Æn.* iii. 6. Now *St. Dimitri*.

⁴ Cities situate on the sea shore.

⁵ An island particularly sacred to

Venus, from which she was named Cytheræa. Now *Cerigo*. See Herod. b. vii. ch. 235, where Demaratus tells Xerxes it would be more beneficial to the state of Sparta were this island to be sunk in the sea.

⁶ The judge of Cythera.

⁷ Ὀλκαδες, ships of the round form of building, merchants' ships.

⁸ The Athenian people.

did but remove the Cytherians, and that also because they were Lacedæmonians, and because the island lay in that manner on the coast of Laconia. After this composition, having as they went by, received Scandea, a town lying on the haven, and put a guard on the Cytherians, they sailed to Asine and most of the towns on the sea-side. And going sometimes on land, and staying where they saw cause, wasted the country for about seven days together.

LV. The Lacedæmonians, though they saw the Athenians had Cythera, and expected withal that they would come to land, in the same manner in their own territory, yet came not forth with their united forces to resist them; but distributed a number of men of arms into sundry parts of their territory to guard it wherever there was need, and were otherwise also exceeding watchful, fearing some innovation should happen in the state; as having received a very great and unexpected loss in the island,¹ and the Athenians having got Pylos and Cythera, and as being on all sides encompassed with a busy and unavoidable war; so that, contrary to their custom, they ordained four hundred horsemen,² and some archers. And if ever they were fearful in matter of war, they were so now, because it was contrary to their own way to contend in a naval war, and against Athenians who thought they lost whatsoever they attempted not. Withal so many misfortunes in so short a time, falling out so contrary to their expectation, exceedingly affrighted them. And fearing some such calamity should again happen as they had received in the island,³ they durst the less to hazard battle; and thought that whatsoever they should go about would miscarry, because their minds, not used formerly to losses, could now warrant them nothing.

LVI. As the Athenians therefore wasted the maritime parts of the country, and disbarked near any garrison, those of the garrison for the most part stirred not, both knowing themselves singly to be too small a number, and being in that manner dejected. Yet one garrison fought about Cotyrta and Aphrodisia,⁴ and frightened in the straggling rabble of light-armed soldiers; but when the men of arms had received them, it retired again with the loss of a few, whom they also rifled of their arms. And the Athenians, after they had erected a trophy, put off again and went to Cythera. From thence they sailed about to Epidaurus, called Limera,⁵ and having wasted some part of that territory, came to Thyrea, which is of the territory called Cynuria,⁶ but is nevertheless the middle border between Argia and Laconia. The Lacedæmonians possessing this [city,] gave the same for an habitation to the Æginetæ after they were driven out of Ægina, both for the benefit they had received from them about the time of the earthquake,

¹ Sphacteria, where their men were taken and carried to Athens.

² The Lacedæmonians relied only on their armed footmen, or men of arms, in whose valour and skill in fight they gloried much, as a peculiar virtue; and as for horsemen and light-armed soldiers, they made less reckoning, and only used such of them as were brought

in by their confederates.

³ Sphacteria.

⁴ Cotyrta and Aphrodisia, two towns of Laconia, situated towards the west, nearly opposite to Cythera.

⁵ So called from λιμήν, a haven, because it is full of havens.

⁶ Cynosyria, according to Bekker.

and of the insurrection of the Helots, and also that being subject to the Athenians, they had nevertheless gone ever the same way with the Lacedæmonians.¹

LVII. When the Athenians were coming towards them, the Æginetæ left the wall which they happened to be then building toward the sea-side, and retired up into the city above where they dwelt, and which was not above ten furlongs from the sea. There was also with them one of those garrisons which the Lacedæmonians had distributed into the several parts of the country; and these, though they helped them to build the fort below, yet would not now enter the town with them, though the Æginetæ entreated them, apprehending danger in being cooped up within the walls; and therefore retiring to the highest ground, lay still there, finding themselves too weak to give battle. Meanwhile the Athenians came in, and marching up presently with their whole army, won Thyrea, and burnt it, and destroyed whatsoever was in it. The Æginetæ, as many as were not slain in the affray, they carried prisoners to Athens; amongst whom Tantalus also, the son of Patrocles, captain of such Lacedæmonians as were amongst them, was wounded and taken alive. They carried likewise with them some few men of Cythera, whom, for safety's sake, they thought good to remove to some other place. These therefore, the Athenians decreed should be placed in the islands.² And the rest of the Cytherians, at the tribute of four talents, should inhabit their own territory. That the Æginetæ, as many as they had taken, (out of former inveterate hatred) should be put to death. And that Tantalus should be put in bonds amongst those Lacedæmonians that were taken in the island.³

LVIII. In Sicily, the same summer, was concluded a cessation of arms, first between the Camarinæans and the Geloans. But afterwards the rest of the Sicilians, assembling, by their ambassadors, out of every city at Gela, held a conference amongst themselves, for making a peace; wherein, after many opinions delivered by men disagreeing, and requiring satisfaction every one as he thought himself prejudiced, Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a Syracusian, who also prevailed with them the most, spake to the assembly to this effect:

Oration of Hermocrates for Peace.

LIX. "Men of Sicily, I am neither of the least city, nor of the most afflicted with war, that am now to speak and to deliver the opinion which I take to conduce most to the common benefit of all Sicily. Touching war, how calamitous it is, to what end should a man, particularizing the evils thereof, make a long speech before those that already know it? for neither does the not knowing of them necessitate man to enter into war, nor the fear of them divert man from it, when he thinks it will turn to his advantage. But rather it falls out that the one thinks the gain greater than the danger; the other prefers danger to present loss. But lest they should both do it unsea-

¹ B. ii. chap. 27. See Pausanias in Arcad,

² Cyclades.

³ Sphacteria.

“sonably, exhortations to peace are profitable, and will be very much worth to us if we follow them at this present. For it was out of a desire that every city had to assure their own, both that we fell ourselves into the war, and also that we endeavour now, by reasoning the matter, to return to mutual amity. Which if it succeeded not so well, that we may depart satisfied every man with reason, we will be at wars again.

LX, “Nevertheless, you must know that this assembly, if we be wise, ought not to be only for the commodity of the cities in particular, but how to preserve Sicily in general, now sought to be subdued (at least in my opinion) by the Athenians. And you ought to think that the Athenians are more urgent persuaders than any words of mine; who having, of all the Grecians, the greatest power, lie here with a few galleys to observe our errors, and by a lawful title of alliance, handsomely to accommodate their natural hostility to their best advantage. For if we enter into a war, and call in these men, who are apt enough to bring their army in uncalled, and if we weaken ourselves at our own charges, and withal cut out for them the dominion here, it is likely, when they shall see us spent, they will some time hereafter come upon us with a greater fleet, and attempt to bring all these states into their subjection.

LXI. “Now, if we were wise, we ought rather to call in confederates, and undergo dangers for the winning of somewhat that is none of ours, than for the impairing of what we already have; and to believe, that nothing so much destroys a city as sedition; and that Sicily, though we the inhabitants thereof be insidiated by the Athenians, as one body, is nevertheless city against city in sedition within itself. In contemplation whereof we ought, man with man, and city with city, to return again into amity, and with one consent to endeavour the safety of all Sicily; and not to have this conceit, that though the Dorians¹ be the Athenians’ enemies, yet the Chalcidæans² are safe, as being of the race of the Ionians. For they invade not these divided races on hatred of a side, but on a covetous desire of those necessities which we enjoy in common. And this they have proved, in their coming hither to aid the Chalcidæans. For though they never received any aid by virtue of their league from the Chalcidæans, yet have they on their part been more forward to help them than by the league they were bound. Indeed the Athenians that covet and meditate these things are to be pardoned. I blame not those that are willing to reign, but those that are most willing to be subject. For it is the nature of man every where to command such as give way, and to be shy of such as assail. We are to blame that know this, and do not provide accordingly, and make it our first care of all to take good order against the common fear. Of which we should soon be delivered if we would agree amongst our-

¹ The Dorians and Ionians are two nations, out of which almost all the people of Greece were descended.—Herod. b. i.

² The Chalcidæans and Athenians

were Ionians, the Lacedæmonians and most of Peloponnesus, Dorians. Hence it is that the Chalcidæans might be thought safe, though the Athenians invaded Sicily, but the Dorians not.

“ selves. For the Athenians come not against us out of their own country, but from theirs here that have called them in. And so not war by war, but all our quarrels shall be ended by peace without trouble. And those that have been called in, as they came with fair pretence to injure us, shall with fair reason be dismissed by us without their errand.

LXII. “ And thus much for the profit that will be found by advising wisely concerning the Athenians. But when peace is confessed by all men to be the best of things, why should we not make it also in respect of ourselves? Or do you think perhaps, if any of you possess a good thing, or be pressed with an evil, that peace is not better than war, to remove the latter, or preserve the former, to both? or that it hath not honours, and eminence more free from danger? or whatever else one might discourse at large concerning war? Which things considered, you ought not to make light of my advice, but rather make use of it, every one to provide for his own safety. Now if some man be strongly conceited to go through with some design of his, be it by right or by violence, let him take heed that he fail not, so much the more to his grief, as it is contrary to his hope; knowing that many men, ere now, hunting after revenge on such as had done them injury, and others, trusting by some strength they have had, to take away another's right, have, the first sort, instead of being revenged been destroyed, and the other, instead of winning from others, left behind them what they had of their own. For revenge succeeds not according to justice, as that because an injury hath been done, it should therefore prosper; nor is strength therefore sure, because hopeful. It is the instability of fortune that is most predominant in things to come, which, though it be the most deceivable of all things, yet appears to be the most profitable. For whilst every one fear it alike, we proceed against each other with the greater providence.

LXIII. “ Now therefore terrified doubly, both with the implicit fear of the uncertainty of events, and with the terror of the Athenians present, and taking these for hinderances sufficient to have made us come short of what we had severally conceived to effect,¹ let us send away our enemies that hover over us, and make an eternal peace amongst ourselves; or if not that, then a truce at least, for as long as may be, and put off our private quarrels to some other time. In sum, let us know this, that following my counsel, we shall each of us have our cities free, whereby being masters of ourselves, we shall be able to remunerate according to their merit, such as do us good or harm. Whereas rejecting it, and following the counsel of others, our contention shall no more be how to be revenged, or at the best, if it be, we must be forced to become friends to our greatest enemies, and enemies to such as we ought not.

LXIV. “ For my part, as I said in the beginning, representing this the greatest city, and which is rather an assailant than assailed;

¹ ὥν ἕκαστος τι ψήθημεν πράξειν, ness of our counsel is hindered by these
Bekker. ὥν ἕκαστος τις ψήθημεν πράξειν impediments from doing the things which
ειν, Duker; thinking that the weak- each of us at all thought we should do.

“and yet foreseeing these things, I hold it fit to come to an agreement, and not so to hurt our enemies, as to hurt ourselves more. Nor yet through foolish spite¹ will I look to be followed as absolute in my will, and master of fortune, which I cannot command; but will also give way where it is reason. And so I look the rest should do as well as I; and that of yourselves, and not forced to it by the enemy. For it is no dishonour to be overcome kinsmen of kinsmen, one Dorian of another Dorian, and one Chalcidæan of another of his own race; or, in sum, any one by another of us, being neighbours, and cohabiters of the same region, encompassed by the sea, and all called by one name, Sicilians. Who, as I conceive, will both war when it happens, and again by common conferences make peace, by our own selves. But when foreigners invade us, we shall (if wise) unite all of us to encounter them,² in as much as being weakened singly, we are in danger universally. As for confederates, let us never hereafter call in any, nor arbitrators. For so shall Sicily attain these two benefits, to be rid of the Athenians, and of domestic war for the present, and to be inhabited by ourselves with liberty, and less insidiated by others for the time to come.”

LXV. Hermocrates having thus spoken, the Sicilians followed his advice, and agreed amongst themselves that the war should cease, every one retaining what they then presently enjoyed; and that the Camarinæans should have Morgantina, paying the Syracusians for the same a certain sum of money then assessed. They that were confederates with the Athenians, calling such of the Athenians to them as were in authority, told them that they also were willing to compound, and be comprehended in the same peace; and the Athenians approving it, they did so; and hereupon the Athenian ships departed out of Sicily. The people of Athens, when their generals came home, banished two, namely, Pythodorus and Sophocles; and laid a fine on the third, Eurymedon, as men that might have subdued the estates of Sicily, but had been bribed to return. So great was their fortune at that time, that they thought nothing could cross them, but that they might have achieved both easy and hard enterprizes, with great and slender forces alike. The cause whereof, was the unreasonable prosperity of most of their designs, subministering strength to their hope.

LXVI. The same summer the Megareans in the city [of Megara,] pinched both by the war of the Athenians, who invaded their territory with their whole forces every year twice, and by their own outlaws from Pegæ, who in a sedition driven out by the commons, grievously afflicted them with robberies, began to talk one to another how it was fit to call them home again, and not let their city, by both these means, be ruined. The friends of those without, perceiving the rumour, they also, more openly than before, required to have it brought to counsel. But the patrons of the commons, fearing that they with the commons, by reason of the miseries they were in, should

¹ Φιλονεικία.

² τοὺς δὲ ἀλλοφύλους ἐπελθόντας ἀεὶ : if we are wise, we shall always in
ἀθροοὶ ἀεὶ, Bekker. Duker omits the a body resist foreigners who come
against us.

not be able to carry it against the other side, made an offer to Hippocrates, the son of Aripbron, and Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, commanders of the Athenians, to deliver them the city, esteeming that course less dangerous for themselves, than the reduction of those whom they had before driven out. And they agreed, that first, the Athenians should possess themselves of the long walls, (these were about eight furlongs in length, and reached from the city to Nisæa, their haven,) thereby to cut off the aid of the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, in which, the better to assure Megara to the side, there lay no other soldiers in garrison, but they; and then afterwards, that these men would attempt to deliver them the city above; which would the more easily succeed, that being effected first.

LXVII. The Athenians, therefore, after all was done and said on both sides, and every thing ready, sailed by night to Minoa,¹ an island of the Megareans with six hundred men of arms led by Hippocrates, and sat down in a pit, out of which bricks had been made for the walls, and which was not far off. But they that were with the other commander, Demosthenes, light-armed Plataeans, and others called Peripoli,² lay in ambush at the temple of Mars, not so far off as the former. And none of the city perceived any thing of this, but only such as had peculiar care to know [the passages] of this same night. When it was almost day, the Megæan traitors did thus: they had been accustomed long, as men that went out for booty,³ with leave of the magistrates, of whom they had obtained by good offices, the opening of the gates,⁴ to carry out a little boat, such as wherein the watermen used an oar in either hand,⁵ and to convey it by night down the ditch to the sea side in a cart; and in a cart to bring it back again, and set it within the gates, that the Athenians who lay in Minoa might not know where to watch for them, no boat being to be seen in the haven. At this time was that cart at the gates, which opened, according to custom, as for the boat;⁶ the Athenians, seeing it, (for so it was agreed on) arose from their ambush, and ran with all speed, to get in before the gates should be shut again, and to be there whilst the cart was yet in the gates and kept them open; and they and the Megareans who took their part slew the guards that were at the gates. And first those Plataeans, and Peripoli, that were with Demosthenes, ran in, in the place where the trophy is now extant; and fighting presently within the gates, (for those Peloponnesians that were nearest⁷ heard the stir) the Plataeans overcame those

¹ This island lying before the haven Nisæa, made the port, and the Athenians kept in it an ordinary garrison ever since they took it first, and could see all the haven and what vessels lay in it, but could not enter. According to Strabo it was a promontory. See Thuc. b. iii. 51.

² There were certain officers called *περίπολοι*, whose duty it was *περιπαλεῖν*, or to walk round the camp, and to visit the watch, to try if they were

awake.

³ To get booty from the Athenians.

⁴ Not the gates of Megara, but the gates in the long walls, near Nisæa, as appears by the narration.

⁵ *Ἀκάτιον ἀμφορικόν*.

⁶ To take it in, for it was almost morning.

⁷ Those that watched in that part of Nisæa which was nearest to this gate of the long walls.

that resisted, and made good the gates for the Athenian men of arms that were coming after.

LXVIII. After this, the Athenian soldiers, as they entered, went up to the wall, and a few of the Peloponnesians of the garrison at first made head, and fought, and were some of them slain, but the most took to their heels, fearing in the night both the enemy that charged them, and also the traitors of the Megareans that fought against them, apprehending that all the Megareans in general had betrayed them. It chanced also that the Athenian herald, of his own discretion, made proclamation, that if any Megarean would take part with the Athenians, he should come and lay down his arms. When the Peloponnesians heard this, they staid no longer, but seriously believing that they jointly warred on them, fled into Nisæa. As soon as it was day, the walls being now taken, and the Megareans being in a tumult within the city, they that had treated with the Athenians, and with them, the rest, as many as were conscious, said it was fit to have the gates opened, and to go out to battle. Now it was agreed on between them, that when the gates¹ were open, the Athenians should rush in, and that they themselves would be easily known from the rest; for that they might have no harm done them, they would besmear themselves with ointment. And the opening of the gates would be for their greater safety. For the four thousand armed Athenians, and six hundred horsemen, which, according to the appointment, were to come to them from Eleusis, having marched all night, were already arrived. When they had besmeared themselves, and were now about the gates, one of those that were privy discovered the conspiracy to the rest that were not. These joining their strength, came all together to the gates, denying that it was fit to go out to fight; (for that neither in former times when they were stronger than now, durst they do so,) or to put the city into so manifest a danger. And said, that if they would not be satisfied, the battle should be there right. Yet they discovered not that they knew of the practice, but only, as having given good advice, meant to maintain it; and they staid at the gates, so that the traitors could not perform what they intended.

LXIX. The Athenian commanders, knowing some cross accident had happened, and that they could not take the city by assault, fell to inclosing Nisæa with a wall, thinking that if they could take it before aid came, Megara would the sooner yield, (but iron was quickly brought to them from Athens, and masons, and whatever else was necessary,) and beginning at the wall² they had won, when they had built across over to the other side, from thence both ways they drew it on to the sea on either side of Nisæa, and having distributed the work amongst the army, as well the wall as the ditch, they served themselves of the stones and bricks of the suburbs, and having felled trees, and timber, supplied what was defective with a strong palisado; the houses also themselves of the suburbs, when they had put on battlements, served them for a fortification. All that day they

¹ Of the city itself of Megara.

² Viz. that part of the long wall which they seized.

wrought; the next day about evening they had within a very little finished, and then they that were in Nisæa, seeing themselves in want of victual, (for they had none but what came day by day from the city above,) and without hope that the Peloponnesians could quickly come to relieve them, conceiving also that the Megareans were their enemies, compounded with the Athenians on these terms: "To be dismissed every one at a certain ransom in money; to deliver up their arms; and the Lacedæmonians, both the captain, and whosoever of them else was within, to be at discretion of the Athenians." Having thus agreed, they went out. And the Athenians, when they had broken off the long walls from the city of Megara,¹ and taken in Nisæa, prepared for what was further to be done.

LXX. Brasidas, the son of Tellis, a Lacedæmonian, happened at this time to be about Sicyon and Corinth, preparing an army to go into Thrace. And when he heard of the taking of the long walls, fearing what might become of the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, and lest Megara should be won, sent to the Bœotians, willing them to meet him speedily with their forces at Tripodiscus, (a village of Megaris, so called, at the foot of the hill Geranea²) and marched presently himself with two thousand and seven hundred men of arms, Corinthians; four hundred of Phliasiens, six hundred Sicyonians, and of his own, all that he had yet levied; thinking to have found Nisæa yet untaken. When he heard the contrary, (for he set first towards Tripodiscus in the night) with three hundred men chosen out of the whole army, before news should arrive of his coming, he came unseen of the Athenians that lay by the sea side, to the city of Megara, pretending in word, and intending also in good earnest, if he could have done it, to make an attempt upon Nisæa, but desiring to get into Megara to confirm it, and required to be let in, saying, he was in hope he should recover Nisæa.

LXXI. But the Megarean factions being afraid, one,³ lest he should bring in the outlaws, and cast out them; the other,⁴ lest the commons, out of this very fear, should assault them, whereby the city, being at battle within itself, and the Athenians lying in wait so near, would be lost, received him not, but resolved on both sides to sit still, and attend the success. For each expected, that the Athenians, and these that came to succour the city, would join battle, and then they might with more safety, such as were the favoured side, turn to them that had the victory.⁵ And Brasidas, not prevailing, went back to the rest of the army.⁶

LXXII. Betimes in the morning arrived the Bœotians, having intended to come to the aid of Megara, before Brasidas sent, esteeming

¹ Not pulled them down quite, but only so far, as not to be a defence to any part of the city itself, nor to join to the walls of the city.

² Book i. 105.

³ The patrons of the commons.

⁴ The nobility.

⁵ οἷς τις εἴη εὐνοῦς, Bekker. ὅστις εἴη

εὐνοῦς, Duker; for both sides expected that there would be a battle between the Athenians and those who came to assist the city, and thus that it would be possible for them, to whom any one was well-disposed, to go over to the victors with greater safety.

⁶ At Tripodiscus.

the danger to concern themselves, and being then with their whole forces at Plataea, but when they had received also this message, they were much more encouraged; and sending two thousand two hundred men of arms, and two hundred horse, to Brasidas, they went back with the greater part of their army. The whole army being now together, less than six thousand men of arms, and the Athenian men of arms lying indeed in good order, about Nisæa, and the sea side, but the light-armed straggling in the plains, the Bœotian horsemen came unexpected upon the light-armed soldiers, and drove them towards the sea. For in all this time till now, there had come no aid to the Megareans from any place. But when the Athenian horse went likewise out to encounter them, they fought, and there was a battle between the horsemen of either side, that held long, wherein both sides claimed the victory. For the Athenians slew the general of the Bœotian horse, and some few others, and rifled them, having themselves been first chased by them to Nisæa. And having these dead bodies in their power, they restored them on truce, and erected a trophy. Nevertheless, in respect of the whole action, neither side went off with assurance, but parting asunder, the Bœotians went to the army, and the Athenians to Nisæa.

LXXIII. After this, Brasidas and his army came nearer to the sea, and to the city of Megara; and having seized a place of advantage, stood still in battle array, thinking the Athenians would be assailants, and knowing the Megareans stood observing which side should have the victory; and they thought it must needs fall out well for themselves both ways; first, because they should not be the assailants, and voluntarily begin the battle and danger; since having shewn themselves ready to fight, the victory must also justly be attributed to them without their labour:¹ and next, it must fall out well in respect of the Megareans; for if they themselves had not come in sight, it had no longer been a matter of chance, but they had without all doubt been presently deprived of the city, as men conquered. Whereas now, if haply the Athenians declined battle likewise, they should obtain what they came for without fighting. Which also came to pass. For the Megareans, when the Athenians going out, ordered their army without the long walls, but yet, because the enemy charged not, stood also still, (their commanders likewise, considering that if they should begin the battle, against a number greater than their own, after the greatest part of their enterprize was already achieved, the danger would be unequal; for if they should overcome, they could win but Megara, and if they were vanquished, must lose the best part of their men of arms; whereas the enemy, who out of the whole power and number that was present in the field, did adventure but every one a part, would in all likelihood put it to the hazard,) and so for awhile affronted each other; and neither doing any thing, withdrew again, the Athenians first to Nisæa, and afterwards the Peloponnesians to the place from whence they had set forth.

LXXIV. Then, I say, such of the Megareans as were friends of

¹ 'Ακουρι, without dust.

the outlaws, taking heart, because they saw the Athenians were unwilling to fight, set open the gates to Brasidas as victor, and to the rest of the captains of the several cities: and when they were in, those that had practised with the Athenians, being all the while in a great fear, they went to council. Afterwards Brasidas having dismissed his confederates to their several cities, went himself to Corinth in pursuit of his former purpose of levying an army for Thrace. Now the Megareans in the city, when the Athenians also were gone home, all that had chief hand in the practice with the Athenians, knowing themselves discovered, presently slipped away; but the rest, after they had conferred with the friends of the outlaws, recalled them from Pegæ, upon great oaths administered to them, no more to remember former quarrels, but to give the city their best advice. These, when they came into office, took a view of the arms, and disposing bands of soldiers in divers quarters of the city, picked out of their enemies, and of those that seemed most to have co-operated in the treason with the Athenians, about a hundred persons; and having constrained the people to pass their sentence on them openly,¹ when they were condemned, slew them; and established in the city the state almost of an oligarchy. And this change of government, made by a few, upon sedition, did nevertheless continue for a long time after.

LXXV. The same summer, when Antandros was to be furnished by the Mitylenians as they intended,² Demodocus and Aristides, captains of certain galleys set forth by the Athenians to fetch in tribute, being then about Hellespont, (for Lamachus, the third in that commission, was gone with ten galleys to Pontus,) having notice of the preparation made in that place; and thinking it would be dangerous to have it happen there, as it had done in Anæa³ over against Samos, in which the Samian outlaws having settled themselves, aided the Peloponnesians in matters of the sea, by sending them steersmen; and both bred trouble within the city, and entertained such as fled out of it, levied an army amongst the confederates, and marched to it, and having overcome in fight those that came out of Antandros against them, recovered the place again. And not long after, Lamachus, that was gone to Pontus, as he lay at anchor in the river Calcx,⁴ in the territory of Heraclea, much rain having fallen above in the country, and the stream of a land flood, coming suddenly down, lost all his galleys, and came himself and his army by land through Bithynia, (belonging to the Thracians who dwell in Asia, on the other side,) to Chalcedon,⁵ a colony of the Megareans, at the mouth of the Pontus Euxinus.

LXXVI. The same summer likewise, Demosthenes, general of the Athenians, with forty galleys presently after his departure out of Me-

¹ Because they should not dare but to condemn them, which they would not have done, if their sentence had passed by secret suffrage.

² Book iv. 52.

³ Book iii. 82.

⁴ This river, which empties itself

into the Euxine sea, was called by different names, as Cales, Caces, Calles; now *Chelit*.

⁵ Founded by a colony from Megara, under command of Argias, B.C. 685. Originally called Procerastis, now *Kadi Keni*.

garis, sailed to Naupactus. For certain men in the cities thereabouts, desiring to change the form of the Bœotian government, and to turn it into a democracy, according to the government of Athens, practised with him and Hippocrates, to betray to him the estates of Bœotia: induced thereunto principally by Ptœodorus, a Theban outlaw. And they ordered the design thus: some had undertaken to deliver up Siphæ; (Siphæ is a city of the territory of Thespiæ, standing on the sea side, in the Crissæan gulf;) and Chæronea, (which paid duties to Orchomenus, called heretofore Orchomenus in Minyeia, but now Orchomenus in Bœotia,) some others, of Orchomenus, were to surrender into their hands, and the Orchomenian outlaws had a principal hand in this, and were hiring soldiers to that end out of Peloponnesus. This Chæronea is the utmost town of Bœotia towards Phanotis of Phocis, and some Phocians also dwelt in it. On the other side, the Athenians were to seize on Delium, a place consecrated to Apollo, in Tanagræa, on the part toward Eubœa; all this ought to have been done together upon a day appointed, that the Bœotians might not oppose them with their forces united, but might be troubled every one to defend his own. And if the attempt succeeded, and they once fortified Delium, they easily hoped, though no change followed in the state of the Bœotians for the present, yet being possessed of those places, and by that means continually fetching in prey out of the country, because there was for every one a place at hand to retire unto, that it could not stand long at a stay; but that the Athenians, joining with such of them as rebelled, and the Bœotians not having their forces united, they might in time order the state to their own liking. Thus was the plot laid.

LXXVII. And Hippocrates himself, with the forces of the city, was ready when time should serve to march against the Bœotians; but sent Demosthenes before with forty galleys to Naupactus, to levy an army of Acarnanians, and other confederates in these quarters, and to sail to Siphæ to receive it by treason; and a day was fixed by them on which these things should have been done together. Demosthenes arriving, and finding the Cœniades by compulsion of the rest of Acarnania, entered into the Athenian confederation, and having himself raised all the confederates thereabouts, made war, first on Salynthius and the Agræans, and having taken in other places thereabouts, stood ready when the time should require, to go to Siphæ.

LXXVIII. About the same time of this summer, Brasidas marching towards the cities upon Thrace, with one thousand five hundred men of arms, when he came to Heraclea in Trachis, sent a messenger before him to his friends at Pharsalus, requiring them to guide to Melitia of Achaia himself and his army; and when there were come Panærus and Dorus, and Hippolochidas, and Torylaus, and Strophacus, the public host of the Chalcidæans, he marched on. There were other of the Thessalians also that convoyed him; and from Larissa he was convoyed by Nikonidas, a friend of Perdicas. For it had been hard to pass Thessaly in any way without a guide, but especially with an army. And to pass through a neighbour territory without leave, is a thing of which all Grecians are alike jealous; besides, the people of

Thessaly had ever borne good affection to the Athenians. Insomuch, as if by custom, the government of that country had not been lordly¹ rather than a commonwealth,² he could never have gone on; for also now as he marched forward, there met him at the river Enipeus others of a contrary mind to the former that forbade him, and told him that he did unjustly *in going* on without the common consent of all. But those that convoyed him answered, that they would not bring him through against their wills; but that coming to them on a sudden, they conducted him as friends. And Brasidas himself said, he came thither a friend, both to the country and to them; and that he bore arms, not against them, but against the Athenians, their enemies. And that he never knew of any enmity between the Thessalians and Lacedæmonians, whereby they might not use one another's ground; and that even now he would not go on without their consent; for neither could he, but only entreated them not to stop him. When they heard this, they went their ways. And he, by the advice of his guides, before any greater number should unite to hinder him, marched on with all possible speed, staying no where by the way; and the same day he set forth from Melitia, he reached Pharsalus, and encamped by the river Apidanus, thence he went to Phacium; from thence into Peræbia. The Peræbians, though subject to the Thessalians, set him at Dion, in the dominion of Perdiccas, a little city of the Macedonians, situate at the foot of Olympus, on the side toward Thessaly.

LXXIX. In this manner Brasidas ran through Thessaly before any there could put in readiness to stop him; and came to the territory of the Chalcidæans, and to Perdiccas. For Perdiccas and the Chalcidæans, all that had revolted from the Athenians, when they saw the affairs of the Athenians prosper, had drawn this army out of Peloponnesus for fear; the Chalcidæans, because they thought the Athenians would make war on them first, as having been also incited thereto, by those cities amongst them that had not revolted; and Perdiccas, not that he was their open enemy, but because he feared the Athenians for ancient quarrels; but principally because he desired to subdue Arrhibæus, king of the Lyncestæans. And the ill success which the Lacedæmonians in these times had, was a cause that they obtained an army from them the more easily.

LXXX. For the Athenians vexing Peloponnesus, and their own territory Laconia³ most of all, they thought the best way to divert them was to send an army to the confederates of the Athenians, so to vex them again. And the rather because Perdiccas and the Chalcidæans were content to maintain the army, having called it thither to help the Chalcidæans in their revolt. And also because they desired a pretence to send away part of their Helots, lest they should take the opportunity of the present state of their affairs, the enemies lying now in Pylos, to innovate; for they did also this further, fearing the youth, and multitude of their Helots, (for the Lacedæmonians had ever many

¹ *Δυναστεία*, absolute government the whole.
under one part.

² *ἰσονομία*, equality of privilege in
try from Pylos and the Cythera.

ordinances concerning how to look to themselves against the Helots,) they caused proclamation to be made, that as many of them as claimed the estimation to have done the Lacedæmonians best service in their wars should be made free; feeling them in this manner, and conceiving, that as they should every one out of pride deem himself worthy to be first made free, so they would soonest also rebel against them. And when they had thus preferred about two thousand, who also with crowns on their heads went in procession about the temples, as to receive their liberty, they not long after made them away, and no man knew how they perished. And now at this time with all their hearts they sent away seven hundred men of arms more of the same men, along with Brasidas, but the rest of the army were mercenaries hired by him out of Peloponnesus. But Brasidas himself the Lacedæmonians sent out, chiefly because it was his own desire.

LXXXI. The Chalcidæans also longed to have him, as one esteemed also in Sparta, every way an active man, and when he was out, he did the Lacedæmonians very great service. For by shewing himself at that present time just and moderate towards the cities, he caused the most of them to revolt, and some of them he also took by treason. Whereby it came to pass, that if the Lacedæmonians pleased to come to composition, as also they did, they might have towns to render and receive reciprocally. And also long after, after the Sicilian war, the virtue and wisdom which Brasidas shewed now, to some known by experience,¹ by others believed upon report, was the principal cause that made the Athenian confederates affect the Lacedæmonians: for being the first that went out, and esteemed in all points a worthy man, he left behind him an assured hope that the rest also were like him.²

LXXXII. Being now come into Thrace, the Athenians on notice thereof declared Perdiccas an enemy, imputing to him this expedition, and reinforced the garrisons in the parts thereabouts.

LXXXIII. Perdiccas, with Brasidas and his army, together with his own forces, marched presently against Arrhibæus, the son of Bromerus, king of the Lyncestians, a people of Macedonia, confining on his dominion, both for a quarrel they had against him, and also as desiring to subdue him. When he came with his army and Brasidas, to the entrance of Lyncus, Brasidas told him that he desired, before he made war, to draw Arrhibæus by parley, if he could, to a league with the Lacedæmonians. For Arrhibæus had also made some proffer by a herald, to commit the matter to Brasidas's arbitrament. And the Chalcidæan ambassadors being present, gave him likewise advice, not to thrust himself into danger in favour of Perdiccas, that they

¹ *ἐς τε τὸν χρόνον ὕστερον κτλ.* Bekker. *ἐς τε τὸν χρόνον ὕστερον.* Duker. And in the war, which was later in point of time, after the affairs of Sicily, the virtue and wisdom of Brasidas, some having known it by experience, &c. It perhaps may escape the notice of many, that τὸν agrees with πόλεμον,

and not, as Hobbes has taken it, with χρόνον ὕστερον, or χρόνῳ ὕστερον.

² When Brasidas was beginning his march for Thrace, he wrote this letter to the Ephori at Sparta: "I will execute your orders in this war, or die." Plut. Lac. Apophthegm.

might have him more prompt in their own affairs.¹ Besides the ministers of Perdiccas, when they were at Lacedæmon, had spoken there, as if they had meant to bring as many of the places about him as they could, into the Lacedæmonian league. So that Brasidas favoured Arrhibæus, for the public good of their own state. But Perdiccas said that he brought not Brasidas thither to be a judge of his controversies, but to destroy those enemies which he should shew him. And that it would be an injury, seeing he paid the half of his army, for Brasidas to parley with Arrhibæus; nevertheless Brasidas, whether Perdiccas would or not, and though it made a quarrel, had conference with Arrhibæus, by whom also he was induced to withdraw his army. But from that time forward, Perdiccas, instead of half, paid but a third part of his army, conceiving himself to have been injured.

LXXXIV. The same summer,² a little before the vintage, Brasidas having joined to his own the forces of the Chalcidæans, marched to Acanthus,³ a colony of the Andrians. And there arose sedition about receiving him, between such as had joined with the Chalcidæans in calling him thither, and the common people. Nevertheless, for fear of their fruits, which were not yet got in, the multitude was won by Brasidas to let him enter alone, and then, after he had said his mind, to advise what to do amongst themselves. And presenting himself before the multitude, (for he was not uneloquent, though a Lacedæmonian) he spake to this effect :

Oration of Brasidas.

LXXXV. “ Men of Acanthus, the reason why the Lacedæmonians have sent me, and this army abroad, is to make good what we gave out in the beginning for the cause of our war against the Athenians, which was, that we meant to make a war for the liberty of Greece. But if we be come late, as deceived by the war there, in the opinion we had, that we ourselves should soon have pulled the Athenians down, without any danger of yours, no man hath reason therefore to blame us. For we are come as soon as occasion served, and with your help will do our best to bring them under. But I wonder why you shut me forth of your gates, and why I was not welcome. For we Lacedæmonians have undergone this great danger, of passing many days’ journey through the territory of strangers, and shewn all possible zeal, imagining that we went to such confederates as before we came, had us present in their hearts, and were desirous of our coming. And therefore it were hard that you should now be otherwise minded, and withstand your own and the rest of the Grecians’ liberty; not only in that yourselves resist us, but also because others whom I go to will be the less willing to come in;

¹ *μη ὑπεξελεῖν τῷ Περδίκκῃ τὰ δεινὰ*, Bekker. *μη ὑπεξελεθεῖν*, Duker. The ambassadors of the Chalcidæans instructed him not to free Perdiccas from apprehension, that they might be able to use him more readily for their own affairs also.

² In the month of August.

³ Situated near to mount Athos, according to some a city of the Thracians, to others, of the Macedonians. See Herod. vi. 44. Taken by the Romans. Livy, xxxi. 45.

“ making difficulty, because you to whom I came first, having a flourishing city, and being esteemed wise, have refused us: for which I shall have no sufficient excuse to plead, but must be thought either to pretend to set up liberty unjustly, or to come weak, and without power to maintain you against the Athenians. And yet against this same army I now have, when I went to encounter the Athenians at Nisæa, though more in number, they durst not hazard battle. Nor is it likely that the Athenians will send forth so great a number against you, as they had in their fleet there at Nisæa.

LXXXVI. “ I come not hither to hurt, but to set free the Grecians, and I have the Lacedæmonian magistrates bound unto me by great oaths, that whatsoever confederates shall be added to their side, at least by me, shall still enjoy their own laws. And that we shall not hold you as confederates to us, brought in either by force, or fraud, but on the contrary, be confederates to you, that are kept in servitude by the Athenians. And therefore I claim not only that you be not jealous of me, especially having given you so good assurance, or think me unable to defend you, but also that you declare yourselves boldly with me. And if any man be unwilling so to do, through fear of some particular man, apprehending that I would put the city into the hands of a few, let him cast away that fear: for I came not to side, nor do I think I should bring you an assured liberty, if neglecting the ancient use here, I should enthral, either the multitude to the few, or the few to the multitude. For to be governed so were worse than the domination of a foreigner. And there would result from it to us Lacedæmonians, not thanks for our labours, but instead of honour and glory, an imputation of those crimes¹ for which we make war amongst the Athenians, and which would be more odious in us than in them, that never pretended the virtue.² For it is more dishonourable, at least, to men in dignity, to amplify their estate by specious fraud, than by open violence. For the latter assaileth with a certain right of power given us by fortune, but the other, with the treachery of a wicked conscience.

LXXXVII. “ But besides the oath which they have sworn already, the greatest further assurance you can have, is this, that our actions weighed with our words, you must needs believe, that it is to our profit to do, as I have told you. But if after these promises of mine, you shall say, you cannot, and yet for as much as your affection is with us, will claim impunity for rejecting us; or shall say that this liberty I offer you seems to be accompanied with danger, and that it were well done to offer it to such as can receive it, but not to force it upon any. Then will I call to witness the gods and heroes³ of this place, that my counsel which you refuse, was for your good, and will endeavour by wasting of your territory to compel you to it. Nor shall I think I do you therein any wrong; but have reason for it from two necessities, one, of the Lacedæmonians,

¹ Ambition and desire to subdue other states.

² Semi-gods feigned by the poets to have been begot between a god and a mortal.

³ The desire to assert the rights of other states.

“lest whilst they have your affections, and not your society, they should receive hurt from your contribution of money to the Athenians; another, of the Grecians, lest they should be hindered of their liberty by your example; for otherwise indeed we could not justly do it; nor ought we Lacedæmonians to set any at liberty against their wills, if it were not for some common good. We covet not dominion over you, but seeing we haste to make others lay down the same, we should do injury to the greater part, if bringing liberty to the other states in general, we should tolerate you to cross us. Deliberate well on these things, strive to be the beginners of liberty in Greece, to get yourselves eternal glory, to preserve every man his private estate from damage, and to invest the whole city with a most honourable title.”

LXXXVIII. Thus spake Brasidas. The Acanthians, after much said on either side, partly for that which Brasidas had effectually spoken, and partly for fear of their fruits abroad, the most of them decreed to revolt from the Athenians, having given their votes in secret. And when they had made him take the same oath which the Lacedæmonian magistrates took, when they sent him out; namely, that what confederates soever he should join to the Lacedæmonians, should enjoy their own laws, they received his army into the city. And not long after revolted Stagyrus,² another colony of the Andrians. And these were the acts of this summer.

LXXXIX. In the very beginning of the next winter, when the Bœotian cities should have been delivered to Hippocrates and Demosthenes, generals of the Athenians, and Demosthenes should have gone to Siphæ, and Hippocrates to Delium, having mistaken the days on which they should have both set forward, Demosthenes went to Siphæ first,³ and having with him the Acarnanians, and many confederates of those parts in his fleet, yet lost his labour; for the treason was detected by Nicomachus, a Phocæan, of Phanotis, who told it to the Lacedæmonians, and they again to the Bœotians: whereby the Bœotians concurring universally to relieve those places, (for Hippocrates was not yet gone to trouble them in their own several territories,) pre-occupied both Siphæ and Chæronea. And the conspirators knowing the error, attempted in those cities no further.

XC. But Hippocrates having raised the whole power of Athens, both citizens and others that dwelt amongst them, and all strangers that were then there, arrived afterwards at Delium,⁴ when the Bœotians were now returned from Siphæ: and there staid, and took in Delium, a temple of Apollo, with a wall in this manner. Round about the temple, and the whole consecrated ground, they drew a ditch, and out of the ditch, instead of a wall, they cast up the earth, and having driven down piles on either side, they cast thereinto the matter of the vineyard about the temple, which to that purpose they

¹ The title of a free city.

² On the borders of Macedonia, founded A.C. 665. Famous for being the birth-place of Aristotle.

³ Before Hippocrates went to De-

lium, whereas it ought to have been at the same time.

⁴ After Demosthenes had been at Siphæ, which was too late.

out down, together with the stones and bricks of the ruined buildings. And by all means heightened the fortification, and in such places as would give leave, erected turrets of wood on the same. There was no edifice of the temple standing, for the cloister that had been was fallen down. They began the work the third day after they set forth from Athens, and wrought all the day, and all the fourth and the fifth, till dinner. And then most part of it being finished, the camp came back from Delium, about ten furlongs homewards. And the light-armed soldiers went most of them presently away, but the men of arms laid down their arms there, and rested. Hippocrates staid yet behind, and took order about the garrison, and about the finishing of the remainder of the fortification.

XCI. The Bœotians took the same time to assemble at Tanagra; and when all the forces were come in, and they understood that the Athenians drew homewards, though the rest of the Bœotian commanders,¹ which were eleven, approved not giving battle, because they were not now in Bœotia, (for the Athenians, when they laid down their arms, were in the confines of Oropia,) yet Pagondas,² the son of Aioladas, being the Bœotian commander³ for Thebes, whose turn it was to have the leading of the army, was, together with Arianthides, the son of Lysimachidas, of opinion to fight, and held it the best course to try the fortune of a battle; wherefore calling to him every company by itself, that they might not be all at once from their arms, he exhorted the Bœotians to march against the Athenians, and to hazard battle, speaking in this manner:

Oration of Pagondas to his Soldiers.

XCII. “Men of Bœotia, it ought never to have so much as entered the thought of any of us the commanders, that because we find not the Athenians now in Bœotia, it should therefore be unfit to give them battle. For they out of a bordering country have entered Bœotia, and fortified in it, with intent to waste it, and are indeed enemies in whatever ground we find them, or whencesoever they come, doing the acts of hostility. But now if any man think it also unsafe, let him henceforth be of another opinion. For providence in them that are invaded, endureth not such deliberation concerning their own, as may be used by them, who retaining their own, out of desire to enlarge, voluntarily invade the estate of another. And it is the custom of this country of yours, when a foreign enemy comes against you, to fight with him, both on your own, and on your neighbours’ ground alike; but much more you ought to do it, against the Athenians, when they be borderers. For liberty with all men, is nothing else but to be a match for the cities that

¹ Βοιωταρχοῦντες, eleven in number.
See note, chap. ii. book ii.

² Book vi. 96.

³ It seems that the several states of Bœotia being free of themselves, and

holding all together, were united under governors sent from them severally, at least in the wars, and then they had the leading of the common forces by turns.

“are their neighbours.¹ With these then that attempt the subjugation, not only of their neighbours, but of estates far from them, why should we not try the utmost of our fortune? (We have for example, the estate that the Eubœans over against us, and also the greatest part of the rest of Greece do live in under them,) and you must know, that though others fight with their neighbours, about the bounds of their territories, we if we be vanquished shall have but one bound amongst us all; so that we shall no more quarrel about limits. For if they enter, they will take all our several states into their own possession by force. So much more dangerous is the neighbourhood of the Athenians, than that of other people. And such as on confidence in their strength invade their neighbours, as the Athenians now do, use to be bold in warring on those that sit still, defending themselves only in their own territories; whereas they be less urgent to those that are ready to meet them without their own limits, or also to begin the war when opportunity serves. We have experience hereof in these same men; for after we had overcome them at Coronea, at what time through our own sedition, they held our country in subjection, we established a great security in Bœotia, which lasted till this present. Remembering which, we ought now, the elder sort to imitate our former acts there, and the younger sort, who are the children of those valiant fathers, to endeavour not to disgrace the virtue of their houses; but rather with confidence that the god, whose temple fortified they unlawfully dwell in, will be with us, the sacrifices we offered him appearing fair, to march against them, and let them see, that though they may gain what they covet, when they invade such as will not fight, yet men that have the generosity to hold their own in liberty by battle, and not invade the state of another unjustly, will never let them go away unfought.”

XCIII. Pagondas with this exhortation persuaded the Bœotians to march against the Athenians; and making them rise,² led them speedily on, for it was drawing towards night; and when he was near their army, in a place, from whence by the interposition of a hill they saw not each other, making a stand, he put his army into order, and prepared to give battle. When it was told Hippocrates, who was then at Delium, that the Bœotians were marching after them, he sends presently to the army, commanding them to be put in array, and not long after he came himself, having left some three hundred horse about Delium, both for a guard to the place, if it should be assaulted, and withal to watch an opportunity to come upon the Bœotians when they were in fight. But for these the Bœotians appointed some forces purposely to attend them. And when all was as it should be, they shewed themselves from the top of the hill; where they sat down with their arms, in the same order they were to fight in; being about seven thousand men of arms, of light-armed above ten thousand, a thousand horsemen, and five hundred targeteers. Their right wing

¹ So that so soon as a state has a neighbour strong enough to subdue it, it is no more to be thought a free state.

² It was the fashion for the soldiers to sit down with their arms by them, when they staid in the field.

consisting of the Thebans, and their partakers; in the middle were the Haliartians, Coronæans, Copæans, and the rest that dwell about the lake;¹ in the left were the Thespians, Tanagræans, and Orchomenians. The horsemen and light-armed soldiers were placed on either wing. The Thebans were ordered by twenty-five in file, but the rest, every one as it fell out. This was the preparation and order of the Bœotians.

XCIV. The Athenian men of arms, in number no fewer than the enemy, were ordered by eight in file throughout. Their horse they placed on either wing; but for light-armed soldiers, armed as was fit, there were none, nor were there any in the city. Those that went out followed the camp, for the most part without arms, as being a general expedition both of citizens and strangers; and after they once began to make homeward, there staid few behind. When they were now in their order, and ready to join battle,² Hippocrates, the general, came to the army of the Athenians, and encouraged them, speaking to this effect:

Oration of Hippocrates to his Soldiers.

XCV. “Men of Athens, my exhortation shall be short, but with valiant men it has as much force as a longer, and is for a remembrance, rather than a command. Let no man think, because it is in the territory of another, that we, therefore, precipitate ourselves into a great danger that did not concern us. For in the territory of these men you fight for your own:³ if we get the victory, the Peloponnesians will never invade our territories again, for want of the Bœotian horsemen: so that in one battle you shall both gain this territory, and free your own. Therefore march on against the enemy, every one as becomes the dignity both of his natural city, which he glories to be chief of all Greece, and of his ancestors, who having overcome these men at Œenophytæ, under the conduct of Myronides, were in times past masters of all Bœotia.”

XCVI. Whilst Hippocrates was making this exhortation, and had gone with it over half the army, but could proceed no further, the Bœotians, for Pagondas likewise made but a short exhortation, and had there sung the Pæan, came down upon them from the hill. And the Athenians likewise went forward to meet them so fast, that they met together running. The utmost parts of both the armies never came to join, hindered both by one and the same cause, for certain currents of water kept them asunder. But the rest made sharp battle, standing close and striving to put by each other's bucklers. The left wing of the Bœotians to the very middle of the army was overthrown by the Athenians, who in this part had to deal amongst others, principally with the Thespians. For whilst they that were placed within the same wing gave back, and were circled in by the Athenians in a

¹ The lake Copais.

² καθιστάτων δὲ ἐς τὴν τάξιν καὶ ἤδη μελλόντων, Bekker. ἐς τὴν τάξιν ἤδη, καὶ μελλόντων, Duker; and when they were appointed in their ranks, and now

about to engage.

³ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἡμετέρας ὁ ἀγὼν ἔσται, Bekker. ὑμετέρας, Duker; for in their country the contest will be for our own.

narrow compass, those Thespians that were slain, were hewed down in the very fight. Some also of the Athenians themselves, troubled with enclosing them, through ignorance slew one another. So that the Bœotians were overthrown in this part and fled to the other part, where they were yet in fight. But the right wing wherein the Thebans stood, had the better of the Athenians, and by little and little, forced them to give ground, and followed on them from the very first. It happened also that Pagondas, whilst the left wing of his army was in distress, sent two companies of horse secretly about the hill, whereby that wing of the Athenians which was victorious, apprehending on their sudden appearing that they had been a fresh army, was put to fright, and the whole army of the Athenians, now doubly terrified by this accident, and by the Thebans that continually won ground, and brake their ranks, betook themselves to flight; some fled toward Delium and the sea, some towards Oropus; others toward the mountain Parnethus, and others other ways, as to each appeared hope of safety. The Bœotians, especially their horse, and those Locrians that came in after the enemy was already defeated, followed, killing them. But night surprising them, the multitude of them that fled was the easier saved. The next day those that were got to Oropus and Delium, went thence by sea to Athens, having left a garrison in Delium, which place, notwithstanding this defeat, they yet retained.

XCVII. The Bœotians, when they had erected their trophy, taken away their own dead, rifled those of the enemy, and left a guard upon the place, returned back to Tanagra, and there entered into consultation for an assault to be made upon Delium. Meanwhile a herald sent from the Athenians to require the bodies, met with a herald by the way, sent by the Bœotians, who turned him back, telling him he could get nothing done, till he himself was returned from the Athenians. This herald, when he came before the Athenians, delivered what the Bœotians had given him in charge; namely, that they had done unjustly in transgressing the universal law of the Grecians, being a constitution received by them all, that the invader of another's country shall abstain from all holy places in the same. That the Athenians had fortified Delium, and dwelt in it, and done whatsoever else men use to do in places profane, and had drawn that water to the common use, which was unlawful for themselves to have touched, save only to wash their hands for the sacrifice.¹ That therefore the Bœotians, both in the behalf of the god, and of themselves, invoking Apollo, and all the interested spirits,² did warn them to be gone, and to remove their stuff out of the temple.

XCVIII. After the herald had said this, the Athenians sent a herald of their own to the Bœotians; denying, that either they had done any wrong to the holy place already, or would willingly do any hurt to it hereafter. For neither did they at first enter into it to such intent, but to requite the greater injuries which had been done them. As for

¹ *Χέρων*. The water with which they washed their hands at purifications, (hence *χερσὶν ἰκτεσθαι*, to offer sacrifice,) and which it was deemed the

greatest sacrilege to employ for profane purposes.

² *Δαίμονες*.

the law which the Grecians have, it is no other, than that they which have the dominion of any territory, great or small, have ever the temples also, and besides the accustomed rites, may superinduce what other they can. For also the Bœotians, and most men else, all that having driven out another nation possess their territory, did at first invade the temples of others, and make them their own. That therefore, if they could win from them more of their land, they would keep it; and for the part they were now in, they were in it with a good will, and would not go out of it, as being their own. That for the water, they meddled with it on necessity, which was not to be ascribed to insolence, but to this, that fighting against the Bœotians that had invaded their territory first, they were forced to use it. For whatsoever is forced by war or danger, hath in reason, a kind of pardon even with the god himself. For the altars in cases of involuntary offences are a refuge; and they are said to violate laws, that are evil without constraint, not they that are a little bold upon occasion of distress. That the Bœotians themselves, who require restitution of the holy places, for a redemption of the dead, are more irreligious by far, than they, who rather than let their temples go, are content to go without that which were fit for them to receive.¹ And they bade him say plainly, that they would not depart out of the Bœotian territory, (for that they were not now in it, but in a territory which they had made their own by the spear;) and nevertheless required truce according to the ordinances of the country, for the fetching away of the dead.

XCIX. To this the Bœotians answered, that if the dead were in Bœotia, they should quit the ground, and take with them whatsoever was theirs. But if the dead were in their own territory, the Athenians themselves knew best what to do; for they thought, that though Oropia, wherein the dead lay, the battle being fought in the border,² by subjection belonged to the Athenians, yet they could not fetch them off by force; and for truce, that the Athenians might come safely on Athenian ground, they would give none, but conceived it was a handsome answer to say, that if they would quit the ground, they should obtain whatsoever they required. Which when the Athenian herald heard, he went his way without effect.

C. The Bœotians presently sent for darters and slingers from the towns on the Melian gulf, and with these, and two thousand men of arms of Corinth, and the Peloponnesian garrison that was put out of Nisæa, and the Megareans, all which arrived after the battle, they marched forthwith to Delium, and assaulted the wall; and when they had attempted the same many other ways, at length they brought to it an engine, wherewith they took it, made in this manner: having slit in two a great mast, they made hollow both the sides, and curiously set them together again in form of a pipe. At the end of it in chains they hung a caldron, and into the caldron from the end of the mast

¹ τὰ μὴ πρόποντα κομίζεσθαι, Bekker. τὰ πρόποντα, Duker; that they are much more impious who require them to give back the temples in payment for

their dead, than they who are unwilling to redeem what they ought not to redeem by temples.

² Between Attica and Bœotia.

they conveyed a snout of iron, having with iron also armed a great part of the rest of the wood. They carried it to the wall (being far off) in carts, to that part where it was most made up, with the matter of the vineyard, and with wood. And when it was close, they applied a pair of great bellows to the end next themselves, and blew. The blast passing narrowly through into the caldron, in which were coals of fire, brimstone, and pitch, raised an exceeding great flame, and set the wall on fire; so that no man being able to stand any longer on it, but abandoning the same, and betaking themselves to flight, the wall was by that means taken. Of the defendants some were slain, and two hundred taken prisoners. The rest of the number recovered their galleys, and got home.

CI. Delium thus taken on the seventeenth day after the battle, and the herald, who not long after was sent again about the fetching away of the dead, not knowing it, the Bœotians let him have them, and answered no more as they had formerly done. In the battle there died, Bœotians, few less than five hundred; Athenians, few less than a thousand, with Hippocrates, the general; but of light-armed soldiers, and such as carried the provisions of the army, a great number.¹

Not long after this battle, Demosthenes, who had been with his army at Siphæ, seeing the treason succeeded not, having aboard his galleys his army of Acarnanians and Agræans, and four hundred men of arms of Athens, landed in Sicyonia. But before all his galleys came to shore, the Sicyonians, who went out to defend their territory, put to flight such as were already landed, and chased them back to their galleys; having also slain some, and taken some alive. And when they had erected a trophy, they gave truce to the Athenians for the fetching away of their dead. About the time that these things passed at Delium, died Sitalces, king of the Odrysians, overcome in battle in an expedition against the Triballians. Seuthes, the son of Sparadocus, his nephew, succeeded him in the kingdom both of the Odrysians and of the rest of Thrace, as much as was before subject to Sitalces.²

CII. The same winter, Brasidas, with the confederates in Thrace, made war on Amphipolis, on the river Strymon, a colony of the Athenians. The place whereon the city now stands, Aristagoras,³ of Miletus, had formerly attempted to inhabit when he fled from king Darius, but was beaten away by the Edonians. Two and thirty years after this, the Athenians assayed the same, and sent thither ten thousand of their own city, and of others as many as would go. And these were destroyed all by the Thracians at Drabescus.⁴ And again, in the twenty-ninth year after, conducted by Agnon, the son of Nicias, the

¹ On this occasion the Athenians received a terrible blow. They ever after remained in dread of the Thebans.—Strabo relates, that Xenophon owed his life this day to Socrates; for, having fallen from his horse, and being trampled among the crowd, Socrates took him upon his shoulders, and carried

him to a place of safety. Athenæus, as is observed by Casaubon, has shewn that this could not be the case. (Athen. v. 15.) See *Mitford*, c. xvi. sect. 3.

² Book ii. 97, 101.

³ Herod. v. 11 and 24.

⁴ Book i. 100, Cimon, leader of the Athenians.

Athenians came, and having driven out the Edonians, became founders of this place, formerly called the Nine-ways.¹ This army lay then at Eion, a town of traffic by the sea side, subject to the Athenians, at the mouth of the Strymon; five and twenty furlongs from the city; Agnon named this city Amphipolis, because it was surrounded by the river Strymon, that runs on either side it. When he had taken it in, with a long wall from river to river, he put inhabitants into the place, being conspicuous round about, both to the sea and land.

CIII. Against this city marched Brasidas with his army, dislodging from Arnæ, in Chalcidæa. Being, about twilight, come as far as Aulon and Bromiscus, where the lake Bolbe enters the sea, he caused his army to sup, and then marched forward by night. The weather was foul, and it snowed a little, which also made him the rather march, as desiring that none of Amphipolis, but only the traitors, should be aware of his coming. For there were both Argilians that dwelt in the same city, (now Argilus is a colony of the Andrians) and others, that contrived this, induced thereto, some by Perdicas, and some by the Chalcidæans. But above all, the Argilians being of a city near it, and ever suspected by the Athenians, and secret enemies to the place, as soon as opportunity was offered, and Brasidas arrived (who had also long before dealt underhand with as many of them as dwelt in Amphipolis, to betray it) both received him into their own city, and revolting from the Athenians, brought the army forward the same night, as far as the bridge of the river.² The town stood not close to the river, nor was there a fort at the bridge then, as there is now, but they kept it only with a small guard of soldiers. Having easily forced this guard, both in respect of the treason, and of the weather, and of his own unexpected approach, he passed the bridge, and was presently master of whatsoever the Amphipolitans had, that dwelt without.

CIV. Having thus suddenly passed the bridge, and many of those without being slain, and some fled into the city, the Amphipolitans were in very great confusion at it, and the rather, because they were jealous one of another. And it is said that if Brasidas had not sent out his army to take booty, but had marched presently to the city, he had in all likelihood taken it then. But so it was, that he pitched there, and fell upon those without, and seeing nothing succeeded by those within, lay still on the place. But the faction contrary to the traitors, being superior in number, whereby the gates were not opened presently, both they and Eucles, the general, who was then there for the Athenians, to keep the town, sent to the other general, Thucydides, the son of Olorus, the writer of this history, who had charge in Thrace,³ and was now about Thasus, (which is an island, and a colony

¹ During the administration of Pericles, and according to Diodorus, only thirteen years before the campaign of Brasidas in Thrace. Diod. xii. 32.

² κατέστησαν τὸν στρατὸν πρὸ ἔω, Bekker. κατέστησαν τὸν στρατὸν πρόσω, Duker; revolting from the Athenians in

that night, they placed the army before morning at the bridge of the river.

³ ἐπὶ τὸν ἕτερον στρατηγὸν τῶν ἐπὶ Θράκης, Bekker. τὸν ἐπὶ Θράκης, Duker; sent unto the other general, who was general over affairs in Thrace.

of the Parians, distant from Amphipolis about half a day's sail,) requiring him to come and relieve them.¹ He hearing the news, went thither in all haste, with seven galleys which chanced to be with him at that time, his purpose principally being to prevent the yielding up of Amphipolis, but if he should fail of that, then to possess himself of Eion,² before Brasidas' coming.

CV. Brasidas in the mean time fearing the aid of the galleys, to come from Thasus, and having also been informed that Thucydides possessed mines of gold in the parts of Thrace thereabouts, and was thereby of ability amongst the principal men of the continent, hastened by all means to get Amphipolis, before he should arrive; lest otherwise at his coming, the commons of Amphipolis, expecting that he would levy confederates, both from the sea side, and in Thrace, and relieve them, should thereupon refuse to yield. And to that end, offered them a moderate composition, causing to be proclaimed, that whatsoever Amphipolitan or Athenian would, might continue to dwell there, and enjoy his own, with equal and like form of government. And that he that would not, should have five days' respite to be gone and carry away his goods.

CVI. When the commons heard this, their minds were turned; and the rather, because the Athenians amongst them were but few, and the most were a promiscuous multitude; and the kinsmen of those that were taken without, flocked together within, and in respect of their fear, they all thought the proclamation reasonable. The Athenians thought so, because they were willing to go out, as apprehending their own danger to be greater than that of the rest, and withal, not expecting aid in haste; and the rest of the multitude, as being thereby both delivered of the danger, and withal to retain their city, with the equal form of government. Insomuch that they who conspired with Brasidas, now openly justified the offer to be reasonable, and seeing the minds of the commons were now turned, and that they gave ear no more to the words of the Athenian general, they compounded, and on the conditions proclaimed, received him. Thus did these men deliver up the city, and Thucydides, with his galleys, arrived in the evening of the same day at Eion. Brasidas had already got Amphipolis, and wanted but a night of taking Eion also, for if these galleys had not come speedily to relieve it, by next morning it had been had.

CVII. After this, Thucydides assured Eion, so as it should be safe, both for the present, though Brasidas should assault it, and for the future; and took into it, such, as according to the proclamation made, came down from Amphipolis. Brasidas, with many boats, came suddenly down the river to Eion, and attempted to seize on the point of the ground lying out from the wall into the sea, and thereby to command the mouth of the river; he assayed also the same, at the same

¹ Thucydides imputes expressly no blame to his colleague; but the conduct of Eucles appears evidently to have been deficient either in judgment or in vigour, or rather in both. *Mitford*.

² τὴν Ἠϊόνα προκαταλαμβάνον, Bekker. προκαταλαβεῖν, Duker; otherwise being beforehand, in taking possession of Eion.

time by land, and was in both beaten off; but Amphipolis he furnished with all things necessary. Then revolted to him Myrcinus, a city of the Edonians, Pittacus, the king of the Edonians, being slain by the sons of Goaxis, and by Braure, his own wife; and not long after, Gapselus also, and CEsyme, colonies of the Thasians. Perdiccas also, after the taking of these places, came to him, and helped him in assuring the same.

CVIII. After Amphipolis was taken, the Athenians were brought into great fear, especially because it was a city that yielded them much profit, both in timber which is sent them for the building of galleys, and in revenue of money; and because also, though the Lacedæmonians had a passage open to come against their confederates, the Thessalians convoying them, as far as to Strymon, yet if they had not got that bridge, the river being upwards nothing but a vast fen, and towards Eion well guarded with their galleys, they could have gone no further, which now they thought they might easily do; and therefore feared lest their confederates should revolt. For Brasidas both shewed himself otherwise very moderate, and also gave out in speech, that he was sent forth to recover the liberty of Greece. And the cities, which were subject to the Athenians, hearing of the taking of Amphipolis, and what assurance he brought with him, and of his gentleness besides, were extremely desirous of innovation; and sent messengers privily to bid him draw near, every one striving who should first revolt. For they thought they might do it boldly, falsely estimating the power of the Athenians to be less than afterwards it appeared, and making a judgment of it according to blind wilfulness, rather than safe forecast. It being the fashion of men, what they wish to be true to admit, even upon an ungrounded hope, and what they wish not, with a magistral kind of arguing¹ to reject. Withal, because the Athenians had lately received a blow from the Bœotians, and because Brasidas had said, not as was the truth, but as served best to allure them, that when he was at Nisæa, the Athenians durst not fight with those forces of his alone, they grew confident thereon, and believed not that any man would come against them. But the greatest cause of all was, that for the delight they took at this time to innovate, and because they were to make trial of the Lacedæmonians, not till now angry, they were content by any means to put it to the hazard. Which being perceived, the Athenians sent garrison soldiers into those cities, as many as the shortness of the time, and the season of winter would permit, and he to Lacedæmon, to demand greater forces; and in the mean time prepared to build galleys on the Strymon. But the Lacedæmonians, partly through envy of the principal men, and partly, because they more affected the redemption of their men taken in the island,² and the ending of the war, refused to furnish him.

CIX. The same winter, the Megareans having recovered their long walls, held by the Athenians, rased them to the very ground, and Brasidas, after the taking of Amphipolis, having with him the confe-

¹ λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι.

Sphacteria.

derates, marched with his army into the territory called Acte. This is that prominent territory, which is disjoined from the continent by a ditch made by the king,¹ and Athos, a high mountain in the same, ends at the *Ægean* sea. Of its cities, one is Sane, a colony of the Andrians, by the side of the said ditch, on the part which looks to the sea towards Eubœa; the rest are Thyssus, Cleonæ, Acrothoi, Olophyxus, and Dion; these are inhabited by promiscuous barbarians of two languages;² some few there are also of the Chalcidæans, but the most are Pelasgic, of those Tyrrhene nations that once inhabited Athens, and Lemnos; and of the Bisaltic and Chrestonic nations, and Edonians; and dwell in small cities. The most of which yielded to Brasidas, but Sane and Dion held out; for which cause he staid with his army and wasted their territory.

CX. But seeing they would not hearken to him, he led his army presently against Torone of Chalcidæa, held by the Athenians. He was called in by the few, who were ready withal to deliver him the city, and arriving there a little before break of day, he sat down with his army at the temple of Castor and Pollux, distant about three furlongs from the city. So that by the rest of the city of the Toronæans, and to the Athenian garrison in it, his coming was unperceived. But the traitors knowing he was to come, some few of them, being also privily gone to him, attended his approach, and when they perceived he was come, they took in to them seven men, armed only with daggers, (for of twenty appointed at first to that service, seven only had the courage to go in, and were led by Lysistratus of Olynthus) who getting over the wall towards the main sea unseen, went up (for the town standeth on a hill's side) to the watch that kept the upper end of the town, and having slain [the watchmen] brake open the postern gate towards Canastræa.

CXI. Brasidas this while, with the rest of his army lay still, and then coming a little forward, sent one hundred targeteers before, who, when the gates should be opened, and sign agreed on be set up, should run in first. These men expecting long, and wondering at the matter, by little and little were at length come up close to the city. Those Toronæans within, who helped the men that entered to perform the enterprize, when the postern gate was broken open, and the gate leading to the market-place opened likewise, by cutting asunder the bar, went first and fetched some of them about to the postern, to the end that they might suddenly affright such of the town as knew not the matter, both behind and on either side; and then they put up the sign appointed, which was fire, and received the rest of the targeteers by the gate that leadeth to the market-place.

CXII. Brasidas, when he saw the sign, made his army rise, and with a huge cry of all at once, to the great terror of those within, entered the city running. Some went directly in by the gate, and some by certain squared timber trees, which lay at the wall, (which having been lately down, was now again in building,) for the drawing up of

¹ Xerxes when he invaded Greece.
Herod. vii. 21, &c.

² The Greek and their own barbarian.

stone. Brasidas therefore, with the greatest number, betook himself to the highest places of the city, to make sure the winning of it by possessing the places of advantage; but the rest of the rabble ran dispersed here and there, without difference.

CXIII. When the town was taken, the most of the Toronæans were much troubled, because they were not acquainted with the matter; but the conspirators, and such as were pleased with it, joined themselves presently to those that entered. The Athenians (of whom there were about fifty men of arms asleep in the market-place,) when they knew what had happened, fled all, except some few that were slain on the place, some by land, some by water in two galleys that kept watch there, and saved themselves in Lecythus, a fort which they themselves held, cut off from the rest of the city toward the sea, in a narrow isthmus. And thither also fled all such Toronæans as were affected to them.

CXIV. It being now day, and the city strongly possessed, Brasidas caused a proclamation to be made, that those Toronæans who were fled with the Athenians, might come back, as many as would, to their own, and inhabit there in security; to the Athenians he sent a herald, bidding them depart from Lecythus, under truce, with all that they had, as [a place] that belonged to the Chalcidæans. The Athenians refused to quit, but the truce they desired for one day, to take up the dead: and he granted two. In which he fortified the buildings near, as did the Athenians theirs. He also called an assembly of the Toronæans, and spake to them, as he had done before to the Acanthians, adding, "That there was no just cause, why either they that had practised to put the city into his hands, should be the worse thought of, or accounted traitors for it, (seeing that they did it with no intent to bring the city into servitude, nor were hired thereto with money, but for the benefit and liberty of the city,) or that they who were not made acquainted with it, should think that they themselves were not to reap as much good by it as the others; for he came not to destroy either city or man. But had therefore made that proclamation touching those that fled with the Athenians, because he thought them never the worse for that friendship, and made account when they had made trial of the Lacedæmonians, they would shew as much good will also to them, or rather more, as they would behave themselves with more equity; and that their present fear was only on want of trial. Withal, he wished them to prepare to be true confederates for the future, and from henceforward to look to have their faults imputed; for what was past he thought they had not done wrong, but suffered it rather from others that were too strong for them, and therefore were to be pardoned, if they had in aught been against him."

CXV. Having thus said, and put them again into heart, the truce being expired, he made divers assaults on Lecythus. The Athenians fought against them from the wall, though a bad one, and from such of the houses as had battlements. And for the first day they kept them off; but the next, when the enemies were to bring to the wall a great engine, out of which they intended to cast fire on their wooden

fences, and the army was now coming up to the place where they thought they might best apply the engine, and which was easiest to be assaulted, the Athenians having, on the top of the building, erected a turret of wood, and carried up many buckets of water, and many men being also gone up into it, the building, overcharged with weight fell suddenly to the ground, and with so huge a noise, that those who were near and saw it, were grieved more than afraid; but such as stood further off, especially the farthest of all, supposing the place in that part already taken, fled as fast as they could towards the sea, and went aboard their galleys.

CXVI. Brasidas, when he perceived the battlements abandoned, and saw what had happened, came on with his army, and presently got the fort, and slew all that he found within it. But the rest of the Athenians, who before abandoned the place, with their boats and galleys,¹ put themselves into Pallene. But Brasidas (for there is in Lecythus a temple of Minerva, and when about to give the assault, he had made proclamation, that whosoever first scaled the wall should have 30 minæ² of silver for a reward) conceiving the place was won by means not human, gave those 30 minæ to the goddess, for the use of the temple, and then pulling down Lecythus, built it anew, and consecrated the whole place to her. The rest of the winter he spent in assuring the places he had already got, and in contriving the conquest of more. Which winter ended, ended the eighth year of this war.

YEAR IX. A.C. 423. OLYMP. 89½.

CXVII. The Lacedæmonians and Athenians, in the spring of the following summer, presently made a cessation of arms for a year, having reputed with themselves, the Athenians, that Brasidas should by this means cause no more of their cities to revolt, but that by this leisure they might prepare to secure them; and that if this suspension pleased them, they might afterwards make some agreement for a longer time; the Lacedæmonians, that the Athenians fearing what they feared, would, on the taste of this intermission of their miseries and weary life, be the more willing to compound, and with the restitution of their men, to conclude a peace for a longer time. For they would fain have recovered their men, whilst Brasidas' good fortune continued, and whilst, if they could not recover them, they might yet (Brasidas prospering, and setting them equal with the Athenians) try it out on even terms, and get the victory.—Whereupon a suspension of arms was concluded, comprehending both themselves and their confederates, in these words:

CXVIII. "Concerning the temple and oracle of Apollo Pythius, "it seems good to us, that whosoever will, may without fraud, and "without fear, ask counsel thereat, according to the laws of his "country. The same also seems good to the Lacedæmonians and

¹ Τοῖς τε πλοίοις καὶ ταῖς ναυσὶ. Ships of burden were called πλοῖα to distinguish them from νῆες, which were properly ships of war. Thucydides distinguishes them, b. ii. c. 84.

² £96 15s.

“ their confederates here present, and they promise moreover to send
 “ ambassadors to the Bœotians and Phocæans, and to do their best
 “ to persuade them to the same. That concerning the treasure be-
 “ longing to the god, we shall take care to find out those that have
 “ offended therein, both we and you proceeding with right and equity,
 “ according to the laws of our several states. And that whosoever
 “ else will, may do the same, every one according to the law of his
 “ own country. If the Athenians will accord that each side shall
 “ keep within their own bounds, retaining what they now possess, the
 “ Lacedæmonians and the rest of the confederates,¹ touching the same,
 “ think good thus: That the Lacedæmonians in Coryphasium² stay
 “ within the mountains of Bouphras and Tomeus, and the Athenians
 “ in Cythera, without joining together in any league, either we with
 “ them, or they with us. That those in Nisæa and Minoa pass not
 “ the highway, which from the gate of Megara, near the temple of
 “ Nisus, leadeth to the temple of Neptune, and so straight forward to
 “ the bridge that lies over into Minoa. That the Megareans pass not
 “ the same high-way, nor into the island which the Athenians have
 “ taken; neither having commerce with other. That the Megareans
 “ keep what they now possess in Trœzene, and what they had before
 “ by agreement with the Athenians, and have free navigation both upon
 “ the coasts of their own territories and their confederates. That the
 “ Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall pass the seas, not in a
 “ long ship,³ but in any other boat rowed with oars, of burthen not ex-
 “ ceeding 500 talents.⁴ That the heralds and ambassadors that shall
 “ pass between both sides for the ending of the war, or for trials of
 “ judgment, may go and come without impeachment, with as many
 “ followers as they shall think good, both by sea and land. That
 “ during this time of truce, neither we nor you receive one another’s
 “ fugitives, free nor bond. That you to us, and we to you shall
 “ afford law according to the use of our several states, to the end our
 “ controversies may be decided judicially without war. This is
 “ thought good by the Lacedæmonians and their confederates. But
 “ if you shall conceive any other articles more fair, or of more equity
 “ than these, then shall you go and declare the same at Lacedæmon.
 “ For neither shall the Lacedæmonians, nor their confederates, refuse
 “ any thing that you shall make appear to be just. But let those that
 “ go, go with full authority, even as you do now require it of us. That
 “ this truce shall be for a year.”

The people decreed it. Acamantis was president of the assembly. Phænippus the scribe, Niciades overseer,⁵ and Laches pronounced these words: “ With good fortune to the people of Athens, a suspen-
 “ sion of arms is concluded, as the Lacedæmonians and their con-

¹ ἔδοξε Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ τοὺς συμμά-
 χους, Bekker. τοῖς ἄλλοις συμμάχοις,
 Duker; it seemeth fit to the Lacedæ-
 monians and their allies.

² In which stood the fort of Pylos.
 See b. iv. 3; v. 18.

³ Long ships were of use for the war,

and therefore here excluded; yet they
 had leave to use vessels that went with
 the oar, so that they were of another
 form.

⁴ Twenty-five tons.

⁵ See note, ch. xxxi. b. i.

“federates have agreed; and they consented before the people, that the suspension should continue for a year, beginning that same day, being the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion.¹ In which time the ambassadors and heralds going from one side to the other, should treat about a final end of the wars. And that the commanders of the army, and the presidents of the city calling an assembly, the Athenians should hold a council touching the manner of embassy, for ending of the war first. And the ambassadors there present should now immediately swear this truce for a year.”

CXIX. The same articles the Lacedæmonians propounded, and the confederates agreed to, with the Athenians and their confederates, on the twelfth day of the Lacedæmonian month Gerastion. There agreed to these articles and sacrificed,² of the Lacedæmonians, Taurus, the son of Echetimides, Athenæus, the son of Pericleides, and Philocharidas, the son of Eryxidaides. Of the Corinthians, Æneas, the son of Ocytes, and Euphamidas, the son of Aristonymus. Of the Sicyonians, Damotimus, the son of Naucrates, and Onasimus, the son of Megacles. Of the Megareans, Nicasus, the son of Cecalus, and Menecrates, the son of Amphidorus. Of the Epidaurians, Amphias, the son of Eupaïdas. Of the Athenians, the generals themselves, Nicostratus, the son of Diotrophes, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Autocles, the son of Tolmæus. This was the truce, and during it they were continually in treaty about a longer peace.

CXX. About the same time, whilst they were going to and fro, Scione, a city in Pallene, revolted from the Athenians to Brasidas. The Scionæans say that they be Pellenians, from Peloponnesus, and that their ancestors passing the seas from Troy, were driven in by a tempest, which tossed the Achæans up and down, and planted themselves in the place they now dwell in. Brasidas, on their revolt, went over to Scione by night, and though he had a galley with him that went before, yet he himself followed aloof in a light-horseman,³ for this reason, if his light-horseman should be assaulted by some greater vessel, the galley would defend it; but if he met with a galley equal to his own, he made account that such a one would not assault his boat, but rather, the galley, whereby he might in the mean time go through in safety. When he was over, and had called the Scionæans to assemble, he said the same thing as at Acanthus and Torone, adding, that they were most worthy to be commended, in as much as Pallene in the Isthmus being cut off by the Athenians possessing Potidæa, and being no other than islanders, they yet of their own accord came forth to meet their liberty, and staid not through cowardice, till they must of necessity have been compelled to their own manifest good; an argument that they would valiantly undergo any other great matter to have their state ordered to their minds; and that he would verily hold them the most faithful friends to the Lacedæmonians, and also otherwise do them honour.

¹ February.

² Ἐσπένδοντο, they offered sacrifices at the making of all leagues or agree-

ments between different states.

³ Ἐν κελήρῳ. See note, ch. ix. b. iv.

CXXI. The Scionæans were elated with these words, and now every one alike encouraged, as well they that liked not what was done, as they that liked it, entertained a purpose stoutly to undergo the war, and received Brasidas both otherwise honourably, and crowned him with a crown of gold, in the name of the city, as the deliverer of Greece. And private persons honoured him with garlands, and came to him, as they used to do to a champion that hath won a prize. But he leaving there a small garrison for the present, came back, and not long after carried over a greater army, with design, by the help of those of Scione, to make an attempt upon Menda and Potidæa, thinking the Athenians would send succours to the place, as to an island, and desiring to prevent them: withal he had in hand a practice with some within to have those cities betrayed. So he attended ready to undertake that enterprize.

CXXII. But in the mean time there came to him in a galley, Aristonymus for the Athenians, and Athenæus for the Lacedæmonians, that carried about the news of the truce. Whereupon he sent away his army again to Torone, and these men related to Brasidas the articles of the agreement. The confederates of the Lacedæmonians in Thrace approved of what was done, and Aristonymus had in all other things satisfaction; but for the Scionæans, whose revolt by computation of the days, he had found to be after the making of the truce, he denied that they were comprehended therein. Brasidas said much in contradiction of this, and that the city revolted before the truce, and refused to render it. But when Aristonymus had sent to Athens to inform them of the matter, the Athenians were ready presently to have sent an army against Scione. The Lacedæmonians in the mean time sent ambassadors to the Athenians to tell them, that they could not send an army against it without breach of the truce; and on Brasidas' word, challenged the city to belong to them, offering themselves to the decision of the law. But the Athenians would by no means put the matter to judgment; but meant, with all the speed they could make, to send an army against it; being angry at the heart that it should come to this pass, that even islanders durst revolt, and trust to the unprofitable help of the strength of the Lacedæmonians by land. Besides touching the time of the revolt, the Athenians had more truth on their side than themselves alleged. For the revolt of the Scionæans was after the truce two days. Whereupon, by the advice of Cleon, they made a decree to take them by force, and to put them all to the sword. And forbearing war in all places else, they prepared themselves only for that.

CXXIII. Meanwhile revolted also Menda¹ in Pallene, a colony of the Eretrians. These also Brasidas received into protection, holding it for no wrong, because they came in openly in time of truce; and somewhat there was also, which he charged the Athenians with, about breach of the truce. For which cause the Mendæans had also been the bolder, as sure of the intention of Brasidas,² which they might guess at by Scione, in as much as he could not be got to deliver

¹ See Herod. vii.

² Sure he would not reject them.

it, and withal, the few were they which had practised the revolt, who being once about it, would by no means give it over, but fearing lest they should be discovered, forced the multitude contrary to their own inclinations to the same. The Athenians being hereof presently advertised, and much more angry now than before, made preparation to war upon both, and Brasidas expecting that they would send a fleet against them, received the women and children of the Scionæans and Mendæans into Olynthus in Chalcidæa, and sent over thither five hundred Peloponnesian men of arms, and three hundred Chalcidæan targeteers, and for commander of them all, Polydamidas. And those that were left in Scione and Menda, joined in the administration of their affairs, as expecting to have the Athenian fleet immediately with them.

CXXIV. Meanwhile Brasidas and Perdiccas, with joint forces, march into Lyncus against Arrhibæus the second time. Perdiccas led with him the power of his Macedonian subjects, and such Grecian men of arms as dwelt among them. Brasidas, besides the Peloponnesians that were left him, led with him the Chalcidæans, Acantiæans, and the rest according to the forces they could severally make. The whole number of the Grecian men of arms was about three thousand. The horsemen, both Macedonians and Chalcidæans, somewhat less than one thousand, but the other rabble of Barbarians was great. Being entered the territory of Arrhibæus, and finding the Lyncestæans encamped in the field, they also sat down opposite to their camp. And the foot of each side, being lodged upon a hill, and a plain lying betwixt them both, the horsemen ran down into the same, and a skirmish followed, first between the horse only of them both; but afterwards the men of arms of the Lyncestæans coming down to aid their horse from the hill, and offering battle first, Brasidas and Perdiccas drew down their army likewise, and charging, put the Lyncestæans to flight, many of whom being slain, the rest retired to the hill top, and lay still. After this they erected a trophy, and staid two or three days expecting the Illyrians, who were coming to Perdiccas upon hire, and Perdiccas meant afterwards to have gone on against the villages of Arrhibæus one after another, and to have sat still there no longer. But Brasidas having his thoughts on Menda, lest, if the Athenians came thither before his return, it should receive some blow; seeing withal that the Illyrians came not, had no liking to do so, but rather to retire.

CXXV. Whilst they thus varied, word was brought that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas, and joined themselves with Arrhibæus; so that now by them both it was thought good to retire, for fear of these who were a warlike people, but yet for the time when to march, there was nothing concluded by reason of their variance. The next night the Macedonians, and multitude of Barbarians, as it is usual with great armies to be terrified upon causes unknown, being suddenly affrighted, and supposing them to be many more in number than they were, and even now upon them, betook themselves to present flight, and went home. And Perdiccas, who at first knew not of it, they constrained when he knew, before he had spoken with Brasidas, (their

camps being far asunder) to be gone also. Brasidas betimes in the morning, when he understood that the Macedonians were gone away without him, and that the Illyrians and Arrhibæans were coming upon him, putting his men of arms into a square, and receiving the multitude of his light-armed into the midst, intended to retire likewise. The youngest men of his soldiers he appointed to run out upon the enemy, when they charged the army any where with shot; and he himself with three hundred chosen men, marching in the rear, intended as he retired, to sustain the foremost of the enemy fighting, if they came close up. But before the enemy approached, he encouraged his soldiers, as the shortness of the time gave him leave, with words to this effect:—

Oration of Brasidas to his Soldiers.

CXXVI. “ Men of Peloponnesus, if I did not mistrust, in respect
 “ you are thus abandoned by the Macedonians, and that the Barbarians who come upon you, are many, that you were afraid, I
 “ should not at this time instruct you, and encourage you as I do.
 “ But now against this desertion of your companions, and the multitude of your enemies, I will endeavour with a short instruction and
 “ hortative, to give you encouragement to the full. For, to be good
 “ soldiers, is to you natural, not by the presence of any confederates,
 “ but by your own valour; and not to fear others for number, seeing you are not come from a city where the many bear rule over the
 “ few, but the few over many, and have got this for power by no other
 “ means than by overcoming in fight. And as to these Barbarians,
 “ whom through ignorance you fear, you may take notice both by the
 “ former battles fought against them with the Macedonians, and also
 “ by what I myself conjecture, and have heard by others, that they
 “ have no great danger in them. For when any enemy makes shew
 “ of strength, being indeed weak, the truth once known, rather serves
 “ to embolden the other side; whereas against such as have valour
 “ indeed, a man will be the boldest, when he knows the least. These
 “ men here, to such as have not tried them, do indeed make terrible
 “ offers; for the sight of their number is fearful; the greatness of their
 “ cry, intolerable; and the vain shaking of their weapons on high, is
 “ not without signification of menacing. But they are not answerable
 “ to this when with such as stand them, they come to blows. For
 “ fighting without order, they will quit the place without shame, if
 “ they be once pressed, and seeing it is with them honourable alike
 “ to fight, or run away, their valours are never called in question.
 “ And a battle wherein every one may do as he list, affords them a
 “ more handsome excuse to save themselves. But they trust rather
 “ in their standing out of danger, and terrifying us afar off, than in
 “ coming to hands with us, else they would rather have taken that
 “ course than this. And you see manifestly, that all that was before
 “ terrible in them, is in effect little, and serves only to urge you to be
 “ going, with their shew and noise. Which if you sustain at their first
 “ coming on, and again withdraw yourselves still, as you shall have
 “ leisure, in your order and places, you shall not only come the sooner

“ to a place of safety, but shall learn also against hereafter, that such a rabble as this, to men prepared to endure their first charge, do but make a flourish of valour, with threats from afar, before the battle; but to such as give them ground, they are eager enough to seem courageous, where they may do it safely.”

CXXVII. When Brasidas had made his exhortation he led away his army. And the Barbarians seeing it, pressed after them with great cries and tumult, as supposing he fled. But seeing that those who were appointed to run out upon them, did so, and met them, which way soever they came on; and that Brasidas himself with his chosen band sustained them where they charged close, and endured the first brunt, beyond their expectation, and seeing also that afterwards continually when they charged, the other received them and fought, and when they ceased, the other retired, then at length the greatest part of the Barbarians forbore the Grecians, that with Brasidas were in the open field, and leaving a part to follow them with shot, the rest ran with all speed after the Macedonians who were fled, of whom, as many as they overtook, they slew; and withal, prepossessed the passage, which is a narrow one between two hills, giving entrance into the country of Arrhibæus, knowing that there was no other passage, by which Brasidas could get away. And when he was come to the very strait, they were going about him, to have cut him off.

CXXVIII. He, when he saw this, commanded the three hundred that were with him, to run every man as fast as he could to one of the tops, which of them they could easiest get up to, and try if they could drive down those Barbarians that were now going up to the same, before any greater number was above to hem them in. These accordingly fought with and overcame the Barbarians upon the hill, and thereby the rest of the army marched more easily to the top. For this beating them from the vantage of the hill, made the Barbarians also afraid, so that they followed them no further, conceiving withal, that they were now at the confines, and already escaped through. Brasidas, having now got the hills, and marching with more safety, came first the same day to Arnissa,¹ of the dominion of Perdiccas. And the soldiers of themselves being angry with the Macedonians, for leaving them behind, whatsoever teams of oxen, or fardles fallen from any man, (as was likely to happen in a retreat, made in fear, and in the night,) they lighted on by the way, the oxen they cut in pieces, and took the fardles to themselves. And from this time Perdiccas first esteemed Brasidas as his enemy, and afterwards hated the Peloponnesians, not with ordinary hatred for the Athenians' sake; but being utterly fallen out with him, about his own particular interest, sought means as soon as he could to compound with these, and to be dis-leagued from the other.

CXXIX. Brasidas, at his return out of Macedonia to Torone, found that the Athenians had already taken Menda, and therefore staying there, for he thought it impossible to pass over into Pallene.

¹ A town situated on the river Erigon.

“federates have agreed; and they consented before the people, that the suspension should continue for a year, beginning that same day, being the fourteenth of the month Elaphebolion.¹ In which time the ambassadors and heralds going from one side to the other, should treat about a final end of the wars. And that the commanders of the army, and the presidents of the city calling an assembly, the Athenians should hold a council touching the manner of embassy, for ending of the war first. And the ambassadors there present should now immediately swear this truce for a year.”

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¹ February.

² ἑσπίνδοντο, they offered sacrifices at the making of all leagues or agree-

ments between different states.

³ Ἐν κελήρῳ. See note, ch. ix. b. iv.

CXXXIV. The winter following, nothing was done between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, because of the truce; but the Mantineans, and the Tegeatæ, with the confederates of both, fought a battle at Laodicea, in the territory of Oresthis,¹ wherein the victory was doubtful, for either side put to flight one wing of their enemies, both sides set up trophies, and both sides sent off their spoils to Delphi. Nevertheless, after many slain on either side, and equal battle, which ended by the coming of night, the Tegeatæ lodged all night in the place, and erected their trophy then presently, whereas the Mantineans turned to Bucolion, and set up their trophy afterwards.

CXXXV. The same winter ending, and the spring now approaching, Brasidas made an attempt on Potidæa; for coming by night, he applied his ladders, and was thitherto undiscerned. He took the time to apply his ladders, when the bell passed by, and before he that carried it to the next returned.² Nevertheless, being discovered, he scaled not the wall, but presently again withdrew his army with speed, not staying till it was day. So ended this winter, and the ninth year of this war written by Thucydides.

¹ Oresthis, according to Bekker, commonly Orestis. See Livy, xxxi. and Strabo, vii.

² The officers regularly went their rounds to see that all the centinels were at their posts. When they approached any of them, a little bell was rung, to which the centinel was to an-

swer, in proof that he was at his post, and awake. The interval between the rounds was so considerable, and the vigilance of the centinel, as the bell was just gone by, might be so relaxed, that Brasidas hoped he might execute his scheme. *Smith.*

THUCYDIDES.

BOOK V.

Nearly six years more of the war. Truce of the former year ended. Cleon wars on the Chalcidic cities, and recovers Torone. Phæax sent by the Athenians to move a war amongst the Sicilians. Cleon and Brasidas, who were the principal maintainers of the war, both slain at Amphipolis. Presently after their death a peace concluded, after that a league between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians. Divers of the Lacedæmonian confederates discontented thereat, seek the confederacy of the Argives. These make league, first with the Corinthians, Eleans, and Mantineans, then with the Lacedæmonians; and then again (by the artifice of Alcibiades) with the Athenians. After this the Argives make war on the Epidaurians; and the Lacedæmonians on the Argives. The Athenian captains and the Melians treat by way of dialogue, touching the yielding of Melos, which the Athenians afterwards besiege and win.

YEAR X. A. C. 422. OLYMP. 89- $\frac{1}{2}$.

CHAP. I.

THE summer following, the truce for a year, which was to last till the Pythian holidays,¹ expired; during the truce, the Athenians removed the Delians from Delos, because though they were consecrated, yet for a certain crime committed of old, they esteemed them polluted; because also they thought there wanted this part to make perfect the purgation of the island; in the purging whereof, as I declared before,² they thought they did well to take up the sepulchres of the dead. These Delians seated themselves afterwards, every one as he came, in Atramyttium³ in Asia, [a town] given them by Pharnaces.⁴

II. After the truce, Cleon⁵ prevailed with the Athenians to be sent out with a fleet against the cities lying upon Thrace, having with him of Athenians twelve hundred men of arms, and three hundred horsemen; of confederates more, and thirty galleys. And first arriving at Scione, which was yet besieged, he took aboard some men of arms,

¹ Exercises dedicated to Apollo, and celebrated at Delphi, about the 12th of the month Elaphobelium, as may be gathered by the beginning of the truce on that day.

² B. iii. 104.

³ See b. viii. 108.

⁴ οὐτως ἱεραὸς ὄρητο, Bekker.—ὡς ἱεραὸς ὄρητο, Duker. And the Delians inhabited Atramyttium, in Asia, (Pharnaces having given it to them,) so

each was inclined.

⁵ After the affair at Pylos, when in the height of popularity, Cleon's conduct was held up to public ridicule by Aristophanes, in the comedy of the Knights, in which he was much reviled. The effect produced on the minds of the people was extraordinary. He was accused of misapplying the public money, and condemned to pay a fine of five talents. See Aristoph. Acharn. v. 6. and Nub. v. 549.

of those that kept the siege, and sailed to the haven of the Colophonians, not far distant from the city of Torone. And there having heard by fugitives, that Brasidas was not in Torone, nor those within sufficient to give him battle, he marched with his army to the city, and sent ten galleys about into the haven.¹ And first he came to the new wall, which Brasidas had raised about the city to take in the suburbs, making a breach in the old wall, that the whole might be one city.

III. And Pasitelidas, the Lacedæmonian commandant, with the garrison there present, came to the defence, and fought with the Athenians that assaulted it. But being oppressed, (and the galleys which were before sent about, being by this time come into the haven) Pasitelidas was afraid lest those galleys should take the town unfurnished of defendants before he could get back, and that the Athenians on the other side should win the wall, and he be intercepted between them both; and thereupon abandoned the wall, and ran back to the city. But the Athenians in the galleys having taken the town before he came, and the land army following in after him without resistance, and entering the city by the breach of the old wall, slew some of the Peloponnesians and Toronæans on the place, and some others, amongst whom was the commandant Pasitelidas, they took alive. Brasidas was now coming with aid towards Torone, but advertised by the way that it was already lost, went back again, being about forty furlongs short of preventing it. Cleon and the Athenians erected two trophies, one at the haven, another at the wall, and made slaves of the women and children of the Toronæans, but the men, and the Peloponnesians, and such Chalcidæans as were amongst them, in all about seven hundred, they sent prisoners to Athens; and the Peloponnesians were afterwards at the making of the peace dismissed, the rest were redeemed by the Olynthians, by exchange of man for man. About the same time the Boeotians took Panactum, a fort of the Athenians, standing in their confines, by treason; and Cleon, having settled the garrison in Torone, went thence by sea about mount Athos, to make war against Amphipolis.

IV. About the same time, Phæax, the son of Erasistratus, who with two others was sent ambassador to Italy and Sicily, departed from Athens with two galleys. For the Leontines, after the Athenians, on the making of the peace, were gone out of Sicily, received many strangers into the freedom of their city, and the commons had a purpose also to have made division of the land. But the great men perceiving it, called in the Syracusians, and drove the commons out; and they wandered up and down every one as he chanced; and the great men, on conditions agreed on with the Syracusians, abandoning and deserting that city, went to dwell with the privilege of free citizens in Syracuse. After this again, some of them relinquished Syracuse on dislike, and seized on Phocææ, a certain place of the city of the Leontines, and on Bricinnæ, a castle in Leontina; thither also came to them most of the commons that had before been driven out,

¹ Of Torone.

and settling themselves, made war from those places of strength. On intelligence hereof, the Athenians sent Phæax thither to persuade their confederates there, and, if they could, all the Sicilians jointly, to make war on the Syracusians that were now beginning to grow great, to try if they might thereby preserve the common people of the Leontines. Phæax arriving, prevailed with the Camarinæans and the Agrigentines; but the business finding a stop at Gela, he went to no more, conceiving he should not be able to persuade them. So he returned through the cities of the Siculi to Catana, having been at Bricinnæ by the way, and there encouraged them to hold out; and from Catana he set sail, and departed.

V. In his voyage to Sicily, both going and coming, he dealt as he went by with sundry cities also of Italy, to enter into friendship with the Athenians, and also lighted on those Locrians, who having dwelt once in Messina, were afterwards driven out again; being the same who after the peace in Sicily, on a sedition in Messina, wherein one of the factions called in the Locrians, had been then sent to inhabit there, and now were sent away again, for the Locrians held Messina for a time. Phæax therefore chancing to meet with these as they were going to their own city, did them no hurt; for the Locrians had been in speech with him about an agreement with the Athenians. For when the Sicilians made a general peace, these only of the confederates refused to make peace with the Athenians; nor indeed would they have done it now, but that they were constrained by their war with the Itonæans and Melæans, their own colonies and borderers. And Phæax after this returned to Athens.

VI. Cleon, who was now gone from Torone, and come about to Amphipolis, making Eion the seat of the war, assaulted Stagirus, a colony of the Andrians,¹ but could not take it; but Galepsus, a colony of the Thasians, he took by assault. And having sent ambassadors to Perdiccas to will him to come to him with his forces, according to the league, and other ambassadors into Thrace to Polles, king of the Odomantians, to take up as many mercenary Thracians as he could, he lay still in Eion, expecting their coming. Brasidas, on notice hereof, sat down over against him at Cerdylum; this is a place belonging to the Argilians, standing high, and beyond the river, not far from Amphipolis, and from whence he might discern all that was about him, so that Cleon could not but be seen, if he should rise with his army to go against Amphipolis; which he expected he would do, and that in contempt of his small number, would go up with the forces he had then present. Withal he furnished himself with fifteen hundred mercenary Thracians, and took to him all his Edonians, both horsemen and targeteers; he had also of Myrcinians and Chalcidæans, one thousand targeteers, besides them in Amphipolis. But for men of arms, his whole number was at the most two thousand, and of Grecian horsemen three hundred. With fifteen hundred of these came Brasidas, and sat down at Cerdylum; the rest stood ready ordered with Clearidas their captain within Amphipolis.

¹ B. iv. 88.

CXXI. The Scionæans were elated with these words, and now every one alike encouraged, as well they that liked not what was done, as they that liked it, entertained a purpose stoutly to undergo the war, and received Brasidas both otherwise honourably, and crowned him with a crown of gold, in the name of the city, as the deliverer of Greece. And private persons honoured him with garlands, and came to him, as they used to do to a champion that hath won a prize. But he leaving there a small garrison for the present, came back, and not long after carried over a greater army, with design, by the help of those of Scione, to make an attempt upon Menda and Potidæa, thinking the Athenians would send succours to the place, as to an island, and desiring to prevent them: withal he had in hand a practice with some within to have those cities betrayed. So he attended ready to undertake that enterprize.

CXXII. But in the mean time there came to him in a galley, Aristonymus for the Athenians, and Athenæus for the Lacedæmonians, that carried about the news of the truce. Whereupon he sent away his army again to Torone, and these men related to Brasidas the articles of the agreement. The confederates of the Lacedæmonians in Thrace approved of what was done, and Aristonymus had in all other things satisfaction; but for the Scionæans, whose revolt by computation of the days, he had found to be after the making of the truce, he denied that they were comprehended therein. Brasidas said much in contradiction of this, and that the city revolted before the truce, and refused to render it. But when Aristonymus had sent to Athens to inform them of the matter, the Athenians were ready presently to have sent an army against Scione. The Lacedæmonians in the mean time sent ambassadors to the Athenians to tell them, that they could not send an army against it without breach of the truce; and on Brasidas' word, challenged the city to belong to them, offering themselves to the decision of the law. But the Athenians would by no means put the matter to judgment; but meant, with all the speed they could make, to send an army against it; being angry at the heart that it should come to this pass, that even islanders durst revolt, and trust to the unprofitable help of the strength of the Lacedæmonians by land. Besides touching the time of the revolt, the Athenians had more truth on their side than themselves alleged. For the revolt of the Scionæans was after the truce two days. Whereupon, by the advice of Cleon, they made a decree to take them by force, and to put them all to the sword. And forbearing war in all places else, they prepared themselves only for that.

CXXIII. Meanwhile revolted also Menda¹ in Pallene, a colony of the Eretrians. These also Brasidas received into protection, holding it for no wrong, because they came in openly in time of truce; and somewhat there was also, which he charged the Athenians with, about breach of the truce. For which cause the Mendæans had also been the bolder, as sure of the intention of Brasidas,² which they might guess at by Scione, in as much as he could not be got to deliver

¹ See Herod. vii.

² Sure he would not reject them.

it, and withal, the few were they which had practised the revolt, who being once about it, would by no means give it over, but fearing lest they should be discovered, forced the multitude contrary to their own inclinations to the same. The Athenians being hereof presently advertised, and much more angry now than before, made preparation to war upon both, and Brasidas expecting that they would send a fleet against them, received the women and children of the Scionæans and Mendæans into Olynthus in Chalcidæa, and sent over thither five hundred Peloponnesian men of arms, and three hundred Chalcidæan targeteers, and for commander of them all, Polydamidas. And those that were left in Scione and Menda, joined in the administration of their affairs, as expecting to have the Athenian fleet immediately with them.

CXXIV. Meanwhile Brasidas and Perdiccas, with joint forces, march into Lyncus against Arrhibæus the second time. Perdiccas led with him the power of his Macedonian subjects, and such Grecian men of arms as dwelt among them. Brasidas, besides the Peloponnesians that were left him, led with him the Chalcidæans, Acantiæans, and the rest according to the forces they could severally make. The whole number of the Grecian men of arms was about three thousand. The horsemen, both Macedonians and Chalcidæans, somewhat less than one thousand, but the other rabble of Barbarians was great. Being entered the territory of Arrhibæus, and finding the Lyncestæans encamped in the field, they also sat down opposite to their camp. And the foot of each side, being lodged upon a hill, and a plain lying betwixt them both, the horsemen ran down into the same, and a skirmish followed, first between the horse only of them both; but afterwards the men of arms of the Lyncestæans coming down to aid their horse from the hill, and offering battle first, Brasidas and Perdiccas drew down their army likewise, and charging, put the Lyncestæans to flight, many of whom being slain, the rest retired to the hill top, and lay still. After this they erected a trophy, and staid two or three days expecting the Illyrians, who were coming to Perdiccas upon hire, and Perdiccas meant afterwards to have gone on against the villages of Arrhibæus one after another, and to have sat still there no longer. But Brasidas having his thoughts on Menda, lest, if the Athenians came thither before his return, it should receive some blow; seeing withal that the Illyrians came not, had no liking to do so, but rather to retire.

CXXV. Whilst they thus varied, word was brought that the Illyrians had betrayed Perdiccas, and joined themselves with Arrhibæus; so that now by them both it was thought good to retire, for fear of these who were a warlike people, but yet for the time when to march, there was nothing concluded by reason of their variance. The next night the Macedonians, and multitude of Barbarians, as it is usual with great armies to be terrified upon causes unknown, being suddenly affrighted, and supposing them to be many more in number than they were, and even now upon them, betook themselves to present flight, and went home. And Perdiccas, who at first knew not of it, they constrained when he knew, before he had spoken with Brasidas, (their

same time, having spied his opportunity, and that the army of the Athenians removed, said to those about him, and the rest, "These men stay not for us, it is apparent by the wagging of their spears, and of their heads, for where such motion is they use not to stay for the charge of the enemy; therefore open me somebody the gates appointed, and let us boldly and speedily sally forth upon them." Then he went out himself at the gate towards the trench, and which was the first gate of the long wall, which then was standing, and at high speed took the straight way, in which, as one passeth by the strongest part of the town, there standeth now a trophy. And charging upon the midst of the Athenian army, which was terrified both with their own disarray, and the valour of the men, forced them to fly. And Clearidas (as was appointed) having issued out by the Thracian gates, was withal coming upon them. And it fell out that the Athenians by this unexpected and sudden attempt, were on both sides in confusion; and the left wing, which was next to Eion, and which indeed was marching away before, was immediately broken off from the rest of the army, and fled. When that was gone, Brasidas coming up to the right wing, was there wounded; and the Athenians saw not when he fell, and they that were near took him up and carried him off. The right wing stood longer to it, and though Cleon himself presently fled, (as at first he intended not to stay,) and was intercepted by a Myrcinian targeteer, and slain, yet his men of arms casting themselves into a circle on the top of a little hill, twice or thrice resisted the charge of Clearidas, and shrunk not at all, till begirt with the Myrcinian and Chalcidæan horse, and with the targeteers, they were put to flight by their darts. Thus the whole army of the Athenians getting away with much ado over the hills, and by several ways; all that were not slain upon the place, or by the Chalcidæan horse and targeteers, recovered Eion. The other side taking up Brasidas out of the battle, and having so long kept him alive, brought him yet breathing into the city. And he knew that his side had got the victory, but expired shortly after.¹ When Clearidas, with the rest of the army, were returned from pursuit of the enemy, they rifled those that were slain, and erected a trophy.

XI. After this the confederates following the corpse of Brasidas, all of them in their arms, buried him in the city at the public charge, in the entrance of that which is now the market-place.² And the Amphipolitans afterwards having taken in his monument with a wall, sacrificed to him as to a hero, honoured him with games and anniversary sacrifice, and attributed their colony to him as founder; pulling down the edifices of Agaon,³ and defacing whatever monument might maintain the memory of his foundation, esteeming Brasidas their preserver, and also at this time, through fear of the Athenians, courting

¹ When the first embassy came from the Grecians in Thrace to Sparta, after the death of Brasidas, (which embassy is mentioned by Thucydides, v. 21,) the ambassadors told Argæleonis, his mother, that Brasidas had not left his equal behind him. "Strangers," answered she,

"you mistake—my son was a man of great merit, but there are many superior to him in Sparta."—Diod. xii. 72.

² There was a cenotaph to his memory erected at Sparta.—See Pausan.

³ Who was their true founder.

“ to a place of safety, but shall learn also against hereafter, that such a rabble as this, to men prepared to endure their first charge, do but make a flourish of valour, with threats from afar, before the battle; but to such as give them ground, they are eager enough to seem courageous, where they may do it safely.”

CXXVII. When Brasidas had made his exhortation he led away his army. And the Barbarians seeing it, pressed after them with great cries and tumult, as supposing he fled. But seeing that those who were appointed to run out upon them, did so, and met them, which way soever they came on; and that Brasidas himself with his chosen band sustained them where they charged close, and endured the first brunt, beyond their expectation, and seeing also that afterwards continually when they charged, the other received them and fought, and when they ceased, the other retired, then at length the greatest part of the Barbarians forbore the Grecians, that with Brasidas were in the open field, and leaving a part to follow them with shot, the rest ran with all speed after the Macedonians who were fled, of whom, as many as they overtook, they slew; and withal, prepossessed the passage, which is a narrow one between two hills, giving entrance into the country of Arrhibæus, knowing that there was no other passage, by which Brasidas could get away. And when he was come to the very strait, they were going about him, to have cut him off.

CXXVIII. He, when he saw this, commanded the three hundred that were with him, to run every man as fast as he could to one of the tops, which of them they could easiest get up to, and try if they could drive down those Barbarians that were now going up to the same, before any greater number was above to hem them in. These accordingly fought with and overcame the Barbarians upon the hill, and thereby the rest of the army marched more easily to the top. For this beating them from the vantage of the hill, made the Barbarians also afraid, so that they followed them no further, conceiving withal, that they were now at the confines, and already escaped through. Brasidas, having now got the hills, and marching with more safety, came first the same day to Arnissa,¹ of the dominion of Perdiccas. And the soldiers of themselves being angry with the Macedonians, for leaving them behind, whatsoever teams of oxen, or fardles fallen from any man, (as was likely to happen in a retreat, made in fear, and in the night,) they lighted on by the way, the oxen they cut in pieces, and took the fardles to themselves. And from this time Perdiccas first esteemed Brasidas as his enemy, and afterwards hated the Peloponnesians, not with ordinary hatred for the Athenians' sake; but being utterly fallen out with him, about his own particular interest, sought means as soon as he could to compound with these, and to be dis-leagued from the other.

CXXIX. Brasidas, at his return out of Macedonia to Torone, found that the Athenians had already taken Menda, and therefore staying there, for he thought it impossible to pass over into Pallene.

¹ A town situated on the river Erigon.

of expiring, and the Argives would not renew it, without restitution made them of Cynuria; so that to war against the Argives and the Athenians both at once, seemed impossible. They suspected also that some of the cities of Peloponnesus would revolt to the Argives, as indeed it came afterwards to pass.

XV. These things considered, it was by both parties thought good to conclude a peace; but especially by the Lacedæmonians, for the desire they had to recover their men taken in the island; for the Spartans that were amongst them, were both of the prime men of the city, and their kinsmen; and therefore they began to treat presently after they were taken; but the Athenians, by reason of their prosperity, would not lay down the war at that time on equal terms. But after their defeat at Delium, the Lacedæmonians knowing they would be apter now to accept it, made that truce for a year, during which they were to meet and consult about a longer time.

XVI. But when also this other overthrow happened to the Athenians at Amphipolis, and both Cleon and Brasidas were slain, who on either side were most adverse to the peace; the one, because he had good success and honour in the war; the other, because in quiet times his evil actions would more appear, and his calumniation be the less believed. Those two that in the two states aspired most to be chief, Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, and Nicias, the son of Niceratus, who in military charges had been the most fortunate of his time, did most of all others desire to have the peace go on; Nicias, because he was desirous (having hitherto never been overthrown) to carry his good fortune through, and to give both himself and the city rest from their troubles for the present; and for the future to leave a name, that in all his time he had never made the commonwealth miscarry; which he thought might be done by standing out of danger, and by putting himself as little as he might into the hands of fortune; and to stand out of danger is the benefit of peace. Pleistoanax had the same desire, because of the imputation laid on him about his return from exile by his enemies, who suggested to the Lacedæmonians, on every loss they received, that the same befel them, for having contrary to the law repealed his banishment.¹ For they charged him further, that he and his brother Aristocles, had suborned the prophetess of Delphi, to answer the deputies² of the Lacedæmonians when they came thither, most commonly with this, that they should bring back the seed of the semi-god,³ the son of Jupiter, out of a strange country into his own: and if they did not, they should plough their land with a silver plough: and so at length to have made the Lacedæmonians, nineteen years after, with such dances and sacrifices as they who were the first founders of Lacedæmon had ordained to be used at the enthroning of their kings, to fetch him home again, who lived in the mean time in exile in the mountain Lycæum,⁴ in a house, whereof the one half was part of the temple of Jupiter, for fear of the Lacedæmonians, as

¹ See b. ii. 21.

² *Θεωποδοί*, ambassadors to the oracles were so called.

³ Hercules, from whom Pleistoanax

was descended.

⁴ A mountain of Arcadia, in which was the temple of Jupiter Lycæus.

being suspected to have taken a bribe to withdraw his army out of Attica,

XVII. Being troubled with these imputations, and considering that there being no occasion of calamity in time of peace, and the Lacedæmonians thereby recovering their men, he also should cease to be obnoxious to the calumnies of his enemies; whereas in war such as had charge, could not but be quarrelled on their losses, he was therefore forward to have the peace concluded. And this winter they fell to treaty, and withal the Lacedæmonians braved them with a preparation already making against the spring, sending to the cities about for that purpose, as if they meant to fortify in Attica, that the Athenians might give them the better ear. When after many meetings, and many demands on either side, it was at last agreed, that peace should be concluded, each part rendering what they had taken in the war, save that the Athenians should hold Nisæa, (for when they likewise demanded Platæa, and the Thebans answered, that it was neither taken by force nor by treason, but rendered voluntarily; the Athenians said that they also had Nisæa in the same manner.) The Lacedæmonians calling together their confederates, and all but the Bœotians, Corinthians, Eleans, and Megareans, (for these disliked it) giving their votes for the ending of the war, they concluded the peace, and confirmed it to the Athenians with sacrifices, and swore it, and the Athenians again to them, on these articles.

XVIII. The Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and their confederates, have made peace, and sworn it city by city, as follows:—
 “Touching the public temples, it shall be lawful to whomsoever will,
 “to sacrifice in them, and to have access to them, and to ask counsel of the oracles in them, and to send their deputies’ to them,
 “according to the custom of his country, securely both by sea and
 “land. The whole place consecrate, and temple of Apollo in Delphi,
 “and Delphi itself, shall be governed by their own law, taxed by
 “their own state, and judged by their own judges, both city and territory, according to the institution of the place.—The peace shall
 “endure between the Athenians, with their confederates, and the
 “Lacedæmonians, with their confederates, for fifty years, both by
 “sea and land, without fraud and without harm.—It shall not be
 “lawful to bear arms, with intention of hurt, neither for the Lacedæmonians and their confederates against the Athenians, nor for the
 “Athenians and their confederates against the Lacedæmonians, by
 “any art or machination whatever.—If any controversy arise between
 “them, the same shall be decided by law, and by oath, in such manner
 “as shall be agreed on.—The Lacedæmonians and their confederates
 “shall render Amphipolis to the Athenians.—The inhabitants of
 “whatever city the Lacedæmonians shall render to the Athenians,
 “shall be at liberty, to go forth whither they will, with bag and
 “baggage.—Those cities which paid the tribute, taxed in the time’

¹ Ambassadors about matters of religion. Athenians began to command the rest of Greece, for when in the end of the Median war, the Lacedæmonians left that

² Which was the first time that the

" of Aristides, continuing to pay it, shall be governed by their own laws; and now that the peace is concluded, it shall be unlawful for the Athenians, or their confederates, to bear arms against them, or to do them any hurt, as long as they shall pay the said tribute. The cities are these, Argilus, Stagirus, Acanthus, Scolus, Olynthus, Spartolus. And they shall be confederates of neither side, neither of the Lacedæmonians, nor of the Athenians. But if the Athenians can persuade these cities, then it shall be lawful for the Athenians to have them for their confederates, having got their consent.—The Mæcybernæans, Sanæans, and Singæans, shall inhabit their own cities, on the same conditions, with the Olynthians and Acanthians. —The Lacedæmonians, and their confederates, shall render Panactum¹ to the Athenians. And the Athenians shall render to the Lacedæmonians, Coryphasium,² Cythera, Methone, Pteleum, and Atalante, and likewise what Lacedæmonians are in the prison of Athens, or in any prison of any place in the Athenian dominion; and dismiss all the Peloponnesians, besieged in Scione, and all that Brasidas did there put in, and whatever confederates of the Lacedæmonians are in prison, either at Athens, or in the Athenian state. And the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall deliver whomsoever of the Athenians or their confederates they have in their hands, in the same manner.—Touching the Scionæans, Toronæans, and Sermyliaus, and any other city belonging to the Athenians, the Athenians shall do with them what they think fit.—The Athenians shall take an oath to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, city by city; and that oath shall be the greatest that in each city is in use; the thing that they shall swear, shall be this: I stand to these articles, and to this peace, truly and sincerely. And the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, shall take the same oath to the Athenians.—This oath they shall on both sides every year renew, and shall erect pillars, [inscribed with this peace] at Olympia,³ Pythia,⁴ and in the isthmus; at Athens, within the citadel; and at Lacedæmon, in the Amyclæum.⁵—And if any thing be on either side forgot, or shall be thought fit on good deliberation to be changed, it shall be lawful for them to do it, in such manner⁶ as the Lacedæmonians and Athenians shall jointly think fit."

XIX. This league begins the fourth day before the end of the month Artemisius, Pleistolas being Ephore; at Athens the sixth day before the end of Elaphebolion, Alcæus being Archon. These took the oath and sacrificed; of the *Lacedæmonians*, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Daithus, Ischagoras, Philocidas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Tellis, Alcidas, Empedias, Menas,

command, the Athenians undertook it, and taxed the several cities with tribute towards the war. The war ended, the tribute ended not. See note, b. i. 96.

¹ See b. v. 3.

² The promontory wherein Pylos stood, put here for Pylus.

³ The name by which Homer calls Delphi, and which seems to have been

continued in use as a more solemn and sacred appellation.

⁴ By Delphi, where the Pythian games were kept.

⁵ Amyclæum, a temple of Apollo.

⁶ This article displeased the confederates of Lacedæmon, because the articles might by this be changed without them.

Lamphilus. Of the *Athenians*, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Nicias, Laches, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thracycles, Theagenes, Aristocætes, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.

XX. This peace was made in the very end of winter,¹ and the spring then beginning, presently after the city bacchanals,² and full ten years, and some few days over, after the first invasion of Attica, and the beginning of this war. But now for the certainty hereof, let a man consider the times themselves, and not trust to the account of the names of such as in the several places bare chief offices, or, for some honour to themselves, had their names ascribed, for marks to the actions foregoing. For it is not exactly known who was in the beginning of his office, or who in the midst, or how he was, when any thing fell out. But if one reckon the same by summers and winters, according as they are written, he shall find by the two half years, which make the whole, that this first war was of ten summers', and as many winters' continuance.

XXI. The Lacedæmonians (for it fell to them by lot to begin the restitution) both dismissed presently those prisoners they had then in their hands, and also sent ambassadors, Ischagoras, Menas, and Philocharidas, to the parts upon Thrace, with command to Clearidas, to deliver up Amphipolis to the Athenians, and requiring the rest of their confederates there to accept of the peace in such manner as was for each of them accorded. But they would not, thinking it was not for their advantage. And Clearidas also, to gratify the Chalcidæans, surrendered not the city, alleging that he could not do it, whether they would or not. And coming away soon after with those ambassadors to Lacedæmon, both to purge himself if accused by those with Ischagoras for disobeying the state's command, and also to try if the peace might by any means be shaken; when he found it firm, he himself being sent back by the Lacedæmonians, with command principally to surrender the place, and if he could not do that, then to draw thence all the Peloponnesians that were in it, immediately took his journey.

XXII. But the confederates chancing to be present themselves in Lacedæmon, and the Lacedæmonians required such of them as formerly refused, to accept the peace. But they, on the same pretence on which they had rejected it before, said that unless it were more reasonable, they would not accept it. And the Lacedæmonians seeing they refused, dismissed them, and by themselves entered with the Athenians into a league; because they imagined that the Argives would not renew their peace, (because they had refused it before, when Ampelidas and Lichas went to Argos,) and held them for no dangerous enemies without the Athenians: and also conceived, that by this means the rest of Peloponnesus would not stir; for if they could they would turn to the Athenians. Wherefore the ambassadors of

¹ It appears that Elaphebolion, amongst the Athenians was the last month of their winter quarter.

² Of these feasts there were three during the year, viz. τὰ ἀρχαῖα, ἀστικά, and Ἀγναῖα.

Athens being then present, and conference had, they agreed, and the oath and league was concluded on in the terms following:

XXIII. "The Lacedæmonians shall be confederates with the Athenians for fifty years.—If any enemy invade the territory of the Lacedæmonians, and do the Lacedæmonians any harm, the Athenians shall aid the Lacedæmonians against them in the strongest manner they can possibly. But if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall be gone away, then that city shall be held as enemy both to the Lacedæmonians and to the Athenians, and shall be warred on by them both; and both cities shall again lay down the war jointly. And this to be done justly, readily, and sincerely. And if any enemy shall invade the territories of the Athenians, and do the Athenians any harm, then the Lacedæmonians shall aid the Athenians against them, in the strongest manner they can possibly. But if the enemy, after he hath spoiled the country, shall be gone away, then shall that city be held for enemy both to the Lacedæmonians and to the Athenians, and shall be warred upon by both, and both the cities shall again lay down the war together. And this to be done justly, readily, and sincerely.—If their slaves shall rebel, the Athenians shall assist the Lacedæmonians with all their strength possible.—These things shall be sworn to by the same men on either side that swore the peace, and shall be every year renewed by the Lacedæmonians¹ at their coming to the bacchanals at Athens; and by the Athenians at their going to the Hyacinthian feast at Lacedæmon; and either side shall erect a pillar [inscribed with this league] one at Lacedæmon, near to Apollo in the Amyclæum, another at Athens, near to Minerva in the citadel.—If it shall seem good to the Lacedæmonians and Athenians to add or take away any thing touching the league, it shall be lawful for them to do it jointly."

XXIV. Of the Lacedæmonians, these took the oath: Pleistoanax, Agis, Pleistolas, Damagetus, Chionis, Metagenes, Acanthus, Dalthus, Ischagoras, Philocharidas, Zeuxidas, Anthippus, Alcinares, Tellis, Empedias, Menas, Laphilus. Of the Athenians, Lampon, Isthmionicus, Laches, Nicias, Euthydemus, Procles, Pythodorus, Agnon, Myrtilus, Thrasyclus, Theagenes, Aristocrates, Iolcius, Timocrates, Leon, Lamachus, Demosthenes.

This league was made not long after the peace. And the Athenians delivered to the Lacedæmonians the men they had taken in the island; and by this time began the summer of the eleventh year. And hitherto hath been written these ten years which this first war continued, without intermission.

YEAR XI. A.C. 421. OLYMP. 89½.

XXV. After the peace and league made between the Lacedæmonians and Athenians after the ten years' war, Pleistolas being Ephore at Lacedæmon, and Alcæus, Archon of Athens; though there were peace to those that had accepted it; yet the Corinthians and some

¹ ἀνανεοῦσθαι δὲ κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν, Bek. αὐτὸν, Duker. And that the Lacedæmonians should renew them every year.

cities of Peloponnesus endeavoured to overthrow what was done, and presently arose another stir, by the confederates, against Lacedæmon. And the Lacedæmonians also after awhile became suspected by the Athenians, for not performing somewhat agreed on in the articles. And for six years and ten months they abstained from entering into each other's territories with their arms: but the peace being but weak, they did each other abroad what harm they could; and in the end, were forced to dissolve the peace, made after those ten years, and fell again into open war.

XXVI. This also hath the same Thucydides of Athens written from point to point, by summers and winters, as every thing came to pass, until such time as the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, had made an end of the Athenian dominion, and had taken their long walls, and Peiræus. To which time from the beginning of the war, it is in all twenty-seven years.¹ As for the composition between, if any man shall think it not to be accounted with the war, he shall think amiss. For let him look to the actions that passed as they are distinctly set down, and he shall find, that that serveth not to be taken for a peace, in which they neither rendered all nor accepted all, according to the articles; besides, in the Mantinean and Epidaurian wars, and in other actions, it was on both sides infringed, and the confederates on the borders of Thrace continued in hostility as before; and the Boeotians had but a truce from one ten days to another. So that with the first ten years' war, and with this doubtful cessation, and the war that followed it, a man shall find, counting by the times, that it came to just so many years and some few days; and that those who built upon the prediction of the oracles, have this number only to agree. And I remember yet, that from the very beginning of this war, and so on, till the end, it was uttered by many, that it should be of thrice nine years' continuance. And for the time thereof I lived in my strength, and applied my mind to gain an accurate knowledge of the same. It happened also that I was banished my country for twenty years, after my charge at Amphipolis; whereby being present at the affairs of both, and especially of the Lacedæmonians, by reason of my exile, I could at leisure the better learn the truth of all that passed. The quarrels, therefore, and perturbations of the peace, after those ten years, and that which followed, according as from time to time the war was carried, I will now pursue.

XXVII. After the concluding of the fifty years' peace, and the league which followed, and when those ambassadors who were sent for, out of the rest of Peloponnesus, to accept the said peace, were departed from Lacedæmon, the Corinthians (the rest going all to their own cities,) turning first to Argos, entered into treaty with some of the Argive magistrates, to this purpose, that since the Lacedæmonians had made a peace and league with the Athenians, their heretofore mortal enemies, tending not to the benefit, but to the enslaving of Peloponnesus, it behoved them to consider of a course for the safety of the same, and to make a decree, that any city of the Grecians that

¹ Twenty-eight according to Xenophon. Hellen. b. i. But the first and last he takes for whole years, which was not the case. Thucydides more correct.

would, and that was free, and admitted the like, and equal trials of judgment with theirs, might make a league with the Argives, for the one mutually to aid the other, and to assign them a few men, with absolute authority from the state, to treat with; and that it should not be motioned to the people, so that if the multitude would not agree to it, it might be unknown that ever they had made such a motion; affirming that many would come into this confederacy out of hatred to the Lacedæmonians. And the Corinthians, when they had made this overture, went home.

XXVIII. But these men of Argos, having heard them, and reported their proposition, both to the magistrates and to the people, the Argives ordered the same accordingly, and elected twelve men, with whom it should be lawful for any Grecian to make the league that would accept the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, with neither of whom they were to enter into any league, without the consent of the Argive people. And this the Argives did the more willingly admit, as well because they saw the Lacedæmonians would make war upon them, (for the truce between them was now upon expiring) as also because they hoped to have the principality of Peloponnesus. For about this time Lacedæmon had but a bad report, and was in contempt for the losses it had received, and the Argives in all points were in good estate, not having concurred in the Attic war, but rather been in peace with both, and thereby got in their revenue. Thus the Argives received into league all the Grecians that came to them.

XXIX. First of all came in the Mantineans, and their confederates, through fear of the Lacedæmonians. For a part of Arcadia, during the war of Athens, was come under the obedience of the Mantineans, which they thought the Lacedæmonians, now they were at rest, would not permit them any longer to command; so that they willingly joined with the Argives, thinking it a great city, ever an enemy to the Lacedæmonians, and governed as their own by democracy. When the Mantineans had revolted, the rest of Peloponnesus began also to mutter amongst themselves that it was fit for them to do the like; conceiving that there was somewhat in it more than they knew, that made the Mantineans turn, and were also angry with the Lacedæmonians, amongst many other causes, because it was written in the articles of the Attic peace, that it should be lawful to add to, or take from the same, whatever should seem good to the two cities of the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians. For this was the article that the most troubled the Peloponnesians, and put them into a jealousy that the Lacedæmonians might have a purpose joining with the Athenians to bring them into subjection. For in justice the power of changing the articles ought to have been ascribed to all the confederates in general. Whereupon many fearing such an intention, applied themselves to the Argives, every one severally striving to come into their league.

XXX. The Lacedæmonians perceiving this stir to begin in Peloponnesus, and that the Corinthians were both the contrivers of it, and entered themselves also into the league with Argos, sent ambassadors to Corinth to prevent the sequel of it, and accused them both for the

whole design, and for their own revolt in particular, which they intended to make from them, to the league of the Argives; saying that they should therein infringe their oath, and that they had already done unjustly, in refusing the peace made with the Athenians; for as much as it is an article of their league,¹ that what the major part of the confederates should conclude, unless it were hindered by some god or hero, the same was to stand good. But the Corinthians, those confederates who had refused the peace as well as they, being now at Corinth, (for they had sent for them before) in their answer to the Lacedæmonians, did not openly allege the wrongs they had received, as that the Athenians had not restored Solium², nor Anactorium, nor any thing else they had in this war lost; but pretended not to betray those of Thrace, for that they had in particular taken an oath to them, both when together with Potidæa they first revolted, and also another afterwards; and therefore they did not break the oath of their league, by rejecting the peace with Athens. For having sworn to them by the gods, they should in betraying them offend the gods. And whereas it is said, unless some god or hero hinder it; this appears to be a divine hinderance. Thus they answered for their old oath; and for their league with the Argives, they gave this answer; that when they had advised with their friends, they would do afterwards what would be just. And so the ambassadors of Lacedæmon went home. At the same time were present also in Corinth, the ambassadors of Argos, to invite the Corinthians to their league, and that without delay. But the Corinthians appointed them to come again at their next sitting.

XXXI. Presently after this came to them an embassy, also from the Eleans, and first they made a league with the Corinthians; and going thence to Argos, made a league with the Argives, according to the declaration³ before mentioned. The Eleans had a quarrel with the Lacedæmonians concerning Lepreum.⁴ For the Lepreates having heretofore warred on certain of the Arcadians, and for their aid called the Eleans into their confederacy, on condition to give them the moiety of the land to be won from them, when the war was ended, the Eleans gave to the Lepreates the whole land to be enjoyed by themselves, with an imposition thereon of a talent to be paid to Olympian Jupiter. This they continued to pay till the beginning of the Athenian war, when on pretence of that war, giving over the payment, the Eleans would have forced them to it again, but they had recourse to the Lacedæmonians; and the cause being referred to their decision, the Eleans afterwards, on suspicion that the Lacedæmonians would not do them right, renounced the reference, and wasted the territory of the Lepreates. The Lacedæmonians nevertheless gave sentence, that the Lepreates should be at liberty to pay it or not, and that the Eleans did the injury; and because the Eleans had not stood to the reference, the Lacedæmonians put into Lepreum a garrison of men of arms. The

¹ The Peloponnesian league against Athens.

² Sollium, according to Bekker.

³ The decree of the Argives, that any Grecian that would might make a league

with them, treating with the twelve commissioners by them chosen to that purpose.

⁴ A city of Elis, about forty furlongs from the sea, on the confines of Arcadia.

Eleans taking this as if the Lacedæmonians had received their revolted city, and producing the article of their league, that what every one possessed when they entered into the Attic war, the same they should possess when they gave it over, revolted to the Argives, as wronged, and entered league with them, as is before related. After these came presently into the Argive league, the Corinthians, and the Chalcidæans upon Thrace. The Bœotians also and Megareans threatened as much, but because they thought the Argive democracy would not be so commodious for them, who were governed according to the government of the Lacedæmonians by oligarchy, they stirred no further in it.

XXXII. About the same time of this summer, the Athenians expugned Scione, slew all that were within it at man's estate, made slaves of the women and children, and gave their territory to the Plataeans: they also replanted the Delians in Delos, both in consideration of the defeats they had received after their expulsion, and also because the oracle of Delphi had commanded it. The Phocians and Locrians also began a war at that time against each other. And the Corinthians and Argives, being now leagued, went to Tegea, to cause it to revolt from the Lacedæmonians; conceiving it to be an important piece of Peloponnesus, and making account, if they gained it to their side, they should easily obtain the whole. But when the Tegeates refused to become enemies to the Lacedæmonians, the Corinthians, who till then had been very forward, grew less violent, and were afraid that none of the rest would come in. Nevertheless they went to the Bœotians, and solicited them to enter into league with them, and the Argives, and to do as they did. And the Corinthians further desired the Bœotians to go along with them to Athens, and to procure for them the like ten days' truce, to that which was made between the Athenians and Bœotians, presently after the making of the fifty years' peace, on the same terms that the Bœotians had it; and if the Athenians refused, then to renounce theirs, and make no more truces hereafter without the Corinthians. The Corinthians having made this request, the Bœotians willed them touching the league with the Argives to stay awhile longer, and went with them to Athens, but obtained not the ten days' truce, the Athenians answering that if the Corinthians were confederates with the Lacedæmonians, they had a peace already. Nevertheless, the Bœotians would not relinquish their ten days' truce, though the Corinthians both required the same, and affirmed that it was so before agreed on; yet the Athenians granted the Corinthians a cessation of arms, but without solemn ratification.

XXXIII. The same summer the Lacedæmonians with their whole power, under the conduct of Pleistoanax, the son of Pausanias, king of the Lacedæmonians, made war on the Parrhasians of Arcadia, subjects of the Mantineans, partly as called in, by occasion of sedition, and partly because they intended, if they could, to demolish a fortification which the Mantineans had built, and kept with a garrison in Cypsela, in the territory of the Parrhasians, towards Sciritis of Laconia.¹ The Lacedæmonians therefore wasted the territory of the

¹ See Diod. Sic. b. xv.

Parrhasians, and the Mantineans leaving their own city to the custody of the Argives, came forth to aid the Parrhasians their confederates; but being unable to defend both the fort of Cypsela and the cities of the Parrhasians too, they went home again. And the Lacedæmonians when they had set the Parrhasians at liberty, and demolished the fortification, went home likewise.

XXXIV. The same summer, when those soldiers who went out with Brasidas, and of whom Clearidas, after the making of the peace, had the charge, were returned from the parts upon Thrace, the Lacedæmonians made a decree, that those Helots who had fought under Brasidas should receive their liberty, and inhabit where they thought good; but not long after, they placed them, together with such others as had been newly enfranchised¹ in Lepreum, a city standing in the confines between Laconia and the Eleans, with whom they were now at variance; fearing also lest those citizens of their own, who had been taken in the island,² and had delivered up their arms to the Athenians, should on apprehension of disgrace for that calamity, if they remained capable of honours, make some innovation in the state, they disabled them, though some of them were in office already; and their disablement was this, that they should neither bear office, nor be capable of buying or selling; yet in time they were again restored to their former honours.

XXXV. The same summer the Dictideans took Thyssos, a town in mount Athos, and a confederate of the Athenians. The whole summer there was continual commerce between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians; nevertheless they began, both the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians, to have each other in suspicion immediately after the peace, in respect of the places not yet mutually surrendered. For the Lacedæmonians, to whose lot it fell to make restitution first, had not rendered Amphipolis, and the other cities, nor had caused the peace to be accepted by the confederates upon Thrace, nor by the Bœotians, nor Corinthians, though they had ever professed, that in case they refused, they would join with the Athenians to bring them to it by force; and had prefixed a time, though not by writing, within which such as entered not into this peace, were to be held as enemies to both. The Athenians, therefore, when they saw none of this really performed, suspected that they had no sincere intention, and thereupon refused to render Pylos, when they required it; nay, they repented that they had delivered up the prisoners they took in the island; and detained the rest of the towns they then held, till the Lacedæmonians should have performed the conditions on their part also. The Lacedæmonians, to this, alleged, that they had done what they were able to do; for they had delivered the Athenian prisoners that were in their hands, and had withdrawn their soldiers from the parts upon

¹ Those who having deserved well of the state, either by their bravery in battle, or by some other cause, were sometimes admitted to the participation of certain of the rights of citizens, and were called *νιοδαμώδεις*, *νιοὺς δαμώδης*,

newly added to the people; those citizens being called *δαμώδεις*, who paid taxes. The exact privileges to which they were admitted is not known. See Diod. Sic. b. xii. p. 124.

² Sphacteria.

Thrace, and whatever else was in their own power to perform. But Amphipolis, they said, was not in their power to surrender, that they would endeavour to bring the Bœotians and Corinthians to accept the peace, and to get Panactum restored, and all the Athenian prisoners in Bœotia to be sent home; and therefore desired them to make restitution of Pylos, or if not so, at least to draw out of it the Messenians and Helots, (as they for their part had drawn their garrisons out of the towns upon Thrace) and, if they thought good, to keep it with a garrison of Athenians. After divers and long conferences had this summer, they so far prevailed with the Athenians, at the last, that they drew thence all the Messenians, and Helots, and all other Læonian fugitives, and placed them in Cranii, [a city] of Cephallenia. So for this summer there was peace, and free passage from one to another.

XXXVI. In the beginning of winter, (for now there were other Ephors in office;¹ not those in whose time the peace was made, but some of them that opposed it,) ambassadors being come from the confederates, and the Athenian, Bœotian, and Corinthian ambassadors being already there, and having had much conference together, but concluded nothing, Cleobulus, and Xenares,² Ephors, that most desired the dissolution of the peace, when the rest of the ambassadors were gone home, entered into private conference with the Bœotians and Corinthians, exhorting them to run both the same course; and advised the Bœotians to endeavour first to make a league themselves with the Argives, and then to get the Argives, together with themselves, into a league with the Lacedæmonians; for that they might by this means avoid the necessity of accepting the peace with Athens; for the Lacedæmonians would more regard the friendship and league of the Argives, than the enmity and dissolution of the peace with the Athenians. For he knew the Lacedæmonians had ever desired to have Argos their friend on any reasonable conditions, because they knew that their war without Peloponnesus would thereby be a great deal the easier. Wherefore they entreated the Bœotians to put Panactum into the hands of the Lacedæmonians, to the end that if they could get Pylos for it in exchange, they might make war against the Athenians the more commodiously.

XXXVII. The Bœotians and Corinthians being dismissed by Xenares and Cleobulus, and all the other Lacedæmonians of that faction, with these points to be delivered to their commonwealths, went to their several cities; and two men of Argos, of principal authority in that city, having waited for, and met with them by the way, entered into a treaty with them about the league between the Argives and the Bœotians, as there was between them and the Corinthians, and the Eleans, and Mantineans already; for they thought, if it succeeded, they might the more easily have either war or peace, as the cause would now be common, either with the Lacedæmonians, or

¹ From this we may learn, that the Ephors entered on their office during the autumn.

² *Ξενάρης*, Bekker. *Ξενάρης*, Duker. Here and in other places Bekker substitutes Xenarces for Xenares.

whomsoever else it should be needful. When the Bœotian ambassadors heard this, they were well pleased; for as it chanced, the Argives requested the same things of them, that they by their friends in Lacedæmon had been sent to procure of the Argives. These men therefore of Argos, when they saw that the Bœotians accepted the motion, promised to send ambassadors to the Bœotians about it, and so departed. The Bœotians coming home related what they had heard, both at Lacedæmon and by the way from the Argives; and the governors of Bœotia were glad thereof, and much more forward in it now than formerly they had been, seeing that not only their friends in Lacedæmon desired, but the Argives themselves hastened to have done the self-same thing. Not long after this the ambassadors came to them from Argos, to solicit the despatch of the business before propounded, but the governors of Bœotia commended only the proposition, and dismissed them, with promise to send ambassadors about the league to Argos.

XXXVIII. In the mean time the governors of Bœotia thought fit that an oath should first be taken by themselves, and by the ambassadors from Corinth, Megara, and the confederates upon Thrace, to give mutual assistance on any occasion to them that should require it, and neither to make war nor peace without the common consent; and that the Bœotians and Megareans (for these two ran the same course) should make a league with the Argives. But before this oath was to be taken, the governors of Bœotia communicated the business to the four Bœotian councils, in which the whole authority of the state consists;¹ and withal presented their advice, that any city that would, might join with them in the like oath for mutual assistance. But they that were of these councils approved not the proposition, because they feared to offend the Lacedæmonians in being sworn to the Corinthians that had revolted from their confederacy. For the governors of Bœotia had not reported to them what had passed at Lacedæmon, how Cleobulus, and Xenares, the Ephors, and their friends there, had advised them to enter first into a league with the Argives and Corinthians, and then afterwards to make the same league with the Lacedæmonians. For they thought that the councils, though this had never been told them, would have decreed it no otherwise than they on premeditation should advise. So the business was checked, and the ambassadors from Corinth, and from the cities upon Thrace, departed without effect. And the governors of Bœotia that were before minded, if they had got this done, to have leagued themselves also with the Argives, made no mention of the Argives at all in the councils, nor sent the ambassadors to Argos, as they had before promised, but a kind of carelessness and delay possessed the whole business.

XXXIX. The same winter the Olynthians took Meceberna, held with a garrison of the Athenians, by assault. After this the Lacedæmonians (for the conferences between the Athenians and the Lacedæmonians about reciprocal restitution continued still) hoping that if the

¹ See note, book ii. c. 2.

Athenians should obtain from the Bœotians Panactum, that then they also should recover Pylos, sent ambassadors to the Bœotians, to request that Panactum and the Athenian prisoners might be put into the hands of the Lacedæmonians, that they might get Pylos restored in exchange. But the Bœotians answered, that unless the Lacedæmonians would make a particular league with them, as with the Athenians, they would not do it. The Lacedæmonians, though they knew they should therein wrong the Athenians, because it being said in the articles that neither party should make either league or war without the other's consent, yet such was their desire to get Panactum, to exchange it for Pylos, and withal they that longed to break the peace with Athens were so eager in it, that at last they concluded a league with the Bœotians, winter then ending, and the spring approaching; and Panactum was presently pulled down to the ground. So ended the eleventh year of this war.

YEAR XII. A.C. 420. OLYMP. 80-4 90-1.

XL. In the spring following, the Argives, when they saw that the ambassadors whom the Bœotians had promised to send came not, and that Panactum was rased, and that also there was a private league made between the Bœotians and the Lacedæmonians, were afraid lest they should on all hands be abandoned, and that the confederates would all go to the Lacedæmonians. For they apprehended that the Bœotians had been induced both to rase Panactum, and also to enter into the Athenian peace by the Lacedæmonians; and that the Athenians were privy to the same. So that now they had no means to make league with the Athenians neither; whereas before they made account that if their truce with the Lacedæmonians continued not, they might on these differences have joined themselves to the Athenians. The Argives being therefore at a stand, and fearing to have war all at once with the Lacedæmonians, Tegeates, Bœotians, and Athenians, as having formerly refused the truce with the Lacedæmonians, and imagined to themselves the principality of all Peloponnesus, they sent ambassadors with as much speed as might be, Eustrophus and Æson, persons as they thought most acceptable to them, with this cogitation, that by compounding with the Lacedæmonians, as well as for their present estate, they might, however the world went, at least live at quiet.

XLI. These ambassadors being there, fell to treat of the articles on which the agreement should be made. And at first the Argives desired to have the matter referred either to some private man or to some city, concerning the territory of Cynuria, about which they have always differed, as lying on the borders of them both, (it contains the cities of Thyrea and Anthena, and is possessed by the Lacedæmonians;) but afterwards the Lacedæmonians not suffering mention to be made of that, but that if they would have the truce go on as it did before, they might; the Argive ambassadors got them to yield to this, that for the present an accord should be made for fifty years, but that it should be lawful nevertheless (if one challenged the other thereto,) both for Lacedæmon and Argos to try their titles to this territory by

battle, so that there were in neither city the plague or a war to excuse them, as once before they had done, when as both sides thought they had the victory.¹ And that it should not be lawful for one part to follow the other, further than to the bounds of Lacedæmon or Argos. And though this seemed to the Lacedæmonians at first to be but a foolish proposition, yet afterwards (because they desired by all means to have friendship with the Argives) they agreed to it, and put into writing what they required. However, before the Lacedæmonians would make any full conclusion of the same, they willed them to return first to Argos, and to make the people acquainted with it; and then if it were accepted, to return at the Hyacinthian feast and swear it. So these departed.

XLII. Whilst the Argives were treating about this, the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Andromenes,² and Phædimus, and Antimenidas, commissioners for receiving of Panactum and the prisoners from the Bœotians to render them to the Athenians, found that Panactum was demolished, and that their pretext was this, that there had been anciently an oath on occasion of difference between the Athenians and them, that neither part should inhabit the place solely, but jointly both, but for the Athenian prisoners, as many as the Bœotians had, they that were with Andromenes received, convoyed and delivered them to the Athenians, and withal told them of the rasing of Panactum, alleging it as rendered, in that no enemy of Athens should dwell in it hereafter. But when this was told them, the Athenians made it a heinous matter, conceiving that the Lacedæmonians had done them wrong, both in the matter of Panactum, which was pulled down, and should have been rendered standing; and because also they had heard of the private league made with the Bœotians, whereas they had promised to join with the Athenians in compelling such to accept of the peace as had refused it; withal they weighed whatever other points the Lacedæmonians had been short in, touching the performance of the articles, and thought themselves abused; so that they answered the Lacedæmonian ambassadors roughly, and dismissed them.

XLIII. This difference arising between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians, it was presently wrought upon by such also of Athens as desired to have the peace dissolved. Amongst the rest was Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, a man though young in years,³ yet in the dignity of his ancestors honoured as much as any man of any city; who was of opinion, that it was better to join with the Argives, not only for the matter itself, but also out of stomach,⁴ labouring to cross the Lacedæmonians, because they had made the peace by the means of Nicias and Laches without him; whom for his youth they had neglected and not honoured, as for the ancient hospitality between his house and them, had been requisite, which his father had indeed

¹ Herod. b. i. c. 82.

² Andromedes. *Bekker*.

³ From several circumstances mentioned by Plato, Alcibiades is supposed to have been about thirty at this time. According to Diodorus and Cornelius

Nepos, about three years younger. For a full account of him, see Plutarch, in Alcibiad.; Isocrates in his oration *περί ζεύγους*.

⁴ *Φρονήματι*,

renounced, but he himself by good offices done to those prisoners who were brought from the island, had a purpose to have renewed. But supposing himself on all hands disparaged, he both opposed the peace at first, alleging that the Lacedæmonians would not be constant; and that they had made the peace only to get the Argives by that means away from them, and afterwards to invade the Athenians again, when they should be destitute of their friends; and also as soon as this difference was on foot, he sent presently to Argos of himself, willing them with all speed to come to Athens, as being thereto invited, and to bring with them the Eleans and Mantineans, to enter with the Athenians into a league, the opportunity now serving; and promising that he would help them all he could.

XLIV. The Argives having heard the message, and knowing that the Athenians had made no league with the Bœotians, and that they were at great quarrel with the Lacedæmonians, neglected the ambassadors they had then in Lacedæmon, whom they had sent about the truce, and applied themselves to the Athenians, thinking that if they should have war, they should by this means be backed with a city that had been their ancient friend, governed like their own by democracy, and of greatest power by sea. Whereupon they presently sent ambassadors to Athens to make a league; and together with theirs, went also the ambassadors of the Eleans and Mantineans; thither also with all speed came the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, Philocharidas, Leon, and Endius, persons accounted most gracious with the Athenians, lest in their passion they should make a league with the Argives: and withal to require the restitution of Pylos for Panactum, and to excuse themselves concerning their league with the Bœotians, as not made for any harm intended to the Athenians.

XLV. Now speaking of these things before the council, and how that they were come thither with full power to make agreement concerning all controversies betwixt them, they put Alcibiades into fear, lest if they should say the same before the people, the multitude would be drawn to their side, and so the Argive league fall off. But Alcibiades devises against them this plot; he persuades the Lacedæmonians not to confess their plenary power before the people, and gives them his faith, that then Pylos should be rendered, for he said he would persuade the Athenians to it, as much as he now opposed it, and that the rest of their differences should be compounded. This he did to alienate them from Nicias, and that by accusing them before the people, as men that had no true meaning, nor ever spake one and the same thing, he might bring on the league with the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans. And it came to pass accordingly. For when they came before the people, and to the question, whether they had full power of concluding, (contrary to what they had said in council,) answered no, the Athenians would no longer endure them, but gave ear to Alcibiades, that exclaimed against the Lacedæmonians far more now than ever, and were ready then presently to have the Argives, and those others with them brought in, and to make the league. But an earthquake happening, before any thing was concluded, the assembly was adjourned.

XLVI. In the next day's meeting, Nicias, though the Lacedæmonians had been abused, and he himself also deceived, touching their coming with full power to conclude, yet he persisted to affirm, that it was their best course to be friends with the Lacedæmonians, and to defer the Argives' business till they had sent to the Lacedæmonians again to be assured of their intention; saying that it was honour to themselves, and dishonour to the Lacedæmonians, to have the war put off; for, they themselves being in estate of prosperity, it was best to preserve their good fortune as long as they might; whereas for the other side, being in evil estate, it should be gain to put things as soon as they could to the hazard. So he persuaded them to send ambassadors, whereof he himself was one, to require the Lacedæmonians, if they meant sincerely, to render Panactum standing, and also Amphipolis; and if the Bœotians would not accept of the peace, then to undo their league with them, according to the article, that the one should not make league with any, without the consent of the other. They willed him to say further: that they themselves also, if they had had the will to do wrong, had ere this made a league with the Argives, who were then present at Athens, for the same purpose. And whatever they had to accuse the Lacedæmonians of besides, they instructed Nicias in it, and sent him and his fellow ambassadors away. When they were arrived, and had delivered what they had in charge, and this last of all, that the Athenians would make league with the Argives, unless the Lacedæmonians would renounce their league with the Bœotians, if the Bœotians accepted not the peace; the Lacedæmonians refused to renounce their league with the Bœotians, (for Xenares the Ephor, and the rest of that faction carried it,) but at the request of Nicias, they renewed their former oath; for he was afraid he should return with nothing done, and be carped at, as after also it fell out, as author of the Lacedæmonian peace.¹ At his return, when the Athenians understood that nothing was effected at Lacedæmon, they grew presently enraged, and apprehending injury, (the Argives, and their confederates, being there present, brought in by Alcibiades,) they made a peace, and a league with them, in these words:

XLVII. "The Athenians, and Argives, and Mantineans, and Eleans, for themselves, and for the confederates commanded by every of them, have made an accord for one hundred years without fraud or damage, both by sea and land.—It shall not be lawful for the Argives nor Eleans, nor Mantineans, nor their confederates, to bear arms against the Athenians, or the confederates,² under the command of the Athenians, or their confederates, by any fraud or machination whatever. And the Athenians, Argives, and Mantineans, have made league with each other for one hundred years, on these terms.—If any enemy shall invade the territory of the Athenians, then the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, shall go to Athens

¹ Nicias was the author of the peace between the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, and that peace was therefore called Nicias. as on equal terms entered league with other, and such as served other in the war by compulsion, or as subjects; both called in the Greek *σύνμαχοι* properly, but not properly confederates.

² Confederates were of two sorts, such

“ to assist them according as the Athenians shall send them word to do, in the best manner they possibly can. But if the enemy, after he have spoiled the territory, shall be gone back, then their city shall be held as an enemy to the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and Athenians, and war shall be made against it, by all those cities. And it shall not be lawful for any of those cities, to give over the war, without the consent of all the rest.—And if an enemy shall invade the territory, either of the Argives, or of the Eleans, or of the Mantineans, then the Athenians shall come to Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, to assist them in such sort as those cities shall send them word to do, in the best manner they possibly can. But if the enemy, after he hath wasted their territory, shall be gone back, then their city shall be held as an enemy both to the Athenians, and also to the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, and war shall be made against it, by all those cities; and it shall not be lawful for any of them to give over the war against that city, without the consent of all the rest.—There shall no armed men be suffered to pass through the dominions either of themselves, or of any of the confederates, under their several commands to make war in any place whatever, unless by the suffrage of all the cities, Athens, Argos, Elis, and Mantinea, their passage be allowed.—To such as come to assist any of the other cities, that city which sends them shall give maintenance for thirty days after they shall arrive in the city that sent for them; and the like at their going away. But if they will use the army for a longer time, then the city that sent for them shall find them maintenance at the rate of three oboli of Ægina a day for a man of arms, and a drachma of Ægina for a horseman.¹—The city which sends for the aids shall have the leading and command of them, whilst the war is in their own territory; but if it shall seem good to these cities to make a war in common, then all the cities shall equally participate in the command.—The Athenians shall swear to the articles both for themselves, and for their confederates: and the Argives, Eleans, Mantineans, and the confederates of these, shall every one swear to them, city by city, and their oath shall be the greatest that by custom of the several cities is used, and with most perfect hosts,² and in these words: ‘ I will stand to this league, according to the articles thereof, justly, innocently, and sincerely, and not transgress the same by any art or machination whatever.’—This oath shall be taken at Athens, by the senate, and the officers of the commons, and administered by the Prytaneis; at Argos it shall be taken by the senate and the council of eighty, and by the Artynæ, and administered by the council of eighty; at Mantinea it shall be taken by the procurators of the people, and by the senate, and by the rest of the magistrates, and administered by the Theori, and by the tribunes of the soldiers; at Elis it shall be taken by the

¹ The value of three oboli of Ægina was about sixpence, and the drachma of Ægina nearly a shilling; for the talent of Ægina consisted of a hundred Attic minæ, and therefore was larger than the Attic talent, in the proportion of one to sixty.

² Beasts offered in sacrifice.

“ procurators of the people, and by the officers of the treasury, and by
 “ the council of six hundred, and administered by the procurators of
 “ the people, and by the keepers of the law.—This oath shall be re-
 “ newed by the Athenians, who shall go to Elis, and to Mantinea,
 “ and to Argos, thirty days before the Olympian games; and by the
 “ Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, who shall come to Athens ten
 “ days before the great Panathenæan holidays.¹—The articles of this
 “ league and peace and the oath, shall be inscribed in a pillar of
 “ stone; by the Athenians in the citadel; by the Argives in their
 “ market-place, within the precinct of the temple of Apollo; and by
 “ the Mantineans in their market-place, within the precinct of the
 “ temple of Jupiter. And at the Olympian games now at hand, there
 “ shall be erected jointly by them all a brazen pillar in Olympia [with
 “ the same inscription.]—If it shall seem good to these cities to add
 “ any thing to these articles, whatever shall be determined by them all
 “ in common council, the same shall stand good.”

XLVIII. Thus was the league and the peace concluded, and that which was made before between the Lacedæmonians and the Athenians was notwithstanding by neither side renounced. But the Corinthians, although they were the confederates of the Argives, yet would they not enter into this league; nay, though there was made a league before this, between them and the Argives, Eleans, and Mantineans, that were one, there all should have war or peace, yet they refused to swear to it; but said that their league defensive was enough, whereby they were bound to defend each other, but not to take part one with another in invading. So the Corinthians fell off from their confederates, and inclined again to the Lacedæmonians.

XLIX. This summer were celebrated the Olympian games, in which Androstheneas an Arcadian was the first time victor in the Pancratium.² And the Lacedæmonians were by the Eleans prohibited the temple there; so as they might neither sacrifice, nor contend for the prizes, amongst the rest; because they had not paid the fine set upon them (according to an Olympic law) by the Eleans, that laid to their charge, that they had put soldiers into the fort of Phyrcon, and into Lepreum, in the time of the Olympic truce. The fine amounted to two thousand minæ, which was two minæ for every man of arms, according to the law. But the Lacedæmonians, by their ambassadors which they sent thither, made answer, that they had been unjustly condemned, alleging that the truce was not published in Lacedæmon, when their soldiers were sent out. To this the Eleans said again, that the truce was already begun amongst themselves, for they used to publish it first in their own dominion; and thereupon, whilst they lay still, and expected no such matter as in time of truce, the Lacedæmonians did them the injury unawares. The Lacedæmonians hereto replied, that it was not necessary to proceed to the publishing of the truce in Lacedæmon at all, if they thought themselves wronged already; but rather if they

¹ There were both a great and little Panathenæan festival, the former taking place every fifth year; the latter an-

nually.

² Pancratium consisted of wrestling and fighting with fists.

thought themselves not wronged yet, then to do it by way of prevention, that they should not arm against them afterwards. The Eleans stood stiffly in their first argument, that they would never be persuaded but injury had been done them; but were nevertheless contented, if they would render Lepreum, both to remit their own part of the money, and also to pay that part for them which was due to the god.

L. When this would not be agreed to, they required this, not that they should render Lepreum unless they would, but that then they should come to the altar of Olympian Jupiter, seeing they desired to have free use of the temple, and there before the Grecians take an oath to pay the fine at least hereafter. But when the Lacedæmonians refused that also, they were excluded the temple, the sacrifices, and the games, and sacrificed at home; but the rest of the Grecians, except the Lepreates, were all admitted to be spectators. Nevertheless, the Eleans fearing they would come and sacrifice there by force, kept a guard there of their youngest men in arms, to whom were added Argives and Mantineans of either city, one thousand, and certain Athenian horsemen who were then at Argos, waiting the celebration of the feast. For a great fear possessed all the assembly, lest the Lacedæmonians should come on them with an army; and the rather because Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus, a Lacedæmonian, had been whipped by the serjeants on the race, for that when his chariot had got the prize, after proclamation made that the chariot of the Bœotian state had won it, (because he himself was not admitted to run) he came forth to the race, and crowned his charioteer to make known that the chariot was his own;¹ this added much to their fear, and they verily expected some accident to follow. Nevertheless the Lacedæmonians stirred not, and the feast passed over. After the Olympian games, the Argives and their confederates went to Corinth, to get the Corinthians into their league, and the Lacedæmonian ambassadors chanced to be there also; and after much conference and nothing concluded, on occasion of an earthquake, they brake off the conference, and returned every one to his own city. And so this summer ended.²

LI. The next winter the men of Heraclea, in Trachis, fought a battle against the Ænians,³ Dolopians, Melieans, and certain Thessalians. For the neighbour cities were enemies to this city, as built to the prejudice only of them, and both opposed the same from the time it was first founded, annoying it what they could, and also in this battle overcame them, and slew Xenares, the Cnidian,⁴ a Lacedæmonian, their commander, with some others, Heracleots. Thus ended this winter, and the twelfth year of this war.

¹ See Pausan. Eli. b. ii.

² It is not to be supposed from this that the Olympic festival took place at the end of the summer; Thucydides merely adds, that "the summer ended," because nothing further of any consequence occurred.

³ Ænia, a city in the bay of Thermæ,

opposite to Pydnæ, and one hundred and twenty furlongs from Thessalonica. See Herod. vii. 123. Livy xlii. 10.

⁴ In some copies "*the Cnidian*" is omitted, but without reason, for the Cnidians being a colony of Lacedæmon (Herod.) Xenares might be called a Lacedæmonian.

YEAR XIII. A.C. 419. OLYMP. 90½.

LII. In the very beginning of the next summer, the Boeotians took Heraclea miserably afflicted, into their own hands, and put Hegesipidas, a Lacedæmonian, out of it, for his evil government. They took it because they feared lest whilst the Lacedæmonians were troubled about Peloponnesus, it should have been taken in by the Athenians. Nevertheless the Lacedæmonians were offended with them. The same summer Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, being general of the Athenians, by the practice of the Argives, and their confederates, went to Peloponnesus, and having with him a few men of arms, and archers of Athens, and some of the confederates whom he took up there¹ as he passed through the country with his army, both ordered such affairs by the way concerning the league, as was fit; and coming to the Patreans, persuaded them to build their walls down to the sea side, and purposed to raise another wall himself towards Rhium, in Achaia.² But the Corinthians, Sicyonians, and such others as this wall would have prejudiced, came forth and hindered him.³

LIII. The same summer fell out a war between the Epidaurians and the Argives: the pretext thereof was about a beast for sacrifice, which the Epidaurians ought to have sent in consideration of their pastures, to Apollo Pythius, and had not done it; the Argives being the principal owners of the temple. But Alcibiades and the Argives had indeed determined to take in the city, though without pretence at all, both that the Corinthians might not stir, and also that they might bring the Athenian succours from Ægina into those parts a nearer way than by compassing the promontory of Scyllæum. And therefore the Argives prepared, as of themselves, to exact the sacrifice by invasion.

LIV. About the same time also the Lacedæmonians with their whole forces, came forth as far as Leuctra, in the confines of their own territory, towards Lycæum, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus their king. No man knew against what place they intended the war; no, not the cities themselves out of which they were levied. But when in the sacrifices which they made for their passage, the tokens observed were unlucky, they went home again, and sent word about to their confederates to prepare themselves to be again on the march after the next month (it being now the month Carneius,⁴ festival of the Dorians.) The Argives, who set forth the 26th day of the month before Carneius, though they celebrated the same day, yet all the time they continued invading and wasting Epidauria. And the

¹ τῶν ἀντόθεν ξυμμάχων παραλαβὼν, Bekker. τῶν ἀντόθεν ξυμμάχων, καὶ παραλαβὼν, Duker. And taking with him some of the allies from thence.

² There was another Rhium in Ætolia.

³ This project aimed at no less than the total ruin of Corinth, and putting an end to all its navigation through the bay of Crissa. The Athenians were already entire masters of the sea on the other

side of the isthmus.

⁴ Their holy month, in which they kept a feast to Apollo. This festival was observed by most cities of Greece, but with the greatest pomp and solemnity at Sparta, where it began the 13th of the month Carneius, and lasted nine days. Apollo was called Carneus, ὅτι καὶ μένος ὀπάται νέος. It was the same month as the Athenian Metageitmon, viz. August.

Epidaurians called in their confederates to help them, whereof some excused themselves on account of the month, and others came but to the confines of Epidauria, and there staid.

LV. Whilst the Argives were in Epidaurus, the ambassadors of divers cities, solicited by the Athenians, met together at Mantinea, where in a conference amongst them, Euphamidas, of Corinth, said, that their actions agreed not with their words, for as much as whilst they were sitting there to treat of a peace, the Epidaurians with their confederates, and the Argives, stood armed in the mean time against each other in order of battle. That it was therefore fit that somebody should go first to the armies from either side, and dissolve them, and then come again and dispute of peace. This advice being approved, they departed, and withdrew the Argives from Epidauria. And meeting afterwards again in the same place, they could not for all that agree; and the Argives again invaded and wasted Epidauria. The Lacedæmonians also drew forth their army against Caryæ;¹ but then again their sacrifice for passage being not to their mind, they returned. And the Argives when they had spoiled about the third part of Epidauria, went home likewise. They had the assistance of one thousand men of arms of Athens, and Alcibiades their commander; but these hearing that the Lacedæmonians were in the field, and seeing now there was no longer need of them, departed; and so passed this summer.

LVII. The next winter the Lacedæmonians, unknown to the Athenians, put three hundred garrison soldiers under the command of Agesippidas into Epidaurus by sea. For which cause the Argives came and expostulated with the Athenians, that whereas it was written in the articles of the league, that no enemy should be suffered to pass through either of their dominions, yet had they suffered the Lacedæmonians to pass by sea;² and said they had been wronged unless the Athenians would again put the Messenians and Helots into Pylos against the Lacedæmonians. But the Athenians, at the persuasion of Alcibiades, wrote on the Laconian pillar³ [under the inscription of the peace] that the Lacedæmonians had violated their oath, and they drew the Helots out of Cranii,⁴ and put them again into Pylos, to infest the territory with driving booties, but did no more. All this winter, though there was war between the Argives and Epidaurians, yet was there no set battle, but only ambushes and skirmishes, wherein was slain on both sides such as it chanced. But in the end of winter, and the spring now at hand, the Argives came to Epidaurus with ladders, as destitute of men by reason of the war, thinking to have won it by assault, but returned again with their labour lost. And so ended this winter, and the thirteenth year of this war.

YEAR XIV. A. C. 418. OLYMP. 90.²/₃.

LVII. In the middle of the next summer, the Lacedæmonians see-

¹ In Arcadia, between Orchomenus and Pheneum, distant from the latter sixty furlongs.

² The Argives allow the sea on their own coast to be under the dominion of

Athens.

³ Which was erected for the articles of the peace to be written on.

⁴ In Cephallenia, where they had before placed them.

ing that the Epidaurians, their confederates, were tired, and that of the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus, some had already revolted, and others were but on bad terms, and apprehending that if they prevented it not, the mischief would spread still farther, put themselves into the field with all their own forces, both of themselves and their Helots, to make war against Argos, under the conduct of Agis, the son of Archidamus, their king. The Tegeates went also with them, and the rest of Arcadia, all that were in the Lacedæmonian league. But the rest of their confederates, both within Peloponnesus and without, were to meet together at Phlius. That is to say, of the Bœotians five thousand men of arms, and as many light-armed, five hundred horse, and to every horseman¹ another man on foot, who holding the horse's mane, ran by with equal speed. Of Corinthians, two thousand men of arms, and of the rest more or less, as they were. But the Phliasians, because the army was assembled in their own territory, put forth their whole power.

LVIII. The Argives having had notice, both formerly of the preparation of the Lacedæmonians, and afterward of their marching on to join with the rest at Phlius, brought their army likewise into the field. They had with them the aids of the Mantineans and their confederates, and three thousand men of arms of the Eleans; and marching forward, met the Lacedæmonians² at Methydrium, a town of Arcadia, each side seizing on a hill. And the Argives prepared to give battle to the Lacedæmonians, whilst they were single. But Agis dislodging his army by night, marched on to Phlius to the rest of the confederates, unseen. On knowledge hereof, the Argives betimes in the morning retired first to Argos, and afterwards to the forest of Nemea, by which they thought the Lacedæmonians and their confederates would fall in. But Agis came not the way which they expected, but with the Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, and Epidaurians, whom he acquainted with his purpose, took another more difficult way to pass, and came down to the Argive plains. The Corinthians also, and Pelienians, and Phliasians, marched another troublesome way; only the Bœotians, Megareans, and Sicyonians, were appointed to come down by the way of the forest of Nemea, in which the Argives were encamped; that if the Argives should turn head against the Lacedæmonians, these might set upon them at the back with their horse. Thus ordered, Agis entered the plains, and spoiled Saminthos and some other [towns.]

LIX. Which when the Argives understood, they came out of the forest somewhat after break of day to oppose them, and lighting among the Phliasians and Corinthians, slew some few of the Phliasians, but had more slain of their own by the Corinthians, though not many. The Bœotians, Megareans and Sicyonians marched forward toward Nemea, and found the Argives were departed, for coming down and seeing their country wasted, they put themselves into order of battle;

¹ Ἀμύκκοι. The exact business of these we are informed only by late writers, whose authority is extremely doubtful. Mitford.

² The Lacedæmonians, Tegeates, and some Arcadians, not the whole league, which was not yet united.

and the Lacedæmonians on the other side did the same; and the Argives stood intercepted in the midst of their enemies. For in the plain between them and the city, stood the Lacedæmonians and those with them; and above them were the Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pellonians; and towards Nemea were the Bœotians, Sicyonians, and Megareans. And horsemen they had none, for the Athenians alone of all their confederates, were not yet come. Now the generality of the army of the Argives and their confederates, did not think the danger present so great as indeed it was, but rather that the advantage in the battle would be their own, and that the Lacedæmonians were intercepted, not only in the Argives' territory, but also hard by the city. But two men of Argos, Thrasyllus, one of the five commanders of the army, Alciphron, entertainer¹ of the Lacedæmonians, when the armies were even ready to join, went to Agis and dealt with him to have the battle put off, for as much as the Argives were content and ready, both to propound and accept of equal arbitrators in whatever the Lacedæmonians should charge them with, and in the mean time to have peace with them solemnly confirmed.

LX. This these Argives said of themselves, without the command of the generality; and Agis of himself likewise accepting their proposition, without deliberation had with the major part, and having communicated it only to some one more of those that had charge in the army, made truce with them for four months; in which they were to perform the things agreed on betwixt them. And then presently he withdrew his army, without giving account to any of the rest of the league why he did so. The Lacedæmonians and their confederates followed Agis, according to the law, he being their general, but amongst themselves taxed him exceedingly, for that having a very fair occasion of battle, the Argives being enclosed on all sides, both by their horse and foot, he yet went his way, doing nothing worthy the great preparation they had made. For this was in very truth the fairest army that ever the Grecians had in the field to this day; but it was most to be seen when they were altogether² in the forest of Nemea; where the Lacedæmonians were with their whole forces, besides the Arcadians, Bœotians, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Pellenians, Phliasians, and Megareans; and these all chosen men of their several cities, and such as were thought a match not only for the league of the Argives, but for such another added to it. The army thus offended with Agis, departed, and were dissolved, every man to his home. The Argives were much more offended with those of their city, who without the consent of the multitude, had made the truce, they also supposing that the Lacedæmonians had escaped their hands in such an advantage, as they never had the like before; in that the battle was to have been fought under their city walls, and with the assistance of many and good confederates. And in their return they began to stone Thrasyllus at the Charadrum, (the place where the

¹ Πρόξευος. He that lodged the Lacedæmonians when any of them came to Argos.

² That is, going home; for till then they were never altogether in Nemea.

soldiers before they enter into the city from warfare used to have their military causes heard,) but he flying to the altar saved himself, nevertheless they confiscated his goods.

LXI. After this, the Athenians coming in with the aid of one thousand men of arms, and three hundred horse, under the conduct of Laches and Nicostratus, the Argives (for they were afraid for all this to break the truce with the Lacedæmonians,) willed them to be gone again; and when they desired to treat, would not present them to the people till such time as the Mantineans and Eleans (who were not yet gone) forced them to it by their importunity. Then the Athenians,¹ in the presence of Alcibiades, the ambassador there, spake to the Argives and their confederates, saying, that the truce was unduly made, without the assent of the rest of their confederates, and that now (for they were come time enough) they ought to fall again to the war, and did by their words so prevail with the confederates, that they all, save the Argives, presently marched against Orchomenus,² of Arcadia. And these, though satisfied, staid behind at first, but afterwards they also went. And sitting down before Orchomenus, jointly besieged and assaulted the same; desiring to take it in; as well for other causes, as chiefly for that the hostages which the Arcadians had given to the Lacedæmonians, were there in custody. The Orchomenians fearing the weakness of their walls, and the greatness of the army, and lest they should perish before any relief arrived, yielded up the town on conditions: to be received into the league; to give hostages for themselves; and to surrender the hostages held there by the Lacedæmonians into the hands of the Mantineans.

LXII. The confederates after this, having got Orchomenus, sat in council about what town they should proceed against next. The Eleans gave advice to go against Lepreum,³ but the Mantineans against Tegea. And the Argives and Athenians concurred in opinion with the Mantineans. But the Eleans taking it in evil part that they did not decree to go against Lepreum, went home; but the rest prepared themselves at Mantinea to go against Tegea, which also some within had a purpose to put into their hands.

LXIII. The Lacedæmonians after their return from Argos with their four months' truce, severely questioned Agis, for that upon so fair an opportunity, as they never had before, he subdud not Argos to the state; for so many and so good confederates would hardly be got together again at one time. But when also the news came of the taking of Orchomenus, then was their indignation much greater, and they presently resolved, contrary to their own custom, in their passion, to rase his house, and fine him in the sum of a hundred thousand drachmas.⁴ But he besought them that they would do neither of these things yet; and promised that leading out the army again, he would by some valiant action cancel those accusations; or if not they might proceed afterwards to do with him whatever they thought good. So

¹ Laches and Nicostratus.

² As being in particular hostility

³ There was another Orchomenus in Boeotia.

with it.

⁴ Nearly four thousand pounds.

they forbore both the fine and the rasing of his house ; but made a decree for that present, such as had never been before, that ten Spartans should be elected and joined with him as counsellors, without whom it should not be lawful for him to lead the army into the field. In the mean time came news from their side in Tegea, that unless they came presently with aid, the Tegeans would revolt to the Argives, and their confederates ; and that they wanted little of being revolted already.

LXIV. On this the Lacedæmonians with speed levied all their forces, both of themselves and their Helots, in such number as they had never done before,¹ and marched to Orestium² in Mænalia, and appointed the Arcadians, such as were of their league, to assemble and follow them at the heels to Tegea, they being come entire to Orestium, from thence sent back the sixth part of their army, in which they put both the youngest and the eldest sort, for the custody of the city, and with the rest marched on to Tegea, and not long after arrived also their confederates of Arcadia. They sent also to Corinth, and to the Bœotians, Phocians, and Locrians, to come with their aids with all speed to Mantinea. But these had too short a warning, nor was it easy for them, unless they came altogether, and staid for one another, to come through the enemies' country, which lay between, and barred them of passage. Nevertheless they made what haste they could. And the Lacedæmonians, taking with them their Arcadian confederates present, entered the territory of Mantinea, and pitching their camp by the temple of Hercules, wasted the territory about.

LXV. The Argives and their confederates, as soon as they came in sight, seized a certain place fortified by nature, and of hard access, and put themselves in battle array. And the Lacedæmonians marched presently towards them, and came up within a stone or a dart's cast. But then one of the ancient men of the army³ cried out to Agis, seeing him to go on against a place of that strength, that he went about to amend one fault with another ; signifying that he intended to make amends for his former retreat from Argos, which he was questioned for, with his now unseasonable forwardness. But he, whether it were on that increpation, or some other sudden apprehension of his own, presently withdrew his army before the fight began, and marching to the territory of Tegea, turned [the course of] the water into the territory of Mantinea ; touching which water, because into what part soever it had its course, it did much harm to the country, the Mantineans and Tegeates were at war. Now his drift was, by the turning of that water, to provoke those Argives and their confederates who kept the hill, when they should hear of it, to come down and oppose them, that so they might fight with them in the plain. And by that

¹ οἷα οὐπω πρότερον, Bekker. ὥς οὐπω πρότερον, Duker. Upon this, speedy assistance is brought by the Lacedæmonians, with their whole force, both of themselves and their Helots, and such assistance as had never been

before brought by them.

² Orestium. Bekker.

³ Τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τις, one of the council appointed to advise him, or one of the elder officers of the army.

time he had staid about the water a day, he had diverted the stream : but the Argives and their confederates were at first amazed at this their sudden retreat from so near them, and knew not what to make of it ; but when after the retreat they returned no more in sight, and that they themselves lying still on the place, did not pursue them, then began they anew to accuse their commanders ; both for suffering the Lacedæmonians to depart formerly, when they had them enclosed at so fair an advantage before Argos ; and now again for not pursuing them when they ran away, but giving them leave to save themselves, and betraying the army. The commanders for the present were much troubled hereat, but afterwards they drew down the army from the hill, and coming forth into the plain, encamped as to go against the enemy.

LXVI. The next day the Argives and their confederates put themselves into such order as, if occasion served, they meant to fight in, and the Lacedæmonians returning from the water to the temple of Hercules, the same place where they had formerly encamped, perceive the enemies to be all of them in order of battle hard by them, come down already from the hill. Certainly the Lacedæmonians were more affrighted at this time than ever they had been to their remembrance before. For the time they had to prepare themselves was exceeding short, and such was their diligence that every man fell immediately into his own rank, Agis the king commanding all, according to the law. For whilst the king¹ has the army in the field, all things are commanded by him, and he signifies what is to be done to the Polemarchi, they to the Lochagi, these to the Pentecontateres, and these again to the Enomatarchi, who lastly make it known every one to his own Enomatia.² In this manner when they would have any thing to be done, their commands pass through the army, and are quickly executed ; for almost all the Lacedæmonian army, save a very few, are captains of captains, and the care of what is to be put in execution, lies upon many.

LXVII. Now their left wing consisted of the Sciritæ,³ who amongst the Lacedæmonians have ever alone that place ; next to these were placed the Brasidian soldiers, lately come out of Thrace ; and with them those that had been newly made free.⁴ After them in order, the rest of the Lacedæmonians, band after band ; and by them Arcadians, first the Heræans, after these the Mænaliens, in the right wing the Tegeates, and a few Lacedæmonians in the point of it, and on the outside of either wing, the horsemen. So stood the Lacedæmonians ; opposite to them in the right wing stood the Mantineans,

¹ The power of the Spartan kings on the field of battle was absolute : see Herod. b. vi. where speaking of Leoty-chides, he says, it was lawful for him in his capacity of commander, to do what he pleased against the Thessalians.

² Πολέμαρχοι, marshals of the field ; Λεχαγοί, commanders of regiments, colonels ; Πεντηκονταῖρες, (or, according

to Xenophon, Πεντηκοστῆρες,) captains of companies ; Ἐνωμοτάρχοι, captains of companies ; Ἐνωμοτία in this army consisted of thirty-two soldiers.

³ A band of the Lacedæmonians, so called, perhaps, from Scirus, a town of Arcadia.

⁴ Νεοδαμώδεις.

because it was on their own territory, and with them such Arcadians as were of their league; then the thousand chosen Argives, whom the city had for a long time caused to be trained for the wars at the public charge; and next to them the rest of the Argives, and after these the Cleonæans and Orneates, their confederates; and lastly, the Athenians with the horsemen (who were also theirs) had the left wing.

LXVIII. This was the order and preparation of both the armies, but the army of the Lacedæmonians appeared to be the greater. But the exact number, either of the particulars of either side, or in general, I could not exactly write; for the number of the Lacedæmonians, agreeable to the secrecy of that state, was unknown; and of the other side, for the ostentation usual with all men, touching the number of themselves, was unbelieved. Nevertheless the number of the Lacedæmonians may be attained by computing thus. Besides the Sciritæ, who were six hundred, there fought in all seven regiments,¹ in every regiment were four companies,² in each company were four Enomatæ, and of every Enomatiæ there stood in front four; but they were not ranged all alike in file, but as the captains of bands thought it necessary. But the army in general was so ordered, as to be eight men in depth, and the first rank of the whole, besides the Sciritæ, consisted of four hundred and forty-eight soldiers.

LXIX. Now when they were ready to join, the commanders made their exhortations, every one to those that were under his own command. To the Mantineans it was said, that they were to fight for their territory, and concerning their liberty and servitude, that the former might not be taken from them, and that they might not again taste of the latter.—The Argives were admonished, that whereas anciently they had the leading of Peloponnesus, and in it an equal share,³ they should not now suffer themselves to be deprived of it for ever; and that withal, they should now revenge the many injuries of a city, their neighbour and enemy. To the Athenians it was remembered, how honourable a thing it would be for them, in company of so many and good confederates, to be inferior to none of them; and that if they had once vanquished the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, their own dominion would become both the more assured, and the larger by it, and that no other would invade their territory hereafter. Thus much was said to the Argives and their confederates.⁴ But the

¹ Λόχοι, less than ordinary regiments with us, more than companies.

² Περηκοστύες, companies of fifty, but more or less in them as occasion served; of these the *ἐνωμοτία* was the fourth part. By this account, every *ἐνωμοτία* had thirty-two, every *περηκοστύς* one hundred and twenty-eight, every band or Λόχοι five hundred and twelve, the whole army besides the Sciritæ three thousand five hundred and eighty-four, and with the Sciritæ, who are six hundred, four thousand one hundred and eighty-four; which number

rises also thus, four hundred and forty-eight in rank, eight in file, make three thousand five hundred and eighty-four, and then the six hundred Sciritæ, as before, make four thousand one hundred and eighty-four. Light-armed soldiers, who usually far exceeded the number of men of arms, are not reckoned.

³ See Herod. b. vii. c. 148, 149.

⁴ τοιαῦτα παρρησίῳ, Bekker.—ταῦτα παρρησίῳ, Duker. Such things were said by way of advice to the Argives and their allies.

Lacedæmonians encouraged one another, both of themselves, and also by the manner¹ of their discipline in the wars; taking encouragement, being valiant men, by the commemoration of what they already knew, as being well acquainted, that a long actual experience conferred more to their safety, than any short verbal exhortation, though never so well delivered.

LXX. After this followed the battle, the Argives and their confederates marching to the charge with great violence and fury. But the Lacedæmonians, slowly, and with many flutes, according to their military discipline, not as a point of religion, but that marching evenly, and by measure, their ranks might not be distracted, as the greatest armies, when they march in the face of the enemy use to be.²

LXXI. Whilst they were yet marching up, Agis the king thought of this course. All armies do thus; in the conflict they extend their right wing, so as it comes in upon the flank of the left wing of the enemy; and this happens because every one through fear seeks all he can to cover his unarmed side with the shield of him that stands next him on his right hand, conceiving that to be so locked together is their best defence. The beginning hereof is in the leader of the first file on the right hand, who ever striving to shift his unarmed side from the enemy, the rest on like fear follow after. And at this time the Mantineans in the right wing had far encompassed the Sciritæ; and the Lacedæmonians on the other side, and the Tegeates, were come in, yet farther on the flank of the Athenians, by as much as they had the greater army. Wherefore Agis, fearing lest his left wing should be encompassed, and supposing the Mantineans to be come in far, signified to the Sciritæ and Brasidians, to draw out part of their bands, and therewith to equalize their left wing to the right wing of the Mantineans, and into the void space he commanded to come up Hipponoidas and Aristocles, two colonels, with their bands out of their right wing, and to fall in there, and make up the breach; conceiving that more than enough would be still remaining in their right wing, and that the left wing opposed to the Mantineans would be the stronger.

LXXII. But it happened (for he commanded it in the very onset, and on the sudden,) both that Aristocles and Hipponoidas refused to go to the place commanded, for which they were afterwards banished Sparta, as thought to have disobeyed out of cowardice, and that the enemy had in the mean time also charged. And when those whom he commanded to go to the place of the Sciritæ, went not, they could no more reunite themselves, nor close again the empty space. But the Lacedæmonians, though they had the worst at this time in every point, for skill, yet in valour they manifestly shewed themselves superior. For after the fight was once begun, notwithstanding that the right wing of the Mantineans put to flight the Sciritæ and Brasidians, and that the Mantineans, together with their confederates, and those one thousand chosen men of Argos, falling on them in flank, by the breach not yet closed up, killed many of

¹ They used, before battle, to sing songs of encouragement to die for their country.

² Milton in his *Paradise Lost*, b. i. l. 578, has made use of this Lacedæmonian march to adorn his own poetry.

the Lacedæmonians, and put to flight, and chased them to their carriages, slaying also certain of the elder sort left there for a guard, so as in this part the Lacedæmonians were overcome. But with the rest of the army, and especially the middle battle, where king Agis was himself, and those who are called the three hundred horsemen about him, they charged the eldest of the Argives, and those named the five cohorts, and the Cleonæans and Orneates, and certain Athenians arranged amongst them, and put them all to flight, so that many of them never struck stroke, but as soon as the Lacedæmonians charged, gave ground presently, and some for fear to be overtaken, were trodden under foot.

LXXIII. As soon as the army of the Argives and their confederates had in this part given ground, they began also to break on either side, and the right wing of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeates had now with their surplus of number hemmed in the Athenians, so as they had the danger on all hands, being within the circle, penned up; and without it, already vanquished. And they had been the most distressed part of all the army had not their horsemen come in to help them. Withal it fell out that Agis when he perceived the left wing of his own army to labour, namely, that which was opposed to the Mantineans, and to those thousand Argives, commanded the whole army to go and relieve the part overcome. By which means the Athenians and such of the Argives as together with them were overlaid whilst the army passed by and declined them, saved themselves at leisure. And the Mantineans with their confederates, and those chosen Argives, had no more mind now of pressing their enemies, but seeing their side overcome, and the Lacedæmonians approaching them, presently turned their backs. Of the Mantineans the greatest part were slain, but of those chosen Argives, the most were saved, the flight and going off being neither hasty nor long. For the Lacedæmonians fight long and constantly, till they have made the enemy turn his back, but that done, they follow him not far.

LXXIV. Thus or near thus went the battle, the greatest that had been for a long time between Grecians, and of two the most famous cities. The Lacedæmonians laying together the arms of their slain enemies, presently erected a trophy, and rifled their dead bodies; and their own dead they took up, and carried to Tegea, where they were also buried, and delivered to the enemy theirs, under truce. Of the Argives, and Orneates, and Cleonæans, were slain seven hundred, of the Mantineans two hundred, and of the Athenians with the Æginetæ, two hundred, and both the captains. The confederates of the Lacedæmonians were never pressed, and therefore their loss was not worth mentioning; and of the Lacedæmonians themselves it is hard to know the certainty, but it is said there were slain three hundred.

LXXV. When it was certain they would fight, Pleistoanax, the other king of the Lacedæmonians, and with him both old and young came out of the city to have aided the army; and he came forth as far as Tegea,¹ but being advertised of the victory, returned. And the

¹ A decree was passed at Sparta that both kings should not be absent at the same time. Herod. b. v.

Lacedæmonians sending out, turned back their confederates coming from Corinth, and from without the isthmus; and then they also went home themselves, and having dismissed their confederates, (for now were the Carneian holidays,) celebrated that feast. Thus in this one battle they wiped off their disgrace with the Grecians, for they had been taxed both with cowardice, for the blow they received in the island, and with imprudence and slackness in other occasions; but after this, their miscarriage was imputed to fortune, and for their minds, they were esteemed to have been ever the same they had been. The day before this battle it chanced also that the Epidaurians with their whole power invaded the territory of Argos, as being deserted, and whilst the Argives were abroad, killed many of those that were left behind to defend it. Also three thousand men of Elis, and a thousand Athenians, besides those who had been sent before, being come after the battle to aid the Mantineans, marched presently all to Epidaurus, and lay before it all the while the Lacedæmonians were celebrating the Carneian holidays: and assigning to every one his part, began to take in the city with a wall, but the rest gave over; only the Athenians quickly finished a fortification, (which was their task,) wherein stood the temple of Juno. In it, amongst them all, they left a garrison, and went home every one to his own city. And so this summer ended.

LXXXVI. In the beginning of the winter following, the Lacedæmonians, presently after the end of the Carneian holidays, drew out their army into the field, and being come to Tegea, sent certain propositions of agreement before to Argos. There were before this time many citizens in Argos well affected to the Lacedæmonians, and who desired the deposing of the Argive people, and now after the battle, they were better able by much to persuade the people to composition, than they formerly were. And their design was first to get a peace made with the Lacedæmonians, and after that a league, and then at last to set upon the commons. There went thither Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus, entertainer of the Argives in Lacedæmon, and brought to Argos two propositions; one of war, if the war were to proceed; another of peace, if they would have peace. And after much contradiction, (for Alcibiades was also there,) the Lacedæmonian faction, that boldly now discovered themselves, prevailed with the Argives to accept the proposition of peace, which was this:

LXXXVII. "It seems good to the council of the Lacedæmonians
 "to accord with the Argives on these articles:—the Argives shall
 "re-deliver to the Orchomenians their children,¹ and to the Mænalians
 "their men,² and to the Lacedæmonians those men³ that are at Mantinea.—They shall withdraw their soldiers from Epidaurus, and rase
 "the fortification there. And if the Athenians depart not from Epidaurus likewise, they shall be held as enemies both to the Argives
 "and to the Lacedæmonians, and also to the confederates of them

¹ Hostages which they took of the Orchomenians. the Lacedæmonians, and by them kept in Orchomenus, and at the taking of

² Hostages of the Mænalians. Orchomenus by the Argive league, carried away to Mantinea.

³ Hostages of the Arcadians given to

“ both.—If the Lacedæmonians have any men of theirs in custody, they shall deliver them every one to his own city.—And for so much as concerns the god,¹ the Argives shall accept composition with the Epidaurians, upon an oath² which they shall swear, touching that controversy, and the Argives shall give the form of that oath.³—All the cities of Peloponnesus, both small and great, shall be free, according to their patril laws.—If any without Peloponnesus shall enter into it to do it harm, the Argives shall come forth to defend the same, in such sort as in a common council shall by the Peloponnesians be thought reasonable.—The confederates of the Lacedæmonians without Peloponnesus, shall have the same conditions which the confederates of the Argives and of the Lacedæmonians have, every one holding his own.—This composition is to hold from the time that they shall both parts have shewn the same to their confederates, and obtained their consent.—And if it shall seem good to either part to add or alter any thing, their confederates shall be sent to, and made acquainted therewith.”

LXXVIII. These propositions the Argives accepted at first, and the army of the Lacedæmonians returned from Tegea to their own city. But shortly after, when they had commersed together, the same men⁴ went further, and so wrought, that the Argives renouncing their league with the Mantineans, Eleans, and Athenians, made league and alliance with the Lacedæmonians in this form :

LXXIX. “ It seems good to the Lacedæmonians and Argives to make league and alliance for fifty years, on these articles :—That either side shall allow the other equal and like trials of judgment, after the form used in their cities.—That the rest of the cities of Peloponnesus (this league and alliance comprehending also them,) shall be free,⁵ both from the laws and payments of any other city than their own, holding what they have, and affording equal and like trials of judgment, according to the form used in their several cities.—That all of the cities, confederates with the Lacedæmonians, without Peloponnesus, shall be in the same condition with the Lacedæmonians, and the confederates of the Argives in the same with the Argives, every one holding his own.—That if at any time there shall need an expedition to be undertaken in common, the Lacedæmonians and the Argives shall consult thereof, and decree as shall stand most with equity towards the confederates ; and that if any controversy arise between any of the cities, either within or without Peloponnesus, about limits or other matter, they also shall decide

¹ Apollo, to whom the Epidaurians should have sent a beast for sacrifice, in name of their pastures, but not doing it, the Argives went about to force them to it.

² An oath to send the beast for sacrifice hereafter.

³ *περι δὲ τῷ σῶ σώματος εἶμεν λῆν*, Bekker. *περι δὲ τῷ σῶ, συμβατόσασμεν λῆν*, Duker. Respecting the person of the god, that it should be allowed the

Epidaurians to receive the oath, and that they (the Argives) should administer it. It may not be useless to throw out the peculiarities of the Doric dialect : *περι δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ σώματος εἶναι λαμβάνειν—διδόναι δὲ. αἱ δὲ τι δοσὴ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις*, Bekker. *αἱ δὲ τι καὶ ἄλλο*, Duker. And if any thing should seem fit to the allies, to send word home.

⁴ The Lacedæmonian faction.

⁵ *Ἀπρόνομοι καὶ ἀντροπῳλεις*.

“ it.—That if any confederate city be at contention with another, it shall have recourse to that city which they both shall think most indifferent; but the particular men of any one city shall be judged according to the law of the same.”

LXXX. Thus was the peace and league concluded, and whatever one had taken from another in the war, or had against another otherwise, was all acquitted. Now when they were together settling their business, they ordered that the Argives should neither admit herald nor embassy from the Athenians, till they were gone out of Peloponnesus, and had quitted the fortification; nor should make peace or war with any, without consent of the rest. And amongst other things which they did in this heat, they sent ambassadors from both their cities, to the towns lying upon Thrace, and to Perdiccas, whom they also persuaded to swear himself of the same league. Yet he revolted not from the Athenians presently, but intended it; because he saw the Argives had done so (and was himself also anciently descended out of Argos:*) they likewise renewed their old oath with the Chalcidæans, and took another besides it. The Argives sent ambassadors also to Athens, requiring them to abandon the fortification made against Epidaurus. And the Athenians considering that the soldiers they had in it were but few, in respect of the many other that were with them in the same, sent Demosthenes thither to fetch them away. He, when he was come, and had exhibited for a pretence, a certain exercise of naked men without the fort, when the rest of the garrison were gone forth to see it, made fast the gates, and afterwards having renewed the league with the Epidaurians, the Athenians by themselves put the fort into their hands.

LXXXI. After the revolt of the Argives from the league, the Mantineans also, though they withstood it at first, being too weak without the Argives, made peace with the Lacedæmonians, and laid down their command over the other cities.† And the Lacedæmonians and Argives, with a thousand men of either city, having joined their arms, the Lacedæmonians first, with their single power, reduced the government of Sicyon to a smaller number, and then they both together dissolved the democracy at Argos; and the oligarchy was established conformable to the state of Lacedæmon.‡ These things passed in the end of the winter, and near the spring. And so ended the fourteenth year of this war.

YEAR XV. A. C. 417. OLYMP. 90½.

LXXXII. The next summer the Dictidians seated in Mount Athos, revolted from the Athenians to the Chalcidæans, and the Lacedæmonians ordered the state of Achaia, after their own form, which before was otherwise. But the Argives, after they had by little and little assembled themselves and recovered heart, taking their time when the Lacedæmonians were celebrating their exercises of the naked

* See Herod. b. viii. c. 137.

Arcadia.

† Which they had the leading of in

‡ See Diod. Sic. b. xii.

youth,¹ assaulted the few, and in a battle fought within the city, the commons had the victory, and some they slew, others they drove into exile. The Lacedæmonians, though those of their faction in Argos sent for them, went not a long time after, yet at last they adjourned the exercises, and came forth with intention to give them aid, but hearing by the way at Tegea, that the few were overcome, they could not be intreated by such as had escaped thence to go on, but returning, went on with the celebration of their exercises. But afterwards, when there came ambassadors to them, both from the Argives in the city, and from them that were driven out, there being present also their confederates, and much alleged on either side, they concluded at last that those in the city had done the wrong, and decreed to go against Argos with their army; but many delays passed, and much time was spent between. In the mean time the common people of Argos fearing the Lacedæmonians, and regaining the league with Athens, as conceiving the same would turn to their very great advantage, raise long walls from their city down to the sea shore; to the end that if they were shut up by land, they might yet, with the help of the Athenians, bring things necessary into the city by sea. And with this their building, some other cities of Peloponnesus were also acquainted. And the Argives, universally themselves, and wives, and servants, wrought at the wall; and had workmen and hewers of stone from Athens. So this summer ended.

LXXXIII. The next winter the Lacedæmonians understanding that they were fortifying, came to Argos with their army, they and their confederates, all but the Corinthians, and some practice they had beside, within the city itself of Argos. The army was commanded by Agis, the son of Archidamus, king of the Lacedæmonians. But those things which were practising in Argos, and supposed to have been already mature, did not then succeed. Nevertheless they took the walls that were then building, and rased them to the ground; and then after they had taken Hysiaë, a town in the Argive territory, and slain all the freemen in it, they went home, and were dissolved every one to his own city. After this, the Argives went with an army into Phliasia, which when they had wasted, they went back. They did it because the men of Phlius had received their outlaws; for there the greatest part of them dwelt. The same winter the Athenians shut up Perdiccas in Macedonia, from the use of the sea, objecting that he had sworn the league of the Argives and Lacedæmonians, and that when they had prepared an army under the conduct of Nicias, the son of Niceratus, to go against the Chalcidæans upon Thrace, and against Amphipolis, he had broken the league made betwixt them and him; and by his departure was the principal cause of the dissolution of that army, and was therefore an enemy. And so this winter ended, and the fifteenth year of this war.

YEAR XVI. A.C. 416. OLYMP. 90-91. 4-1.

LXXXIV. The next summer went Alcibiades to Argos with

¹ *Γυμνοπαῖδιαι*, were solemn dances at Sparta, performed by naked boys. See Herod. vi. 67.

twenty galleys, and took thence the suspected Argives, and such as seemed to savour of the Lacedæmonian faction, to the number of three hundred, and put them into the nearest of the islands subject to the Athenian state. The Athenians made war also against the isle of Melos, with thirty galleys of their own, six of Chios, and two of Lesbos. Wherein were of their own twelve hundred men of arms, three hundred archers, and twenty archers on horseback, and of their confederates and islanders about fifteen hundred men of arms. The Melians are a colony of the Lacedæmonians,¹ and therefore refused to be subject, as the rest of the islands were, to the Athenians; but rested at first neutral, and afterwards, when the Athenians put them to it, by wasting their land, they entered into open war. Now the Athenian commanders, Cleomenes, the son of Lycomedes, and Tisias, the son of Tisimachus, being encamped on their land with these forces, before they would hurt the same, sent ambassadors to deal with them first by way of conference. These ambassadors the Melians refused to bring before the multitude, but commanded them to deliver their message before the magistrates and the few, and they accordingly said as follows:

LXXXV. *Ath.* Since we may not speak to the multitude, lest when they hear our persuasive and unanswerable arguments, all at once in a continued oration, they should chance to be seduced, (for we know that this is the scope of your bringing us to audience before the few) make surer yet that point, you that sit here, answer you also to every particular, not in a set speech, but presently interrupting us, whenever any thing shall be said by us which shall seem to you otherwise. And first answer us, whether you like this motion or not?—Whereunto the council of the Melians answered.

LXXXVI. *Mel.* The equity of a leisurely debate is not to be found fault withal; but this preparation of war, not future, but already here present, seems not to agree with the same. For we see that you are come to be judges of the conference, and that the issue of it, if we be superior in argument, and therefore yield not, is likely to bring us war; and if we yield, servitude.

LXXXVII. *Ath.* Nay, if you be come together to reckon up suspicions of what may be, or to any other purpose, than to take advice upon what is present, and before your eyes, how to save your city from destruction, let us give over. But if this be the point, let us speak to it.

LXXXVIII. *Mel.* It is reasonable and pardonable for men in our cases, to turn both their words and thoughts upon divers things; howsoever, this consultation being held only on the point of our safety, we are content, if you think good, to go on with the course you have propounded.

LXXXIX. *Ath.* As we therefore will not, for our parts, with fair pretences, (as that having defeated the Medes, our reign is therefore

¹ See Herod. b. vii.; and Xenophon, Plutarch, in his book, *On the Virtues of Women*. A particular account of the origin of the colony is given by

lawful, or that we come against you for injury done) make a long discourse without being believed; so would we have you also not expect to prevail by saying, either, that you took not our parts, because you were a colony not of the Lacedæmonians; or that you have done us no injury; but out of those things which we both of us do really think, let us go through with that which is feasible; both you and we knowing, that in human disputation justice is then only agreed on, when the necessity is equal. Whereas they that have odds of power, exact as much as they can, and the weak yield to such conditions as they can get.

XC. *Mel.*¹ Well then, (seeing you put the point of profit in the place of that of justice,) we hold it profitable for ourselves, not to overthrow a general profit to all men, which is this. That men in danger, if they plead reason and equity, nay, though somewhat without the strict compass of justice, yet it ought ever to do them good. And the same most of all concerneth me, for as much as you shall else give an example unto others of the greatest revenge that can be taken, if you chance to miscarry.

XCI. *Ath.* As for us, though our dominion should cease, yet we fear not the sequel. For not they that command, as do the Lacedæmonians, are cruel to those that are vanquished by them, (yet we have nothing to do now with the Lacedæmonians,) but such as having been in subjection, have assaulted those that commanded them, and got the victory. But let the danger of that be to ourselves. In the mean time we tell you this, that we are here now, both to enlarge our own dominion, and also to confer about the saving of your city. For we would have dominion over you, without oppressing you, and preserve you to the profit of us both.

XCII. *Mel.* But how can it be profitable for us to serve, though it be so for you to command?

XCIII. *Ath.* Because you by obeying shall save yourselves from extremity; and we not destroying you, shall reap profit by you.

XCIV. *Mel.* But will you not accept that we remain quiet, and be your friends, (whereas before we were your enemies,) and take part with neither?

¹ Ἡμεῖς δὲ νομιζομέν γε χρησίμων — μή καταλύνειν ὑμᾶς — καὶ το καὶ ἐντὸς τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς, Bekker. Ἡ μὲν δὲ νομιζομέν γε χρησίμων — μή καταλύνειν ἡμᾶς — καὶ τι καὶ ἐκτὸς τοῦ ἀκριβοῦς, Duker. We indeed think it is useful, (for it is necessary, since you have put profit in the place of justice,) that you should not destroy the common good, but that reason and justice should be considered by one who is still in danger, and that any one should be profited who tries to persuade even somewhat within the strict point of accuracy.—This sentence is very difficult to translate; its meaning may be given more clearly if we do not too closely adhere to the text. The

Meleians mean to say—Since you have put profit in the place of justice, we must of necessity consider what may be profitable to you, at the same time that it is as favourable as possible to ourselves; we therefore think that it is for your advantage not to destroy the common good by enslaving us, but rather, since you are yourselves constantly in danger, to let reason and justice have their sway, and although a person cannot make good his own cause accurately, yet to allow him the greatest indulgence, for if you do not treat others so, you must not expect that when you happen to be the weaker, you will meet with lenity from your superiors.

XCV. *Atk.* No, for your enmity doth not so much hurt us, as your friendship will be an argument of our weakness; and your hatred, of our power, amongst those whom we bear rule over.

XCVI. *Mel.* Why? Do your subjects measure equity so, as to put those that never had to do with you, and themselves, who for the most part have been your own colonies, and some of them after revolt conquered, into one and the same consideration?

XCVII. *Atk.* Why not? For they think they have reason on their side, both the one sort and the other; and that such as are subdued are subdued by force, and such as are forborne are so through our fear. So that by subduing you, besides the extending of our dominion over so many more subjects, we shall also assure it the more over those we had before, especially being masters of the sea, and you islanders, and weaker (except you can get the victory) than others whom we have subdued already.

XCVIII. *Mel.* Do you think then that there is no assurance in that which we propounded? For here again, (since driving us from the plea of equity, you persuade us to submit to your profit) when we have shewed you what is good for us, we must endeavour to draw you to the same, as far forth as it shall be good for you also. As many therefore as now are neutral, what do you but make them your enemies, when beholding these your proceedings, they look that hereafter you will also turn your arms upon them? And what is this, but to make greater the enemies you have already, and to make others your enemies even against their wills, that would not else have been so?

XCIX. *Atk.* We do not think that they shall be ever the more our enemies, who inhabiting any where in the continent, will be long ere they so much as keep guard upon their liberty against us. But islanders unsubdued, as you be, or islanders offended with the necessity of subjection which they are already in, these may indeed, by unadvised courses, put both themselves and us into apparent danger.

C. *Mel.* If you then to retain your command, and your vassals to get loose from you, will undergo the utmost of danger, would it not in us that be already free, be great baseness and cowardice if we should not encounter any thing whatsoever, rather than suffer ourselves to be brought into bondage?

CI. *Atk.* No, if you advise rightly. For you have not in hand a match of valour upon equal terms, wherein to forfeit your honour; but rather a consultation upon your safety, that you resist not such as be so far your over-matches.

CII. *Mel.* But we know that in matter of war the event is sometimes otherwise than according to the difference of the number in sides. And that if we yield presently, all our hope is lost; whereas if we hold out, we have yet a hope to keep ourselves up.¹

¹ καὶ ὅμιν τὸ μὲν εἶναι, Bekker. resistance there is still some hope that ἡμῖν, Duker. And if we yield to you, we shall hold up. immediately we lose all hope; but with

CIII. *Ath.* Hope! the comfort of danger, when such use it as have to spare, though it hurt them, yet it destroys them not. But to such as set their rest upon it, (for it is a thing by nature prodigal,) it at once by failing maketh itself known; and known, leaveth no place for future caution. Which let not be your own case, you that are but weak, and have no more but this one stake. Nor be you like unto many men, who though they may presently save themselves by human means, will yet when (upon pressure of the enemy) their most apparent hopes fail them, betake themselves to blind ones, as divination, oracles, and other such things, which with hopes destroy men.

CIV. *Mel.* We think it (you well know) a hard matter for us to combat your power and fortune, unless we might do it on equal terms. Nevertheless we believe, that for fortune we shall be nothing inferior, as having the gods on our side, because we stand innocent, against men unjust. And for power, what is wanting in us, will be supplied by our league with the Lacedæmonians, who are of necessity obliged, if for no other cause, yet for consanguinity's sake, and for their own honour, to defend us. So that we are confident, not altogether so much without reason, as you think.

CV. *Ath.* As for the favour of the gods, we expect to have it as well as you, for we neither do nor require any thing contrary to what mankind hath decreed, either concerning the worship of the gods, or concerning themselves. For of the gods we think according to the common opinion; and of men that for certain by necessity of nature, they will every where reign over such as they be too strong for. Neither did we make this law, nor are we the first that use it made, but as we found it, and shall leave it to posterity for ever, so also we use it. Knowing that you likewise, and others that should have the same power which we have, would do the same. So that for as much as toucheth the favour of the gods, we have in reason no fear of being inferior. And as for the opinion you have of the Lacedæmonians, in that you believe they will help you for their own honour, we bless your innocent minds, but affect not your folly. For the Lacedæmonians, though in respect of themselves and the constitutions of their own country, they are wont for the most part to be generous; yet in respect of others, though much might be alleged, yet the shortest way one might say it all thus, that most apparently of all men, they hold for honourable that which pleaseth, and for just that which profiteth. And such an opinion maketh nothing for your now absurd means of safety.

CVI. *Mel.* Nay for this same opinion of theirs we now the rather believe that they will not betray their own colony, the Melians; and thereby become perfidious to such of the Grecians as be their friends, and beneficial to such as be their enemies.

CVII. *Ath.* You think not then that what is profitable must be also safe, and that which is just and honourable must be performed with danger, which commonly the Lacedæmonians are least willing of all men to undergo for others.

CVIII. *Mel.* But we suppose that they will undertake danger for us rather than for any other; and that they think that we will be more

assured unto them than unto any other ; because for action we lie near to Poloponnesus, and for affection are more faithful than others for our nearness of kin.

CIX. *Ath.* The security of such as are at wars, consisteth not in the good will of those that are called to their aid, but in the power of those means they excel in. And this the Lacedæmonians themselves use to consider more than any ; and therefore out of diffidence to their own forces, they take many of their confederates with them, though to an expedition but against their neighbours. Wherefore it is not likely, we being masters of the sea, that they will ever pass over into an island.

CX. *Mel.* Yea, but they may have others to send, and the Cretan sea is wide, wherein to take another, is harder for him that is master of it, than it is for him that will steal by to save himself. And if this course fail, they may turn their arms against your own territory, or those of your confederates not invaded by Brasidas. And then you shall have to trouble yourselves no more about a territory that you have nothing to do withal, but about your own and your confederates.

CXI. *Ath.* Let them take which course of these they will, that you also may find by experience, and not be ignorant that the Athenians never yet gave over siege, for fear of any diversion upon others. But we observe, that whereas you said you would consult for your safety, you have not yet in all this discourse said any thing which a man relying on, could hope to be preserved by, the strongest arguments you use being but future hopes, and your present power too short to defend you against the forces already arranged against you. You shall therefore take very absurd counsel, unless excluding us, you make amongst yourselves some more discreet conclusion. For when you are by yourselves, you will no more set your thoughts on shame, which when dishonour and danger stand before men's eyes, for the most part undoes them. For many when they have foreseen into what dangers they were entering, have nevertheless been so overcome by that forcible word dishonour, that that which is but called dishonour, hath caused them to fall willingly into immedicable calamities, and so to draw upon themselves really by their own madness a greater dishonour than could have befallen them by fortune. Which you, if you deliberate wisely, will take heed of, and not think shame to submit to a most potent city, and that upon so reasonable conditions, as of league, and of enjoying your own, under tribute.¹ And seeing choice is given you of war or safety, do not out of peevishness take the worst. For such do take the best course, who though they give no way to their equals, yet do fairly accommodate to their superiors, and towards their inferiors use moderation. Consider of it therefore,

¹ ὃ ὑμεῖς, ἣν εὔ βουλευέσθε.—This whole sentence is pointed differently by Bekker, and he changes ὑποτελή for ὑποτελείς which you, if you consult well, will beware of, and will not think it disgraceful to be overcome by a very large city, which invites you to mode-

rate terms, viz. to become its allies, subject to tribute, enjoying your own country, and when the choice is given you of war and safety, do not, through your love of quarrelling, choose the worst.

whilst we stand off, and have often in your mind that you deliberate of your country, which is to be happy or miserable in and by this one consultation.

CXII. So the Athenians went aside from the conference; and the Melians after they had decreed the very same things which before they had spoken, answered them in this manner.

Mel. Men of Athens, our resolution is no other than what you have heard before; nor will we in a small portion of time, overthrow that liberty in which our city hath remained for the space of seven hundred years since it was first founded. But trusting to the fortune by which the gods have preserved it hitherto, and unto the help of men, that is of the Lacedæmonians, we will do our best to maintain the same. But this we offer; to be your friends; enemies to neither side; and you to depart out of our land after agreement, such as we shall both think fit.

CXIII. Thus the Melians answered; to which the Athenians, the conference being already broken off, replied thus:

Ath. You are the only men, (as it seemeth to us by this consultation) that think future things more certain than things seen, and behold things doubtful, through desire to have them true, as if they were already come to pass. As you attribute and trust the most unto the Lacedæmonians, and to fortune, and hopes; so will you be the most deceived.

CXIV. Thus said, the Athenians' ambassadors departed to their camp, and the commanders, seeing that the Melians stood out, fell presently to the war, and dividing the work among the several cities, encompassed the city of the Melians with a wall. The Athenians afterwards left some forces of their own, and of their confederates, for a guard, both by sea and land, and with the greatest part of their army went home. The rest that were left besieged the place.

CXV. About the same time the Argives making a road into Phlissia, lost about eighty of their men by ambush laid for them by the men of Phlius and the outlaws of their own city. And the Athenians that lay in Pylos, fetched in thither a great booty from the Lacedæmonians; notwithstanding which the Lacedæmonians did not war on them, as renouncing the peace, but gave leave by edict only to any of their people that would take booties reciprocally in the territory of the Athenians. The Corinthians also made war on the Athenians, but it was for certain controversies of their own, and the rest of Peloponnesus stirred not. The Melians also took that part of the wall of the Athenians by an assault in the night, which looked towards the market-place,¹ and having slain the men that guarded it, brought into the town both corn and other provision, whatsoever they could buy for money, and so returned and lay still.² And the Athenians from thenceforth kept a better watch. And so this summer ended.

¹ The market-place in the fortifications of the Athenians, where the food was served for the use of the soldiers, not the market-place of the Melians themselves.

² ὅσα πλείστα ἰδύναντο χρήσιμα,

Bekker. ὅσα πλείστα ἰδύναντο χρήσιμα, Duker. And having brought in corn, and as many other useful things as they were able, they retired, and lay quiet.

CXVI. The winter following the Lacedæmonians with their army being about to enter the territory of the Argives, when they perceived that the sacrifices made on the border for their passage, were not acceptable, returned. And the Argives, having some of their own city in suspicion, in regard of this design of the Lacedæmonians, apprehended some of them, and some escaped. About the same time the Melians took another part of the wall of the Athenians, they that kept the siege being then not many. But this done, there came afterwards fresh forces from Athens, under the conduct of Philocrates, the son of Demeas. And the town being now strongly besieged, there being also within some that practised to have it given up, they yielded themselves to the discretion of the Athenians, who slew all the men of military age, made slaves of the women and children, and inhabited the place with a colony sent thither afterwards, of five hundred men of their own.

END OF THE FIFTH BOOK.

THUCYDIDES.

BOOK VI.

Sicily described. Causes and pretences of the Sicilian war, with the consultation and preparation for the same. Alcibiades, one of the generals of the army, accused of defacing the images of Mercury, is suffered for that time to depart with the army. The Athenian army comes to Rhegium, thence to Catana. From thence Alcibiades is sent for home, to answer to his accusations, and by the way escaping, goes to Lacedæmon. Nicias encamps near Syracuse, and having overcome the army of the Syracusians in battle, returns to Catana. The Syracusians procure aids amongst the rest of the Sicilians. Alcibiades instigates and instructs the Lacedæmonians against his country. Nicias returns from Catana to Syracuse, and encamping in Epipolæ, besieges the city, and begins to enclose them with a double wall, which was almost brought to perfection in the beginning of the eighteenth year of this war.

YEAR XVI. A.C. 416. OLYMP. 90-91. 4-1.

CHAP. I.

THE same winter the Athenians with greater forces than they had before sent out with Laches and Eurymedon,¹ resolved to go again into Sicily, and, if they could, wholly to subdue it. Being for the most part ignorant both of the greatness of the island, and of the multitude of people, as well Greeks as Barbarians, that inhabited the same; and that they undertook a war not much less than the war against the Peloponnesians. For the compass of Sicily is little less than eight days' sail for a ship,² and though so great, is yet divided by no more than twenty furlongs, sea measure, from the continent.³

II. It was inhabited in old time thus: and these were the nations that held it. The most ancient inhabitants in a part thereof are said to have been the Cyclopes and Læstrygonæ, of whose stock, and whence they came, or to what place they removed, I have nothing to say. Let that suffice which the poets have spoken, and which every particular man hath learned of them.⁴ After them the first that appear to have dwelt therein, are the Sicanians, as they say them-

¹ B. iii. 86. 115.

² Concerning the compass of Sicily, see Pliny iii. 8. Strabo vi. p. 266. Writers do not agree in their admeasurements of the island. Cluverius took great pains to ascertain its dimensions, and carefully perambulated it, and the result of his inquiry was, that from the promontory of Pelorus to Lilybæum was two hundred

and fifty-five miles; from Lilybæum to Pachynum one hundred and ninety; from Pachynum to Pelorus one hundred and fifty-four; in all, five hundred and ninety-nine miles.

³ The channel at the straits of Messina is scarcely three miles wide.

⁴ See Homer's *Odyssey*, b. ix.

selves; nay, before the other, as being the natural breed¹ of the island, but the truth is, they were Iberians, and driven away by the Ligians from the banks of Sicanus, [a river on which they were seated] in Iberia. And the island from them came to be called Sicania, which was before Trinacria; and these two still inhabit the western parts of Sicily. After the taking of Ilium, certain Trojans escaping the hands of the Grecians, landed with small boats in Sicily, and having planted themselves on the borders of the Sicanians, both the nations in one were called Elymi, and their cities were Eryx and Egesta. Hard by these came and dwelled also certain Phocians, who coming from Troy, were by tempest carried first into Africa, and thence into Sicily. But the Siculi passed out of Italy, (for there they inhabited) flying from the Opicæ, having, as is most likely, and as it is reported, observed the strait, and with a fore-wind got over in boats which they made suddenly on the occasion, or perhaps by some other means. There is at this day a people in Italy, called Siculi;² and Italy itself got that name after the same manner, from a king of Arcadia,³ called Italus.⁴ Of these a great army crossing over into Sicily, overthrew the Sicanians in battle, and drove them into the south and west parts of the same; and instead of Sicania, caused the island to be called Sicilia, and held and inhabited the best of the land for near three hundred years after their going over, and before any of the Grecians came thither. And till now they possess the midland, and north parts of the island. Also the Phœnicians inhabited the coast of Sicily on all sides, having taken possession of certain promontories and little islands adjacent, for trade's sake with the Sicilians. But after that many Grecians were come in by sea, the Phœnicians abandoned most of their former habitations, and uniting themselves, dwelt in Motya, and Soloes, and Panormus, on the borders of the Elymi: as relying on their league with the Elymi, and because also from thence lay the shortest cut over to Carthage. These were the Barbarians, and thus they inhabited Sicily.

III. Now for Grecians, first a colony of Chalcidæans, under Thucles, their conductor, going from Eubœa, built Naxos,⁵ and the altar of Apollo Archegetes,⁶ now standing without the city, on which the ambassadors employed to the oracles, as often as they launch from Sicily, are accustomed to offer their first sacrifice. The next year Archias, a man of the family of the Heraclidæ, carried a colony from Corinth, and became founder of Syracuse, where first he drove the Siculi out of that island,⁷ in which the inner part of the city now stands, not now environed wholly with the sea as it was then. And in process of time, when the city also that is without, was taken in

¹ *Αὐτόχθονες*. Their sovereign was Cocalus. "Cyclopihus extinctis, Cocalus regnum insulæ occupavit." *Justin.*

² This is contrary to the account of other historians. Diodorus says that the whole of the Siculi passed over into Sicily.

³ *βασιλῆως τινὸς Σικελῶν*, Bekker.

βασιλῆως τινὸς Ἀρκάδων, Duker. From a certain king of the Sicilians.

⁴ See Virg. *Æneid.* vii. 178.

⁵ A.C. 759.

⁶ Chief guide.

⁷ Ortygia, an island part of the city of Syracuse, joined to it by a bridge.

with a wall, it became a populous city.¹ In the fifth year after the building of Syracuse, Thucles and the Chalcidæans, going from Naxos, built Leontium,² expelling thence the Siculi, and after that Catana; but they that went to Catana chose Euarchus for their founder.

IV. About the same time arrived in Sicily also Lamis, with a colony from Megara, and first built a certain town called Trotilus, on the river Pantacius, where for a while after he governed his colony in common with the Chalcidæans of Leontium; but afterwards, when he was by them thrust out, and had built Thapsus, he died; and the rest going from Thapsus, under the conduct of Hyblon, a king of the Siculi, built Megara, called Megara-Hylea. And after they had there inhabited two hundred and forty-five years, they were by Gelon, a tyrant of Syracuse, put out both of the city and territory. But before they were driven thence, namely one hundred years after they had built it, they sent out Pammilus, and built the city of Selinus; this Pammilus came to them from Megara, their own metropolitan city, and so together with them founded Selinus. Gela was built in the forty-fifth year after Syracuse, by Antiphemus, who brought a colony out of Rhodes, and by Entimus, who did the like out of Crete, jointly. (This city was named after the river Gela; and the place where now the city stands, and which at first they walled in, was called Lindii; and the laws which they established were the Doric.) About one hundred and eight years after their own foundation, they of Gela built the city of Acragas, calling the city after the river Acragas, and for their conductors chose Aristonous and Pystilus, giving them the laws of Gela. Zancle was first built by pirates, who came from Cumæ, a Chalcidæan city in Opicia; but afterwards there came a multitude, and helped to people it, out of Chalcis and the rest of Eubœa; and their conductors were Perieres and Cratæmenes, one of Cumæ, the other of Chalcis. And the name of the city was at first Zancle, so named by the Sicilians, because it hath the form of a sickle, and the Sicilians call a sickle Zancalon.³ But these inhabitants were afterwards chased thence by the Samians and other people of Ionia, that in their flight from the Medes, fell upon Sicily.

V. After this, Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium, drove out the Samians, and peopling the city with a mixed people of them and his own, instead of Zancle, called the place by the name of his own country from whence he was anciently descended, Messena. After Zancle was built Himera, by Eucleides, Simus, and Sacon; the most of which colony were Chalcidæans; but there were also amongst them certain outlaws of Syracuse, the vanquished part of a sedition, called the Myletidæ. Their language grew to a mean between the Chalcidæan and Doric; but the laws of the Chalcidæan prevailed. Acræ

¹ It extended twenty-two miles and a half in circumference, and was divided into four districts, Ortygia, Acradina, Tycha, and Neapolis, to which may perhaps be added Epipolæ. It fell into the hands of the Romans, under the consul Marcellus, A. C. 212. See Livy, xxiii.

Polyb. viii. Cic. in Verr. iv. c. 52, 53.

² See Polyb. vii. It was situated about five miles from the coast, near the spot on which stands the modern city of Lentini.

³ Diodorus says the city derived its name from a king Zancus.

and Chasmenæ were built by the Syracusians; Acræ twenty years after Syracuse, and Chasmenæ almost twenty after Acræ. Camarina was at first built by the Syracusians, very near the one hundred and thirty-fifth year of their own city, Dascon and Menecolus being the conductors. But the Camarinæans having been by the Syracusians driven from their seat by war for revolt, Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, in process of time taking of the Syracusians that territory for ransom of certain Syracusian prisoners, became their founder, and placed them in Camarina again. After this again, having been driven thence by Gelon, they were planted the third time in the same city.

VI. These were the nations, Greeks and Barbarians, that inhabited Sicily; and though it were thus great, yet the Athenians longed very much to send an army against it, out of a desire to bring it all under their subjection, (which was the true motive,) but as having withal this fair pretext of aiding their kindred and new confederates. But principally they were instigated to it by the ambassadors of Egesta, who were at Athens, and earnestly pressed them thereto. For bordering on the territory of the Selinuntians, they had begun a war about certain things concerning marriage, and about a piece of ground that lay doubtfully between them. And the Selinuntians having leagued themselves with the Syracusians, infested them with war both by sea and by land. So that the Egestæans putting the Athenians in mind of their former league with the Leontines, made by Laches, prayed them to send a fleet thither to their aid; alleging, amongst many other things, this as principal, that if the Syracusians who had driven the Leontines from their seat, should pass without revenge taken on them, and so proceed by consuming the rest of the allies of the Athenians there, to get the whole power of Sicily into their hands, it would be dangerous, lest hereafter, some time or other, being Dorians, they should with great forces aid the Dorians for affinity, and being a colony of the Peloponnesians, join with the Peloponnesians that sent them out to pull down the Athenian empire; that it were wisdom therefore, with those confederates they yet retain, to make head against the Syracusians; and the rather, because for the defraying of the war, the Egestæans would furnish money sufficient of themselves. Which things when the Athenians had often heard in their assemblies from the mouths of the Egestæan ambassadors, and of their advocates and patrons, they decreed to send ambassadors to Egesta to see first whether there were in their treasury and temples so much wealth as they said there was, and to bring word on what terms the war stood between that city and the Selinuntians.

VII. And ambassadors were sent into Sicily accordingly. The same winter the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, all but the Corinthians, having drawn out their forces into the territory of the Argives, wasted a small part of their fields, and carried away certain cart-loads of their corn, placing in Orneæ the Argive outlaws, and leaving with them a few others of the rest of the army. And then making a composition for a certain time, that the Ornetæ and those Argives should not wrong each other, they carried their army home. But the Athenians arriving not long after with thirty galleys and six

hundred men of arms, the people of Argos came also forth with their whole power, and joining with them, sat down betimes in the morning before Orneæ. But when at night the army went somewhat far off to lodge, they within fled out, and the Argives the next day perceiving it, pulled Orneæ to the ground, and went home; as also did the Athenians not long after with their galleys. Also the Athenians transported certain horsemen by sea, part of their own and part of Macedonian fugitives that lived with them, into Methone,¹ and ravaged the territory of Perdiccas. And the Lacedæmonians sent to the Chalcidæans upon Thrace, who held peace with the Athenians from ten days to ten days, appointing them to aid Perdiccas; but they refused. And so ended the winter, and the sixteenth year of this war, written by Thucydides.

YEAR XVII. A. C. 415. OLYMP. 90. $\frac{1}{4}$.

VIII. The next summer, early in the spring, the Athenian ambassadors returned from Sicily, and the ambassadors of Egesta with them, and brought in silver uncoined sixty talents, for a month's pay of sixty galleys, which they would entreat the Athenians to send thither. And the Athenians having called an assembly, and heard both from the Egestæan and their own ambassadors, amongst other persuasive, but untrue allegations touching their money, how they had great store ready, both in their treasury and temples, decreed the sending of sixty galleys to Sicily, and Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, Nicias, the son of Niceratus, and Lamachus,² the son of Xenophanes, for commanders, with absolute authority to aid the people of Egesta against the Selinuntians; and withal, if they had time to spare, to plant the Leontines anew in their city, and to order all other the affairs of Sicily, as they should think most for the profit of the Athenians. Five days after this the people assembled again, to consult how most speedily they might put this armada in readiness, and to decree such things as the generals should further require for the expedition. But Nicias having heard that himself was chosen for one of the generals, and conceiving that the state had not well resolved, but affected the conquest of all Sicily, a great matter on small and superficial pretences, stood forth desiring to have altered this the Athenians' purpose, and spake as follows:

Oration of Nicias.

IX. "Though this assembly was called to deliberate of our preparation, and of the manner how to set forth our fleet for Sicily; yet to me it seems that we ought rather once again to consult, whether it be not better, not to send it at all, than on a short deliberation in

¹ At the siege of this town, Philip of Macedon lost an eye.

² Lamachus seems to have been picked out for the third in this commission on account of the peculiar constitution of his character, which was a mean between the cautious phlegmatic disposition of Nicias, and the fiery, impetuous ardour

of Alcibiades. His condition was low; he was, according to Plutarch, so exceedingly poor, that before he went to any foreign command, he used to petition the state for a little money to furnish him out, and even to buy him shoes.—*Smith.*

“ so weighty an affair, and on the credit of strangers, to draw on ourselves an impertinent war. For my own part, I have honour by it; and for the danger of my person, I esteem it the least of all men; not but that I think him a good member of the commonwealth, that hath regard also to his own person and estate: for such a man especially will desire the public to prosper, for his own sake. But as I have never spoken heretofore, so nor now will I speak any thing that is against my conscience, for gaining to myself a pre-eminence of honour, but that only which I apprehend for the best. And although I am sure, that if I go about to persuade you to preserve what you already hold, and not to hazard things certain for uncertain and future, my words will be too weak to prevail against your humour; yet this I must needs let you know, that neither your haste is seasonable, nor your desires easy to be achieved.

X. “ For I say, that going thither you leave many enemies here behind you, and more you endeavour to draw hither. You perhaps think that the league will be firm that you have made with the Lacedæmonians, which though as long as you stir not, may continue a league in name, (for so some have made it of our own side,) yet if any considerable forces of ours chance to miscarry, our enemies will soon renew the war, as having made the peace, constrained by calamities, and upon terms of more dishonour and necessity than ourselves. Besides, in the league itself, we have many things controverted; and some there be that refuse utterly to accept it, and they none of the weakest, whereof some¹ are now in open war against us, and others,² because the Lacedæmonians stir not, maintain only a truce with us from ten to ten days, and so are contented yet to hold their hands. But peradventure when they shall hear that our power is distracted, (which is the thing we now hasten to do,) they will be glad to join in the war with the Sicilians against us, the confederacy of whom they would heretofore have valued above many other. It behoveth us therefore to consider of these things, and not to run into new dangers, when the state of our own city hangeth unsettled, nor seek a new dominion before we assure that which we already have. For the Chalcidæans of Thrace, after so many years’ revolt, are yet unreduced: and from others in divers parts of the continent, we have but doubtful obedience. But the Egestæans, being forsooth our confederates, and wronged, they in all haste must be aided: though to right us on those by whom we have a long time ourselves been wronged, that we defer.

XI. “ And yet if we should reduce the Chalcidæans into subjection, we could easily also keep them so. But the Sicilians, though we vanquish them, yet being many, and far off, we should have much ado to hold them in obedience. Now it were madness to invade such, whom conquering, you cannot keep; and failing, should lose the means for ever after to attempt the same again. As for the Sicilians, it seemeth unto me, at least as things now stand, that they shall be of less danger to us if they fall under the

¹ The Corinthians.² The Bœotians.

“dominion of the Syracusians, than they are now. And yet this is
 “that the Egestæans would most affright us with; for now the states
 “of Sicily in several, may perhaps be induced in favour of the Lacedæmonians, to take part against us: whereas then, being reduced
 “into one, it is not likely they would hazard with us state against
 “state. For by the same means that they, joining with the Peloponnesians, may pull down our dominion, by the same it would be
 “likely that the Peloponnesians would subvert theirs. The Grecians
 “there will fear us most, if we go not at all; next, if we but shew
 “our forces, and come quickly away. But if any misfortune befall
 “us, they will presently despise us, and join with the Grecians here
 “to invade us; for we all know that those things are most admired
 “which are farthest off, and which least come to give proof of the
 “opinion conceived of them. And this (Athenians) is your own case
 “now with the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, whom because
 “beyond your hope you have overcome, in those things for which
 “you at first feared them, you now in contempt of them turn your
 “arms upon Sicily. But we ought not to be puffed up upon the
 “misfortunes of our enemies, but to be confident then only, when we
 “have mastered their designs. Nor ought we to think that the Lacedæmonians set their minds on any thing else, but how they may yet
 “for the late disgrace repair their reputation, if they can, by our overthrow, and the rather, because they have so much, and so long,
 “laboured to win an opinion in the world of their valour. The question with us therefore, (if we be well advised,) will not be of the
 “Egestæans in Sicily, but how we may speedily defend our city
 “against the insidiation of them that favour the oligarchy.

XII. “We must remember also, that we have had now some short
 “recreation from a late great plague, and great war, and thereby
 “are improved, both in men and money; which it is most meet we
 “should spend here upon ourselves, and not upon these outlaws who
 “seek for aid. Seeing it maketh for them to tell us a specious lie;
 “who contributing only words, whilst their friends bear all the
 “danger, if they speed well, shall be disobliged of thanks; if ill,
 “undo their friends for company.¹ Now if there be any man² here
 “that for ends of his own, as being glad to be general, especially
 “being yet too young to have charge in chief, shall advise the expedition, that he may have admiration for his expense on horses, and
 “help from his place to defray that expense, suffer him not to purchase
 “his private honour and splendour with the danger of the public

¹ αὐτῶν λόγους μόνον, Bekker. αὐ-
 ρους, Duker. To whom to tell a specious
 falsehood is useful, and in endangering
 their neighbour, affording only their
 own words, either that, if they succeed,
 they know not how to make a worthy
 repayment, or if by chance they fail,
 they will make their friends perish with
 them.

² He glances at Alcibiades, whose
 passion for splendour was not to be sub-

dued. It had usually been reckoned
 a great exertion for the greatest indi-
 vidual citizen to send one chariot to
 contend at the Olympic games; it was
 reckoned creditable for a commonwealth
 to send one at the public expense.—
 To one meeting Alcibiades sent seven;
 there he won the first, second, and fourth
 honours, see c. 16. and Isocrat. Orat.
 περὶ ζεύγους.

“fortune. Believe rather that such men, though they rob the public, do nevertheless consume also their private wealth. Besides, the matter itself is full of great difficulties, such as it is not fit for a young man to consult of, much less hastily to take in hand.

XIII. “And I, seeing those now that sit by and abet the same man, am fearful of them, and do on the other side exhort the elder sort, if any of them sit near those other, not to be ashamed to deliver their minds freely; as fearing, that if they give their voice against the war, they should be esteemed cowards; nor to dote (as they do) upon things absent, knowing that by passion the fewest actions, and by reason the most do prosper; but rather for the benefit of their country, which is now cast into greater danger than ever before, to hold up their hands on the other side, and decree, that the Sicilians within the limits they now enjoy,¹ not disliked by you, and with liberty to sail by the shore, in the Ionian gulf, and in the main of the Sicilian sea, shall possess their own, and compound their differences within themselves. And for the Egestæans, to answer them in particular thus; that as without the Athenians they had begun the war against the Selinuntians, so they should without them likewise end it;² and, that we shall no more hereafter, as we have used to do, make such men our confederates, as when they shall do injury we must maintain it, and when we require their assistance, cannot have it.

XIV. “And you the president, (if you think it your office to take care of the commonwealth, and desire to be a good member of the same,) put these things once more to the question, and let the Athenians speak to it again. Think (if you be afraid to infringe the orders of the assembly) that before so many witnesses it will not be made a crime, but that you shall be rather thought a physician of your country, that hath swallowed down evil counsel. And he truly discharges the duty of a president, who labours to do his country the most good, or at least will not willingly do it hurt.”

XV. Thus spake Nicias; but the most of the Athenians that spake after him, were of opinion that the voyage ought to proceed, the decree already made, not to be reversed; yet some there were that said to the contrary. But the expedition was most of all pressed by Alcibiades, the son of Clinias, both out of desire he had to cross Nicias, with whom he was likewise at odds in other points of state, and also because he had glanced at him invidiously in his oration; but principally because he affected to have charge, hoping that himself should be the man to subdue both Sicily and Carthage to the state of Athens, and withal, if it succeeded, to increase his own private wealth and glory. For being in great estimation with the citizens, his desires were more vast than for the proportion of his estate, both

¹ *χωρμένους πρὸς ἡμᾶς, οὐ μεμπτοῖς*, Bekker. *χωρμένους πρὸς ὑμᾶς οὐ μεμπτοῖς*, Duker. And decree that the Sicilians possessing the limits which they now enjoy in relation to us, those same limits not being objected to.

² *τὸ πρῶτον πόλεμον*, Bekker. *τὸν πρῶτον πόλεμον*, Duker. Since without the Athenians they had first begun the war against the Selinuntians, they should also get rid of it by themselves.

in maintaining of horses, and other his expenses was meet; which proved afterwards none of the least causes of the subversion of the Athenian commonwealth. For most men fearing him, both for his excess in things that concerned his person and form of life, and for the greatness of his spirit in every particular action he undertook, as one that aspired to the tyranny, they became his enemy. And although for the public he excellently managed the war, yet every man privately displeased with his course of life, gave the charge of the wars to others, and thereby not long after overthrew the state. But he at this time standing forth, spake to this effect :

Oration of Alcibiades.

XVI. “ Men of Athens, it both belongs to me, more than to any other, to have this charge ; and withal, I think myself (for I must needs begin with this, as having been touched by Nicias) to be worthy of the same. For those things for which I am so much spoken of do indeed purchase glory to my progenitors, and myself, but to the commonwealth they confer both glory and profit. For the Grecians have thought our city a mighty one, even above the truth, by reason of my brave appearance at the Olympian games ; whereas before they thought easily to have warred it down. For I brought thither seven chariots, and not only won the first, second, and fourth prize, but carried also in all other things a magnificence worthy the honour of the victory. And in such things as these, as there is honour to be supposed, according to the law ; so is there also a power conceived, upon sight of the thing done. As for my expenses in the city upon setting forth shows,¹ or whatsoever else is remarkable in me, though naturally it procure envy in other citizens, yet to strangers this also is an argument of our greatness. Now it is no unprofitable course of life, when a man shall at his private cost, not only benefit himself, but also the commonwealth. Nor does he that bears himself high on his own worth, and refuses to make himself fellow with the rest, wrong the rest ; for if he were in distress, he should not find any man that would share with him in his calamity. Therefore as we are not so much as saluted when we be in misery, so let them likewise be content to be contemned of us when we flourish ; or if they require equality, let them also give it. I know that such men, or any man else, that excels in the glory of any thing, shall, as long as he lives, be envied, principally by his equals, and then also by others amongst whom he converses ; but with posterity they shall have kindred claimed of them, though there be none : and his country will boast of him, not as of a stranger, or one that had been a man of lewd life, but as their own citizen, and one that had achieved worthy and laudable acts. This being the thing I aim at, and for which I am renowned, consider now whether I administer the public the worse for it, or not. For having reconciled unto you the most potent states of Peloponnesus without much, either danger or cost, I compelled the Lacedæmo-

¹ *Xorhγai*, the exhibition of masks, games, or other festival spectacles.

“nians to stake all that ever they had on the fortune of one day of Mantinea.

XVII. “And this hath my youth and madness, supposed to have been very madness, with familiar and fit words, wrought on the power of the Peloponnesians; and shewing reason for my passion, made my madness now no longer to be feared. But as long as I flourish with it, and Nicias is esteemed fortunate, make you use of both our services; and abrogate not your decree touching the voyage to Sicily, as though the power were great you are to encounter. For the number wherewith their cities are populous is but of promiscuous nations, easily shifting, and easily admitting new comers; and consequently not sufficiently armed any of them for the defence of their bodies, nor furnished as the custom of the place appoints, to fight for their country. But what any of them thinks he may get by fair speech, or snatch from the public by sedition, that only he looks after, with purpose, if he fail, to ruin the country. And it is not likely that such a rabble should either with one consent give ear to what is told them, or unite themselves for the administration of their affairs in common; but if they hear of fair offers, they will one after one be easily induced to come in; especially if there be seditions amongst them, as we hear there are. And the truth is, there are neither so many men of arms as they boast of; nor doth it appear that there are so many Grecians there in all, as the several cities have every one reckoned for their own number. Nay, even Greece hath much belied itself, and was scarce sufficiently armed in all this war past. So that the business there, for all that I can by fame understand, is even as I have told you, and will yet be easier. For we shall have many of the Barbarians, on hatred of the Syracusians, take our parts against them there, and if we consider the case aright, there will be nothing to hinder us at home. For our ancestors having the same enemies whom they say we leave behind us now in our voyage to Sicily; and the Persian besides, did nevertheless erect the empire we now have, by our only odds of strength at sea. And the hope of the Peloponnesians against us was never less than now it is, though their power were also as great as ever; for they would be able to invade our land, though we went not into Sicily; and by sea they can do us no harm though we go, for we shall leave behind us a navy sufficient to oppose theirs.

XVIII. “What therefore can we allege with any probability for our backwardness? Or what can we pretend to our confederates for denying them assistance? whom we ought to defend, were it but because we have sworn it to them; without objecting that they have not reciprocally aided us. For we took them not into league, that they should come hither with their aids, but that by troubling our enemies there, they might hinder them from coming hither against us. And the way whereby we, and whoever else has dominion, have got it by ever cheerfully succouring their associates who required it, whether Greeks or Barbarians. For if we should all sit still, or stand to make choice which were fit to be

“ assisted and which not, we should have little under our government of the estates of other men, but rather hazard our own. For when one is grown mightier than the rest, men use not only to defend themselves against him when he shall invade, but to anticipate him that he invade not at all. Nor is it in our power to be our own carvers, how much we will have subject to us; but considering the case we are in, it is as necessary for us to seek to subdue those that are not under our dominion, as to keep so those that are: lest if others be not subject to us, we fall in danger of being subjected by them. Nor are we to weigh quietness in the same balance that others do,¹ unless also the institution of this state were like that of other states. Let us rather make reckoning by enterprising abroad, to increase our power at home; and proceed in our voyage, that we may cast down the haughty conceit of the Peloponnesians, and shew them the contempt and slight account we make of our present ease, by undertaking this our expedition to Sicily.² Whereby either conquering those states, we shall become masters of all Greece, or weaken the Syracusians, to the benefit of ourselves and our confederates. And for our security to stay, if any city shall come to our side, or to come away, [if otherwise] our galleys will afford it. For in that we shall be at our own liberty, though all the Sicilians together were against it.³ Let not the speech of Nicias, tending only to laziness, and to the stirring of debate between the young men and the old, avert you from it; but with the same decency wherewith your ancestors consulting young and old together, have brought our dominion to the present height, endeavour you likewise to enlarge the same. And think not that youth or age, one without the other, is of any effect, but that the simplest, the middle sort, and the exactest judgments tempered together, is it that doth the greatest good; and that a state, as well as any other thing, will, if it rest, wear out of itself, and all men’s knowledge decay; whereas by the exercise of war, experience will continually increase, and the city will get a habit of resisting the enemy, not with words, but action. In sum, this is my opinion, that a state accustomed to be active, if it once grow idle, will quickly be subjected by the change; and that they of all men are most surely planted, that with most unity observe the present laws and customs, though not always of the best.”

XIX. Thus spake Alcibiades. The Athenians, when they had heard him, together with the Egestæans and Leontine outlaws, who being then present, entreated, and objecting to them their oath, begged their help in form of suppliants, were far more earnestly bent on the journey than they were before. But Nicias, when he saw he could not alter their resolution with his oration, but thought he might per-

¹ ἐπισκεπτόν ὑμῖν, Bekker. ἡμῖν, we shall appear to disregard our present ease, and sail against Sicily. Duker. Nor are you to consider quietness in the same light that others do.

² εἰ δόξομεν ὑπεριδόντες τὴν ἐν τῷ παρόντι ἡσυχίαν, Bekker. ὑπεριδόντες καὶ οὐκ ἀγαπήσαντες τὴν, Duker. If ³ ναυκράτορες γὰρ ἐσόμεθα, Bekker. αὐτοκράτορες, Duker. For we shall be masters by sea even in spite of all the Sicilians.

haps put them from it by the greatness of the provision, if he should require it with the most, stood forth again, and said in this manner :

Oration of Nicias.

XX. “ Men of Athens, for as much as I see you violently bent
 “ on this expedition, such effect may it take, as is desired. Never-
 “ theless I shall now deliver my opinion upon the matter as it yet
 “ stands. As far as we understand by report, we set out against
 “ great cities, not subject one to another, nor needing innovation;
 “ whereby they should be glad out of hard servitude to admit of
 “ easier masters; nor such as are likely to prefer our government be-
 “ fore their own liberty; but many, (as for one island,) and those
 “ Greek cities. For besides Naxos and Catana, (which two I hope
 “ will join with us, for their affinity with the Leontines,) there are
 “ other seven, furnished in all respects after the manner of our own
 “ army, and especially those two against which we bend our forces
 “ most, Selinus and Syracuse.¹ For there are in them many men of
 “ arms, many archers, many darters, besides many galleys, and a
 “ multitude of men to man them. The Selinuntians have also store
 “ of money, both amongst private men, and in their temples; the
 “ Syracusians have tribute beside coming in from some of the Bar-
 “ barians. But that wherein they exceed us most, is this, that they
 “ abound in horses, and have corn of their own, not fetched in from
 “ other places.

XXI. “ Against such a power we shall therefore need, not a fleet
 “ only, and with it a small army, but there must great forces go along
 “ of land soldiers, if we mean to do any thing worthy our design,
 “ and not to be kept by their many horsemen from landing; especi-
 “ ally if the cities there terrified by us, should now hold all together,
 “ and none but the Egestæans prove our friends, and furnish us with a
 “ cavalry to resist them. And it would be a shame either to come
 “ back with a repulse, or to send for a new supply afterwards, as if
 “ we had not wisely considered our enterprize at first. Therefore we
 “ must go sufficiently provided from hence, as knowing that we go
 “ far from home, and are to make war in a place of disadvantage,
 “ and not as when we went as confederates, to aid some of our sub-
 “ jects here at home, where we had easy bringing in of necessities
 “ to the camp from the territories of friends. But we go far off, and
 “ into a country of none but strangers, and from whence in winter
 “ there can hardly come a messenger to us in so little as four months.

XXII. “ Wherefore I am of opinion that we ought to take with
 “ us many men of arms, of our own, of our confederates, and of our
 “ subjects, and also out of Peloponnesus as many as we can get
 “ either for love or money: and also many archers and slingers,
 “ whereby to resist their cavalry; and much spare shipping, for the
 “ more easy bringing in of provision. Also our corn, I mean wheat
 “ and barley parched, we must carry with us from hence in ships;

¹ The seven were, Syracuse, Selinus, Camarina, Gela, Agrigentum, Himera, Messena.

“ and bakers from the mills, hired and made to work by turns, that the army, if it chance to be weather-bound, may not be in want of victual. For being so great, it will not be for every city to receive it. And so for all things else, we must, as much as we can, provide them ourselves, and not rely on others. Above all, we must take hence as much money as we can. For as for that which is said to be ready at Eggesta, think it ready in words, but not in deed.

XXIII “ For although we go thither with an army not only equal to theirs, but also (excepting their men of arms for battle) in every thing exceeding it, yet so shall we scarce be able both to overcome them, and withal to preserve our own. We must also make account that we go to inhabit some city in that foreign and hostile country, and either the first day we come thither to be presently masters of the field, or failing, be assured to find all in hostility against us. Which fearing, and knowing that the business requires much good advice, and more good fortune (which is a hard matter, being but men,) I would so set forth, as to commit myself to fortune as little as I may, and take with me an army, that in likelihood should be secure. And this I conceive to be both the surest course for the city in general, and the safest for us that go the voyage. If any man be of a contrary opinion, I resign him my place.”

XXIV. Thus spake Nicias, imagining that either the Athenians would, on the multitude of the things required, abandon the enterprize : or if he were forced to go, he might go thus with the more security. But they gave not over their desire of the voyage, on account of the difficulty of the preparation, but were the more inflamed thereby to have it proceed ; and the contrary fell out of that which he before expected. For they approved his counsel, and thought now there would be no danger at all, and every one alike fell in love with the enterprize. The old men, hoping to subdue the place they went to, or that at least so great a power could not miscarry ; and the young men, desiring to see a foreign country, and to gaze, making little doubt but to return with safety. As for the common sort and the soldiers, they made account to gain by it not only their wages for the time, but also so to amplify the state in power, as that their stipend should endure for ever. So that through the vehement desire thereto, of the most, they also that liked it not, lest (if they held up their hands against it) they should be thought evil affected to the state, were content to let it pass.

XXV. And in the end a certain Athenian stood up, and calling on Nicias, said, he ought not to shift off, nor delay the business any longer, but to declare there before them all what forces he would have the Athenians decree him. To which unwillingly he answered and said, he wished to consider of it first with his fellow commanders ; nevertheless for so much as he could judge on the sudden, he said, there would need no less than a hundred galleys ; whereof for transporting of men of arms, so many of the Athenians own, as they themselves should think meet, and the rest to be sent for to their confederates. And that of men of arms, in all, of their own and of their confederates, there would be requisite no less than five thousand, but rather more if

they could be got, and other provision proportionable. As for archers both from hence and from Crete, and slingers, and whatsoever else should seem necessary, they would provide it themselves, and take it with them.

XXVI. When the Athenians had heard him, they presently decreed that the generals should have absolute authority, both touching the greatness of the preparation, and the whole voyage, to do therein as should seem best to them for the commonwealth. And after this they went in hand with the preparations accordingly, and both sent unto the confederates, and enrolled soldiers at home. The city had by this time recovered herself from the sickness, and from their continual wars, both in number of men fit for the wars, grown up after the ceasing of the plague, and in store of money gathered together by means of the peace, whereby they made their provisions with much ease. And thus were they employed in preparation for the voyage.

XXVII. In the mean time the Mercuries of stone throughout the whole city of Athens, (now there were many of these of square stone,¹ set up by the law of the place, and many in the porches of private houses, and in the temples,) had in one night most of them their faces pared, and no man knew who had done it. And yet great rewards out of the treasury had been propounded to the discoverers; and a decree made, that if any man knew of any other profanation, he might boldly declare the same, were he citizen, stranger, or bondman. And they took the fact exceedingly to heart, as ominous to the expedition, and done withal upon conspiracy for alteration of the state, and dissolution of the democracy.

XXVIII. Hereupon certain strangers dwelling in the city, and certain serving-men,² revealed something, not about the Mercuries, but of the paring of the statues of some other of the gods, committed formerly through wantonness and too much wine, by young men, and withal, how they had in private houses acted the mysteries of their religion in mockery.³ Amongst whom they also accused Alcibiades. This, they that most envied Alcibiades, because he stood in their way, that they could not constantly bear chief sway with the people, making account to have the primacy if they could thrust him out, took hold of, and exceedingly aggravated, exclaiming, that both the mockery of the mysteries, and the paring of the Mercuries, tended to the deposing of the people; and that nothing therein was done without him, alleging for argument his other excess in the ordinary course of his life, not convenient in a popular estate.

XXIX. He at that present made his apology, and was there ready, if he had done any such thing, to answer it before he went the

¹ *Smith* does not translate the words ἡ τετραγώνος ἰσχυρία, assigning as a reason that he does not comprehend their meaning, and cannot conceive how *Hobbes* could have translated them "a square stone." Whether they allude to the inclosure in which the statues were erected, or to the form of the pedestals,

or whether a Mercury was carved on any or all the sides of a square stone, he cannot decide. The Mercuries were very numerous, and many of them strange, uncouth performances.

² Ἀκολουθῶν.

³ The sacred mysteries celebrated by the Athenians at Eleusis.

voyage, (for by this time all their preparation was in readiness,) and to suffer justice, if he were guilty; and if absolved, to resume his charge. Protesting against all accusations to be brought against him in his absence, and pressing to be put to death then presently, if he had offended; and saying, that it would not be discreetly done to send away a man accused of so great crimes, with the charge of such an army, before his trial. But his enemies fearing lest if he came then to his trial, he should have had the favour of his army; and lest the people who loved him, because the Argives and some of the Manti-neans served them in this war, only for his sake, should have been mollified, put the matter off, and hastened his going out, by setting on other orators to advise that for the present he should go, and that the setting forward of the fleet should not be retarded, and that at his return he should have a day assigned him for his trial. Their purpose being upon further accusation, which they might easily contrive in his absence, to have him sent for back to make his answer. And thus it was concluded that Alcibiades should go.

XXX. After this, the summer being now half spent, they put to sea for Sicily. The greatest part of the confederates, and the ships that carried their corn, and all the lesser vessels, and the rest of the provision that went along, they before appointed to meet upon a day set, at Corcyra, thence all together to cross over the Ionian gulf to the promontory of Iapygia. But the Athenians themselves, and as many of their confederates as were at Athens on the day appointed, betimes in the morning came down into Piræus, and went aboard to take sea. With them came down (in a manner) the whole multitude of the city, as well inhabitants as strangers: the inhabitants to follow after such as belonged to them, some their friends, some their kinsmen, and some their children; filled both with hope and lamentations; hope of conquering what they went for, and lamentation, as being in doubt whether ever they should see each other any more, considering what a way they were to go from their own territory.

XXXI. And now when they were to leave one another to danger, they apprehended the greatness of the same more than they had done before, when they decreed the expedition. Nevertheless their present strength, by the abundance of every thing before their eyes prepared for the journey, gave them heart again in beholding it. But the strangers and other multitude came only to see the shew, as of a worthy and incredible design. For this preparation, being the first Grecian power that ever went out of Greece from one only city, was the most sumptuous and the most glorious of all that ever had been set forth before it to that day. Nevertheless for number of galleys and men of arms, that which went out with Pericles to Epidaurus, and that which Agnon carried with him to Potidæa, was not inferior to it. For there went four thousand men of arms, three hundred horse, and one hundred galleys out of Athens itself; and out of Lesbos and Chios fifty galleys, besides many confederates that accompanied him in the voyage. But they went not far, and were but meanly furnished. Whereas this fleet, as being to stay long abroad, was furnished for both kinds of service, in which of them soever it should

have occasion to be employed, both with shipping and land soldiers. For the shipping, it was elaborate with a great deal of cost, both of the captains of galleys, and of the city. For the state allowed a drachma¹ per day to every mariner; the empty galleys² which they sent forth, being of nimble ones, sixty, and of such as carried their men of arms forty more. And the captains of galleys both put into them the most able servants, and besides the wages of the state, unto the [uppermost bank of oars, called the] *Thranitæ*,³ and to the servants, gave somewhat of their own; and bestowed great cost otherwise, every one upon his own galley, both in the badges⁴ and other rigging, each one striving to the utmost to have his galley, both in some ornament, and also in swiftness, to exceed the rest. And for the land forces, they were levied with exceeding great choice, and every man endeavoured to excel his fellow in the bravery of his arms and utensils that belonged to his person. Insomuch as that amongst themselves it begat quarrel about precedency, but amongst other Grecians a conceit that it was an ostentation rather of their power and riches, than a preparation against an enemy. For if a man enter into account of the expense, as well of the public as of private men that went the voyage, viz. of the public, what was spent already in the business, and what was to be given to the commanders to carry with them; and of private men, what every one had bestowed upon his person, and every captain on his galley, beside what every one was likely over and above his allowance from the state, to bestow on provision for so long a warfare, and what the merchant carried with him for traffic, he will find the whole sum carried out of the city to amount to a great many talents. And the fleet was no less noised amongst those against whom it was to go, for the strange boldness of the attempt, and gloriousness of the shew, than it was for the excessive report of their number, for the length of the voyage, and for that it was undertaken with so vast future hopes, in respect of their present power.

XXXII. After they were all aboard, and all things laid in that they meant to carry with them, silence was commanded by the trumpet; and after the wine had been carried about to the whole army, and all, as well the generals as the soldiers, had drunk⁵ a health to the voyage, they made their prayers, such as by the law were appointed, before their taking sea; not in every galley apart, but altogether, the herald pronouncing them; and the company from the shore, both of the city and whosoever else wished them well, prayed with them. And when they had sung the *Pæan* and ended the health,

¹ Seven-pence three farthings.

² Empty in respect of those that carried provision.

³ *Θραυίται*. There being three banks of oars one above another, the uppermost were called *Thranitæ*, the middlemost *Zengitæ*, and the lowest *Thalamitæ*, whereof the *Thranitæ* managed the longest oar, and, therefore, in respect of their greater labour, might de-

serve a greater pay.

⁴ *Σημεῖα*. The images, which being set on the forepart of the galley, generally gave it the name.

⁵ *Σπίνδοντες*. It was a form amongst the Grecians, and other nations then, both before great enterprizes to wish good fortune, and at the making of league and peace, to ratify what they did, by drinking one to another.

they put forth to sea.¹ And having at first gone out in a long file, galley after galley, they afterwards made the best of their way to Ægina. Thus hastened these to be at Corcyra; to which place also the other army of the confederates was assembling. At Syracuse they had advertisement of the voyage from divers places; nevertheless it was long ere any thing would be believed. Nay, an assembly being there called, orations were made, such as follow, on both parts, as well by them that believed the report touching the Athenian army to be true, as by others that affirmed the contrary. And Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, as one that thought he knew the certainty, stood forth and spake to this effect:

Oration of Hermocrates.

XXXIII. "Concerning the truth of this invasion, though perhaps I shall be thought as well as other men to deliver a thing incredible; and though I know that such as be either the authors or relaters of matter incredible, shall not only not persuade, but be also accounted fools; nevertheless I will not for fear thereof hold my tongue, as long as the commonwealth is in danger; being confident that I know the truth hereof somewhat more certainly than others do. The Athenians are bent to come, even against us, (which you verily wonder at,) and that with great forces, both for the sea and land, with pretence indeed to aid their confederates, the Egestæans, and to replant the Leontines, but in truth they aspire to the dominion of all Sicily, and especially of this city of ours; which obtained, they make account to get the rest with ease. Seeing then they will presently be upon us, advise with your present means, how you may with most honour make head against them, that you may not be taken unprovided through contempt, nor be careless through incredulity; and that such as believe it, may not be dismayed with their audaciousness and power. For they are not more able to do hurt unto us, than we be unto them, neither indeed is the greatness of their fleet without some advantage unto us. Nay, it will be much the better for us in respect of the rest of the Sicilians; for being terrified by them, they will the rather league with us. And if we either vanquish or repulse them without obtaining what they come for, (for I fear not at all the effecting of their purpose,) verily it will be a great honour to us, and in my opinion not unlikely to come to pass. For in truth there have been few great fleets, whether of Grecians or Barbarians, sent far from home, that have not prospered ill. Neither are these that come against us more in number than ourselves, and the neighbouring cities, for surely we shall all hold together upon fear. And if for want of necessities in a strange territory they chance to miscarry, the honour of it will be left to us, against whom they bend their counsels, though the greatest cause of their overthrow

¹ Plutarch in his Life of Nicias relates many incidents respecting the denunciations of the priest against this expedition. Socrates constantly declared against it, assuring his friends it would draw after it the destruction of the state.

“ should consist in their own errors. Which was also the case of
 “ these very Athenians, who raised themselves by the misfortune
 “ of the Medes, (though it happened for the most part contrary to
 “ reason,) because in name they went only against the Athenians.
 “ And that the same shall now happen to us, is not without proba-
 “ bility.

XXXIV. “ Let us therefore with courage put in readiness our
 “ forces; let us send to the Siculi, to confirm those we have, and
 “ to make peace and league with others; and let us send ambassadors
 “ to the rest of Sicily, to shew them that it is a common danger; and
 “ into Italy to get them into our league, or at least that they receive
 “ not the Athenians. And in my judgment it were our best course
 “ to send also to Carthage, for even they are not without expectation
 “ of the same danger. Nay, they are in a continual fear that the
 “ Athenians will bring the war on them also, even to their city. So
 “ that on apprehension, that if they neglect us, the trouble will come
 “ home to their own door, they will, perhaps, either secretly or openly,
 “ or some way assist us, and of all that now are, they are the best
 “ able to do it, if they please; for they have the most gold and silver,
 “ by which both the wars and all things else are the best expedited.
 “ Let us also send to Lacedæmon, and to Corinth, praying them not
 “ only to send their succours hither with speed, but also to set on foot
 “ the war there. But that which I think the best course of all, though
 “ through a habit of sitting still you will hardly be brought to it, I will
 “ nevertheless now tell you what it is. If the Sicilians all together,
 “ or if not all, yet if we, and most of the rest, would draw together
 “ our whole navy, and with two months’ provision go and meet the
 “ Athenians at Tarentum, and the promontory of Iapygia, and let
 “ them see that they must fight for their passage over the Ionian gulf,
 “ before they fight for Sicily, it would both terrify them the most, and
 “ also put them into a consideration, that we as the watchmen of our
 “ country, come upon them out of an amicable territory, (for we shall
 “ be received at Tarentum,) whereas they themselves have a great
 “ deal of sea to pass with all their preparations, and cannot keep
 “ themselves in their order for the length of the voyage. And that
 “ for us, it will be an easy matter to assail them; coming up as they
 “ do, slowly and thin. Again, if lightening their galleys they shall come
 “ up to us more nimbly and more close together, we shall charge
 “ them already wearied, or we may, if we please, retire again to
 “ Tarentum. Whereas, they, if they come over but with a part of
 “ their provisions, as to fight at sea, shall be driven into want of vic-
 “ tuals in those desert parts, and either staying be there besieged, or
 “ attempting to go by, leave behind them the rest of their provision,
 “ and be dejected, as not assured of the cities, whether they will re-
 “ ceive them or not. I am therefore of opinion, that, dismayed with
 “ this reckoning, they will either not put over at all from Corcyra,
 “ or whilst they spend time in deliberating, and in sending out to
 “ explore how many, and in what place we are, the season will be
 “ lost, and winter come; or, deterred with our unlooked-for oppo-
 “ sition, they will give over the voyage. And the rather, because

“ (as I hear) the man of most experience amongst their commanders
 “ hath the charge against his will, and would take a light occasion
 “ to return, if he saw any considerable stop made by us in the way.
 “ And I am very sure we should be voiced amongst them to the
 “ utmost. And as the reports are, so are men’s minds; and they
 “ fear more such as they hear will begin with them, than such as give
 “ out that they will no more but defend themselves. Because then
 “ they think the danger equal. Which would be now the case of the
 “ Athenians. For they come against us with an opinion that we will
 “ not fight; deservedly contemning us, because we joined not with
 “ the Lacedæmonians to pull them down. But if they should see us
 “ once bolder than they looked for, they would be terrified more with
 “ the unexpectedness, than with the truth of our power itself. Be
 “ persuaded therefore principally to dare to do this; or if not this, yet
 “ speedily to make yourselves otherwise ready for the war; and every
 “ man to remember that though to shew contempt of the enemy be
 “ the best in the heat of fight, yet those preparations are the surest, that
 “ are made with fear and opinion of danger. As for the Athenians,
 “ they come, and I am sure are already in the way, and want only
 “ that they are not now here.”

XXXV. Thus spake Hermocrates. But the people of Syracuse were at much strife amongst themselves, some contending that the Athenians would by no means come, and that the reports were not true; and others, that if they came, they would do no more harm than they were likely again to receive.¹ Some contemned and laughed at the matter; but some few there were that believed Hermocrates, and feared the event. But Athenagoras, who was chief magistrate of the people, and at that time most powerful with the commons, spake as followeth:

Oration of Athenagoras.

XXXVI. “ He is either a coward, or not well affected to the
 “ state, whoever he be that wishes the Athenians not to be so mad,
 “ as coming hither to fall into our power. As for them that report
 “ such things as these, and put you into fear, though I wonder not
 “ at their boldness, yet I wonder at their folly, if they think their ends
 “ not seen. For they that are afraid of any thing themselves, will put
 “ the city into a fright, that they may shadow their own with the
 “ common fear. And this may the reports do at this time, not raised
 “ by chance, but framed on purpose, by such as always trouble the
 “ state. But if you mean to deliberate wisely, make not your reck-
 “ oning by the reports of these men, but by that which wise men, and
 “ men of great experience, (such as I hold the Athenians to be,) are
 “ likely to do. For it is not probable, that leaving the Peloponne-
 “ sians and the war there not yet surely ended, they should willingly
 “ come hither to a new war, no less than the former; seeing, in my

¹ *τί ἂν δράσειαν*. Bekker reads this sentence with a mark of interrogation: they do them, which they would not themselves suffer in a greater degree? And if they did come, what harm could

“ opinion, they may be glad that we invade not them, so many and
 “ so great cities as we are.

XXXVII. “ And if indeed they come, (as these men say they
 “ will,) I think Sicily more sufficient to despatch the war than Peloponnesus, as being in all respects better furnished; and that this our
 “ own city is much stronger than the army which they say is now
 “ coming, though it were twice as great as it is. For I know they
 “ neither bring horses with them, nor can get any here, save only a
 “ few from the Egestæans, nor have men of arms so many as we, in
 “ that they are to bring them by sea. For it is a hard matter to come
 “ so far as this by sea, though they carried no men of arms in their
 “ galleys at all, if they carry with them all other their necessities;
 “ which cannot be small against so great a city. So that I am so
 “ far from the opinion of these others, that I think the Athenians,
 “ though they had here another city as great as Syracuse, and con-
 “ fining on it, and should from thence make their war, yet should not
 “ be able to escape from being destroyed every man of them; much
 “ less now, when all Sicily is their enemy. For in their camp fenced
 “ with their galleys they shall be cooped up; and from their tents and
 “ forced munition, never be able to stir far abroad without being cut
 “ off by our horsemen. In short, I think they shall never be able to
 “ get landing; so much above theirs do I value our own forces.

XXXVIII. “ But these things, as I said before, the Athenians
 “ considering, I am very sure, will look unto their own; and our men
 “ talk here of things that neither are, nor ever will be; who, I know,
 “ have desired, not only now, but ever, by such reports as these, or
 “ by worse, or by their actions, to put the multitude in fear, that they
 “ themselves might rule the state. And I am afraid, lest attempting
 “ it often, they may one day effect it. And for us, we are too poor-
 “ spirited, either to foresee it ere it be done, or foreseeing, to prevent
 “ it. By this means our city is seldom quiet, but subject to sedition
 “ and contention, not so much against the enemy as within itself; and
 “ sometimes also to tyranny and usurpation. Which I will endeavour
 “ (if you will second me) so to prevent hereafter, as nothing more of
 “ this kind shall befall you. Which must be done, first by gaining
 “ you the multitude, and then by punishing the authors of these plots,
 “ not only when I find them in the action, (for it will be hard to take
 “ them so,) but also for those things which they would and cannot do.
 “ For one must not only take revenge upon an enemy for what he hath
 “ already done, but strike him first for his evil purpose; for if a man
 “ strike not first, he shall first be stricken. And as for the few, I
 “ shall in somewhat reprove them, in somewhat have an eye to them,
 “ and in somewhat advise them.—For this I think will be the best
 “ course to avert them from their bad intentions. Tell me forsooth,
 “ (I have asked this question often,) you that are the younger sort,
 “ what would you have? would you now bear office; the law allows
 “ it not. And the law was made because ye are not now sufficient
 “ for government, not to disgrace you when you shall be sufficient.
 “ But forsooth, you would not be ranked with the multitude. But

“ what justice is it, that the same men should not have the same privileges ?

XXXIX. “ Some will say, that the democracy is neither a well-governed, nor a just state, and that the most wealthy are aptest to make the best government. But I answer, first, democracy is a name of the whole, oligarchy but of a part. Next, though the rich are indeed fittest to keep the treasure, yet the wise are the best counsellors, and the multitude, upon hearing, the best judge. Now in a democracy all these, both jointly and severally, participate equal privileges. But in the oligarchy, they allow indeed to the multitude a participation of all dangers ; but in matters of profit, they not only encroach upon the multitude, but take from them and keep the whole. Which is the thing that you, the rich and the younger sort, affect ; but in a great city cannot possibly embrace. But yet, O ye, the most unwise of all men, unless you know that what you affect is evil, and if you know not that, you are the most ignorant of all the Grecians I know ; or ye most wicked of all men, if knowing it, you dare do this.

XL. “ Yet I say, inform yourselves better, or change your purpose, and help to amplify the common good of the city, making account that the good amongst you, shall not only have an equal, but a greater share therein than the rest of the multitude ; whereas, if you will needs have all, you shall run the hazard of losing all. Away therefore with these rumours, as discovered and not allowed. For this city, though the Athenians come, will be able to defend itself with honour. And we have generals to look to that matter. And if they come not, (which I rather believe,) it will not, upon the terror of your reports, make choice of you for commanders, and cast itself into voluntary servitude. But taking direction of itself, it both judgeth your words virtually as facts, and will not upon words let go her present liberty, but endeavour to preserve it by not committing the same actually to your discretion.”

XLI. Thus said Athenagoras. Then one of the generals¹ rising up, forbade any other to stand forth, and spake himself to the matter in hand, to this effect :

Speech of one of the Syracusan Generals.

“ It is no wisdom neither for the speakers to utter such calumnies one against another, nor for the hearers to receive them. We should rather consider, in respect of these reports, how we may in the best manner, both every one in particular, and the city in general, be prepared to resist them when they come. And if there be no need, yet to furnish the city with horses and arms, and other habiliments of war can do us no hurt. As for the care hereof, and the musters, we will look to it, and will send men abroad,

¹ ὥς πρὸς αἰσθημένους, Bekker. ὥς προαίσθανομένους, Duker. Be freed then from such rumours as these, as if they were brought to men who perceived

them, but did not allow them.

² The constitution of Syracuse at this time divided the chief military command between a board of fifteen:

“both to the cities and for spies, and do whatsoever else is requisite. Somewhat we have done already, and what more we shall hereafter find meet, we will from time to time report unto you.” Which when the general had said, the Syracusians dissolved the assembly.

XLII. The Athenians were now all in Corcyra, both they and their confederates. And first the generals took a view of the whole army, and put them into the order wherein they were to anchor, and make their naval camp, and having divided them into three squadrons, to each squadron they assigned a captain by lot, to the end that being at sea, they might not come into want of water,¹ or harbours, or any other necessities, where they chanced to stay; and that they might otherwise be the more easy to be governed, when every squadron had its proper commander. After this, they sent before them three galleys, into Italy and Sicily, to bring them word what cities in those parts would receive them, whom they appointed to come back and meet them, that they might know whether they might be received or not before they put in.

XLIII. This done, the Athenians with all their provisions put out from Corcyra towards Sicily, having with them in all one hundred and thirty-four galleys, and two Rhodian long boats of fifty oars a-piece. (Of these, one hundred were of Athens itself, whereof sixty were expedite, the other forty for transportation of soldiers; the rest of the navy belonged to the Chians, and other the confederates; of men of arms they had in all five thousand one hundred. Of these there were of the Athenians themselves fifteen hundred enrolled, and seven hundred more [of the poorer sort, called] Thetes, hired for defence of the galleys. The rest were of their confederates, some of them being their subjects, of Argives there were five hundred, of Mantineans and mercenaries two hundred and fifty.) Their archers, in all four hundred and eighty, (of whom eighty were Cretans,) Rhodian slingers they had seven hundred. Of light-armed Megarean fugitives one hundred and twenty, and in one vessel made for transportation of horses, thirty horsemen.

XLIV. These were the forces that went over to the war at first. With these went also thirty ships carrying necessities, wherein went also the bakers, and masons, and carpenters, and all tools of use in fortification. And with these thirty ships went a hundred boats by constraint, and many other ships and boats that voluntarily followed the army for trade, which then passed altogether from Corcyra over the Ionian gulf. And the whole fleet being come to the promontory of Iapygia and to Tarentum, and such other places as every one could recover, they went on by the coast of Italy, neither received of the states there into any city, nor allowed any market, having only the liberty of anchorage and water, (and that also at Tarentum and Locri denied them) till they were at Rhegium, where they all came together again, and settled their camp in the temple of Diana, (for neither there

¹ ἵνα μήτε ἄμα πλείοντες, Bekker. ἀναπλείοντες, Duker. That sailing together, they might not be in want of water.

were they suffered to come in) without the city, where the Rhegians allowed them a market. And when they had drawn their galleys to land, they lay still. Being here, they dealt with the Rhegians, who were Chalcidæans, to aid the Leontines, Chalcidæans likewise. To which was answered, that they would take part with neither, but what the rest of the Italians should conclude, that also they would do. So the Athenians lay still, meditating on their Sicilian business, how they might carry it the best; and withal expected the return from Egesta of the three galleys which they had sent before them, desiring to know if so much money were there or not, as was reported by their messengers at Athens.

XLV. The Syracusians in the mean time from divers parts, and also from their spies, had certain intelligence that the fleet was now at Rhegium, and therefore made their preparations with all diligence, and were no longer incredulous; but sent to the Siculi, to some cities, men to keep them from revolting; to others, ambassadors; and into such places as lay upon the sea, garrisons; and examined the forces of their own city by a view taken of the arms and horse, whether they were complete or not, and ordered all things as for a war at hand and only not already present.

XLVI. The three galleys sent before to Egesta returned to the Athenians at Rhegium, and brought word, that for the rest of the money promised there was none, only there appeared thirty talents. At this the generals were presently discouraged, both because this first hope was crossed, and because also the Rhegians, whom they had already begun to persuade to their league, and whom it was most likely they should have won, as being of kin to the Leontines, and always heretofore favourable to the Athenian state, now refused. And though to Nicias this news from the Egestæans was no more than he expected, yet to the other two it was extremely strange. But the Egestæans, when the first ambassadors from Athens went to see their treasure, had thus deceived them. They brought them into the temple of Venus, in Eryx,¹ and shewed them the holy treasure, goblets, flagons, censers, and other furniture, in no small quantity, which being but silver, appeared to the eye a great deal above their true value in money. Then they feasted such as came with them in their private houses, and at those feastings exhibited all the gold and silver vessels they could get together, either in the city of Egesta itself, or could borrow in other, as well Phœnician as Grecian cities, for their own. So all of them in a manner making use of the same plate; and much appearing in every of those houses, it put those who came with the ambassadors into a very great admiration, insomuch that at their return to Athens, they strove who should first proclaim what wealth they had seen. These men having both been abused themselves, and having abused others, when it was told that there was no such wealth in Egesta, were much taxed by the soldiers. But the generals went to council on the business in hand.

XLVII. Nicias was of opinion, that it was best to go presently

¹ Eryx was a city near Egesta, and subject to it.

with the whole fleet to Selinus, against which they were chiefly set forth ; and if the Egestæans would furnish them with money for the whole army, then to deliberate further on the occasion ; if not, then to require maintenance for the sixty galleys set forth at their own request, and staying with them, by force or composition to bring the Selinuntians and them to a peace. And thence passing along by other of those cities, to make a shew of the power of the Athenian state, and of their readiness to help their friends and confederates, and so to go home, unless they could light on some quick and unthought of means to do some good for the Leontines, or gain some of the other cities to their own league, and not to put the commonwealth in danger at her own charges.

XLVIII. Alcibiades said, it would not do well to have come out from Athens with so great a power, and then dishonourably without effect to go home again : but rather to send heralds to every city but Selinus and Syracuse, and assay to make the Siculi revolt from the Syracusians ; and others to enter league with the Athenians, that they might aid them with men and victual. And first to deal with the Messenians, as being seated in the passage, and most opportune place of all Sicily for coming in ; and having a port and harbour sufficient for their fleet ; and when they had gained those cities, and knew what help they were to have in the war, then to take in hand Syracuse and Selinus ; unless these would agree with the Egestæans, and the other suffer the Leontines to be replanted.

XLIX. But Lamachus was of opinion that it was best to go directly to Syracuse, and to fight with them as soon as they could at their city, whilst they were yet unfurnished, and their fear at the greatest. For that an army is always most terrible at first ; but if it stay long ere it come in sight, men recollect their spirits, and contemn it the more when they see it. Whereas if it come upon them suddenly, while they expect it with fear, it would the more easily get the victory, and every thing would affright them :¹ as the sight of it, (for then they would appear most for number) and the expectation of their sufferings, but especially the danger of a present battle. And that it was likely that many men might be cut off in the villages without, as not believing they would come ; and though they should be already got in, yet the army being master of the field, and sitting down before the city, would want no money, and the other Sicilians would then neglect leaguings with the Syracusians, and join with the Athenians, no longer standing off and spying who should have the better. And for a place to retire to, and anchor in, he thought Megara most fit, being desert, and not far from Syracuse neither by sea nor land.

L. Lamachus saying this, came afterwards to the opinion of Alcibiades. But after this, Alcibiades with his own galley having passed over to Messina, and propounded to them a league, and not prevailed, they answering, that they would not let the army in, but allow them only a market without the walls, returned back to Rhegium. And

¹ κατὰ πάντα ἄν αὐτοὺς ἐκφοβῆσαι, Bekker. ἐκφοβῆναι, Duker. That they would be terrified at every thing.

presently the generals having out of the whole fleet manned threescore galleys, and taken provision aboard, went along the shore to Naxos, having left the rest of the army with one of the generals at Rhegium. The Naxians having received them into the city, they went on by the coast to Catana. But the Catanæans receiving them not, (for there were some within that favoured the Syracusians,) they entered the river Terias, and having staid there all that night, went the next day towards Syracuse,¹ leisurely with the rest of their galleys; but ten they sent before into the great haven, not to stay, but to discover if they had launched any fleet there, and to proclaim from their galleys, that the Athenians were come to replant the Leontines on their own, according to league and affinity; and that therefore such of the Leontines as were in Syracuse, should without fear go forth to the Athenians, as to their friends and benefactors. And when they had thus proclaimed, and well considered the city and the havens, and the region where they were to seat themselves for the war, they returned to Catana.

LI. An assembly being called at Catana, though they refused to receive the army, they admitted the generals, and willed them to speak their minds.² And whilst Alcibiades was in his oration, and the citizens at the assembly, the soldiers having secretly pulled down a little gate, which was but weakly built, entered the city, and were walking up and down in the market. And the Catanæans, such as favoured the Syracusians, seeing the army within, for fear stole presently out of the town, being not many; the rest concluded the league with the Athenians, and willed them to fetch in the rest of the army from Rhegium. After this, the Athenians went back to Rhegium,³ and rising from thence, came to Catana with their whole army together.

LII. Now they had news from Camarina, that if they would come thither, the Camarinæans would join with them, and that the Syracusians were manning their navy. Whereupon with the whole army they went along the coast, first to Syracuse, where not finding any navy manned, they went on to Camarina. And being come close up to the shore, they sent a herald unto them; but the Camarinæans would not receive the army, alleging that they had taken an oath not to receive the Athenians with more than one galley, unless they should have sent for more, of their own accord. Having lost their labour, they departed, and landed in a part of the territory of Syracuse, and had got some booty. But the Syracusian horsemen coming out and killing some stragglers of the light-armed, they returned again to Catana.

LIII. Here they find the galley called the Salamina, come thither from Athens, both for Alcibiades, who was commanded to come

¹ ἐπὶ Συρακούσας ἔπλεον ἐπὶ κέρως. Bekker. Hobbes has translated this as if it were ἐπικαίρως. They sailed to Syracuse, having the other ships on their wing.

² ἔτι τι βούλονται. Bekker. ὅ, τι βούλονται, Duker. But they desired the

generals, if they wished any thing, to speak.

³ μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο διαπλεύσαντες, Bekker. πλεύσαντες, Duker. And after this, the Athenians sailing through to Rhegium.

home, to purge himself of such things as were laid to his charge by the state, and also for other soldiers that were with him, whereof some were accused for profanation of the mysteries, and some also for the Mercuries. For the Athenians, after the fleet was put to sea, proceeded nevertheless in the search of those that were culpable, both concerning the mysteries and the Mercuries, and making no inquiry into the persons of the informers, but through jealousy admitting of all sorts, on the report of evil men, apprehended very good citizens, and cast them into prison. Choosing rather to examine the fact and find the truth by torments, than that any man, however good in estimation, being once accused, should escape unquestioned. For the people having by fame understood that the tyranny of Pisistratus and his sons was heavy in the latter end; and withal, that neither themselves nor Harmodius, but the Lacedæmonians,¹ overthrew it, were ever fearful, and apprehended every thing suspiciously.

LIV. For the fact of Aristogiton and Harmodius, was undertaken on an accident of love, which unfolding at large, I shall make appear, that neither any other, nor the Athenians themselves, report any certainty, either of their own tyrants, or of the fact. For the old Pisistratus dying in the tyranny, not Hipparchus, (as the most think,) but Hippias, who was the eldest son, succeeded in the government.² Now Harmodius, a man in the flower of his youth, of great beauty, was in the power of one Aristogiton, a citizen of a middle condition, that was his lover. This Harmodius, having been solicited by Hipparchus the son of Pisistratus, and not yielding, discovered the same to Aristogiton. He apprehending it, as lovers use, with a great deal of anguish, and fearing the power of Hipparchus, lest he should take him away by force, fell presently, as much as his condition would permit, to a contriving how to pull down the tyranny. In the mean time, Hipparchus having again attempted Harmodius, and not prevailed, intended, though not to offer him violence, yet in secret, as if forsooth he did it not for that cause, to do him some disgrace. For neither was the government otherwise heavy till then, but carried without their evil will. And to say the truth, these tyrants held virtue and wisdom in great account for a long time, and taking of the Athenians but a twentieth part of their revenues, adorned the city, managed their wars, and administered their religion worthily. In other points they were governed by the laws formerly established, save that these took a care ever to prefer to the magistracy, men of their own adherence. And amongst many that had the annual office of Archon, Pisistratus also had it, the son of Hippias, of the same name with his grandfather, who also when he was Archon, dedicated the altar of the twelve gods in the market-place, and that other in the temple of Apollo Pythius.³ And though the people of Athens, amplifying afterwards that altar⁴ which was in the market-place, thereby

¹ Under the command of Cleomenes. puted. See note, b i. c. 20.
Herod. b. v.

³ See b. ii. 15.

² The point of seniority much dis-

⁴ Herod. b. vi.

defaced the inscription, yet that upon the altar that is in the temple of Apollo Pythius is to be seen still, though in letters somewhat obscure, in these words :

Pisistratus, the son of Hippias, erected this to stand
I'th' temple of Apollo Pythius, witness of his command.

LV. And that Hippias, being the elder brother, had the government, I can affirm, as knowing it by a more exact relation than other men, and it may be known also by this ; for it appears, that of all the legitimate brethren, this only had children, as is both signified by the altar, and also by that pillar, which for a testimony of the injustice of the tyrants, was erected in the Athenian citadel, in which there is no mention of any son of Thessalus, or of Hipparchus, but of five sons of Hippias, whom he had by Myrrhine the daughter of Callias the son of Hyperochidas ; for it is probable that the eldest was first married, and in the forepart of the pillar his name after his father's was the first ; not without reason, as being both next him in age, and having also enjoyed the tyranny. Nor indeed could Hippias have easily taken on him the government on a sudden, if his brother had died, seized of the tyranny, and he been the same day to settle it on himself ; whereas he retained the same with abundant security, both for the customary fear in the people, and diligence in the guard ; and was not to seek, like a younger brother, to whom the government had not continually been familiar. But Hipparchus came to be named for his misfortune, and thereby grew an opinion afterwards, that he was also tyrant.

LVI. This Harmodius, therefore, that had denied his suit, he disgraced, as he before intended. For when some had warned a sister of his, a virgin, to be present, to carry a little basket in a procession, they rejected her again when she came, and said that they had never warned her at all, as holding her unworthy the honour. This was taken heavily by Harmodius ; but Aristogiton, for his sake, was far more exasperated than he. Whereupon, with the rest of the conspirators, he made all things ready for the execution of the design, only they were to stay the time of the holiday called the great Panathenæa, on which day only such citizens, as lead the procession might, without suspicion, be armed in good number.¹ And they were to begin the fact themselves, but the rest were to help them against the halberders.² Now the conspirators, for their security, were not many ; for they hoped, that such also as were not privy to it, if they saw it once undertaken, being on this occasion armed, would assist in the recovery of their own liberty.

LVII. When this holiday was come, Hippias was gone out of the city to the place called Ceramicum,³ with his guard of halberders,

¹ It was usual for citizens in different countries to go armed during the celebration of their festivals. See Polyb. iv. 35. Dionys. Halic. vii. 72.

² The guard of Hippias the tyrant.

³ There were two places of this name ; one without, the other within the city.

and was ordering the procession, how it was to go; but Harmodius and Aristogiton, with each of them a dagger, proceeded to the fact. But when they saw one of the conspirators familiarly talking with Hippias, (for Hippias was very affable to all men,) they were afraid, and believed that they were discovered, and must presently have been apprehended. They resolved therefore (if it were possible) to be revenged, first upon him that had done them the wrong, and for whose sake they had undergone all this danger; and, furnished as they were, ran furiously into the city, and finding Hipparchus at a place called Leocorium,¹ without all regard of themselves, fell upon him,² and with all the anger in the world, one on jealousy, the other on disgrace, struck and slew him. Aristogiton for the present, by means of the great confluence of people, escaped through the guard, but taken afterwards, was ungently handled; but Harmodius was slain on the place.

LVIII. The news being brought to Hippias in the Ceramicum, he went not towards the place where the fact was committed, but presently to those that were armed for the solemnity of the shews, and were far off, that he might be with them before they heard of it, and composing his countenance as well as he could to dissemble the calamity, pointed to a certain place, and commanded them to repair thither without their arms. Which they did accordingly, expecting that he would have told them somewhat. But having commanded his guard to take those arms away, he then fell presently to picking out of such as he meant to question, and whoever else was found amongst them with a dagger: for with shields and spears to be in the head of the procession, was of custom.

LIX. Thus was the enterprize first undertaken upon quarrel of love, and then on a sudden fear, followed this unadvised adventure of Harmodius and Aristogiton.³ And after this time the tyranny grew sorer to the Athenians than it had been before. And Hippias standing more in fear, not only put many of the citizens to death, but also cast his eye on the states abroad, to see if he might get any security from them in this alteration at home. He therefore afterwards, though an Athenian, and to a Lampsacen,⁴ gave his daughter Archedice unto Æantidas the son of Hippocles, tyrant of Lampsacus,⁵ knowing that the Lampsacens were in great favour with king Darius. And her sepulchre is yet to be seen with this inscription:

¹ A monument and temple erected to the daughters of Leo, Pasithea, Theope, and Eubule, who sacrificed themselves when an oracle had ordered, that to stop the pestilence some of the blood of the citizens must be shed. Cic. de Nat. Deor. iii. 19.

² καὶ ἐνθὺς ἀπερισκίπτως, Bekker. Duker omits the καὶ. And immediately falling on him, without any regard to themselves.

³ The memory of Harmodius and Aristogiton was ever after held in the

greatest respect. Their praises were publicly sung at the great Panathenæa. Their statues, in brass, were cast by Praxiteles, and set up in the Forum. No slave was ever allowed to be called after their names.

⁴ A woman of Athens, a city flourishing for letters and civility, to a man of Lampsacus, a city infamous for barbarity and effeminacy.

⁵ See Herod. v. 117. Livy xliii. 6. Now called *Lepseke* by the Turks.

he had been accused, seemed a great deal the more to have been committed by him for the same reason, and conspiracy against the people. For it fell out withal, whilst the city was in a tumult about this, that an army of the Lacedæmonians was come as far as the isthmus, on some design against the Bœotians. These therefore they thought were come thither, not against the Bœotians, but by appointment of him, and that if they had not first apprehended the persons impeached, the city had been betrayed. And one night they watched all night long in their arms in the temple of Theseus¹ within the city. And the friends of Alcibiades in Argos, were at the same time suspected of a purpose to set on the people there, whereupon the Athenians also delivered to the Argive people those hostages² which they held of theirs in the islands to be slain. And there were presumptions against Alcibiades on all sides; insomuch as purposing by law to put him to death, they sent, as I have said, the galley called Salaminia into Sicily, both for him and the rest with him that had been accused; but gave command to those that went not to apprehend him, but to bid him follow them, to make his purgation; because they had a care not to give occasion of stir, either amongst their own or the enemies' soldiers; but especially because they desired that the Mantineans and the Argives, who they thought followed the war by his persuasion, might not depart from the army. So he and the rest accused with him, in his own galley, in company of the Salaminia, left Sicily and set sail for Athens. But being at Thuria they followed no further, but left the galley and were no more to be found; fearing indeed to appear to the accusation. They of the Salaminia made search for Alcibiades and those that were with him for a while, but not finding him, followed on their course for Athens. Alcibiades, now an outlaw, passed shortly after in a small boat from Thuria into Peloponnesus; and the Athenians proceeding to judgment upon his not appearing, condemned both him and them to death.³

LXII. After this, the Athenian general that remained in Sicily, having divided the army into two, and taken each his part by lot, went with the whole towards Selinus and Egæta, intending both to see if the Egæstæans would pay them the money, and withal to get knowledge of the designs of the Selinuntians, and learn the state of their controversy with the Egæstæans. And sailing by the coast of Sicily, having it on their left hand on that side which lieth to the Tyrrhene gulf, they came to Himera, the only Grecian city in that part of Sicily; which not receiving them, they went on, and by the way took Hyccara, a little town of the Sicanians, enemy to the Egæstæans, and a sea town; and having made the inhabitants slaves, delivered the town to the Egæstæans, whose horse forces were there with them.

¹ There were two temples of Theseus, one in the middle of the city, near the Gymnasium; the other without, near the long wall.

² Three hundred in number, lib. v. c. 84.

³ Sentence of death was pronounced

against Alcibiades in what was called a deserted judgment, *Ἐρήμῳ δίκῃ*. For when the person accused of a crime did not make his appearance, the Athenians without further trouble gave sentence against him, and this they called *ἐξ ἐρήμης καταδικασθῆναι*.

Thence the Athenians with their land men returned through the territory of the Siculi to Catana; and the galleys went about with the captives. Nicias going with the fleet presently from Hyccara to Egesta, when he had despatched with them his other business, and received thirty talents¹ of money, returned to the army. The captives² they ransomed, of whom they made one hundred and twenty³ talents more. Then they sailed about to their confederates of the Siculi, appointing them to send their forces; and with the half of their own they came before Hybla in the territory of Gela, a hostile city, but took it not. And so ended this summer.

LXIII. The next winter the Athenians fell presently to make preparation for their journey against Syracuse, and the Syracusians on the other side prepared to invade the Athenians. For seeing the Athenians had not presently on the first fear, and expectation of their coming, fallen upon them, they got every day more and more heart, and because they went far from them into those other parts of Sicily, and assaulting Hybla, could not take it, they contemned them more than ever: and prayed their commanders, (as is the manner of the multitude when they be in courage,) seeing the Athenians came not upon them, to conduct them to Catana. And the Syracusian horsemen, who were ever abroad for scouts, spurring up to the camp of the Athenians, amongst other scorns, asked them whether they came not rather to dwell in the land of another, than to restore the Leontines to their own.

LXIV. The Athenian generals having observed this, and being desirous to draw forth the Syracusians' whole power as far as might be from the city, to be able in the meantime, without impeachment, going thither in the night by sea, to seize on some convenient place to encamp in; for they knew they should not be able to do it so well in the face of an enemy prepared, nor if they were known to march by land, for that the Syracusian horsemen being many, would greatly annoy the light-armed, and other multitude, they themselves having no horsemen there: whereas thus they might possess themselves of a place where the horse could not do them any hurt at all to speak of, (now the Syracusian outlaws that were with them had told them of a place near the temple of Olympicum, which also they seized,) I say the Athenian generals to bring this their purpose to effect, contrived the matter thus: they send a man, of whose fidelity they were well assured, and in the opinion of the Syracusian commanders, no less a friend of theirs. This man was a Catanæan, and said he came from Catana, from such and such whose names they knew, and knew to be the remnant of their well-willers in that city. He told them that the Athenians lay every night within the town, and far from their arms, and that if with the whole power of their city, at a day appointed, betimes in a morning, they would come to their camp, those friends of the Syracusians would shut the Athenians in, and set fire on their

¹ £5812 10s. sterling.

² Amongst these was Lais the famous courtesan, at this time a very young girl,

who was carried to Corinth, where she made herself remarkable. Plut. in Nic.

³ £23,250 sterling.

galleys, by which means the Syracusians assaulting the palisado, might easily win the camp; and that the Catanæans who were to help them herein were many, and those he came from already prepared for it.

LXV. The Syracusan commanders having been also otherwise encouraged, and having intended a preparation to go against Catana, though this messenger had not come, did so much the more unadvisedly believe the man, and straightways being agreed of the day on which they were to be there, sent him away; these commanders (for by this time the Selinuntians, and some other their confederates, were come in,) appointed the Syracusians universally to set forward by a day. And when all their necessities were in readiness, and the day at hand on which they were to be there, they set forward toward Catana, and encamped the night following on the river Simethus, in Leontina. The Athenians, upon advertisement that they were set forth, rising with their whole army, both themselves, and such of the Siculi, and others as went with them, and going aboard their galleys and boats in the beginning of the night, set sail for Syracuse. In the morning betimes, the Athenians disembarked over against Olympicum, to make their camp, and the Syracusan horsemen, who were at Catana before the rest, finding the camp risen, came back to the foot and told them. Whereupon they went altogether back to the aid of the city.

LXVI. In the mean time, the way the Syracusians had to go being long, the Athenians had pitched their camp at leisure in a place of advantage, wherein it was in their own power to begin battle when they wished, and where both in and before the battle the Syracusan horsemen could least annoy them. For on one side there were walls, and houses, and trees, and a lake that kept them off; on the other side, steep rocks; and having felled trees hard by, and brought them to the sea side, they made a palisado both before their galleys, and toward Dascon.¹ And on that part that was most accessible to the enemy they made a fort with stone, (the best they could find, but unwrought,) and with wood,² and withal pulled down the bridge of the Anapus. Whilst this was doing, there came none to impeach them from the city. The first that came against them were the Syracusan horsemen, and by and by after, all the foot together. And though at first they came up near to the camp of the Athenians, yet after, seeing the Athenians came not out against them, they retired again, and crossing to the other side of the Helorine highway, staid there that night.

LXVII. The next day the Athenians and their confederates prepared to fight, and were ordered thus: the Argives and the Mantiæans had the right wing, the Athenians were in the middle, and the rest of their confederates in the other wing. That half of the army which stood foremost was ordered by eight in file; the other half

¹ A fort and bay of Sicily.

² *καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ Δάσκωνι κτλ.*—Bekker has altered the pointing of this sentence: And towards Dascon they

quickly erected a fortification, where it was most easy of access for the enemy, with stones and wood, collected together.

towards their tents ordered likewise by eights, was cast into the form of a long square, and commanded to observe diligently where the rest of the army was in distress, and to make specially thither. And in the midst of these so arranged, were received such as carried the weapons and tools of the army. The Syracusians arranged their men of arms, who were Syracusians of all conditions, and as many of their confederates as were present, by sixteen in file, (they that came to aid them were chiefly the Selinuntians, and then the horsemen of the Geloans, about two hundred; and of the Camarinæans about twenty horsemen, and fifty archers,) the cavalry they placed in the right point of the battle, being in all no less than twelve hundred, and with them the darters. But the Athenians intending to begin the battle, Nicias went up and down the army, from one nation to another, to whom, and to all in general, he spake to this effect:

Oration of Nicias to his Army.

LXVIII. "What need I, sirs, make a long exhortation, when the battle is the thing for which we all came hither? For, in my opinion, the present preparation is more able to give you encouragement than any oration, how well soever made, if with a weak army. For where we are together, Argives, Mantineans, Athenians, and the best of the islanders, how can we choose, amongst so many and good confederates, but conceive great hope of the victory? especially against tag and rag, and not chosen men as we are ourselves, and against Sicilians, who though they contemn us, cannot stand against us; their skill not being answerable to their courage. It must be remembered also, that we be far from our own, and not near to any amicable territory, but such as we shall acquire by the sword. My exhortation to you, I am certain, is contrary to that of the enemy. For they say to theirs, you are to fight for your country; I say to you, you are to fight out of your country, where you must either get the victory, or not easily get away. For many horsemen will be upon us. Remember therefore every man his own worth, and charge valiantly, and think the present necessity and strait we are in to be more formidable than the enemy."

LXIX. Nicias having thus exhorted the army, led it presently to the charge. The Syracusians expected not to have fought at that instant, and the city being near, some of them were gone away; and some for haste came in running; and though late, yet every one, as he came, put himself in where was the greatest number. For they wanted neither willingness, nor courage either in this or any other battle, being no less valiant, so far forth as they had experience, than the Athenians. But the want of this made them even against their wills to abate also somewhat of their courage. Nevertheless, though they thought not the Athenians would have begun the battle, and were thereby constrained to fight on a sudden, yet they resumed their arms, and came presently forward to the encounter. And first, the casters of stones, and slingers, and archers of either side, skirmished in the midst between the armies, mutually chasing each other, as amongst the light-armed was not unlikely. After this, the soothsayers

brought forth their sacrifices according to the law of the place, and the trumpets instigated the men of arms to the battle. And they came on to fight, the Syracusians for their country, and their lives for the present, and for their liberty in the future. On the other side, the Athenians to win the country of another, and make it their own, and not to weaken their own by being vanquished. The Argives and other free confederates, to help the Athenians to conquer the country they came against, and to return to their own with victory. And their subject-confederates came also on with great courage, principally for their better safety, as desperate if they overcame not, and withal upon the by, that by helping the Athenians to subdue the country of another, their own subjection might be the easier.

LXX. After they were come to handstrokes, they fought long on both sides. But in the mean time there happened some claps of thunder and flashes of lightning, together with a great shower of rain; inasmuch as it added to the fear of the Syracusians that were now fighting their first battle, and not familiar with the wars; whereas to the other side that had more experience the season of the year seemed to expound that accident, and their greatest fear proceeded from the so long resistance of their enemies, in that they were not all this while overcome. When the Argives first had made the left wing of the Syracusians give ground, and after them the Athenians also had done the like to those that were arranged against them, then the rest of the Syracusian army was presently broken and put to flight. But the Athenians pursued them not far, (because the Syracusian horsemen being many, and unvanquished, whosoever any men of arms advanced far from the body of the army, charged upon them and still drove them in again,) but having followed as far as safely they might in great troops, they retired again, and erected a trophy. The Syracusians having rallied themselves in the Helorine way, and recovered their order as well as they could for that time, sent a guard into Olympicum, lest the Athenians should take the treasure there, and returned with the rest of the army into the city.

LXXI. The Athenians went not to assault the temple, but gathering together their dead, laid them on the funeral fire, and staid that night on the place. The next day they gave truce to the Syracusians to take up their dead, (of whom and of their confederates were slain about two hundred and sixty,) and gathered up the bones of their own, (of whom and their confederates there died about fifty,) and thus, having rifled the bodies of their dead enemies, they returned to Catana. For it was now winter, and to make war there they thought it yet impossible, before they had sent for horsemen to Athens, and levied other amongst their confederates there in Sicily, to the end they might not be altogether over-mastered in horse, and before they had also both levied money there and received more from Athens, and made league with certain cities which they hoped after this battle, would the more easily hearken thereunto; and before they had likewise provided themselves with victuals and other things necessary, as intending the next spring to undertake Syracuse again.

LXXII. With this mind they went to winter at Naxos and Catana.

The Syracusians, after they had buried their dead, called an assembly, and Hermocrates, the son of Hermon, a man not otherwise second to any in wisdom and in war, both able for his experience and eminent for his valour, standing forth, gave them encouragement, and would not suffer them to be dismayed with that which had happened. Their courage, he said, was not overcome, though their want of order had done them hurt. And yet in that they were not so far inferior, as it was likely they would have been. Especially being (as one may say) home-bred artificers against the most experienced in the war of all the Grecians. That they had also been hurt by the number of their generals and commanders, (for there were fifteen that commanded in chief,) and by the many supernumerary soldiers under no command at all. Whereas if they would make but a few and skilful leaders, and prepare armour this winter for such as want it, to increase as much as might be, the number of their men of arms, and compel them in other things to the exercise of discipline, in all reason they were to have the better of the enemy. For valour they had already, and to keep their order would be learnt by practice : and both of these would still grow greater ; skill, by practising with danger ; and their courage would grow bolder of itself, upon the confidence of skill. And for their generals they ought to choose them few and absolute, and to take an oath unto them, to let them lead the army whithersoever they thought best. For by this means, both the things that require secrecy would the better be concealed, and all things would be put in readiness with order, and less tergiversation.

LXXIII. The Syracusians, when they had heard him, decreed all that he advised, and elected three generals, him, Heraclides, the son of Lysimachus, and Sicanus, the son of Execestus. They sent also ambassadors to Corinth and Lacedæmon, as well to obtain a league with them, as also to persuade the Lacedæmonians to make a hotter war against the Athenians, and to declare themselves in the quarrel of the Syracusians, thereby either to withdraw them from Sicily, or to make them the less able to send supply to their army which was there already.

LXXIV. The Athenian army at Catana sailed presently to Messina to receive it by treason of some within, but the plot came not to effect. For Alcibiades, when he was sent for from his charge, being resolved to fly, and knowing what was to be done, discovered the same to the friends of the Syracusians in Messina, who with those of their faction slew such as were accused ; and being armed upon occasion of the sedition, obtained to have the Athenians kept out. And the Athenians, after thirteen days' stay, troubled with tempestuous weather, provision also failing, and nothing succeeding, returned again to Naxos ; and having fortified their camp with a palisado, they wintered there, and despatched a galley to Athens for money and horsemen, to be with them early in the spring.

LXXV. The Syracusians this winter raised a wall before their city, all the length of the side towards Epipolæ, including Temenitis,¹

¹ The ground belonging to the temple of Apollo.

to the end, if they chanced to be beaten, they might not be so easily inclosed, as when they were in a narrower compass. And they put a guard into Megara, and another into Olympium, and made palisadoes on the sea side, at all the places of landing. And knowing that the Athenians wintered at Naxos, they marched with all the power of the city to Catana; and after they had wasted the territory, and burnt the cabins and camp where the Athenians had lodged before, returned home. And having heard that the Athenians had sent ambassadors to Camarina, according to a league made before in the time of Laches, to try if they could win them to their side, they also sent ambassadors to oppose it. For they suspected that the Camarinæans had sent those succours in the former battle with no great good will, and that now they would take part with them no longer, seeing the Athenians had the better of the day, but would rather join with the Athenians upon the former league. Hermocrates therefore and others being come to Camarina from the Syracusians, and Euphemus and others from the Athenians, when the assembly was met, Hermocrates desiring to increase their envy to the Athenians, spake unto them to this effect:

Oration of Hermocrates.

LXXVI. "Men of Camarina, we come not hither upon fear that
 "the forces of the Athenians here present may affright you, but
 "lest their speeches which they are about to make may seduce you,
 "before you have also heard what may be said by us. They are
 "come into Sicily with that pretence indeed which you hear given
 "out, but with that intention which we all suspect. And to me they
 "seem not to intend the replantation of the Leontines, but rather our
 "supplantation; for surely it holdeth not in reason, that they who
 "subvert the cities yonder, should come to plant any city here: nor
 "that they should have such a care of the Leontines, because Chal-
 "cidæans, for kindred's sake, when they keep in servitude the Chal-
 "cidæans themselves of Eubœa, of whom these here are but the
 "colonies. But they both hold the cities there, and attempt those that
 "are here in one and the same kind. For when the Ionians and the
 "rest of their confederates, their own colonies, had willingly made
 "them their leaders in the war, to avenge them on the Medes, the
 "Athenians laying afterwards to their charge, to some the not send-
 "ing of their forces, to some their war among themselves, and so to
 "the rest the most colourable criminations they could get, subdued
 "them all to their obedience. And it was not for the liberty of the
 "Grecians that these men, nor for the liberty of themselves that the
 "Grecians made head against the Medes; but the Athenians did it
 "to make them serve, not the Medes, but them; and the Grecians
 "to change their master as they did, not for one less wise, but for
 "one worse wise.

LXXVII. "But in truth we come not to accuse the Athenian
 "state (though it be obnoxious enough) before you that know suffi-
 "ciently the injuries they have done; but far rather to accuse our-
 "selves, who though we have the examples before our eyes, of the

“ Grecians there brought into servitude for want of defending themselves; and though we see them now with the same sophistry of replanting the Leontines and their kindred, and aiding of their confederates the Eggestæans, prepare to do the like unto us, do not yet unite ourselves, and with better courage make them to know that we be not Ionians, nor Hellespontines, nor islanders, that changing, serve always the Mede or some other master; but that we are Dorians and free men, come to dwell here in Sicily out of Peloponnesus, a free country. Shall we stand still till we be taken city after city? when we know that that only way we are conquerable, and when we find them wholly bent to this, that by drawing some from our alliance with their words, and causing some to wear each other out with war, upon hope of their confederacy, and winning others by other fit language, they may have the power to do us hurt. But we think, though one of the same island perish, yet if he dwell far off, the danger will not come to us; and before it arrive, we count unhappy only him that suffereth before us.

LXXVIII. “ If any therefore be of this opinion, that it is not he, but the Syracusian that is the Athenians’ enemy, and thinketh it a hard matter, that he should endanger himself for the territory that is mine, I would have him to consider, that he is to fight not chiefly for mine, but equally for his own in mine, and with the more safety, for that I am not destroyed before, and he thereby destitute of my help, but stand with him in the battle. Let him also consider, that the Athenians come not hither to punish the Syracusians for being enemies to you, but by pretence of me, to make himself the stronger by your friendship. If any man here envieth, or also feareth us, (for the strongest are still liable unto both,) and would therefore wish that the Syracusians might be weakened, to make them more modest, but not vanquished for their own safety’s sake, that man hath conceived a hope beyond the power of man. For it is not reasonable that the same man should be the disposer both of his desires and of his fortune. And if his aim should fail him, he might, deploring his own misery, peradventure wish to enjoy my prosperity again. But this will not be possible to him that shall abandon me, and not undertake the same dangers, though not in title, yet in effect the same that I do. For though it be our power in title, yet in effect it is your own safety you shall defend. And you men of Camarina that are our borderers, and likely to have the second place of danger, you should most of all have foreseen this, and not have aided us so dully. You should rather have come to us, and that which if the Athenians had come first against Camarina, you should in your need have implored at our hands, the same you should now also have been seen equally to hearten us withal, to keep us from yielding. But as yet neither you, nor any of the rest have been so forward.

LXXIX. “ Perhaps upon fear you mean to deal evenly between us both, and allege your league with the Athenians; you made no league against your friends, but against your enemies, in case any should invade you: and by it you are also tied to aid the Athe-

“nians when others wrong them, but not when (as now) they wrong their neighbours; for even the Rhegians, who are Chalcidæans, refuse to help them in replanting the Leontines, being also Chalcidæans. And then it were a hard case, if they suspecting a bad action under a fair justification, are wise without a reason, and you on pretence of reason, should aid your natural enemies, and help them that most hate you, to destroy your more natural kindred. But this is no justice; to fight with them is justice, and not to stand in fear of their preparation. Which if we hold together is not terrible, but is, if contrarily (which they endeavour) we be divided, since neither when they came against us being none but ourselves, and had the upper hand in battle, could they yet effect their purpose, but quickly went their ways.

LXXX. “There is no reason therefore we should be afraid when we are all together, but that we should have the better will to unite ourselves in a league; and the rather, because we are to have aid from Peloponnesus, who every way excel these men in military sufficiency. Nor should you think that your purpose to aid neither, as being in league with both, is either just in respect of us, or safe for yourselves. For it is not so just in substance, as it is in the pretence. For if through want of your aid the assailed perish, and the assailant become victor, what do you by your neutrality but leave the safety of the one undefended, and suffer the other to do evil? Whereas it were more noble in you, by joining with the wronged, and with your kindred, both to defend the common good of Sicily, and keep the Athenians as your friends, from an act of injustice. To be short, we Syracusians say, that to demonstrate plainly to you, or to any other, the thing you already know, is no hard matter; but we pray you, and withal, if you reject our words, we protest, that whereas the Ionians, who have ever been our enemies, do take counsel against us, you that are Dorians as well as we, betray us. And if they subdue us, though it be by your counsels that they do it, yet they only shall have the honour of it. And for the prize of their victory, they will have none other but even the authors of their victory. But if the victory fall unto us, even you also, the cause of this our danger, shall undergo the penalty. Consider therefore now, and take your choice, whether you will have servitude without the present danger, or saving yourselves with us, both avoid the dishonour of having a master, and escape our enmity, which is likely otherwise to be lasting.”

LXXXI. Thus spake Hermocrates. After him, Euphemus, ambassador from the Athenians, spake thus:

Oration of Euphemus.

LXXXII. “Though our coming were to renew our former league, yet seeing we are touched by the Syracusians, it is necessary we speak something here of the right of our dominion. And the greatest testimony of this right he hath himself given, in that he said the Ionians were ever enemies to the Dorians. And it is true. For being Ionians, we have ever endeavoured to find out some

“ means or other how best to free ourselves from subjection to the
 “ Peloponnesians that are Dorians, more in number than we, and
 “ dwelling near us. After the Medan war, having obtained a navy,
 “ we were thereby delivered from the command and leading of the
 “ Lacedæmonians, there being no cause why they should rather be
 “ leaders of us than we of them, save only that they were then the
 “ stronger. And when we were made commanders of those Grecians
 “ who before lived under the king, we took on us the government of
 “ them, because we thought, that having power in our hands to defend
 “ ourselves, we should thereby be the less subject to the Peloponne-
 “ sians. And to say truth, we subjected the Ionians and islanders,
 “ whom the Syracusians say we brought into bondage, being our kin-
 “ dred, not without just cause; for they came with the Medes against
 “ ours their mother city, and for fear of losing their wealth, durst not
 “ revolt as we did, who abandoned our very city. But as they were
 “ content to serve, so they would have imposed the same condition
 “ upon us.’

LXXXIII. “ For these causes we took upon us our dominion
 “ over them, both as worthy of the same, in that we brought the
 “ greatest fleet and promptest courage to the service of the Grecians;
 “ whereas they with the like promptness in favour of the Medes did
 “ us hurt; and also as being desirous to procure ourselves a strength
 “ against the Peloponnesians. And follow any other we will not,
 “ seeing we alone have pulled down the Barbarian, (and therefore
 “ have right to command,) or at least have put ourselves into danger
 “ more for the liberty of the Peloponnesians, than of all the rest of
 “ Greece, and our own besides. Now to seek means for one’s own
 “ preservation is a thing unblameable. And as it is for the sake of
 “ our own safety that we are now here, so also we find that the same
 “ will be profitable for you. Which we will make plain, from those
 “ very things which they accuse, and you as most formidable suspect
 “ us of; being assured that such as suspect with vehement fear,
 “ though they may be won for the present with the sweetness of an
 “ oration, yet when the matter comes to performance, will then do as
 “ shall be most for their turn. We have told you that we hold our
 “ dominion yonder on fear; and that on the same cause we come
 “ hither now by the help of our friends, to assure the cities here, and
 “ not to bring you into subjection, but rather to keep you from it.

LXXXIV. “ And let no man object that we be solicitous for
 “ those that are nothing to us, for as long as you be preserved, and
 “ are able to make head against the Syracusians, we shall be the less
 “ annoyed by their sending forces to the Peloponnesians. And in
 “ this point you are very much to us; and for the same reason it is
 “ meet also that we replant the Leontines, not subject them, as their
 “ kindred in Eubœa, but make them as puissant as we can; that
 “ being near, they may from their own territory weaken the [Syracu-
 “ sians] in our behalf. For as for our wars at home, we are a match
 “ for our enemies without their help, and the Chalcidæan (whom

¹ See Herod. b. viii.

“ having made a slave yonder, the [Syracusan] said, we absurdly
 “ pretend to vindicate into liberty here) is most beneficial to us there
 “ without arms, paying money only; but the Leontines, and other
 “ our friends here, are the most profitable to us when they are most
 “ in liberty.

LXXXV. “ Now to a tyrant or city that reigneth, nothing can be
 “ thought absurd, if profitable, nor any man a friend that may not be
 “ trusted to. Friend or enemy he must be, according to the several
 “ occasions. But here it is for our benefit, not to weaken our friends,
 “ but by our friends' strength to weaken our enemies. This you must
 “ needs believe, inasmuch as yonder also we so command over our
 “ confederates, as every of them may be most useful to us. The
 “ Chians and Methymnæans redeem their liberty with providing us
 “ some galleys: the most of the rest with a tribute of money some-
 “ what more pressing. Some, again, of our confederates are abso-
 “ lutely free, notwithstanding that they be islanders, and easy to be
 “ subdued. The reason whereof is this, they are situate in places
 “ commodious about Peloponnesus. It is probable, therefore, that
 “ here also we will so order our affairs, as shall be most for our own
 “ turn, and most according to our fear (as we told you) of the Syra-
 “ cusians. For they affect a dominion over you; and having by
 “ advantage of your suspicion of us drawn you to their side, will them-
 “ selves by force, or (if we go home without effect) by your want of
 “ friends, have the sole command of Sicily. Which, if you join with
 “ them, must of necessity come to pass. For neither will it be easy
 “ for us to bring so great forces again together, nor will the Syracu-
 “ sians want strength to subdue you if we be absent.

LXXXVI. “ Him that thinketh otherwise the thing itself con-
 “ vinceth: for when you called us in to aid you at the first, the fear
 “ you pretended was only this, that if we neglected you the Syracu-
 “ sians would subdue you, and we thereby should participate of the
 “ danger. And it were unjust that the argument you would needs
 “ have to prevail then with us, should now have no effect with your-
 “ selves; or that you should be jealous of the much strength we
 “ bring against the power of the Syracusians, when much rather you
 “ would give the less ear unto them. We cannot so much as stay
 “ here without you; and if becoming perfidious, we should subdue
 “ these states, yet we are unable to hold them; both in respect of
 “ the length of the voyage, and for want of means of guarding them,
 “ because they be great, and provided after the manner of the con-
 “ tinent. Whereas they, not lodged near you in a camp, but inha-
 “ biting near you in a city of greater power than this of ours, will be
 “ always watching their advantages against you: and where an
 “ opportunity shall be offered against any of your cities, will be sure
 “ not to let it slip. This they have already made to appear, both in
 “ their proceedings against the Leontines, and also otherwise. And
 “ yet have these the face to move you against us that hinder this, and
 “ that have hitherto kept Sicily from falling into their hands. But we
 “ on the other side invite you to a far more real safety, and pray you
 “ not to betray that safety, which we both of us hold from one another at

“ this present, but to consider that they by their own number have way to you always, though without confederates, whereas you shall seldom have so great an aid again to resist them. Which if through your jealousy you suffer to go away without effect ; or if it miscarry, you will hereafter wish for the least part of the same, when their coming can no more do you good.

LXXXVII. “ But (Camarinæans) be neither you nor others moved with their calumnies. We have told you the very truth why we are suspected ; and summarily we will tell it you again, claiming to prevail with you thereby. We say we command yonder, lest else we should obey, and we assert into liberty the cities here, lest else we should be harmed by them. Many things we are forced to be doing, because many things we have to beware of. And both now and before we came not uncalled, but called as confederates to such of you as suffer wrong. Make not yourselves judges of what we do, nor go about as censors (which were now hard to do) to divert us ; but as far as this busy humour and fashion of ours may be for your own service, so far take and use it. And think not the same hurtful alike to all, but that the greatest part of the Grecians have good by it. For in all places, though we be not of any side, yet both he that looketh to be wronged, and he that contriveth to do wrong, by the obviousness of the hope that the one hath of our aid, and of the fear that the other hath of their own danger if we should come, are brought by necessity, the one to moderation against his will, the other into safety without his trouble. Refuse not therefore the security now present, common both to us that require it, and to yourselves. But do as others use to do ; come with us, and instead of defending yourselves always against the Syracusians, take your turn once, and put them to their guard, as they have done you.”

LXXXVIII. Thus spake Euphemus. The Camarinæans stood thus affected : they bare good will to the Athenians, save that they thought to subjugate Sicily ; and were ever at strife with the Syracusians about their borders. Yet because they were afraid that the Syracusians that were near them might as well get the victory as the other, they had both formerly sent them some few horse, and also now resolved for the future to help the Syracusians, but underhand, and as sparingly as was possible ; and withal, that they might no less seem to favour the Athenians than the Syracusians, especially after they had won a battle, to give for the present an equal answer unto both. So after deliberation had they answered thus : that forasmuch as they that warred were both of them their confederates, they thought it most agreeable to their oath for the present to give aid to neither.

And so the ambassadors of both sides went their ways, and the Syracusians made preparation for the war by themselves. The Athenians being encamped at Naxos, treated with the Siculi, to procure as many of them as they might to their side. Of whom, such as inhabited the plain and were subject to the Syracusians, for the most part held off, but they that dwelt in the most inland parts of the island, being a free people, and ever before dwelling in villages, presently

agreed with the Athenians, and brought corn into the army, and some of them also money. To those that held off, the Athenians went with their army, and some they forced to come in, and others they hindered from receiving the aids and garrisons of the Syracusians. And having brought their fleet from Naxos, where it had been all the winter till now, they lay the rest of the winter at Catana, and re-erected their camp, formerly burnt by the Syracusians. They sent a galley to Carthage to procure amity, and what help they could from thence; and into Hetruria, because some cities there had of their own accord promised to take their parts. They sent likewise to the Siculi about them, and to Egesta, appointing them to send in all the horse they could, and make ready bricks and iron, and whatsoever else was necessary for a siege, and every other thing they needed, as intending to fall in hand with the war early the next spring.

The ambassadors of Syracuse, who were sent to Corinth and Lacedæmon, as they sailed by, endeavoured also to move the Italians to a regard of this action of the Athenians. Being come to Corinth, they spake unto them, and demanded aid upon the title of consanguinity.¹ The Corinthians having forthwith for their own part decreed cheerfully to aid them, sent also ambassadors from themselves along with these to Lacedæmon, to help them to persuade the Lacedæmonians, both to make a more open war against the Athenians at home, and to send some forces also into Sicily. At the same time that these ambassadors were at Lacedæmon from Corinth, Alcibiades was also there with his fellow fugitives; who presently, upon their escape, passed over from Thuria first to Cyllene, the haven of the Eleans in a ship, and afterwards went thence to Lacedæmon, sent for by the Lacedæmonians themselves under public security; for he feared them for his doings about Mantinea. And it fell out, that in the assembly of the Lacedæmonians, the Corinthians, Syracusians, and Alcibiades, made all of them the same request. Now the Ephors and magistrates though intending to send ambassadors to Syracuse, to hinder them from compounding with the Athenians, being yet not forward to send them aid, Alcibiades stood forth and sharpened the Lacedæmonians, inciting them with words to this effect:

Oration of Alcibiades.

LXXXIX. "It will be necessary that I say something first concerning mine own accusation, lest through jealousy of me you bring a prejudicate ear to the common business. My ancestors having on a certain quarrel renounced the office of receiving you,² I was the man that restored the same again, and shewed you all possible respect, both otherwise, and in the matter of your loss at Pylos.³ Whilst I persisted in my good will to you, being to make a peace at Athens, by treating the same with my adversaries, you invested

¹ Corinth was the mother city of Syracuse.

² Προξενίαν. The Lacedæmonian ambassadors that came at any time to Athens were entertained by his ances-

tors; this was the office which they after upon a quarrel renounced, and Alcibiades sought to repair.

³ He favoured their prisoners taken there, and imprisoned at Athens.

“ them with authority, and me with disgrace. For which cause, if in
 “ applying myself afterwards to the Mantinæans and Argives, or in
 “ any thing else I did you hurt, I did it justly. And if any man here
 “ were causelessly angry with me then, when he suffered, let him now
 “ be content again, when he knows the true cause of the same. Or
 “ if any man think the worse of me for inclining to the people, let him
 “ acknowledge that therein also he is offended without a cause. For
 “ we have been always enemies to tyrants, and what is contrary to a
 “ tyrant is called the people; and from thence hath continued our
 “ adherence to the multitude. Besides, in a city governed by demo-
 “ cracy, it was necessary in most things to follow the present course;
 “ nevertheless we have endeavoured to be more moderate than suiteth
 “ with the now headstrong humour of the people. But others there
 “ have been, both formerly and now, that have incited the common
 “ people to worse things than I, and they are those that have also
 “ driven out me. But as for us, when we had the charge of the
 “ whole we thought it reason, by what form it was grown most great
 “ and most free, and in which we received it, in the same to preserve
 “ it. For though such of us as have judgment do know well enough
 “ what the democracy is, and I no less than another, (insomuch as I
 “ could inveigh against it, but of confessed madness nothing can be
 “ said that is new,) yet we thought it not safe to change it, when you
 “ our enemies were so near us.

XC. “ Thus stands the matter touching my own accusation. And
 “ concerning what we are to consult of, both you and I, if I know
 “ any thing which yourselves do not, hear it now. We made this
 “ voyage into Sicily, first (if we could) to subdue the Sicilians; after
 “ them, the Italians; after them, to assay the dominion of Carthage,
 “ and Carthage itself. If these, or most of these enterprizes suc-
 “ ceeded, then next we would have undertaken Peloponnesus, with
 “ the accession both of the Greek forces there, and with many merce-
 “ nary Barbarians, Iberians, and others of those parts, confessed to
 “ be the most warlike of the Barbarians that are now. We should
 “ also have built many galleys, besides these which we have already,
 “ (there being plenty of timber in Italy,) with the which besieging
 “ Peloponnesus round, and also taking the cities thereof with our
 “ land forces, upon such occasions as should arise from the land,
 “ some by assault, and some by siege, we hoped easily to have con-
 “ quered it, and afterwards to have got the dominion of all Greece.
 “ As for money and corn to facilitate some points of this, the places
 “ we should have conquered there, besides what here we should have
 “ found, would sufficiently have furnished us.

XCI. “ Thus, from one that most exactly knoweth it, you have
 “ heard what is the design of the fleet now gone, and which the gene-
 “ rals there, as far as they can, will also put in execution. Under-
 “ stand next, that unless you aid them, they yonder cannot possibly
 “ hold out. For the Sicilians, though inexpert, if many of them unite,
 “ may well subsist; but that the Syracusians alone, with their whole
 “ power already beaten, and withal kept from the use of the sea,
 “ should withstand the forces of the Athenians already there, is a

“ thing impossible. And if their city should be taken, all Sicily is
 “ had, and soon after Italy also, and the danger from thence, which
 “ I foretold you, would not be long ere it fell upon you. Let no
 “ man therefore think that he now consulteth of Sicily only, but also
 “ of Peloponnesus, unless this be done with speed. Let the army
 “ you send be of such, as being aboard may row, and landing, pre-
 “ sently be armed. And (which I think more profitable than the
 “ army itself) send a Spartan for commander, both to train the sol-
 “ diers already there, and to compel unto it such as refuse. For thus
 “ will your present friends be the more encouraged, and such as be
 “ doubtful come to you with the more assurance. It were also good
 “ to make war more openly upon them here, that the Syracusians
 “ seeing your care, may the rather hold out, and the Athenians be
 “ less able to send supply to their army. You ought likewise to for-
 “ tify Decelea, in the territory of Athens, a thing which the Athenians
 “ themselves most fear, and reckon for the only evil they have not
 “ yet tasted in this war. And the way to hurt an enemy most, is to
 “ know certainly what he most feareth, and to bring the same upon
 “ him. For in reason a man therefore feareth a thing most, as having
 “ the precisest knowledge of what will most hurt him. As for the
 “ commodities, which yourselves shall reap and deprive the enemy of
 “ by so fortifying, letting much pass, I will sum you up the principal.
 “ Whatsoever the territory is furnished withal, will come most of it
 “ unto you, partly taken, and partly of its own accord. The revenue
 “ of the silver mines in Laurium, and whatsoever other profit they
 “ have from their land,¹ or from their courts of justice, will presently
 “ be lost. And which is worst, their confederates will be remiss in
 “ bringing in their revenue, and will care little for the Athenians, if
 “ they believe once that you follow the war to the utmost.

XCII. “ That any of these things be put in act speedily and
 “ earnestly, (men of Lacedæmon,) it resteth only in yourselves: for
 “ I am confident, and I think I err not, that all these things are
 “ possible to be done. Now I must crave this, that I be neither
 “ the worse esteemed for that having once been thought a lover of
 “ my country, I go now amongst the greatest enemies of the same,
 “ against it; nor yet mistrusted as one that speaketh with the zeal of
 “ a fugitive. For though I fly from the malice of them that drove
 “ me out, I shall not (if you take my counsel) fly your profit. Nor
 “ are you enemies so much, who have hurt but your enemies, as they
 “ are, that have made enemies of friends. I love not my country as
 “ wronged by it, but as having lived in safety in it. Nor do I think
 “ that I do herein go against any country of mine, but that I far
 “ rather seek to recover the country I have not. And he is truly a
 “ lover of his country, not that refuseth to invade the country he hath
 “ wrongfully lost, but that desires so much to be in it, as by any
 “ means he can, he will attempt to recover it. I desire you, there-

¹ As fees and fines, which would continually lying upon them, or not be
 cease in the towns abroad, the enemy able to be conveyed to the city.

“fore, (Lacedæmonians,) to make use of my service, in whatsoever danger or labour, confidently seeing you know, (according to the common saying,) if I did hurt you much when I was your enemy, I can help you much when I am your friend. And so much the more, in that I know the state of Athens, and but conjectured at yours. And considering you are now in deliberation upon a matter of so extreme importance, I pray you think not much to send an army both into Sicily and Attica, as well to preserve the great matters that are there with the presence of a small part of your force, as also to pull down the power of the Athenians, both present and to come; and afterwards to dwell in safety yourselves, and to have the leading of all Greece; not forced, but voluntary, and with their good affection.”

XCIII. Thus spake Alcibiades. And the Lacedæmonians, though before this they had a purpose of their own accord to send an army against Athens, but had delayed and neglected it, yet when these particulars were delivered by him, they were a great deal the more confirmed in the same, conceiving that what they had heard, was from one that evidently knew it. Insomuch as they had set their minds already upon the fortifying at Decelea, and upon the sending of some succours into Sicily for the present. And having assigned Gylippus the son of Cleandridas unto the Syracusan ambassadors for chief commander, they willed him to consider both with them and the Corinthians, how best, (for their present means,) and with greatest speed, some help might be conveyed unto them in Sicily. He thereupon appointed the Corinthians to send him two galleys presently to Asine, and to furnish the rest they meant to send, and to have them ready to sail when occasion should serve. This agreed upon, they departed from Lacedæmon.

In the mean time the galley arrived at Athens, which the generals sent home for money and horsemen. And the Athenians, upon hearing, decreed to send both provision and horsemen to the army. So the winter ended, and the seventeenth year of this war, written by Thucydides.

YEAR XVIII. A.C. 414. OLYMP. 91½.

XCIV. In the very beginning of the next spring the Athenians in Sicily departed from Catana, and sailed by the coast to Megara of Sicily. The inhabitants whereof in the time of the tyrant Gelon, the Syracusians (as I mentioned before) had driven out, and now possess the territory themselves. Landing here they wasted the fields, and having assaulted a certain small fortress of the Syracusians, not taking it, they went presently back, part by land and part by sea, unto the river Tereas. And landing again in the plain fields, wasted the same, and burnt up their corn; and lighting on some Syracusians, not many, they slew some of them; and having set up a trophy, went all again aboard their galleys. Thence they returned to Catana, and took in victual. Then with their whole army they went to Centoripa, a small city of the Siculi, which yielding on composition, they departed, and

in their way burnt up the corn of the Inessæans and the Hyblæans. Being come again to Catana, they find there two hundred and fifty horsemen arrived from Athens, without horses, though not without the furniture, supposing to have horses there; and thirty archers on horseback, and three hundred talents of silver.¹

XCV. The same spring the Lacedæmonians led forth their army against Argos, and went as far as to Cleonæ; but an earthquake happening, they went home again. But the Argives invaded the territory of Thyrea, confining on their own, and took a great booty from the Lacedæmonians, which they sold for no less than twenty-five talents.²

Not long after, the commons of Thespiæ set upon them that had the government; but not prevailing, were part apprehended, and part escaped to Athens, the Athenians having also aided them.³

XCVI. The Syracusians the same summer, when they heard that the Athenians had horsemen sent to them from Athens, and that they were ready now to come against them, conceiving that if the Athenians got not Epipolæ, a rocky ground, and lying just against the city, they would not be able, though masters of the field, to take in the city with a wall; intended, therefore, lest the enemy should come secretly up, to keep the passages by which there was access unto it with a guard. For the rest of the place is to the outside high and steep, falling to the city by degrees, and on the inside wholly subject to the eye. And it is called by the Syracusians Epipolæ, because it lieth above the level of the rest. The Syracusians coming out of the city with their whole power into a meadow by the side of the river Anapus betimes in the morning, (for Hermocrates and his fellow-commanders had already received their charge,) were there taking a view of their arms; but first they had set apart seven hundred⁴ men of arms, under the leading of Diomilus, an outlaw of Andros, both to guard Epipolæ, and to be ready together quickly upon any other occasion wherein there might be use of their service.

XCVII. The Athenians the day following, having been already mustered, came from Catana with their whole forces, and landed their soldiers at a place called Leon, six or seven furlongs from Epipolæ, unperceived, and laid their navy at anchor under Thapsus. Thapsus is almost an island, lying out into the sea, and joined to the land with a narrow isthmus, not far from Syracuse, neither by sea nor land. And the naval forces of the Athenians, having made a palisado across the said isthmus, lay there quiet. But the land soldiers marched at high speed toward Epipolæ, and got up by Euryalus before the Syracusians could come to them from out of the meadow where they were mustering.⁵ Nevertheless they came on, every one with what speed

¹ £58,125.

² £4,843 15s.

³ βοηθησάντων Θηβαίων, Bekker. Ἀθηναίων, Duker. The Thebans having assisted them.

⁴ ἑξακοσίους λογάδας, Bekker. ἑπτακοσίους, Duker. And first they had chosen out six hundred choice men of arms.

⁵ ἐκ τοῦ λειμῶνος καὶ τῆς ἐξετάσεως,

he could; not only Diomilus with his seven hundred,¹ but the rest also. They had no less to go from the meadow than twenty-five furlongs, before they could reach the enemy: the Syracusians therefore coming up in this manner, and thereby defeated in battle at Epipolæ, withdrew themselves into the city. But Diomilus was slain, and three hundred of the rest. The Athenians after this erected a trophy, and delivered to the Syracusians the bodies of their dead under truce, and came down the next day to the city. But when none came out to give them battle, they retired again, and built a fort upon Labdalum, in the very brink of the precipices of Epipolæ, on the side that looketh towards Megara, for a place to keep their utensils and money in when they went out either to fight or to work.

XCVIII. Not long after there came unto them from Egesta three hundred horsemen; and from the Siculi, namely, the Naxians and some others, about one hundred; and the Athenians had of their own two hundred and fifty; for whom they had horses, part from the Egestæans and Catanæans, and part they bought. So that they had together in the whole, six hundred and fifty horsemen. Having put a guard into Labdalum, the Athenians went down to Syca,² and raised there a wall in circle very quickly, so that they struck a terror into the Syracusians with the celerity of the work. Who therefore coming forth, intended to have given them battle, and no longer to have neglected the matter. But when the armies were one set against the other, the Syracusan generals perceiving their own to be in disarray, and not easily to be embattled, led them again into the city, save only a certain part of their horsemen, who staying, kept the Athenians from carrying of stone, and straggling far abroad from their camp. But the Athenians, with one squadron of men of arms, together with their whole number of horse, charged the horsemen of the Syracusians, and put them to flight. Of whom they slew a part, and erected a trophy for this battle of horse.

XCIX. The next day the Athenians fell to work upon their wall, to the north side of their circular wall, some building, and some fetching stone and timber, which they still laid down toward the place called Trogilus, in the way by which the wall should come, with the shortest compass from the great haven to the other sea. The Syracusians, by the persuasion of their generals, and principally of Hermocrates, intended not to hazard battle with their whole power against the Athenians any more, but thought fit rather in the way where the Athenians were to bring their wall, to raise a counter-wall, which if they could but do, before the wall of the Athenians came on, it would exclude their further building. And if the Athenians should set upon them as they were doing it,³ they might send part of their

Bekker. ἐκ τοῦ λειμῶνος τῆς ἐξετάσεως, Duker. Before the Syracusians perceiving them came up from the meadow and the review.

¹ οἱ περὶ τὸν Διόμιλον ἑξακόσιοι. Bek-

ker. ἑπτακόσιοι, Duker. And the six hundred with Diomilus.

² Tyca, or Tycha; it was a temple of Fortune, part of the city of Syracuse.

³ καὶ ἅμα καὶ ἐν τούτῳ, Bekker, καὶ

army to defend it, and preoccupy the accesses to it with a palisado. And if they would come with their whole army to hinder them, then must they also be forced to let their own work stand still. Therefore they came out, and beginning at their own city, drew a cross wall beneath the circular fortification of the Athenians, and set wooden turrets upon it, made of the olive trees which they felled in the ground belonging to the temple. The Athenian navy was not yet come about into the great haven from Thapsus, but the Syracusians were masters of the places near the sea; and the Athenians brought their provision to the army from Thapsus by land.

C. The Syracusians, when they thought both their palisado and wall sufficient, and considering that the Athenians came not to impeach them in the work, as they that feared to divide their army, and to be thereby the more easy to be fought withal, and that also hastened to make an end of their own wall, wherewith to encompass the city, left one squadron for a guard of their works, and retired with the rest into the city. And the Athenians cut off the pipes of their conduits, by which their water to drink was conveyed under ground into the town. And having observed also, that about noon the Syracusians kept within their tents, and that some of them were also gone into the city, and that such as were remaining at the palisado kept but negligent watch, they commanded three hundred chosen men of arms, and certain others picked out and armed from amongst the unarmed, to run suddenly to that counter-wall of the Syracusians. The rest of the army divided in two, went one part with one of the generals to stop the succour which might be sent from the city; and the other with the other general to the palisado, next to the gate of the counter-wall. The three hundred assaulted and took the palisado; the guard whereof forsaking it, fled within the wall into the temple ground, and with them entered also their pursuers, but after they were in, were beaten out again by the Syracusians, and some slain, both of the Argives and Athenians, but not many. Then the whole army went back together, and pulled down the wall, and plucked up the palisado, the pales whereof they carried with them to their camp, and erected a trophy.

CI. The next day the Athenians beginning at their circular wall, built onwards to that crag over the marshes, which on that part of Epipolæ, looketh to the great haven, and by which the way to the haven for their wall to come through the plain and marsh was the shortest. As this was doing, the Syracusians came out again, and made another palisado, beginning at the city, through the middle of the marsh, and a ditch at the side of it to exclude the Athenians from bringing their wall to the sea. But the Athenians, when they had finished their work, as far as to the crag, assaulted the palisado and trench of the Syracusians again. And having commanded their galleys to be brought about from Thapsus into the great haven of Syra-

ἀπα ἐν τοῦτω, Duker. And if they time also that they were employed in should attack them at the same this.

cusa, about break of day, went straight down into the plain; and passing through the marsh, where the ground was clay, and firmest, and partly upon boards and planks,¹ won both the trench and palisado, all but a small part, betimes in the morning, and the rest not long after. And here also they fought, and the victory fell to the Athenians. The Syracusians, those of the right wing fled to the city, and they of the left to the river. The three hundred chosen Athenians, desiring to cut off their passage, marched at high speed towards the bridge;² but the Syracusians, fearing to be prevented, (for most of the horsemen were in this number,) set upon these three hundred, and putting them to flight, drove them upon the right wing of the Athenians, and following, affrighted also the foremost guard of the wing. Lamachus seeing this, came to aid them with a few archers from the left wing of their own, and with all the Argives, and passing over a certain ditch, having but few with him, was deserted and slain, with some six or seven more.³ These the Syracusians hastily snatched up, and carried into a place of safety beyond the river. And when they saw the rest of the Athenian army coming towards them, they departed.

CII. In the mean time they that fled at first to the city, seeing how things went on, took heart again, and re-embattled themselves against the same Athenians that stood ranged against them before, and withal sent a certain portion of their army against the circular fortification of the Athenians upon Epipolæ; supposing to find it without defendants, and so to take it. And they took and demolished the outwork ten plethers⁴ in length; but the circle itself was defended by Nicias, who chanced to be left within it for infirmity. For he commanded his servants to set fire on all the engines, and whatsoever wooden matter lay before the wall, knowing there was no other possible means to save themselves for want of men. And it fell out accordingly. For by reason of this fire they came no nearer, but retired. For the Athenians having by this time beaten back the enemy below, were coming up to relieve the circle; and their galleys withal (as is before-mentioned) were going about from Thapsus into the great haven. Which they above perceiving, speedily made away, they, and the whole army of the Syracusians, into the city: with opinion that they could no longer hinder them with the strength they now had from bringing their wall through unto the sea.

CIII. After this the Athenians erected a trophy, and delivered to the Syracusians their dead, under truce; and they on the other side delivered to the Athenians the body of Lamachus, and of the rest

¹ *θύρας καὶ ξύλα*, Bekker. *καὶ θύρας καὶ ξύλα*, Duker. Placing over it boards and broad planks.

² The bridge of the river Anapus.

³ According to Plutarch, Callicrates, a good soldier, but of great impetuosity, rode at the head of the Syracusian horse, by whom being challenged, La-

machus came to a personal engagement with him, and received the first wound, but returning the blow, dropped, his antagonist, falling with him. See *Life of Nicias*.

⁴ Ten plethers, six hundred and eighty cubits, a plether containing, according to Suidas, sixty-eight cubits.

slain with him. And their whole army, both land and sea forces, being now together, they began to enclose the Syracusians with a double wall, from Epipolæ and the rocks unto the sea side. The necessities of the army were supplied from all parts of Italy: and many of the Siculi, who before stood aloof to observe the way of fortune, took part now with the Athenians, to whom came also three *Pentacoteri* [long-boats of fifty oars apiece] from *Hetruria*; and divers other ways their hopes were nourished. For the Syracusians also, when there came no help from *Peloponnesus*, made no longer account to subsist by war, but conferred both amongst themselves and with *Nicias*, of composition: for *Lamachus* being dead, the sole command of the army was in him. And though nothing was concluded, yet many things (as was likely with men perplexed, and now more straitly besieged than before,) were propounded unto *Nicias*, and more amongst themselves. And the present ill success had also bred some jealousy amongst them, one of another. And they discharged the generals under whose conduct this happened, as if their harm had come either from their unluckiness, or from their perfidiousness, and chose *Heraclides*, *Eucles*, and *Tellias*, in their places.

CIV. Whilst this passed, *Gylippus* of *Lacedæmon*, and the *Corinthian* galleys were ready at *Leucas*, purposing with all speed to go over into *Sicily*. But when terrible reports came to them from all hands, agreeing in an untruth, that *Syracuse* was already quite enclosed, *Gylippus* had hope of *Sicily* no longer, but desiring to assure *Italy*, he and *Pythen*, a *Corinthian*, with two *Laconic* and two *Corinthian* galleys, with all speed crossed the *Ionian* sea at *Tarentum*, and the *Corinthians* were to man ten galleys of their own, two of *Leucas*, and three of *Ambracia*, and come after. *Gylippus* went first from *Tarentum* to *Thuria*, as ambassador, by his father's right, who was free of the city of *Tarentum*, but not winning them to his side, he put out again, and sailed along the coast of *Italy*. Passing by the *Terinæan* gulf, he was put from the shore, (by a wind which in that quarter bloweth strongly against the north,) and driven into the main sea; and after another extreme tempest, brought in again into *Tarentum*, where he drew up such of his galleys as had been hurt by the weather, and repaired them. *Nicias* hearing that he came, contemned the small number of his galleys, as also the *Thurians* had before, supposing them furnished as for piracy, and appointed no watch for them yet.

CV. About the same time of this summer the *Lacedæmonians* invaded the territory of *Argos*, they and their confederates, and wasted a great part of their land. And the *Athenians* aided the *Argives* with thirty galleys, which most apparently broke the peace between them and the *Lacedæmonians*. For before they went out from *Pylos* with the *Argives* and *Mantineans*,¹ but in the nature of freebooters; and that also not into *Laconia*, but other parts of *Peloponnesus*. Nay,

¹ μετὰ τε Ἀργείων καὶ Μαντινίων *ker*. They waged war in conjunction with the *Argives* and *Mantineans*.
 ξυνοπολέμουν, *Bekker*. ἐπολέμουν, *Du-*

when the Argives have often entreated them but only to land with their arms in Laconia, and having wasted never so little of their territory to return, they would not. But now, under the conduct of Pythodorus, Læspodius, and Demaratus, they landed in the territory of Epidaurus Limera, and in Prasia, and there and in other places wasted the country, and gave unto the Lacedæmonians a most justifiable cause to fight against the Athenians. After this, the Athenians being departed from Argos with their galleys, and the Lacedæmonians gone likewise home, the Argives invaded Phliasia, and when they had wasted part of their territory, and killed some of their men, returned.

END OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

THUCYDIDES.

BOOK VII.

Eighteenth and nineteenth years of the war. Gylippus arrives at Syracuse, checks the fortune of the Athenians, and cuts off their works with a counter-wall. The Lacedæmonians invade Attica, and fortify Decelea. The confederates of each side are solicited for supplies to be sent to Syracuse. Two battles fought in the great haven; in the first of which the Syracusians are beaten; in the second are superior; Demosthenes arrives with a new army, and attempting the works of the enemy in Epipolæ by night, is repulsed with great slaughter of his men. They fight the third time, and the Syracusians having the victory, block up the haven with boats. A catalogue of the confederates on each side. They fight again at the bars of the haven, where the Athenians losing their galleys, prepare to march away by land. In their march they are afflicted, beaten, and finally subdued by the Syracusians; the death of Nicias and Demosthenes, and misery of the captives in the quarry.

YEAR XVIII. A.C. 414. OLYMP. 91-3.

CHAP. I.

GYLIPPUS and Pythen having repaired their galleys, from Tarentum went along the coast to Locri Epizephyrii. And on certain intelligence now, that Syracuse was not wholly enclosed, but that coming with an army, there was entrance still by Epipolæ, they consulted whether it were better to take Sicily on their right hand, and adventure into the town by sea; or on the left, and so first to go to Himera, and then taking along both them and as many other as they could get to their side, to go into it by land. And it was resolved to go to Himera; the rather because the four Attic galleys which Nicias (though he contemned them before) had now, when he heard they were at Locri, sent to wait for them, were not arrived yet at Rhegium. Having prevented this guard, they crossed the strait, and touching at Rhegium and Messina by the way, came to Himera. Being there, they prevailed so far with the Himeræans, that they not only followed them to the war themselves, but also furnished with armour such of the mariners of Gylippus and Pythen as wanted, (for at Himera they had drawn their galleys to land,) and likewise sent to the Selinuntians to meet them at a place assigned, with their whole army. The Geloans also, and other of the Siculi, promised to send them forces, though not many; being much the more willing to come to the side, both because Archonidas was lately dead, who reigning over some of the Siculi in those parts, and being a man of no mean power, was friend to the Athenians, and also because Gylippus seemed to come from Lacedæmon with a good will to the business. Gylippus taking with him

of his own mariners and sea soldiers, for whom he had got arms, at the most seven hundred, and Himeræans, with armour and without, in the whole one thousand, and one hundred horse, and some light-armed Selinuntians with some few horse of the Geloans, and of the Siculi, in all about one thousand, marched with these towards Syracuse.

II. Meanwhile the Corinthians, with the rest of their galleys, putting to sea from Leucas, made after as they were, every one with what speed he could, and Gongylus,¹ one of the Corinthian commanders, though the last that set forth, arrived first at Syracuse with one galley, and but a little before the coming of Gylippus; and finding them ready to call an assembly about an end of the war, he hindered them from it, and put them in heart, relating both how the rest of the galleys were coming, and also Gylippus, the son of Cleandridas, for general, sent to them by the Lacedæmonians. With this the Syracusians were re-confirmed, and went presently out with their whole army to meet him; for they understood now that he was near. He, having taken Iêgas,² a fort in his way as he passed through the territory of the Siculi, and embattled his men, comes to Epipolæ, and getting up by Euryalus, where also the Athenians had got up before, marched together with the Syracusians towards the wall of the Athenians. At the time when he arrived the Athenians had finished a double wall of seven or eight furlongs towards the great haven, save only a little next the sea; on this they were yet at work. And on the other side of their circle towards Trogilus, and the other sea, the stones were for the most part laid ready on the place, and the work was left in some places half, and in some wholly finished. So great was the danger into which Syracuse was now brought.

III. The Athenians, at the sudden coming on of Gylippus, though somewhat troubled at first, yet put themselves in order to receive him. And he, making a stand when he came near, sent a herald to them, saying, that if they would abandon Sicily within five days with bag and baggage, he was content to give them truce. Which the Athenians contemning, sent him away without any answer.³ After this, they were putting themselves into order of battle one against another; but Gylippus finding the Syracusians troubled, and not easily falling into their ranks, led back his army in a more open ground. Nicias led not the Athenians out against him, but lay still at his own fortification. And Gylippus, seeing he came not up, withdrew his army into the top called Temenites, where he lodged all night. The next day he drew out the greatest part of his army, and embattled them

¹ Killed in the first onset, according to Plutarch.

² ὁδὲ Γέτα, Bekker. 'Iéγας, Duker. He having taken Geta.

³ Nicias, according to Plutarch, disdained to return any answer. But some of his soldiers laughed outright, and asked, "If at the arrival of a man-
"tle and staff from Sparta, the Syra-

"cusians were become so full of spirits
"as to despise the Athenians, who had
"lately given up to the Lacedæmonians
"three hundred of their countrymen,
"who had been prisoners, all of them
"better soldiers, and who combed their
"hair, too, much better than Gylippus."
—Smith.

before the fortification of the Athenians, that they might not send succour to any other place, but a part also they sent to the fort of Labdalum, and took it, and slew all those they found within it. For the place was out of sight to the Athenians. The same day the Syracusians took also an Athenian galley as it entered into the great haven.

IV. After this, the Syracusians and their confederates began a wall through Epipolæ, from the city towards the single cross wall upwards; that the Athenians, unless they could hinder it, might be excluded from bringing their own wall any further on. And the Athenians by this time, having made an end of their wall to the sea, were come up again; and Gylippus (for some part of their wall was but weak) rising with his army by night, went to assault it; but the Athenians also knowing it (for they lodged all night without the wall) went presently to relieve it; which Gylippus perceiving, again retired. And the Athenians, when they had built it higher, kept the watch in this part themselves, and divided the rest of the wall to the charge of their confederates. Also it seemed good to Nicias to fortify the place called Plemmyrium,¹ (it is a promontory over against the city, which shooting into the entrance of the great haven, straiteneth the mouth of the same,) which fortified, he thought would facilitate the bringing in of necessaries to the army. For by this means their galleys might ride nearer to the haven² of the Syracusians, and not upon every motion of the navy of the enemies to be to come out against them, as they were before from the bottom of the [great] haven. And he had his mind set chiefly now upon the war by sea, seeing his hopes by land diminished, since the arrival of Gylippus. Having therefore drawn his army and galleys to that place, he built about it three fortifications, wherein he placed his baggage, and where now also lay at road both his great vessels of carriage, and the nimblest of his galleys. Hereupon principally ensued the first occasion of the great loss of his sea soldiers. For having but little water, and that far to fetch, and his mariners going out also to fetch in wood, they were continually intercepted by the Syracusian horsemen that were masters of the field.³ For the third part of the Syracusian cavalry was quartered in a little town called Olympicum,⁴ to keep those in Plemmyrium from going abroad to spoil the country. Nicias was advertised moreover of the coming of the rest of the Corinthian galleys, and sent out a guard of twenty galleys, with order to wait for them about Locri and Rhegium, and the passage there into Sicily.

V. Gylippus in the mean time went on with the wall through Epipolæ, using the stones laid ready there by the Athenians, and withal drew out the Syracusians and their confederates beyond the point of the same, and ever as he brought them forth, put them into their order; and the Athenians on the other side embattled themselves.

¹ Plemmyrium.—*Bekker*.

² Viz. the lesser haven.

³ οἱ πολλοὶ διεφθίγοντο, *Bekker*. οἱ πολλοὶ is omitted by *Duker*. Many of

them were destroyed by the Syracusian cavalry, who were masters of the field.

⁴ The temple there and whole town were consecrated to Jupiter Olympius.

against them. Gylippus, when he saw his time, began the battle; and being come to hands, they fought between the fortifications of them both, where the Syracusians and their confederates had no use at all of their horsemen. The Syracusians and their confederates being overcome, and the Athenians having given them truce to take up their dead, and erected a trophy, Gylippus assembled the army, and told them, that this was not theirs, but his own fault, who by pitching the battle so far within the fortifications, had deprived them of the use both of their cavalry and darters; and that therefore he meant to bring them on again; and wished them to consider, that for forces they were nothing inferior to the enemy: and for courage, it were a thing not to be endured, that being Peloponnesians and Dorians, they should not master, and drive out of the country Ionians, islanders, and a rabble of mixed nations.

VI. After this, when he saw his opportunity, he brought on the army again. Nicias and the Athenians, who thought it necessary, if not to begin the battle, yet by no means to set light by the wall in hand,¹ (for by this time it wanted little of passing the point of theirs, and proceeding, would give the enemy advantage both to win if he fought, and not to fight unless he listed,) did therefore also set forth to meet the Syracusians. Gylippus, when he had drawn his men of arms further without the walls than he had done before, gave the onset. His horsemen and darters he placed upon the flank of the Athenians, in ground enough, to which neither of their walls extended. And these horsemen, after the fight was begun, charging upon the left wing of the Athenians next them, put them to flight; by which means the rest of the army was by the Syracusians overcome likewise, and driven headlong within their fortifications. The night following, the Syracusians brought up their wall beyond the wall of the Athenians, so as they could no longer hinder them, but should be utterly unable, though masters of the field, to enclose the city.

VII. After this, the other twelve galleys of the Corinthians, Ambraciots, and Leucadians, undescried by the Athenian galleys that lay in wait for them, entered the haven, under the command of Erasimides, a Corinthian, and helped the Syracusians to finish what remained to the cross wall. Now Gylippus went up and down Sicily raising forces both for sea and land, and soliciting to his side all such cities as formerly either had not been forward, or had wholly abstained from the war. Other ambassadors also, both of the Syracusians and Corinthians, were sent to Lacedæmon and Corinth to procure new forces, to be transported either in ships or boats, or how they could, because the Athenians had also sent to Athens for the like. In the mean time the Syracusians both manned their navy, and made trial of themselves, as intending to take in hand that part also; and were otherwise exceedingly encouraged.

¹ νομιζοντες καὶ εἰ κεῖνοι, Bekker. νομιζοντες καὶ κεῖνοι εἰ, Duker. But Nicias and the Athenians thinking that, if they were not willing to begin the battle, yet it was necessary for themselves not to make light of the wall which was being built, &c.

VIII. Nicias perceiving this, and seeing the strength of the enemy, and his own necessities daily increasing, he also sent messengers to Athens, both at other times and often, upon the occasion of every action that passed;¹ and now especially, as finding himself in danger, and that unless they quickly sent for those away that were there already, or sent a great supply unto them, there was no hope of safety; and fearing lest such as he sent, through want of utterance or judgment,² or through desire to please the multitude, should deliver things otherwise than they were, he wrote unto them a letter. Conceiving that thus the Athenians should best know his mind, whereof no part could now be suppressed by the messenger, and might therefore enter into deliberation upon true grounds. With these letters and other their instructions, the messengers took their journey; and Nicias in the mean time, having a care to the well guarding of his camp, was weary of entering into any voluntary dangers.

IX. In the end of this summer, Euctemon, general for the Athenians, with Perdiccas, together with many Thracians, warring against Amphipolis, took not the city; but bringing his galleys about into the Strymon, besieged it from the river, lying at Imeræum: and so this summer ended.

X. The next winter the messengers from Nicias arrived at Athens, and having spoken what they had in charge, and answered to such questions as they were asked, they presented the letter, which the clerk of the city,³ standing forth, read unto the Athenians, containing as follows:

Letter of Nicias to the People of Athens.

XI. "Athenians, you know by many other letters of mine what has passed formerly: nor is it less needful for you to be informed of the state we are in, and to take counsel upon it at this present. When we had in many battles beaten the Syracusians, against whom we were sent, and had built the walls within which we now lie, Gylippus, a Lacedæmonian, came with an army out of Peloponnesus, and also out of some of the cities of Sicily;⁴ and in the first battle, was overcome by us; but in the second, forced by his many horsemen and darters, we retired within our works. Whereupon giving over our walling up of the city, for the multitude of our enemies, we now sit still, (for we cannot indeed have the use of our whole army, because some part of the men of arms are employed to defend our walls,) and they have built a single wall up to us, so that now we have no more means to enclose it, except one should come

¹ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας ἀγγέλλον, Bekker. ἀγγέλλοντες, Duker. And Nicias himself sent to Athens with news of every thing that happened, &c.

² μνήμης ἰλλικεῖς γιγνώμενοι, Bekker. γνώμης, Duker. Or being deficient in memory.¹

³ Γραμματεὺς, of these there were three at Athens, one chosen by the po-

pular assembly, whose business it was to recite before the people or assembly; and two appointed by the senate, one of whom was the keeper of the laws, another of public records.

⁴ ἐκ τε Πελοποννήσου, Bekker. ἐκ Πελοποννήσου, Duker. Having an army both from Peloponnesus and from some cities in Sicily.

“ with a great army and win that cross wall of theirs by assault.
 “ And so it is, that we who seemed to besiege others, are besieged
 “ ourselves, for so much as concerns the land. For we cannot go
 “ far abroad by reason of their cavalry.

XII. “ They have also sent ambassadors for another army into
 “ Peloponnesus; and Gylippus is gone amongst the cities of Sicily,
 “ both to solicit such to join with him in the war as have not yet
 “ stirred; and of others to get, if he can, both more land soldiers and
 “ more munition for their navy. For they intend, as I have been in-
 “ formed, both to assault our wall by land with their army, and to
 “ make trial what they are able to do with their navy by sea. For
 “ though our fleet (which they also have heard) were vigorous at first,
 “ both for soundness of galleys, and entireness of the men; yet our
 “ galleys are now soaked with lying so long in the water, and our men
 “ consumed. For we want the means to haul on land our galleys,
 “ and trim them, because the galleys of the enemy, as good as ours,
 “ and more in number, do keep us in a continual expectation of
 “ assault, which they manifestly endeavour. And seeing it is in their
 “ own choice to attempt or not, they have therefore liberty to dry
 “ their galleys at their pleasure. For they lie not, as we do, in
 “ attendance upon others.

XIII. “ Nay, we could hardly do it, though we had many galleys
 “ spare, and were not constrained, as now, to keep watch upon them
 “ with our whole number. For should we abate, though but a little,
 “ of our observance, we should want provision, which as we are,
 “ being to pass so near their city, is brought in with difficulty. And
 “ hence it is that our mariners both formerly have been, and are now
 “ wasted, for fetching wood and water, and foraging far off, they are
 “ intercepted by the horsemen; and our slaves, now we are on equal
 “ terms, run over to the enemy. As for strangers, some of them
 “ having come aboard by constraint, return presently to their cities;
 “ and others having been levied at first with great wages, and thinking
 “ they came to enrich themselves rather than to fight, now they see
 “ the enemy make so strong resistance, both otherwise beyond their
 “ expectation, and especially with their navy, partly take pretext to
 “ be gone, that they may serve the enemy, and partly (Sicily being
 “ large) shift themselves away every one as he can. Some there are
 “ also, who having brought here Hyccarian slaves,¹ have got the cap-
 “ tains of galleys to accept of them in the room of themselves, and
 “ thereby destroyed the purity of our naval strength.

XIV. “ To you I write, who know how small a time any fleet
 “ continues in the height of vigour, and how few of the mariners are
 “ skilful both how to hasten the course of a galley, and how to manage
 “ the oar. But of all, my greatest trouble is this, that being general,
 “ I can neither make them do better, (for your natures are hard to be
 “ governed,) nor get mariners in any other place, which the enemy
 “ can do from many places, but must of necessity have them from
 “ whence we brought both these we have, and those we have lost; for

¹ Those whom Nicias, on the taking of Hyccara, made sale of himself.

“ our now confederate cities, Naxos and Catana, are not able to supply us. Had the enemy but this one thing more, that the towns of Italy which now send us provision, seeing what estate we are in, and you not help us, would turn to them, the war were at an end, and we expugned without another stroke.

“ I could have written to you other things more pleasing than these, but not more profitable, seeing it is necessary for you to know certainly the affairs here, when you go to counsel upon them; withal, because I know your natures to be such, as though you love to hear the best, yet afterwards, when things fall not out accordingly, you will call in question them that wrote it, I thought best to write the truth for the sake of my own safety.

XV. “ And now think thus, that though we have carried ourselves, both captains and soldiers, in that for which we came at first hither, unblameably; yet since all Sicily is united against us, and another army expected out of Peloponnesus, you must resolve (for those we have here are not enough for the enemy’s present forces,) either to send for these away, or to send hither another army both of land and sea soldiers, no less than the former, and money not a little; and also a general to succeed me, who am able no longer to stay here, being troubled with the stone in the kidney. I must crave your pardon. I have done you many good services in the conducting of your armies when I had my health. What you will do, do in the very beginning of spring, and delay it not. For the enemy will soon have furnished himself of his Sicilian aids; and though those from Peloponnesus will be later, yet if you look not to it, they will get hither partly unseen, as before, and partly by preventing you with speed.”

XVI. These were the contents of the letter of Nicias. The Athenians, when they had heard it read, though they released not Nicias of his charge, yet for the present till such time as others chosen to be in commission might arrive, they joined with him two of those that were already in the army, Menander and Euthydemon, to the end that he might not sustain the whole burthen alone in his sickness. They concluded likewise to send another army, as well for the sea as the land, both of Athenians enrolled, and of their confederates. And for fellow generals with Nicias, they elected Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, and Eurymedon, the son of Thucles. Eurymedon they sent away presently for Sicily, about the time of the winter solstice, with ten galleys and twenty talents of silver,¹ to tell them there that aid was coming, and that there was care taken of them.

XVII. But Demosthenes staying, made preparation for the voyage, to set out early the next spring; and sent unto the confederates, appointing what forces they should provide, and to furnish himself amongst them with money and galleys, and men of arms. The Athenians sent also twenty galleys about Peloponnesus, to watch that none should go over to Sicily, from Corinth or Peloponnesus. For the

¹ ἄγοντα εἰκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα, Bekker. εἰκοσι τάλαντα, Duker. Taking a hundred and twenty talents of silver.

Corinthians, after the ambassadors were come to them, and had brought news of the amendment of the affairs in Sicily, thought it was well that they had sent thither those other galleys before; but now they were encouraged a great deal more, and prepared men of arms to be transported into Sicily in ships, and the Lacedæmonians did the like for the rest of Peloponnesus. The Corinthians manned five and twenty galleys to present battle to the fleet that kept watch at Naupactus, that the ships with the men of arms, whilst the Athenians attended these galleys so embattled against them, might pass by unhindered.

XVIII. The Lacedæmonians, as they intended before, and being also instigated to it by the Syracusians and Corinthians, upon advertisement now of the Athenians' new supply for Sicily, prepared likewise to invade Attica, thereby to divert them. And Alcibiades also importunately urged the fortifying of Decelea, and by no means to war remissly. But the Lacedæmonians were heartened thereunto principally because they thought the Athenians having in hand a double war, one against them, and another against the Sicilians, would be the more easily pulled down; and because they conceived the breach of the last peace¹ was in themselves; for in the former war the injury proceeded from their own side, in that the Thebans had entered Plataea in time of peace; and because also whereas it was inserted in the former articles, that arms should not be carried against such as would stand to trial of judgment, they had refused such trial when the Athenians offered it. And they thought all their misfortunes had deservedly befallen them for that cause; remembering amongst others the calamity at Pylos. But when the Athenians, with a fleet of thirty sail, had spoiled part of the territory of Epidaurus, and of Prasiæ and other places, and their soldiers that lay in garrison in Pylos had taken booty in the country about; and seeing that as often as there arose any controversy touching any doubtful point of the articles, the Lacedæmonians offering trial by judgment, they refused it; then indeed the Lacedæmonians, conceiving the Athenians to be in the same fault that themselves had been in before, betook themselves earnestly to the war. And this winter they sent about unto their confederates, to make ready iron, and all instruments of fortification. And for the aid they were to transport in ships to the Sicilians, they both made provision amongst themselves, and compelled the rest of Peloponnesus to do the like. So ended this winter, and the eighteenth year of the war written by Thucydides.

YEAR XIX. A. C. 413. OLYMP. 91- $\frac{2}{3}$.

XIX. The next spring, in the very beginning, earlier than ever before, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates entered with their army into Attica, under the command of Agis the son of Archidamus their king. And first they wasted the campaign country, and then went in hand with the wall at Decelea, dividing the work amongst the army according to their cities. This Decelea is from the city of

¹ The thirty years' truce.

Athens, at the most but one hundred and twenty furlongs, and about as much, or a little more from Bœotia. This fort they made in the plain, and in the most opportune place that could be to annoy the Athenians, and in sight of the city. Now the Peloponnesians and their confederates in Attica went on with their fortification. They in Peloponnesus sent away their ships with the men of arms about the same time into Sicily. Of which the Lacedæmonians, out of the best of their Helots, and men made newly free, sent in the whole six hundred, and Ecritus, a Spartan, for commander. And the Bœotians, three hundred, under the conduct of Xenon and Nikon, Thebans, and Hegesander, a Thespian. And these set forth first, and put to sea at Tænarus in Laconia. After them a little, the Corinthians sent away five hundred more, part from the city itself of Corinth, and part mercenary Arcadians, and Alexarchus, a Corinthian, for captain. The Sicyonians also sent two hundred with them that went from Corinth, and Sargeus, a Sicyonian, for captain. Now the twenty-five Corinthian galleys that were manned in winter, lay opposite to the twenty galleys of Athens which were at Naupactus, till such time as the men of arms¹ in the ships from Peloponnesus might get away; for which purpose they were also set out at first, that the Athenians might not have their minds upon these ships, so much as upon the galleys.

XX. In the mean time also the Athenians, whilst Decelea was fortifying, in the beginning of the spring sent twenty galleys about Peloponnesus, under the command of Charicles the son of Apollodorus, with order, when he came to Argos, to take aboard the men of arms whom the Argives were to send them according to league; and sent away Demosthenes (as they intended before) into Sicily, with threescore galleys of Athens, and five of Chios, and one thousand two hundred men of arms of the roll of Athens, and as many of the islanders as they could get, provided by their subject confederates of all other necessities for the war; but he had order to join first with Charicles, and help him to make war first upon Laconia. So Demosthenes went to Ægina, and staid there both for the remnant of his own army, if any were left behind, and for Charicles, till he had taken aboard the Argives.

XXI. In Sicily, about the same time of the spring, Gylippus also returned to Syracuse, bringing with him from the cities he had dealt withal, as great forces as severally he could get from them. And having assembled the Syracusians, he told them that they ought to man as many galleys as they could, and make trial of a battle by sea, and that he hoped thereby to perform somewhat to the benefit of the war which should be worthy the danger. Hermocrates also was none of the least means of getting them to undertake the Athenians with their navy, who told them, that neither the Athenians had this skill by sea, hereditary, or from everlasting, but were more inland men than the Syracusians, and forced to become seamen by the

¹ ἑωσπερ αὐτοῖς οὗτοι οἱ ὀπλίται, Bekker. αὐτοῖς οἱ ὀπλίται, Duker.—Until these heavy-armed men, &c.

Medes : and that to daring men, such as the Athenians are, they are most formidable that are as daring against them. For wherewith they terrify their neighbours, which is not always the advantage of power, but boldness of enterprising, with the same shall they in like manner be terrified by their enemies. He knew it, he said, certainly, that the Syracusians by their unexpected daring to encounter the Athenian navy, would get more advantage in respect of the fear it would cause, than the Athenians should endamage them by their odds of skill. He bade them therefore to make trial of their navy, and to be afraid no longer. The Syracusians on these persuasions of Gylippus and Hermocrates, and others, if any were, became now extremely desirous to fight by sea, and presently manned their galleys.

XXII. Gylippus, when the navy was ready, drew out his whole power of land soldiers in the beginning of night, meaning to go himself and assault the fortifications in Plemmyrium. Likewise the galleys of the Syracusians by appointment, thirty-five of them came up towards it out of the great haven, and forty-five more came about out of the little haven, where also was their arsenal, with purpose to join with those within, and to go together to Plemmyrium, that the Athenians might be troubled on both sides. But the Athenians having quickly manned sixty galleys to oppose them, with twenty-five of them they fought with the thirty-five of the Syracusians in the great haven, and with the rest went to meet those that came about from the little haven. And these fought presently before the mouth of the great haven, and held each other to it for a long time; one side endeavouring to force the other to defend the entrance.

XXIII. In the mean time Gylippus, (the Athenians in Plemmyrium being now come down to the water side, and having their minds busied upon the fight of the galleys,) betimes in the morning, and on a sudden assaulted the fortifications before they could come back again to defend them; and possessed first the greatest, and afterwards the two lesser: for they that watched in these, when they saw the greatest so easily taken, durst stay no longer. They that fled upon the losing of the first wall, and put themselves into boats, and into a certain ship, got hardly into the camp; for whilst the Syracusians in the great haven had yet the better in the fight upon the water, they gave them chase with one nimble galley. But by that time that the other two walls were taken, the Syracusians upon the water were overcome, and the Athenians who fled from those two walls, got to their camp with more ease. For those Syracusian galleys that fought before the haven's mouth, having beaten back the Athenians, entered in disorder, and falling foul one on another, gave away the victory unto the Athenians, who put to flight, not only them, but also those other by whom they had before been overcome within the haven, and sunk eleven galleys of the Syracusians, and slew most of the men aboard them, save only the men of three galleys, whom they took alive. Of their own galleys, they lost only three. When they had drawn to land the wreck of the Syracusian galleys, and erected

a trophy in the little island over against Plemmyrium, they returned to their camp.

XXIV. The Syracusians, though such was their success in the battle by sea, yet they won the fortification in Plemmyrium, and set up three trophies, for every wall one. One of the two walls last taken they demolished, but two they repaired and kept with a garrison. At the taking of these walls many men were slain, and many taken alive, and their goods, which all together was a great matter, were all taken. For the Athenians using these works for their storehouse, there was in them much wealth and victual belonging unto merchants, and much unto captains of galleys; for there were sails within it for forty galleys, besides other furniture, and three galleys drawn to land. And this loss of Plemmyrium was it that most and principally impaired the Athenians' army. For the entrance of their provision was now no longer safe, (for the Syracusians lying against them there with their galleys, kept them out,) and nothing could be brought in unto them but by fight, and the army besides was thereby otherwise terrified and dejected.

XXV. After this the Syracusians sent out twelve galleys under the command of Agatharchus, a Syracusan. Of which one carried ambassadors to Peloponnesus, to declare what hope they had now of their business, and to instigate them to a sharper war in Attica. The other eleven went to Italy, on the intelligence of certain vessels laden with commodities coming to the Athenian's army; which also they met with, and destroyed most of them; and the timber, which for building of galleys the Athenians had ready framed, they burned in the territory of Caulonia. After this they went to Locri, and riding here, there came to them one of the ships that carried the men of arms of the Thespians; whom the Syracusians took aboard, and went homeward by the coast. The Athenians that watched for them with twenty galleys at Megara, took one of them, and the men that were in her, but could not take the rest; so that they escaped through to Syracuse. There was also a light skirmish in the haven of Syracuse, about the piles which the Syracusians had driven down before their old harbour, to the end that the galleys might ride within, and the Athenians not annoy them by assault. The Athenians, having brought to the place a ship of huge greatness, fortified with wooden turrets, and covered against fire, caused certain men with little boats to go and fasten cords unto the pile, and so broke them up with craning. Some also the divers did cut up with saws. In the mean time the Syracusians from the harbour, and they from the great ship, shot at each other, till in the end the greatest part of the piles were by the Athenians got up. But the greatest difficulty was to get up those piles which lay hid; for some of them they had so driven in, as that they came not above the water. So that he that should come near was in danger to be thrown upon them as upon a rock. But these also, for reward, the divers went down and sawed asunder. But the Syracusians continually drove down other in their stead. Other devices they had against each other, (as was not unlikely between armies so near opposed,) and many light skirmishes passed,

and attempts of all kinds were put into execution. The Syracusians moreover sent ambassadors, some Corinthians, some Ambraciots, and some Lacedæmonians, unto the cities about them, to let them know that they had won Plemmyrium, and that in the battle by sea they were not overcome by the strength of the enemy, but by their own disorder; and also to shew what hope they were in in other respects, and to intreat their aid, both of sea and land forces, for so much as the Athenians expecting another army, if they would send aid before it came, whereby to overthrow that which they had now there, the war would be at an end. Thus stood the affairs of Sicily.

XXVI. Demosthenes, as soon as his forces which he was to carry to the succour of those in Sicily were got together, put to sea from Ægina, and sailing to Peloponnesus, joined with Charicles and the thirty galleys that were with him. And, having taken on board some men of arms of the Argives, came to Laconia, and first wasted part of the territory of Epidaurus Limera; from thence going to that part of Laconia which is over against the island Cythera, (where is a temple of Apollo,) they wasted a part of the country, and fortified an isthmus there, both that the Helots might have a refuge in it, running away from the Lacedæmonians, and that freebooters from thence, as from Pylos, might fetch in prizes from the territory adjoining. As soon as the place was taken in, Demosthenes himself went on to Corcyra, to take up the confederates there, with intent to go thence speedily into Sicily. And Charicles, having staid to finish and put a garrison into the fortification, went afterwards with his thirty galleys to Athens, and the Argives also went home.

XXVII. The same summer also came to Athens a thousand and three hundred targeteers, of those called Machærophori, of the race of them that are called Dii, and were to have gone with Demosthenes into Sicily. But coming too late, the Athenians resolved to send them back again into Thrace, as being too chargeable a matter to entertain them only for the war in Decelea; for their pay was to have been a drachma a man by the day. For Decelea being this summer fortified, first by the whole army, and then by the several cities, maintained with a garrison by turns, much damaged the Athenians, and weakened their estate, both by destroying their commodities, and consuming their men, exceedingly. For the former invasions having been short, hindered them not from reaping the benefit of the earth for the rest of the time; but now, the enemy continually lying upon them, and sometimes with greater forces, sometimes of necessity with the ordinary garrison, making incursions and fetching in booties, Agis, the king of Lacedæmon, being always there in person, and diligently prosecuting the war, the Athenians were thereby very grievously afflicted; for they were not only deprived of the fruit of the land, but also above twenty thousand of their slaves fled over to the enemy, whereof the greatest part were artificers; besides they lost all their sheep and oxen. And by the continual going out of the Athe-

² καὶ ἅμα λησταὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ, Bekker. time freebooters from thence, as from Duker omits the ἅμα. And at the same Pylos, &c.

nian horsemen, making excursions to Decelea, and defending the country, their horses became partly lamed through incessant labour in rugged grounds, and partly wounded by the enemy.

XXVIII. And their provision, which formerly they used to bring in from Eubœa by Oropus, the shortest way, through Decelea by land, they were now forced to fetch in by sea at great cost, about the promontory of Sunium; and whatsoever the city was wont to be served withal from without it now wanted, and instead of a city was become as it were a fort. And the Athenians watching on the battlements of the wall in the day time by turns, but in the night, both winter and summer, all at once, (except the horsemen,) part at the walls, and part at the arms, were quite tired.¹ But what pressed them most was, that they had two wars at once. And yet their obstinacy was so great as no man would have believed, till now they saw it. For being besieged at home from the fortification of the Peloponnesians, no man would have imagined, that they should not only not have recalled their army out of Sicily, but have also besieged Syracuse there, a city of itself no less than Athens,² and therein so much to have exceeded the expectation of the rest of the Grecians, both in power and courage, (who in the beginning of this war conceived, if the Peloponnesians invaded their territory, some of them that they might hold out two years, others three, no man more,) as that in the seventeenth year after they were first invaded, they should have undertaken an expedition into Sicily, and being every way weakened already by the former war, have undergone another not inferior to that which they had before with the Peloponnesians. Now their treasure being by these wars, and by the detriment sustained from Decelea, and other great expenses that came upon them, at a very low ebb, about this time they imposed on such as were under their dominion, a twentieth part of all goods passing by sea, for a tribute, by this means to improve their comings in. For their expenses were not now as before, but so much greater, by how much the war was greater, and their revenue besides cut off.

XXIX. The Thracians, therefore, who came too late to go with Demosthenes, they presently sent back, being unwilling to lay out money in such a scarcity; and gave the charge of carrying them back to Diotrefes, with command as he went along those coasts, (for his way was through the Euripus,³) if occasion served, to do somewhat against the enemy. He accordingly landed them at Tanagra, and hastily fetched in some small booty, and going over the Euripus from Chalcis in Eubœa, he disembarked again in Bœotia, and led his soldiers towards Mycallessus, and lay all night at the temple of Mercury undiscovered, (distant from Mycallessus about sixteen furlongs.) The

¹ Οἱ μὲν ἐφ' ὅπλοις ποιοῦμενοι. The exact value of this phrase is scarcely now to be ascertained. The explanations attempted by the commentators and translators are very unsatisfactory. A passage nearly to the same purpose occurs in b. viii. c. 69. See *Mitford*.

² αὐτὴν τε καθ' αὐτὴν τῆς Ἀθηναίων, Bekker. τῶν Ἀθηνησίων, Duker. A city of itself not at all less than that of the Athenians.

³ The strait between Eubœa and Bœotia.

next day he comes to the city, being a very great one, and takes it:¹ they keeping no watch, nor expecting that any man would have come in and assaulted them so far from the sea; their walls also being but weak, in some places fallen down, and in others low built, and their gates open through security. The Thracians entering Mycallessus, spoiled both houses and temples, slew the people without mercy on old or young, killing all they could light on, both women and children, yea, and the labouring cattle, and whatever other living thing they saw. For the nation of the Thracians, where they dare, are extremely blood-thirsty, equal to any of the Barbarians. Insomuch as there was put in practice at this time, besides other disorder, all forms of slaughter that could be imagined. They likewise fell upon the school-house, (which was in the city, a great one, and the children newly entered into it,) and killed them every one. And the calamity of the whole city, as it was as great as ever befell any, so also was it more unexpected and more bitter.

XXX. The Thebans hearing of it came out to help them; and overtaking the Thracians before they were gone far, both recovered the booty, and chased them to the Euripus, and to the sea, where the galleys that brought them lay. Many of them they killed, of those most as they went on board, for swim they could not; and such as were in the small boats, when they saw how things went on land, had thrust off their boats, and lay without the Euripus. In the rest of the retreat, the Thracians behaved themselves not unhandsomely against the Theban horsemen, by whom they were charged first; but running out, and again rallying themselves in a circle, according to the manner of their country, defended themselves well, and lost but few men in that action; but some also they lost in the city itself, whilst they staid behind for pillage. But in the whole, of thirteen hundred, there were slain only two hundred and fifty. Of the Thebans and others that came out to help the city, there were slain, horsemen and men of arms, one with another, about twenty; and amongst them Scirphondas of Thebes, one of the governors of Bœotia. And of the Mycallessians there perished a part. Thus went the matter at Mycallessus, the loss which it received being for the quantity of the city, no less to be lamented than any that happened in the whole war.

XXXI. Demosthenes going from Corcyra,² after his fortifying in Laconia, found a ship lying in Phia of Elis, and in her certain men of arms of Corinth, ready to go into Sicily. The ship he sunk, but the men escaped, and afterwards getting another ship, went on in their voyage. After this, Demosthenes being about Zacynthus and Cephallenia, took aboard their men of arms, and sent to Naupactus for the Messenians. From thence he crossed over to the continent of Acarnania, to Alyzia³ and Anactorium, which belonged to the Athe-

¹ τῇ πόλει προσέκειτο, οὕση οὐ μεγάλη, Bekker. οὕση μεγάλη, Duker. He came to the city, which was not a large one, and took it.

ker. ἐκ τῆς Κερκύρας, Duker. And Demosthenes then sailing away to Corcyra.

² ἀποπλίων ἐπὶ τῆς Κερκύρας, Bekker. ³ A town of Acarnania, on the western side of the Achelous.

nians. Whilst in these parts he met with Eurymedon out of Sicily, that had been sent in winter with commodities to the army,¹ who told him amongst other things, how he had heard when at sea, that the Syracusians had won Plemmyrium. Conon also, the captain of Naupactus, came to them, and related that the twenty-five galleys of Corinth that lay before Naupactus, would not give over war, and yet delayed to fight; and therefore desired to have some galleys sent him, being unable with his eighteen to give battle to twenty-five of the enemy. Whereupon Demosthenes and Eurymedon sent twenty galleys more to those at Naupactus, the nimblest of the whole fleet, by Conon himself; and went themselves about furnishing of what belonged to the army, Eurymedon sailing to Corcyra, and having appointed them there to man fifteen galleys, levied men of arms; (for now giving over his course to Athens, he joined with Demosthenes, as having been elected with him in the charge of general;) and Demosthenes took up slingers and darters in the parts about Acarnania.

XXXII. The ambassadors of the Syracusians, who, after the taking of Plemmyrium had been sent to the cities about, having now obtained and levied an army amongst them, were conducting the same to Syracuse, but Nicias, on intelligence thereof, sent to such cities of the Siculi as had the passages, and were their confederates, the Centoripines, Alicycæans, and others, not to suffer the enemy to go by, but to unite themselves and stop them; for that they would not so much as offer to pass by any other way, seeing the Agrigentines had already denied them. When the Sicilians² were marching, the Siculi,³ as the Athenians had desired them, put themselves in ambush in three several places, and setting upon them unawares, and on a sudden, slew about eight hundred of them, and all the ambassadors, save one, a Corinthian; but he conducted those that escaped, about fifteen hundred, to Syracuse.

XXXIII. About the same time came also to their aid, the Camari-næans, five hundred men of arms, three hundred darters, and three hundred archers. Also the Geloans sent them men for five galleys, four hundred darters, and two hundred horsemen. For now all Sicily, except the Agrigentines, who were neutral, but all the rest, who before stood looking on, came in to the Syracusian side against the Athenians. Nevertheless, the Syracusians, after this blow received amongst the Siculi, held their hands, and assaulted not the Athenians for a while; but Demosthenes and Eurymedon having their army now ready, crossed over from Corcyra and the continent⁴ with the whole army to the promontory of Iapygia. From thence they went to the Chærades, islands of Iapygia, and took in certain Iapygian darters, two hundred and fifty, of the Messapian nation, and having renewed

¹ Τὰ χρήματα ἄγων τῇ στρατιᾷ.—
"Ἡροδοτὰ πρὸς τροφήν χρήσιμα, καὶ τὰ
λοιπὰ συντείνοντα αὐτοῖς. Schol. This
is not the only occasion on which Thu-
cydides uses the term *χρήματα* for com-
modities in general. The Latin has
pecuniam, which does not express the

sense intended here. *Mitford*.

² Σικελιώται.

³ Σικελιοί.

⁴ The continent about Acarnania, for
there was Demosthenes; and at Corcyra
was Eurymedon.

a certain ancient alliance with Artas, who reigned there, and granted them those darters, they went thence to Metapontium, [a city] of Italy. There by virtue of a league they got two galleys, and three hundred darters, which taken aboard, they kept along the shore till they came to Thuria. Here they found the faction adverse to the Athenians had been lately driven out into a sedition; and because they desired to muster their army here, that they might see if any were left behind, and persuade the Thurians to join with them freely in the war, (and as things stood,) to have for friends and enemies the same that were so to the Athenians, they staid about that in the territory of the Thurians.

XXXIV. The Peloponnesians, and the rest who were at the same time in the twenty-five galleys, which for safeguard of the ships of burden, lay opposite to the galleys before Naupactus, having prepared themselves for battle, and with more galleys, so that they were little inferior in number to those of the Athenians, went to an anchor under Erineus,¹ of Achaia in Rhypica. The place where they rid was like a half moon, and their land forces they had ready on either side to assist them, both Corinthians and other confederates of those parts, embattled on the points of the promontory, and their galleys made up the space between, under the command of Polyantes, a Corinthian. Against these the Athenians came up with thirty-three galleys from Naupactus, commanded by Diphilus. The Corinthians at first lay still, but afterwards when they saw their time, and the signal given, they charged the Athenians, and the fight began. They held each other to it long. The Athenians sunk three galleys of the Corinthians, and though none of their own were sunk, yet seven were made unserviceable, which having encountered the Corinthian galleys ahead, were torn on both sides between the beak and the oars,² by the beaks of the Corinthian galleys, made stronger for the same purpose.³ After they had fought with equal fortune, and so as both sides challenged the victory, (though yet the Athenians were masters of the wrecks, as driven by the wind into the main, and because the Corinthians came not out to renew the fight,) they at length parted, and there was no chasing of men that fled, nor a prisoner taken on either side; for the Peloponnesians and Corinthians fighting near the land easily escaped, nor was there any galley of the Athenians sunk. But when the Athenians were gone back to Naupactus, the Corinthians presently set up a trophy as victors, more of the Athenian galleys being made unserviceable than of theirs; and thinking themselves not to have had the worse, for the same reason that the others thought themselves not to have had the better. For the Corinthians think they have the better, when they have not much the worse: and the Athenians think they have the worse, when they have not much the better.⁴ And

¹ A harbour of Achaia.

² Ἀναρραγίσαι τὰς παρεξίρεσας, παρεξίρεσις, the space between the prow or the stern, in which there are no oars.

³ Παχυτέρας τὰς ἰπρωτίδας ἔχουσων.

Epotides were thick beams projecting from both sides of the prow, for the purpose of warding off the strokes of the enemy's beaks.

⁴ ὅτι οὐ πολὺ ἐνίκων, Bekker. εἰ μὴ πολὺ ἐνίκων, Duker. But the Athe-

when the Peloponnesians were gone, and their army by land dissolved, the Athenians also set up a trophy in Achaia, as if the victory had been theirs, distant from Erineus, where the Peloponnesians rid, about twenty furlongs. This was the success of that battle by sea.

XXXV. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, after the Thurians had put in readiness to go with them seven hundred men of arms, and three hundred darters, commanded their galleys to go along the coast to Crotoniatis,¹ and conducted their land soldiers, having first taken a muster of them all on the side of the river Sibaris, through the territory of the Thurians. But coming to the river Hylas, upon word sent them from the men of Croton, that if the army went through their territory it should be against their will, they marched down to the sea side, and to the mouth of the river Hylas, where they staid all that night, and were met by their galleys. The next day embarking they kept along the shore, and touched at every town, saving Locri, till they arrived at Petra, in the territory of Rhegium.

XXXVI. The Syracusians in the mean time, on intelligence of their coming on, resolved to try again what they could do with their navy, and with their new supply of land-men, which they had got together on purpose to fight with the Athenians before these should arrive.² And they furnished their navy both otherwise, according to the advantages they had learnt in the last battle, and also made shorter the heads of their galleys, and thereby stronger, and made beaks to them of a great thickness, which they also strengthened with rafters fastened to the sides of the galleys, both within and without, of six cubits long, in such a manner as the Corinthians had armed their galleys ahead to fight with those before Naupactus. For the Syracusians made account, that against the Athenian galleys not so built, but weak before, as not using so much to meet the enemy ahead as on the side, by fetching a compass, they could not but have the better; and that to fight in the great haven many galleys in not much room, was an advantage to them, because using direct encounter, they should break with their firm and thick beaks the hollow and infirm foreparts of the galleys of their enemies; and that the Athenians in that narrow room would want means both to go about, and to go through them, which was the point of art they most relied on. For as for their passing through, they would hinder it themselves as much as they could, and for fetching compass, the straitness of the place would not suffer it. And that fighting ahead, which seemed before to be want of skill in the masters, [to do otherwise,] was it they would now principally make use of; for in this would be their principal advantage. For the Athenians, if overcome, would have no retiring but to the land, which was but a little way off, and little in compass, near their own camp, and of the rest of the haven themselves should be masters, and the enemy being pressed, could not chuse, thronging toge-

nians thought that they were conquered, because they did not obtain a great victory.

¹ That district of Italy whereof Crotona was the capital.

² Demosthenes and Eurymedon.

ther into a little room, and all into one and the same place, but disorder one another, which was indeed the thing that in all their battles by sea, did the Athenians the greatest hurt, having not as the Syracusians had, the liberty of the whole haven to retire to, and to go about into a place of more room, they having it in their power to set on them from the main sea, and to retire again at pleasure, they should never be able; especially having Plemmyrium for enemy, and the haven's mouth not being large.

XXXVII. The Syracusians having devised thus much over and above their former skill and strength, and far more confident now since the former battle by sea, assaulted them both with their army and navy at once. The land-men from the city Gylippus drew sooner out a little, and brought them to the wall of the Athenians' camp, on the side towards the city; and from Olympicum, the men of arms, all that were there, and the horsemen and light-armed of the Syracusians, came up to the wall on the other side; and by and by after came sailing forth also the galleys of the Syracusians and their confederates. The Athenians who at first thought they would have made the attempt only with their land-men, seeing also the galleys on a sudden coming towards them, were in confusion, and some of them put themselves in order upon and before the walls, against those that came from the city, and others went out to meet the horsemen and darters, that were coming in great numbers and with speed from Olympicum, and the parts without; others again went aboard, and withal came to aid those ashore; but when the galleys were manned, they put off, in number seventy-five; and those of Syracuse were about eighty.¹

XXXVIII. Having spent much of the day in charging and retiring, and trying each other, and performed nothing worth the mentioning, save that the Syracusians sunk a galley or two of the Athenians, they parted again; and the land soldiers retired at the same time from the wall of the Athenian camp. The next day the Syracusians lay still without shewing any sign of what they meant to do; yet Nicias, seeing that the battle by sea was equal, and imagining that they would fight again, made the captains repair their galleys, such as had been torn, and two great ships to be moored, without those piles which he had driven into the sea before his galleys, to be instead of a haven enclosed. These ships he placed about two acres asunder, so that if any galley chanced to be pressed, it might safely run in, and again go safely out at leisure. In performing this, the Athenians spent a whole day² from morning until night.

XXXIX. Next day the Syracusians assaulted the Athenians again with the same forces both by sea and land, but began earlier in the morning, and being opposed fleet against fleet, they drew out a great part of the day now again, as before, in attempting upon each other without effect; before that Ariston, the son of Pyrrichus, a

¹ καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἦσαν ὀγδοήκοντα μάλιστα, Bekker. καὶ αἱ τῶν Συρακοσίων, Duker. And there were about eighty of the Syracusians.
² ὅλην τὴν ἡμέραν, Bekker. ὅλην ἡμέραν, Duker. The whole day.

Corinthian, the most expert master in the Syracusan fleet, persuaded the commanders of the navy to send to such in the city as it belonged to, and command that the market should be speedily kept at the sea side, and to compel every man to bring thither whatever he had fit for meat, and there to sell it, that the mariners disembarking might presently dine by the sides of the galleys, and quickly again unlooked for assault the Athenians afresh the same day.

XL. This advice being liked, they sent a messenger, and the market was furnished; and the Syracusians suddenly rowed astern towards the city, and disembarking dined there on the shore; but the Athenians supposing they had retired towards the city as vanquished, landed at leisure, and amongst other business, went about the dressing of their dinner, not expecting to fight again the same day. But the Syracusians suddenly going aboard, came towards them again; and the Athenians, in great tumult, and for the most part undined, embarking disorderly, at length with much ado went out to meet them. For awhile they held their hands on both sides, and but observed each other: but soon after the Athenians thought not fit by longer dallying to overcome themselves with their own labour, but rather to fight as soon as they could; and thereupon at once with a joint shout charged the enemy, and the fight began. The Syracusians receiving the charge, resisted it, and fighting as they had before determined, with their galleys head to head with those of the Athenians, and provided with beaks for the purpose, brake the galleys of the Athenians very much, between the heads of the galleys and the oars. The Athenians were also annoyed much by the darters from the decks, but much more by those Syracusians, who going about in small boats, passed under the rows of the oars of the enemy's galleys, and coming close to their sides, threw their darts at the mariners from thence.¹

XLI. The Syracusians having fought in this manner with the utmost of their strength, in the end got the victory, and the Athenians between the two ships escaped into their harbour; but the Syracusan galleys chased them as far as to those ships, but the dolphins² hanging from the masts over the entrance of the harbour, forbade them to follow any further. Yet there were two galleys, which, elated with victory, approached them, but were both lost, one with her men was taken. The Syracusians having sunk seven galleys of the Athenians, and torn many more, and of the men had taken some alive, and killed others, retired, and for both the battles erected trophies, and had already an assured hope of being far superior by sea, and also made account to subdue the army by land. And they prepared to assault them again in both kinds.

XLII. In the mean time Demosthenes and Eurymedon arrived with the Athenian supply, about seventy-three galleys,³ and men of arms, of their own and of their confederates, about five thousand;

¹ See a long note to Mitford's Greece, and when thrown into the enemy's ships, either burnt or sunk them.—vol. iii. c. xviii. sect. vii.

² So called from their form: they were massy, made of lead, hung upon the sail-yards by cords and pulleys; *Smith.* ³ According to Diod. Sic. three hundred and ten.

besides darters, as well Barbarians as Greeks, not a few, and slingers and archers, and all other provision sufficient. For the present it not a little daunted the Syracusians and their confederates to see no end of their danger, and that notwithstanding the fortifying in Decelea, another army should come now, equal and like unto their former, and that their power should be so great in every kind. And on the other side it was a kind of strengthening after weakness to the Athenian army that was there before. But Demosthenes, seeing how things stood, and thinking it unfit to loiter and fall into the same case as Nicias, (for Nicias, who was formidable at his first coming, when he set not presently upon Syracuse, but wintered at Catana, both grew into contempt, and was prevented also by the coming of Gylippus thither with an army out of Peloponnesus, which if Nicias had gone against Syracuse at first, had never been so much as sent for; for supposing themselves to have been strong enough alone, they had at once both found themselves too weak, and the city been enclosed with a wall, whereby though they had sent for it, it could not have helped them as it did.) Demosthenes, I say, considering this, and that he also even at the present, and the same day was most terrible to the enemy, intended with all speed to make use of this present terribleness of the army. And having observed that the cross wall of the Syracusians, wherewith they hindered the Athenians from enclosing the city, was but single, and that if they could be masters of the ascent to Epipolæ, and again of the camp there, the same might easily be taken, (for none would have stood against them,) hastened to put it to trial, and thought it his shortest way to the despatching of the war. For either he should have success he thought, and so win Syracuse, or he would lead away the army, and no longer without purpose consume both the Athenians there with him, and the whole state. The Athenians therefore went out, and first wasted the territory of the Syracusians about the river Anapus, and were the stronger as at first, both by sea and land. (For the Syracusians durst neither way go out against them, but only with their horsemen and darters from Olympicum.)

XLIII. After this, Demosthenes thought good to try the wall which the Athenians had built with engines. But when on applying them they were burnt by the defendants fighting from the wall, and when assaulting it in divers parts with the rest of his army, he was notwithstanding put back, he resolved to spend the time no longer, but having persuaded Nicias and the rest in commission thereto, to put in execution his design for Epipolæ, as he before intended. By day it was thought impossible not to be discovered, either in their approach, or in their ascent; having therefore first commanded to take five days' provision of victual, and all the masons and workmen, as also store of casting weapons, and whatever they might need of for fortification, if they overcame, he, and Eurymedon, and Menander, with the whole army, marched about midnight¹ to Epipolæ; but Nicias they left in the fortifications. Being come to [Epipolæ] at

¹ Ἀπὸ πρώτου ὕπνου, after the first watch.

Euryalus, where also the army went up before, they were not only undiscovered by the watches of the Syracusians, but ascending, took a fortification of the Syracusians there, and killed part of the guards. But the greatest number escaping, ran presently to the camps, of which there were in Epipolæ three, walled about without the city, one of Syracusians, one of other Sicilians, and one of confederates, and carried the news of their coming in, and told it to those six hundred Syracusians who kept this part of Epipolæ at first, and who presently went forth to meet them. But Demosthenes and the Athenians lighting on them, though they fought valiantly, put them to flight, and presently marched on, making use of the present heat of the army to finish what he came for, before it were too late; and others going on, in their first course took the cross wall of the Syracusians, they flying that kept it, and were throwing down the battlements thereof. The Syracusians and their confederates, and Gylippus and those with him, came out to meet them from their camps; but because the attempt was unexpected, and in the night, they charged the Athenians timorously, and were even at first forced to retire. But as the Athenians advanced more out of order, chiefly as having already obtained the victory, and desiring also quickly to pass through all that remained yet unfought with, lest, through their remissness in following, they might again rally themselves, the Boeotians withstood them first, and charging, forced them to turn their backs.

XLIV. And here the Athenians were mightily in disorder and perplexed, so that it hath been very hard to be informed of any side, in what manner each thing passed. For if in the day time, when things are better seen, yet they that are present cannot tell how all things go, save only what every man with much ado seeth near unto himself; how then in a battle by night, the only one that happened between great armies in all this war, can a man know any thing for certain? For though the moon shone bright, yet they saw one another no otherwise than, as by moonlight was likely, so as to see a body, but not be sure whether it were a friend or not. And the men of arms on both sides being not a few in number, had but little ground to turn in. Of the Athenians some were already overcome, others went on in their first way. Also a great part of the rest of the army was already part got up, and part ascending, and knew not which way to march; for after the Athenians once turned their backs, all before them was in confusion; and it was hard to distinguish any thing for the noise. For the Syracusians and their confederates prevailing, encouraged each other, and received the assailants with exceeding great shouts, for they had no other means in the night to express themselves; and the Athenians sought each other, and took for enemies all before them, though friends, and of the number of those that fled, and by often asking the word, there being no other means of distinction, all asking at once, they both made a great deal of stir amongst themselves, and revealed the word to the enemy; but they did not in like manner know the word [of the Syracusians,] because these being victorious and undistracted, knew one another better; so that when they lighted on any number of the enemy, though they

themselves were more, yet the enemy escaped, as knowing the watch-word; but they, when they could not answer were slain. But that which hurt them most was the singing of the Pæan; for being in both armies the same, drove them to their wits end. For the Argives and Corcyræans, and all other of the Doric race on the Athenians' part, when they sounded the Pæan, terrified the Athenians on one side, and the enemy terrified them with the like on the other side. Wherefore at the last falling one upon another in divers parts of the army, friends against friends, and countrymen against countrymen, they not only terrified each other, but came to handstrokes, and could hardly again be parted. As they fled before the enemy, the way of the descent from Epipolæ, by which they were to go back, being but strait, many of them threw themselves down from the rocks and so died; and of the rest that got down safely into the plain, though the greatest part, and all that were of the old army, by their knowledge of the country escaped into the camp, yet of these that came last, some lost their way, and straying in the fields, when the day came on, were cut off by the Syracusan horsemen that ranged the country about.

XLV. The next day the Syracusians erected two trophies, one in Epipolæ at the ascent, and another where the first check was given by the Bæotians; but the Athenians received their dead under truce. And many there were that died, both of themselves and of their confederates;¹ but the arms taken were more than for the number of the slain: for of such as were forced to quit their bucklers, and leap down from the rocks, though some perished, yet some there also were that escaped.

XLVI. After this, the Syracusians having by such unlooked for prosperity recovered their former courage, sent Sicanus with fifteen galleys to Agrigentum, being in sedition, to bring that city if they could to their obedience; and Gylippus went again to the Sicilian cities by land, to raise yet another army, as being in hope to take the camp of the Athenians by assault, considering how the matter had gone in Epipolæ.

XLVII. In the mean time the Athenian generals went to council upon their late overthrow, and present general weakness of the army. For they saw, not only that their designs prospered not, but that the soldiers also were weary of staying. For they were troubled with sickness, proceeding from a double cause, this being the time of the year most obnoxious to diseases, and the place where they lay moorish and noisome. And all things else appeared desperate. Demosthenes thought fit to stay no longer; and since the execution of his design at Epipolæ had failed, delivered his opinion for going out of the haven whilst the seas were open, and whilst, at least with this addition of galleys, they were stronger than the army of the enemy. For it was better, he said, for the city to make war upon those who fortify against them at home, than against the Syracusians, seeing they

¹ Diod. Sic. says, that two thousand five hundred were killed; Plutarch, two thousand.

cannot now be easily overcome; and there was no reason why they should spend much money in lying before the city. This was the opinion of Demosthenes.

XLVIII. Nicias, though he also thought their estate bad, yet was unwilling to have their weakness discovered, and by decreeing their departure openly with the votes of many, to make known the same to the enemy; for if at any time they had a mind to be gone, they should then be less able to do it secretly. Besides, the estate of the enemy, inasmuch as he understood it better than the rest, put him into some hope that it might yet grow worse than their own, in case they pressed the siege, especially being already masters of the sea far and near with their present fleet. There was moreover a party for the Athenians in Syracuse that desired to betray the state into their hands, and that sent messengers unto him, and suffered him not to rise and be gone. All which he knowing, though he were in truth doubtful what opinion to be of, and did yet consider; nevertheless openly in his speech, he was against the withdrawing the army, and said, that he was sure the people of Athens would take it ill, if he went thence without their order: for that they were not to have such judges as should give sentence upon their own sight of things done, rather than upon the report of calumniators, but such as would believe whatsoever some fine speaker should accuse them of. That many, nay, most of the soldiers here, who now cry out upon their misery, will there cry out on the contrary, and say the generals have betrayed the state, and come away for a bribe. That he would not, therefore, knowing the nature of the Athenians so well, choose to be put to death unjustly, and charged with a dishonourable crime by the Athenians, rather than if he must needs do one, to suffer the same at the hand of the enemy by his own adventure. And yet he said the state of the Syracusians was still inferior to their own; for paying much money to strangers, and laying out much more on forts without and about the city, having also had a great navy a year already in pay, they must needs want money at last, and all these things fail them. For they have spent already two thousand talents,¹ and are much in debt besides; and whensoever they shall give over this course, and make pay no longer, their strength is gone, as being auxiliary, and not constrained to follow the war, as the Athenians are. Therefore it was fit, he said, to stay close to the city, and not to go away, as if they were too weak in money, wherein they were much superior.²

XLIX. Nicias, when he spake thus, assured them of it, knowing the state of Syracuse precisely, and their want of money; and that there were some that desired to betray the city to the Athenians, and sent him word not to go; and withal, he had now confidence in the fleet, which as being before overcome, he had not. As for lying where they did, Demosthenes would by no means hear of it; but if

¹ £387,500.

pared to Fabius Cunctator, by Plutarch.

² The obstinacy of Nicias was remarkable. He is not improperly com-

the army might not be carried away without order from the Athenians, but must needs stay in Sicily, then he said they might go to Thapsus, or Catana, from whence by their land-men they might invade and turn much of the country to them, and wasting the fields of the enemy, weaken the Syracusians, and be able to fight with their galleys in the main sea, and not in a narrow (which is the advantage of the enemy,) but in a wide place, where the benefit of skill should be theirs, and where they should not be forced in charging and retiring, to come up, and fall off in narrow and circumscribed limits. In sum, he said he by no means liked to stay where they were, but with all speed, no longer delaying the matter, to arise and be gone. Eurymedon also gave the like counsel. Nevertheless, on the contradiction of Nicias, there grew a kind of sloth and procrastination in the business, and a suspicion withal, that the asseveration of Nicias was grounded on somewhat that he knew above the rest, and thereupon the Athenians deferred their going thence, and staid upon the place.

L. In the mean time Gylippus and Sycanus returned to Syracuse, Sycanus without his purpose at Agrigentum, (for whilst he was yet in Gela, the sedition which had been raised in the behalf of the Syracusians, was turned into friendship;) but Gylippus not without another great army out of Sicily, besides the men of arms, who having set forth from Peloponnesus in ships the spring before, were then lately arrived at Selinus from out of Africa. For having been driven into Africa, and the Cyrenæans having given them two galleys with pilots, in passing by the shore they aided the Euesperitæ, besieged by the Africans; and having overcome the Africans, they went on to Neapolis, a town of traffic belonging to the Carthaginians, where the passage into Sicily is shortest, and but two days' and a night's sail over, and from thence they crossed the sea to Selinus. As soon as they were come, the Syracusians again presently prepared to set upon the Athenians both by sea and land; but the Athenian generals seeing them have another army, and their own not bettering, but growing every day worse than the other, but especially as being pressed to it by the sickness of the soldiers, repented now that they removed not before; and Nicias being now no longer against it as he was, but desirous only that it might not be concluded openly,¹ gave order unto all, as secretly as was possible, to put forth from the harbour, and to be ready when the sign should be given. But when they were about it, and every thing was ready, the moon happened to be eclipsed; for it was full moon; and not only the greatest part of the Athenians called upon the generals to stay, but Nicias also (for he was addicted to superstition and observations of that kind somewhat too much) said, that it should come no more into debate, whether they should go or not, till the three times nine days be past, which the soothsayers

¹ *Μὴ φανερώς γε ἀξιῶν ψηφίζεσθαι.*— of proceeding on such occasions in his age, without thinking of the explanation that posterity might need.—*Mitford.*
We want explanation of this phrase, which the commentators and translators do not give. Thucydides has written for those who knew the common forms

appoint in that behalf.¹ And the Athenians, though upon going, still staid for this reason.

LI. The Syracusians also having intelligence of this, were encouraged to press the Athenians much the more, for that they confessed themselves already too weak for them both by sea and land, (for otherwise they would never have sought to have run away,) and besides they would not have them sit down in any other part of Sicily, and become the harder to be warred on; but had rather there with all speed, and in a place most for their own advantage, compel them to fight by sea. To which end they manned their galleys, and after they had rested as long as was sufficient, when they saw their time, the first day they assaulted the Athenians' camp, and some small number of men of arms and horsemen of the Athenians sallied out against them by certain gates, and the Syracusians intercepting some of the men of arms, beat them back into the camp; but the entrance being strait, there were seventy of the horsemen lost, and men of arms some, but not many.

LII. That day the army of the Syracusians moved away; the next they came out with their galleys, seventy-six² in number, and the Athenians set forth against them with eighty-six; and being come together, they fought.³ Eurymedon had charge of the right wing of the Athenians, and desiring to encompass the galleys of the enemy, drew forth his own galleys in length more toward the shore; and was cut off by the Syracusians that had first overcome the middle battle of the Athenians from the rest in the bottom and inmost part of the haven; and both slain himself, and the galleys that were with him lost; and that done, the rest of the Athenian fleet was also chased and driven ashore.

LIII. Gylippus seeing the navy of the enemy vanquished, and carried past the piles and their own harbour, came with a part of his army to the pier⁴ to kill such as landed, and that the Syracusians might more easily pull the enemy's galleys from the shore, whereof they themselves were masters. But the Tuscans, (for they kept guard in that part for the Athenians,) seeing them coming that way in disorder, made head, and charging these first, forced them into the marsh called Lysimelia.⁵ But when afterwards a greater number of the Syracusians and their confederates came to help them, then also the

¹ *πριν ὥς οἱ μάντις*, Bekker. *ἄς οἱ μάντις*, Duker. Before they had remained the three times nine days, as the prophets had declared.

² Seventy-four according to Diod. Sic.

³ Plutarch says, that on this occasion the lads came out in fishing boats, insulting the Athenians: one of these, Heraclides, of a noble family, having advanced too near, was in danger of being intercepted by an Athenian vessel; but Pollichus, the uncle of the lad, alarmed for his safety, charged instantly

with ten triremes he had under his command; the rest of the Syracusan fleet, frightened for Pollichus, ran in at once, and brought on a general engagement.—See *Life of Nicias*.

⁴ Harbours were divided into three parts as far as related to their construction; one part was by the Greeks called *χηλή*, another *στόμα*, a third *μυχός*. The *χηλή* was a jetty stretching out into the sea, for the purpose of breaking the violence of the waves.

⁵ See Theocritus Idyll. xvi.

Athenians to help the Tuscans, and for fear they should lose their galleys, fought with them, and having overcome them, pursued them, and not only slew many of their men of arms,¹ but also saved the most of their galleys, and brought them back into the harbour; nevertheless the Syracusians took eighteen, and slew the men taken in them. And amongst the rest they let drive before the wind (which blew right upon the Athenians) an old ship, full of fagots and brands set on fire to burn them. The Athenians on the other side, fearing the loss of their navy, devised remedies for the fire, and having quenched the flame and kept the ship from coming near, escaped that danger.

LIV. After this the Syracusians set up a trophy, both for the battle by sea, and for the men of arms which they intercepted above before the camp, where also they took the horses. And the Athenians erected a trophy likewise, both for the flight of those footmen whom the Tuscans drove into the marsh, and for those whom they themselves put to flight with the rest of the army.

LV. When the Syracusians had now manifestly overcome their fleet, (for they feared at first the supply of galleys that came with Demosthenes,) the Athenians were in good earnest utterly out of heart, and as they were much deceived in the event, so they repented more of the voyage. For having come against these cities, the only ones that were for institution like unto their own, and governed by the people as well as themselves; and which had a navy, and horses, and greatness, seeing they could create no dissension amongst them about change of government, to win them that way, nor could subdue it with the greatness of their forces when they were far the stronger, but misprospered in most of their designs, they were then at their wits end; but now, when they were also vanquished by sea, which they would never have thought, they were much more dejected than ever.²

LVI. The Syracusians went presently about the haven without fear, and meditated how to shut up the same, that the Athenians might not steal away without their knowledge, though they would; for now they studied, not only how to save themselves, but how to hinder the safety of the Athenians. For the Syracusians conceived, not untruly, that their own strength was at this present the greater, and that if they could vanquish the Athenians and their confederates, both by sea and land, it would be a mastery of great honour to them amongst the rest of the Grecians. For all the rest of Greece should be one part freed by it, and the other part out of fear of subjection hereafter, (for it would be impossible for the Athenians, with the remainder of their strength, to sustain the war that would be made upon them afterwards,) and they being reputed the authors of it, should be had in admiration, not only with all men now living, but also with posterity. And to say truth, it was a worthy mastery, both for the causes shewn,

¹ ὀπλίτας τε οὐ πολλοὺς, Bekker. πολλῶ δὴ μᾶλλον ἠέθουον, Duker. ὀπλίτας τε πολλοὺς, Duker. And slew a few of their heavy-armed men. And when they were conquered also by sea, which they did not expect, they

² πολλῶ δὴ μᾶλλον ἔτι, Bekker. were now still more in doubt.

and also for that they became victors, not of the Athenians only, but many others their confederates; nor again they themselves alone, but their confederates also, having been in joint command with the Corinthians and Lacedæmonians, and both exposed their city to the first hazard, and of the business by sea performed the greatest part themselves. The greatest number of nations, except the general roll of those which in this war adhered to Athens and Lacedæmon, were together at this one city.

LVII. And this number on both sides, some against Sicily, and some for it, some to help to win, and some to help to save it, came to the war at Syracuse, not on any pretence of right, nor as kindred to aid kindred, but as profit or necessity severally chanced to induce them. The Athenians being Ionic, went against the Syracusians that be Doric voluntarily; with these, as being their colonies, went the Lemnians, and the Imbrians, and the Æginetæ, that dwelt in Ægina then, all of the same language and institutions with themselves; also the Hestians of Eubœa. Of the rest, some went with them as their subjects, and some as their free confederates, and some also hired. Subjects and tributaries, as the Eretrians, Chalcidæans, Styrians, and Carystians, from Eubœa; Ceians, Andrians, Tenians,¹ from out of the islands; Milesians, Samians, and Chians, from Ionia. Of these the Chians followed them as free, not as tributaries of money, but of galleys. And these were almost all of them Ionians, descended from the Athenians, except only the Carystians, (but they are Dryopes,) and though they were subjects, and went upon constraint, yet they were Ionians against Dorians. Besides these there went with them Æolians, namely, the Methymnæans, subjects to Athens, not tributaries of money, but of galleys, and the Tenedians and Ænians, tributaries. Now here Æolians were constrained to fight against Æolians, namely, against their founders, the Bœotians, that took part with the Syracusians, but the Platæans, and only they, being Bœotians, fought against Bœotians upon just quarrel. The Rhodians and Cytherians, Doric, both by constraint bore arms; one of them, namely the Cytherians, a colony of the Lacedæmonians, with the Athenians, against the Lacedæmonians that were with Gylippus; and the other, that is to say, the Rhodians, being by descent Argives, not only against the Syracusians, who were also Doric, but against their own colony, the Gelans, which took part with the Syracusians. Then of the islanders about Peloponnesus, there went with them the Cephallenians and Zacynthians, not but that they were free states, but because they were kept in awe as islanders by the Athenians, who were masters of the sea; and the Corcyræans, being not only Doric, but Corinthians, fought openly against both Corinthians and Syracusians, though a colony of the one, and of kin to the other; which they did necessarily, (to make the best of it,) but indeed no less willingly, in respect of their hatred to the Corinthians. Also the Messenians, now so called in Naupactus, were taken along to this war, and the Messenians at Pylos, then holden by the Athe-

¹ Tenians, Bekker: commonly put Teians.

nians. Moreover the Megarean outlaws, though not many, by advantage taken of their misery, were fain to fight against the Selinuntians that were Megareans likewise. But now the rest of their army was rather voluntary. The Argives, not so much for the league as for their enmity with the Lacedæmonians, and their present particular spleen,¹ and being Dorians, followed the Athenians, though Ionians, to the war against Dorians; but the Mantineans and other Arcadian mercenaries, men ever accustomed to invade any enemy pointed out to them, and now influenced by a desire for gain, regarded as enemies, as much as any, even those other Arcadians who went thither with the Corinthians; but the Cretans and Ætolians were all mercenary, and it fell out that the Cretans, who together with the Rhodians were founders of Gela, not only took not part with their colony, but fought against it willingly for their hire. And some Acarnanians also went with them for gain, but most of them went as confederates, for love to Demosthenes, and for good will to the state of Athens. And thus many within the bound of the Ionian gulf. Then of Italians fallen into the same necessity of seditious times, there went with them to this war, the Thurians and Metapontians; of Greek Sicilians, the Naxians and Catanzæans; of Barbarians, the Egestæans, who also drew with them the most of those Greek Sicilians; and without Sicily there went with them some Tuscans, on quarrels between them and the Syracusians, and some Iapygian mercenaries. These were the nations that followed the army of the Athenians.

LVIII. On the other side, there opposed them on the part of the Syracusians, the Camarinæans their borderers, and beyond them again the Geloans, and then (the Agrigentines not stirring) beyond them again the same way, the Selinuntians. These inhabit the part of Sicily that lieth opposite to Africa, but the Himereæans on the side that lieth to the Tyrrhene sea, where they are the only Grecians inhabiting, and the only ones who came thence to aid the *Syracusians*: these were their confederates of the Greek nation within Sicily all Dorians, and free states; then of the Barbarians there they had the Siculi, all but what revolted to the Athenians; but of Grecians without Sicily, the Lacedæmonians sent them a Spartan commander, with some Helots, and the rest freed men, but the Corinthians only aided them both with galleys, and with land-men, and for kindred sake, the Leucadians and Ambraciots, out of Arcadia, those mercenaries sent by the Corinthians, and Sicyonians on constraint, and from without Peloponnesus, the Bœotians. To the foreign aids the Sicilians themselves, as being great cities, added more in every kind than as much again; for they got together men of arms, galleys and horses, great store, and other number in abundance. And to all these again the Syracusians themselves added, as I may say, above as much more, in respect of the greatness both of their city and of their danger.

LIX. These were the succours assembled on either part, which were then all there, and after them came no more, neither to the one

¹ ἑκαστοὶ ἰδίᾳς ὠφελίας, Bekker. Duker omits ὠφελίας. Each for their own immediate particular profit.

side nor the other. No marvel then, if the Syracusians thought it a noble mastery, if to the victory by sea already got, they could add the taking of the whole Athenian army, so great as it was, and hinder their escape both by sea and land. Presently, therefore, they fall in hand with stopping up the mouth of the great haven, being about eight furlongs wide, with galleys laid across, and lighters and boats upon their anchors, and withal prepared whatsoever else was necessary, in case the Athenians should hazard another battle, meditating on no small matters in any thing.

LX. The Athenians seeing the shutting up of the haven, and the rest of the enemy's designs, thought good to go to counsel upon it; and the generals and commanders of regiments having met, and considered their present wants, both otherwise and in this, that they neither had provision for the present, (for upon their resolution to be gone, they had sent before to Catana, to forbid the sending in of any more,) nor were likely to have for the future, unless their navy got the upper hand, they resolved to abandon their camp above, and to take in some place, no greater than needs they must, near unto their galleys with a wall, and leaving some to keep it, to go aboard with the rest of the army, and to man every galley that they had, serviceable and less serviceable, and having caused all sorts of men to go aboard and fight it out, if they got the victory to go to Catana; if not, to make their retreat in order of battle, by land, (having first set fire on their navy,) the nearest way unto some amicable place, either Barbarian or Grecian, that they should best be able to reach unto before the enemy. As they had resolved on, so they did; for they both came down to the shore from their camp above, and also manned every galley they had, and compelled to go on board every man of age, of any ability whatsoever. So the whole navy was manned, to the number of one hundred and ten galleys, upon which they had many archers and darters, both Acarnanians and other strangers, and all things else provided, according to their means and purpose. And Nicias, when almost every thing was ready, perceiving the soldiers to be dejected for being so far overcome by sea, contrary to their custom, and yet in respect of the scarcity of victual, desirous as soon as could be to fight, called them together, and encouraged them then the first time, with words to this effect:

Oration of Nicias.

LXI. "Soldiers, Athenians, and other our confederates, though the trial at hand will be common to all alike, and will concern the safety and country, no less of each of us, than of the enemy: for if our galleys get the victory, we may every one see his native city again: yet ought we not to be discouraged, like men of no experience, who failing in their first adventures, ever after carry a fear suitable to their misfortunes.¹ But you Athenians here present, having had experience already of many wars, and you our

¹ Compare the speech of Phormio, b. ii. 89.

“ confederates, that have always gone along with our armies, remember how often the event falleth out otherwise in war than one would think; and in hope that fortune will once also be on our side, prepare yourselves to fight again, in such manner as shall be worthy the number you see yourselves to be.

LXII. “ What we thought would be helps in the narrowness of the haven, against such a multitude of galleys as will be there, and against the provision of the enemy upon their decks, whereby we were formerly annoyed, we have with the masters now considered them all, and as well as our present means will permit, made them ready. For many archers and darters shall go aboard, and that multitude, which if we had been to fight in the main sea, we would not have used, because by hindering the working of the galleys, it would take away the use of skill, will nevertheless be useful here, where we are forced to make a land-fight from our galleys. We have also devised, instead of what should have been provided for in the building of our galleys against the thickness of the beaks of theirs, which did most hurt us, to lash their galleys unto ours with iron grapnels, whereby (if the men of arms do their part) we may keep the galleys which once come close up, from falling back again. For we are brought to a necessity now of making it a land-fight upon the water: and it will be the best for us, neither to fall back ourselves, nor to suffer the enemy to do so. Especially when, except what our men on land shall make good, the shore is altogether hostile.

LXIII. “ Which you remembering, must therefore fight it out to the utmost, and not suffer yourselves to be beaten back unto the shore. But when galley to galley shall once be fallen close, never think any cause worthy to make you part, unless you have first beaten off the men of arms of the enemy from their decks.¹ And this I speak to you rather that are the men of arms, than to the mariners, inasmuch as that part belongeth rather unto you that fight above; and in you it lieth even yet to achieve the victory for the most part with the land-men. Now for the mariners, I advise, and withal beseech them not to be too much daunted with the losses past, having now both a greater number of galleys, and greater forces upon the decks. Think it a pleasure worth preserving, that being taken, by your knowledge of the language, and imitation of our fashions for Athenians, (though you be not so,) you are not only admired for it through all Greece, but also partake of our dominion in matter of profit no less than ourselves; and for awfulness to the nations subject, and protection from injury, more.² You therefore that alone participate freely of our dominion, cannot with any justice betray the same. In despite therefore of the Corinthians, whom you have often vanquished; and of the Sicilians, who as long as our fleet was at the best, durst never so

¹ ἀπολύεσθαι ἡ τοῦς, Bekker. ἡν μὴ heavy-armed from the enemy's deck.
 τοῦς, Duker. Do not think it right for you to part before you have beaten the ² Compare Euripides *Medea*, line 536.

“ much as stand us, repel them, and make it appear, that your knowledge, even with weakness and loss, is better than the strength of another with fortune.

LXIV. “ Again, to such of you as are Athenians I must remind of this, that you have no more such fleets in your harbours, nor such able men of arms; and that if aught happen to you but victory, your enemies here will presently be upon you at home; and those at home will be unable to defend themselves, both against those that shall go hence, and against the enemy that lieth there already. So one part of us shall fall into the mercy of the Syracusians, against whom you yourselves know with what intent you came hither, and the other part which is at home shall fall into the hands of the Lacedæmonians. Being therefore in this one battle to fight both for yourselves and them; be therefore valiant now if ever, and bear in mind every one of you, that you that go now aboard are the land forces, the sea forces, the whole estate, and great name of Athens. For which, if any man excel others in skill or courage, he can never shew it more opportunely than now, when he may both help himself with it, and the whole.”

LXV. Nicias having thus encouraged them, commanded presently to go aboard. Gylippus and the Syracusians might easily discern that the Athenians meant to fight, by seeing their preparation, besides they had advertisement of their purpose to cast iron grapnels into their galleys. And as for every thing else, so also for that they had made provision. For they covered the forepart of their galleys, and also the decks for a great way with hides, that the grapnels cast in might slip, and not be able to take hold. When all was ready, Gylippus likewise, and other the commanders, used unto the soldiers this hortative :

Oration of Gylippus and the Syracusian Generals.

LXVI. “ That not only our former acts have been honourable, but that we are to fight now also for further honour, men of Syracuse, and confederates, the most of you seem to know already, (for otherwise you never would so valiantly have undergone it, and if there be any man that is not so sensible of it as he ought, we will make it appear to him better. For whereas the Athenians came into this country first to enslave Sicily, and then if that succeeded, Peloponnesus and the rest of Greece; and whereas already they had the greatest dominion of any Grecians, either present or past, you, the first that ever withstood their navy, wherewith they were every where masters, have in the former battles overcome them, and shall in likelihood overcome them again in this. For men that are cut short where they thought themselves to exceed, become afterwards further out of opinion with themselves than they would have been if they had never thought so; and when they come short of their hope in things they glory in, they come short also in courage of the true strength of their forces: and this is likely now to be the case of the Athenians.

LXVII. “ Whereas with us it falls out, that our former courage

“ wherewith, though inexperienced, we durst not stand them, being now confirmed, and an opinion added of being the stronger, gives to every one of us a double hope. And in all enterprizes, the greatest hope confers for the most part the greatest courage. As for their imitation of our provisions, they are things we are acquainted with, and we shall not in any kind be unprovided for them; but they, when they shall have many men of arms on their decks, being not used to it, and many, as I may term them, land-darters,¹ both Acarnanians and others, who would not be able to direct their darts, though they should sit, how can they fail to put the galleys into danger, and be all in confusion amongst themselves, moving in a fashion² not their own? As for the number of their galleys, it will help them nothing, if any of you fear also that, as being to fight against odds in number, for many in little room are so much the slower to do what they desire, and easier to be annoyed by our munition. But the very truth you shall now understand by these things, whereof we suppose we have most certain intelligence; for overwhelmed with calamities, and forced by the difficulties which they are in at this present, they are grown desperate, not trusting to their forces, but willing to put themselves upon the decision of fortune, as well as they may, that so they may either go out by force, or else make their retreat afterward by land, as men whose estates cannot change into the worse.

LXVIII. “ Against such confusion, therefore, and against the fortune of our greatest enemies, now betraying itself into our hands, let us fight with anger, and with an opinion not only that it is most lawful to fulfil our hearts’ desire upon these our enemies that justified their coming hither, as a righting of themselves against an assailant; but also that to be revenged on an enemy is both most natural, and as is most commonly said, the sweetest thing in the world. And that they are our enemies, and our greatest enemies, you all well enough know, seeing they come hither into our dominion to bring us into servitude; wherein if they had succeeded, they had put the men to the greatest tortures, the women and children to the greatest dishonesty, and the whole city to the most ignominious name.³ In regard whereof, it is not fit that any of you should be so tender as to think it gain, if they go away without putting you to further danger, for so they mean to do though they get the victory; but effecting, as it is likely we shall, what we intend, both to be revenged of these, and to deliver to all Sicily their liberty which they enjoyed before, but now is more assured, honourable is the combat. And rare are those hazards wherein the failing brings little loss, and the success a great deal of profit.”

LXIX. When Gylippus and the commanders of the Syracusians had in this manner encouraged their soldiers, they presently put their men aboard, perceiving the Athenians to do the same. But Nicias, perplexed with this present estate, and seeing how great and how

¹ Ἀκόντισται χερσαῖοι. Such as when on land, could use their darts, but not when tottering on the water.

² That is, according to the motion of the galley, not steadfastly as upon land.

³ The name of subject.

near the danger was, being now on the point to put forth from the harbour, and doubting, as in great battles it falls out, that somewhat in every kind was still wanting, and that he had not yet sufficiently spoken his mind, called unto him again all the captains of galleys, and spoke unto them every one by their fathers, their tribes, and their proper names, and entreated every one of them that had reputation in any kind, not to betray the same; and those whose ancestors were eminent, not to deface their hereditary virtues; calling to their recollection their country's liberty, and the uncontrolled power of all men to live as they pleased; and saying whatever else in such a pinch men are accustomed, not out of their store to utter things stale,¹ and on all occasions the same, touching their wives, children, and patril gods; but such things as being thought by them available in the present discouragement, they use to cry into their ears. And when he thought he had admonished them not enough, but as much as the time would permit, he went his way, and drew out those forces that were to serve on land to the sea side, and embattled them so, as they might take up the greatest length of ground they were able, thereby so much the more to confirm the courage of them that were aboard. And Demosthenes, Menander, and Euthydemus,² (for those of the Athenian commanders went aboard,) putting forth from the harbour, went immediately to the lock of the haven, and to the passage that was left open, intending to force their way out.

LXX. But the Syracusians and their confederates, being out already with the same number of galleys, they had before disposed part of them to the guard of the open passage, and the rest in circle about the haven, to the end they might fall upon the Athenians from all parts at once, and that their land forces might withal be near to aid them wheresoever the galleys touched. In the Syracusian navy, Siccanus and Agatharchus commanded each of them a wing, and Pythen with the Corinthians had the middle battle. After the Athenians were come to the lock of the haven, at the first charge they overcame the galleys placed there to guard it, and endeavoured to break open the bars; but when afterwards the Syracusians and confederates came upon them from every side, they fought not at the lock only, but also in the haven itself; and the battle was sharp, and such as there had never before been the like. For the courage wherewith the mariners on both sides brought up their galleys to any part they were bidden, was very great, and great was the plotting and counterplotting, and contention one against another of the masters. Also the soldiers, when the galleys boarded each other, did their utmost to excel each other in all points of skill that could be used from the decks, and every man in the place assigned him, put himself forth to appear the foremost. But many galleys falling close together in a narrow compass (for they were the most galleys that in any battle they had used, and fought in the least room, being little fewer on the one side and the other than two hundred,) they ran against each other but seldom,

¹ Ἀρχαιολογεῖν. To speak old or though in some copies he is called stale sentences. Eudemus.

² The same mentioned in chap. xvi.

there being no means of retiring, nor of passing by; but made assaults upon each other oftener, as galley with galley, either flying or pursuing, chanced to fall foul. And as long as a galley was making up, they that stood on the decks used their darts and arrows and stones in abundance, but being once come close, the soldiers at handstrokes attempted to board each other. And in many places it so fell out through want of room, that they which ran upon a galley on one side were run upon themselves on the other, and that two galleys, or sometimes more, were forced to lie aboard of one, and that the masters were at once to have a care, not in one place only, but in many together, how to defend on the one side, and how to offend on the other. And the great noise of many galleys falling foul of one another, both amazed them and took away their hearing of what their directors¹ directed; for they directed thick and loud on both sides, not only as art required, but out of their present eagerness; the Athenians crying out to theirs to force the passage, and now, if ever, valiantly to lay hold upon their safe return to their country; and the Syracusians and their confederates to theirs, how honourable a thing to every one of them it would be to hinder their escape, and by this victory to improve every man the honour of his own country. Moreover the commanders of either side, where they saw any man without necessity to row astern, would call unto the captain of the galley by his name, and ask him, the Athenians, whether he retired because he thought the most hostile land to be more their friend than the sea, which they had so long been masters of? The Syracusians theirs, whether when they knew that the Athenians desired earnestly by any means to fly, they would nevertheless fly from the fliers?

LXXI. Whilst the conflict was upon the water, the land-men had a conflict, and sided with them in their affections; they of the place contending for increase of the honour they had already got, and the invaders fearing a worse estate than they were already in. For the Athenians, who had their whole fortune at stake in their galleys, were in such a fear of the event, as they had never been in the like; and were thereby of necessity to behold the fight on the water with very different passions. For the fight being near, and not looking all of them upon one and the same part, he that saw their own side prevail took heart, and fell to calling upon the gods, that they would not deprive them of their safety: and they that saw them have the worse, not only lamented, but shrieked outright, and had their minds more subdued by the sight of what was done, than they that were present in the battle itself. Others that looked on some part where the fight was equal, because the contention continued so as they could make no judgment on it, with gesture of body on every occasion, agreeable to their expectation, passed the time in a miserable perplexity. For they were ever within a little either of escaping or of perishing. And one might hear in one and the same army, as long as the fight upon the water was indifferent, at one and the same time, lamentations, shouts that they won, that they lost, and whatsoever else a great army

¹ Κίλευσαι.

in great danger is forced differently to utter. They also that were aboard suffered the same, till at last the Syracusians and their confederates, after long resistance on the other side, put them to flight, and manifestly pressing, chased them, with great clamour and encouragement of their own, to the shore. And the sea forces making to the shore, some one way and some another, except only such as were lost by being far from it, escaped into the harbour. And the army that was upon the land, no longer now of different passions, with one and the same vehemence, all with shrieks and sighs, unable to sustain what befel, ran part to save the galleys, part to the defence of the camp; and the residue, who were far the greatest number, fell presently to consider every one of the best way to save himself. And this was the time wherein of all other they stood in greatest fear, and they suffered now the like to what they had made others to suffer before at Pylos. For the Lacedæmonians then, besides the loss of their fleet, lost the men whom they had set over into the island, and the Athenians now, without some accident not to be expected, were out of all hope of saving themselves by land.

LXXII. After this cruel battle, and many galleys and men on either side consumed,¹ the Syracusians and their confederates having the victory, took up the wreck, and bodies of their dead, and returning into the city, erected a trophy. But the Athenians, in respect of the greatness of their present loss, never thought of asking leave to take up their dead or wreck, but fell immediately to consultation how to be gone the same night. And Demosthenes coming to Nicias, delivered his opinion for going once again aboard, and forcing the passage, if it were possible, betimes the next morning, saying that their galleys which were yet remaining, and serviceable, were more than those of the enemy. For the Athenians had yet left them about sixty, and the Syracusians under fifty. But when Nicias approved the advice, and would have manned out the galleys, the mariners refused to go aboard, as being not only dejected with their defeat, but also without opinion of ever having the upper hand any more. Whereupon they now resolved all to make their retreat by land.

LXXIII. But Hermocrates of Syracuse, suspecting their purpose, and apprehending it as a matter dangerous, that so great an army going away by land, and sitting down in some part or other of Sicily, should there renew the war, repaired to the magistrates, and admonished them that it was not fit through negligence to suffer the enemy in the night time to go their ways, alleging what he thought best to the purpose, but that all the Syracusians and their confederates should go out and fortify in their way, and prepossess all the narrow passages with a guard.² Now they were all of them of the same opinion, no less than himself, and thought it fit to be done, but they conceived withal that the soldier now joyful, and taking his ease after a sore

¹ Of the Athenian galleys, sixty were destroyed; of the Syracusian, eight, and ten rendered unfit for sea.—Diod. Sic.

² τὰ στενόπορα τῶν χωρίων διαλαβόντας, Bekker. προφθάσαντας, Duker. And that they should seize and guard the narrow passages.

battle, being also holiday, for it was their day of sacrifice to Hercules, would not easily be brought to obey ; for through excess of joy for the victory, they would most of them, being holiday, be drinking, and look for any thing, rather than to be persuaded at this time to take arms again and go out. But seeing the magistrates on this consideration thought it hard to be done, Hermocrates not prevailing, of his own head contrived this ; fearing lest the Athenians should pass the worst of their way in the night, and so at ease out-go them ; as soon as it grew dark, he sent certain of his friends, and with them certain horsemen, to the Athenian camp, who approaching so near as to be heard speak, called to some of them to come forth, as if they had been friends of the Athenians, (for Nicias had some within that used to give him intelligence,) and bade them to advise Nicias not to dislodge that night, for that the Syracusians had beset the ways, but that the next day, having had the leisure to furnish their army, they might march away.

LXXIV. On this advertisement they abode that night, supposing it had been without fraud. And afterwards, because they went not presently, they thought good to stay there that day also ; to the end that the soldiers might pack up their necessities as commodiously as they could, and begone, leaving all things else behind them, save what was necessary for their bodies. But Gylippus and the Syracusians with their land forces went out before them, and not only stopped up the ways in the country about, by which the Athenians were likely to pass, and kept a guard at the fords of brooks and rivers, but also stood embattled to receive and stop their army in such places as they thought convenient. And with their galleys they rowed to the harbour of the Athenians, and towed their galleys away from the shore ; some few whereof they burnt, as the Athenians themselves meant to have done ; but the rest at their leisure, as any of them chanced in any place to drive ashore, they afterwards hauled into the city.

LXXV. After this, when every thing seemed unto Nicias and Demosthenes sufficiently prepared, they dislodged, being now the third day¹ from their fight by sea. It was a lamentable departure, not only for the particulars, as that they marched away with the loss of their whole fleet, and that instead of their great hopes, they had endangered both themselves and the state ; but also for the dolorous objects which were presented both to the eye and mind of every of them in particular in the leaving of their camp. For their dead lying unburied, when any one saw his friend on the ground, it struck him at once both with fear and grief ; the living that were sick or wounded, both grieved them more than the dead, and were more miserable. For with entreaties and lamentations they put them to a stand, pleading to be taken along by whomsoever they saw of their fellows or familiars, and hanging on the necks of their comrades, and

¹ The third from the naval action, the Greeks, who counted the day itself according to the phrase of Thucydides, of an action the first, the next day as the second, and so forth.—*Mitford*.

following as far as they were able, and when the strength of their bodies failed that they could go no further, with *ah-meas* and imprecations were there left; insomuch that the whole army, filled with tears, and irresolute, could hardly get away, though the place were hostile, and they had suffered already, and feared to suffer in the future more than with tears could be expressed; but hung down their heads and generally blamed themselves. For they seemed nothing else, but even the people of some great city expugned by siege, and making their escape. For the whole number that marched were no less one with another than forty thousand men. Of whom, not only the ordinary sort carried every one what he thought he should have occasion to use, but also the men of arms and horsemen, contrary to their custom, carried their victuals under their arms, partly for want, and partly for distrust of their servants, who from time to time ran over to the enemy; but at this time went the greatest number; and yet what they carried was not enough to serve the turn. For not a jot more provision was left remaining in the camp. Neither were the sufferings of others and that equal division of misery, which nevertheless is wont to lighten it, in that we suffer with many, at this time so much as thought light in itself. And the rather, because they considered from what splendour and glory which they enjoyed before, into how low an estate they were now fallen: for never Grecian army so differed from itself. For whereas they came with a purpose to enslave others, they departed in greater fear of being made slaves themselves, and instead of prayers and hymns, with which they put to sea, they went back again with the contrary maledictions: and whereas they came out seamen, they departed land-men, and relied not upon their naval forces, but upon their men of arms. Nevertheless, in respect of the great danger yet hanging over them, these miseries seemed all but tolerable.

LXXVI. Nicias perceiving the army to be dejected, and the great change that was in it, came up to the ranks and encouraged and comforted them, as far as for the present means he was able, and as he went from part to part, exalted his voice more than ever before, both as being earnest in his exhortation, and because also he desired that the benefit of his words might reach as far as might be.

Oration of Nicias to his afflicted Army.

LXXVII. "Athenians and confederates, we must hope still even
 "in our present estate. Men have been saved ere now from greater
 "dangers than these are; nor ought you too much to accuse your-
 "selves, either for your losses past, or the undeserved miseries we
 "are now in. Even I myself, that have the advantage of none of
 "you in strength of body, (you see how I am in my sickness,) nor
 "am thought inferior to any of you for prosperity past, either in
 "respect of my own private person, or otherwise, am nevertheless
 "now in as much danger as the meanest of you. And yet I have
 "worshipped the gods frequently, according to the law, and lived
 "justly and unblameably towards men. For which cause my hope is
 "still confident of the future, though these calamities, as being not

“ according to the measure of our desert, do indeed make me fear.
 “ But they may perhaps cease. For both the enemy have already
 “ had sufficient fortune, and the gods, if any of them have been
 “ already displeased with our voyage, have already sufficiently
 “ punished us. Others have invaded their neighbours as well as we;
 “ and as their offence, which proceeded of human infirmity, so their
 “ punishment also hath been tolerable. And we have reason now,
 “ both to hope for more favour from the gods, (for our case deserveth
 “ their pity rather than their hatred,) and also not to despair of our-
 “ selves, seeing how good and how many men of arms you are,
 “ marching together in order of battle. Make account of this, that
 “ wheresoever you please to sit down, there presently of yourselves
 “ you are a city, such as not any other in Sicily can either easily sus-
 “ tain if you assault, or remove if you be once seated. Now for your
 “ march, that it may be safe and orderly, look to it yourselves, making
 “ no other account any of you, but what place soever he shall be
 “ forced to fight in, the same, if he win it, must be his country and
 “ his walls. March you must with diligence, both night and day alike,
 “ for our victual is short; and if we can but reach some amicable
 “ territory of the Siculi, (for these are still firm to us for fear of the
 “ Syracusians,) then you may think yourselves secure. Let us there-
 “ fore send before to them, and bid them meet us, and bring us forth
 “ some supplies of victual.¹ In sum, soldiers, let me tell you, it is
 “ necessary that you be valiant; for there is no place near where,
 “ being cowards, you can possibly be saved. Whereas, if you escape
 “ through the enemy at this time, you may every one see again what-
 “ soever any where he most desires, and the Athenians may re-erect
 “ the great power of their city, how low soever fallen. For the men,
 “ not the walls, nor the empty galleys, are the city.”

LXXVIII. Nicias, as he used this exhortation, went withal about the army, and where he saw any man straggle, and not march in his rank, he brought him about and set him in his place, and Demosthenes having spoken to the same or like purpose, did as much to those soldiers under him. And they marched forward, those with Nicias in a square battalion, and then those with Demosthenes in the rear;² and the men of arms received those that carried the baggage, and the other multitude within them. When they were come to the ford of the river Anapus, they there found certain of the Syracusians and their confederates embattled against them on the bank, but these they put to flight, and having won the passage, marched forward. But the Syracusian horsemen lay still upon them, and their light-armed plied them with their darts in the flank. This day the Athenians marched forty furlongs, and lodged that night at the foot of a certain hill. The next day, as soon as it was light, they marched for-

¹ προπέμπεται ὃ ὡς αὐτοῖς, Bekker. προπέμπετε ὃ ὡς, Duker. But a message has been sent forward to them, and they have been desired to meet us and bring provisions.

² τὸ δὲ ἐχώρει ἐν πλασίῳ τεταγμένον,

πρῶτον μὲν ἡγούμενον τὸ Νικίου, Bekker. τὸ δὲ ἐχώρει ἐν πλασίῳ τεταγμένον τοῦ Νικίου, Duker. And the army advanced, arranged in a square, the division of Nicias leading the way, and that of Demosthenes following.

wards, about twenty furlongs, and descending into a certain champaign ground, encamped there with intent, both to get victual at the houses, (for the place was inhabited,) and to carry water with them thence; for before them, in the way they were to pass, for many furlongs together, there was little to be had. But the Syracusians in the mean time got before them, and cut off their passage with a wall. This was at a steep hill, on either side whereof was the channel of a torrent with steep and rocky banks, and it is called *Acræum Lepas*.¹ The next day the Athenians went on, and the horsemen and darters of the Syracusians and their confederates, being a great number of both, pressed them so with their horses and darts, that the Athenians, after long fight, were compelled to retire again into the same camp; but now with less victual than before, because the horsemen would suffer them no more to straggle abroad.

LXXIX. In the morning betimes they dislodged and put themselves on their march again, and forced their way to the hill which the enemy had fortified, where they found before them the Syracusian foot embattled in great length above the fortification, on the hill's side; for the place itself was but narrow. The Athenians coming up assaulted the wall, but the shot of the enemy, who were many, and the steepness of the hill (for they could easily cast home from above) making them unable to take it, they retired again and rested. There happened withal some claps of thunder, and a shower of rain, as usually falls out at this time of the year, being now near autumn, which further disheartened the Athenians, who thought that also this did tend to their destruction. Whilst they lay still, Gylippus and the Syracusians sent part of their army to raise a wall at their backs in the way they had come, but this the Athenians hindered, by sending against them part of theirs. After this, the Athenians retiring with their whole army into a more champaign ground, lodged there that night, and the next day went forward again. And the Syracusians, with their darts from every part round about, wounded many of them; and when the Athenians charged they retired, and when they retired the Syracusians charged; and that especially upon the hindmost, that by putting to flight a few they might terrify the whole army. And for a good while the Athenians in this manner withstood them; and afterwards, being got five or six furlongs forward, they rested in the plain; and the Syracusians went from them to their own camp.

LXXX. This night it was concluded by Nicias and Demosthenes, seeing the miserable estate of their army, and the want already of all necessaries, and that many of their men in many assaults of the enemy were wounded, to lead away the army as far as they possibly could, not the way they purposed before, but toward the sea, which was the contrary way to that which the Syracusians guarded. Now this whole journey of the army lay not towards Catana, but towards the

¹ A lofty and precipitous place, to the west of Euryelus, now commonly called *Craniti*.

other side of Sicily, Camarina, and Gela, and the cities, as well Grecian as Barbarian, that way. When they had made many fires accordingly, they marched in the night. And, as usually it falls out in all armies, and most of all in the greatest, to be subject to affright and terror, especially marching by night, and in hostile ground, and the enemy near, they were in confusion; the army of Nicias leading the way, kept together and got far before; but that of Demosthenes, which was the greater half, was both severed from the rest, and marched more disorderly. Nevertheless by the morning betimes they got to the sea side, and entering into the Helorine way they went on towards the river Cacyparis, to the end that when they came thither they should march upwards along the river side through the heart of the country; for they hoped that this way the Siculi, to whom they had sent, would meet them. When they came to the river, here also they found a certain guard of the Syracusians stopping their passage with a wall and with piles. When they had quickly forced this guard, they passed the river and again marched on to another river called Erineus, for that was the way which the guides directed them.

LXXXI. In the mean time the Syracusians and their confederates, as soon as day appeared, and that they knew the Athenians were gone, most of them accusing Gylippus, as if he had let them go with his consent, followed them with speed the same way which they easily understood they were gone, and about dinner time overtook them. When they were come up to those with Demosthenes, who were the hindmost, and had marched more slowly and disorderly than the other part had done, as having been put into disorder in the night, they fell upon them and fought. And the Syracusian horsemen hemmed them in, and forced them up into a narrow compass the more easily now, because they were divided from the rest. Now the army of Nicias was gone by this time one hundred and fifty furlongs further on.¹ For he led away the faster, because he thought not that their safety consisted in staying and fighting voluntarily, but rather in a speedy retreat, and then only fighting when they could not choose. But Demosthenes was both in greater and in more continual toil, in respect that he marched in the rear, and consequently was pressed by the enemy.² And seeing the Syracusians pursuing him, he went not on, but put his men in order to fight, till by his stay he was encompassed and reduced, he and the Athenians with him, into great disorder. For being shut up within a place enclosed round with a wall, and which on either side had a way open amongst abundance of olive trees, they were charged from all sides at once with the enemy's shot. For the Syracusians assaulted them in this kind, and not in close battle, upon very good reason. For to hazard battle against men

¹ ἐντῷ πρόσθεν πενήκοντα, Bekker. ἑκατὸν καὶ πενήκοντα, Duker. But the army of Nicias was distant fifty stadia in advance.

² αὐτῷ πρώτῳ ἐπιχειῖσθαι, Bekker. Duker omits πρώτῳ. Because the enemy pressed upon him first, being last in the retreat.

desperate, was not so much for theirs as for the Athenians' advantage. Besides, after so manifest successes, they spared themselves somewhat, because they were loth to wear themselves out before the end of the business, and thought by this kind of fight, to subdue and take them alive.

LXXXII. Whereupon, after they had plied the Athenians and their confederates all day long from every side with shot, and saw that with their wounds and other annoyances they were already tired, Gylippus and the Syracusians and their confederates, first made proclamation, that if any of the islanders would come over to them, they should be at liberty; and the men of some few cities went over. And by and by after, they made agreement with all the rest that were with Demosthenes, that they should deliver up their arms, and none of them be put to death, neither violently, nor by bonds, nor by want of the necessities of life. And they all yielded, to the number of six thousand men, and the silver they had they laid it all down, casting it into the hollow of targets, and filled with the same four targets. And these men they carried presently into the city; but Nicias and those that were with him attained the same day to the river Erineus, which passing, he caused his army to sit down upon a certain ground more elevated than the rest.

LXXXIII. The Syracusians the next day overtook and told him, that those with Demosthenes had yielded themselves, and willed him to do the like; but he, not believing it, took truce for a horseman to inquire the truth. Upon return of the horseman, and word that they had yielded, he sent a herald to Gylippus and the Syracusians, saying, that he was content to compound on the part of the Athenians, to repay whatsoever money the Syracusians had laid out, so that his army might be suffered to depart. And that till payment of the money were made, he would deliver them hostages, Athenians, every hostage rated at a talent. But the Syracusians and Gylippus refused the condition, and charging them, and hemming them in, plied them with shot, as they had done the other army, from every side, till evening. This part of the army was also pinched with the want both of victual and other necessities. Nevertheless, observing the quiet of the night, they were about to march: but no sooner took they their arms up, than the Syracusians perceiving it gave the alarm. Whereupon the Athenians finding themselves discovered, sat down again, all but three hundred, who breaking by force through the guards, marched as far as they could that night.

LXXXIV. Nicias, when it was day, led his army forward; but the Syracusians and their confederates still pressed them in the same manner, shooting and darting at them from every side. And the Athenians hastened to get to the river Assinarus, being at the same time urged on every side by the assault of many horsemen, and other multitudes, and thinking they would be more at ease when they were over the river, and out of weariness also, and desire to drink. When they were come to the river, they rushed in without any order, every man striving who should first get over; but the pressing of the enemy

made the passage now more difficult:¹ for being forced to take the river in heaps, they fell upon and trampled one another under their feet; and falling amongst the spears and utensils of the army, some perished presently, and others catching hold one of another, were carried away together down the stream. And the Syracusians standing along the farther bank, (being a steep one,) killed the Athenians with their shot from above, as they were many of them greedily drinking, and troubling one another in the hollow of the river. And the Peloponnesians came also down and slew them with their swords, and those especially that were in the river. And suddenly the water was corrupted, nevertheless they drank it, foul as it was with blood and mire, and many also fought for it.

LXXXV. In the end, when many dead lay heaped in the river,² and the army was utterly defeated, part at the river, and part, (if any got away,) by the horsemen, Nicias yielded himself to Gylippus, having more confidence in him than in the Syracusians; his own person he desired to be at the discretion of him and the Lacedæmonians, but no further slaughter to be made of the soldiers. Gylippus from thenceforth commanded to take prisoners; so the residue, except such as were hidden from them, (which were many) they carried alive into the city; and they sent also to pursue the three hundred who broke through their guards in the night, and took them. That which was left together of this army to the public, was not much; but they that were conveyed away by stealth were very many; and all Sicily was filled with them, because they were not taken as those with Demosthenes were, by composition. Besides, a great part of these were slain; for the slaughter at this time was exceeding great, none greater in all the Sicilian war. They were also not a few that died in those other assaults in their march; nevertheless many also escaped, some then presently, and some by running away after servitude, the rendezvous of whom was Catana.

LXXXVI. The Syracusians and their confederates being come together, returned with their prisoners, all they could get, and with the spoil, to the city. As for all other the prisoners of the Athenians and their confederates, they put them into the quarries,³ as the safest custody; but Nicias and Demosthenes they killed against the will of Gylippus. For Gylippus thought the victory would be very honourable, if over and above all his other success he could carry home both the generals of the enemy to Lacedæmon. And it fell out that the one of them, Demosthenes, was their greatest enemy, for the things he had done in the island,⁴ and at Pylos; and the other, upon the same occasion, their greatest friend. For Nicias had earnestly laboured to have those prisoners who were taken in the island set at liberty, by

¹ διαβήνας αβρὸς πρῶτος, Bekker. Duker omits αβρὸς, and points it differently. But every one wishing himself to pass over first, and the enemy pressing on together, made the passage difficult.

² According to Diod. Sic. the number of the slain amounted to eighteen thousand men.

³ Λιθορομῖαι. This prison called by Plutarch and Diodorus Λαρομῖαι.

⁴ Sphacteria.

persuading the Athenians to the peace. For which cause the Lacedæmonians were inclined to love him; and it was principally in confidence of that, that he rendered himself to Gylippus. But certain Syracusians, as it is reported, some of them for fear, because they had been tampering with him, lest being put to the torture, he might bring them into trouble, whereas they were now well enough; and others, especially the Corinthians, fearing he might get away by corruption of one or other, being wealthy, and work them some mischief afresh, having persuaded their confederates to the same, killed him. For these, or for causes near to these, was he put to death, being the man that of all the Grecians of my time least deserved to be brought to so great a degree of misery.¹

LXXXVII. As for those in the quarries, the Syracusians handled them at first but ungently. For in this hollow place, first the sun and suffocating air,² being without roof, annoyed them one way; and on the other side, the nights coming upon that heat, autumnal and cold, put them (by reason of the alteration) into strange diseases; especially doing all things for want of room, in one and the same place; and the carcasses of such as died of their wounds, or change of air, or other like accident, lying together there on heaps; also the smell was intolerable, besides that they were afflicted with hunger and thirst. For during eight months together they allowed them no more but to every man a cotyle³ of water by the day, and two cotylen of corn. And whatsoever misery is probable that men in such a place may suffer, they suffered. Some seventy days they lived thus thronged; afterwards retaining the Athenians and such Sicilians and Italians as were of the army with them, they sold the rest.⁴ How many were taken in all, it is hard to say exactly; but they were seven thousand

¹ διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νευνομισμὴν ἐπιτῆδουσιν, Bekker.—διὰ τὴν νευνομισμὴν ἐς τὸ δεῖον ἐπιτῆδουσιν, Duker. On account of his strict attention to the performance of every virtue.

² ὄντας καὶ ὀλίγω πολλοὺς, Bekker. Duker omits καὶ ὀλίγω. For being in a hollow place, and many in small room, the sun first of all and the suffocating air troubled them.

³ A small measure, about half our pint.

⁴ Plutarch in his life of Nicias, says, that "the decent and engaging behaviour of the Athenians was of great service to them; for by it they either soon obtained their liberty, or were highly esteemed and caressed by their masters. Some of them were indebted for their freedom to Euripides. The Sicilians, it seems, were fonder of the muse of Euripides than were even the people of Greece itself. If the strangers, who were often resorting to Sicily, brought

them any specimens or morsels of his poetry, they learned them by heart, and with high delight communicated them to their friends. It is said that several, who by this means earned their liberty, went afterwards to wait upon Euripides, in token of their gratitude; assuring him, some of them, that they had been released from slavery for teaching their masters what pieces of his writing they were able to repeat; and others, that, when vagabonds after the defeat, they had been supplied with meat and drink for singing some of his lines. This is not to be wondered at; since even a Caunian vessel, which being hard chased by pirates, and endeavouring to get for refuge into a Sicilian harbour, was, however, kept off by force; till at length being asked whether they could repeat any of Euripides's verses, they answered in the affirmative; upon which they obtained immediate reception and refuge." Smith.

at the fewest; and this was the greatest action that happened in all this war, or at all, that we have heard of amongst the Grecians, being to the victors most glorious, and most calamitous to the vanquished; for being wholly overcome in every kind, and receiving small loss in nothing, their army and fleet, and all that ever they had, perished (as they use to say) with an universal destruction; and few of many returned home. And thus passed the business concerning Sicily.

END OF THE SEVENTH BOOK.

THUCYDIDES.

BOOK VIII.

Part of the nineteenth, the twentieth, and twenty-first years of the war, the revolt of the Athenian confederates, and the offers made by Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, the king's lieutenants of the Lower Asia, draw the Lacedæmonians to the war in Ionia and Hellespont. First in Ionia and the provinces of Tissaphernes, who by the counsel of Alcibiades, and connivance of Astyochus, hinders their proceedings. Alcibiades meanwhile, to make way for his return to his country, gives occasion of sedition about the government, whence ensued the authority of the four hundred, under the pretext of the five thousand; the recalling of Alcibiades by the army; and at length by his countenance the deposing again of the four hundred, and end of the sedition. But in the mean time they lose Eubœa. Mindarus, successor of Astyochus, finding himself abused by Tissaphernes, carrieth the war to Pharnabazus into Hellespont, and there presently loseth a battle to the Athenians before Abydus, being then summer, and the twenty first year of the war.

YEAR XIX. A.C. 413. OLYMP. 91- $\frac{2}{3}$.

CHAP. I.

WHEN the news was told at Athens, they believed it not for a long time, though it were plainly related, and by those very soldiers that escaped from the defeat itself, that all was so utterly lost, as it was; but when they knew it, they were mightily offended with the orators that furthered the voyage, as if they themselves had never decreed it; they were angry also with those that gave out prophecies, and with the soothsayers, and with whosoever else had at first by any divination put them in hope that Sicily should be subdued. Every thing from every place grieved them; and fear and astonishment, the greatest that ever they were in, beset them round. For they were not only grieved for the loss which both every man in particular, and the whole city sustained, of so many men of arms, horsemen, and serviceable men, the like whereof they saw was not left; but seeing they had neither sufficient galleys in their haven, nor money in their treasury, nor furniture in their galleys, were even desperate at that time of their safety, and thought the enemy out of Sicily would come forthwith with their fleet into Piræus, (especially after the vanquishing of so great a navy,) and that the enemy here would surely now, with double preparation in every kind, press them to the utmost both by sea and land, and be aided therein by their revolting confederates. Nevertheless, as far as their means would stretch, it was thought best to stand it out, and getting materials and money where they could have them, to make ready a navy, and to make sure of their confederates,

especially those of Eubœa; and to introduce a greater frugality in the city, and to erect a magistracy of the elder sort, as occasion should be offered, to pre-consult of the business that passed. And they were ready, in respect of their present fear, (as is the people's fashion,) to order every thing aright. And as they resolved this, so they did it; and the summer ended.

II. The winter following, on the great overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily, all the Grecians were presently up against them; those who before were confederates of neither side, thought fit no longer, though uncalled, to abstain from the war, but to go against the Athenians of their own accord, as having not only every one severally this thought, that had the Athenians prospered in Sicily, they would afterwards have come upon them also; but imagined withal, that the rest of the war would be but short, whereof it would be an honour to participate; and such of them as were confederates of the Lacedæmonians longed now more than ever to be freed as soon as might be of their great toil. But above all, the cities subject to the Athenians were ready, even beyond their ability, to revolt, as they that judged according to their passion, without admitting reason in the matter, that the next summer they were to remain with victory. But the Lacedæmonians themselves took heart, not only from all this, but also principally from that, that their confederates in Sicily, with great power, having another navy now necessarily added to their own, would in all likelihood be with them in the beginning of the spring. And being every way full of hopes, they purposed without delay to fall close to the war; making account if this were well ended, both to be free hereafter from any more such dangers as the Athenians, if they had got Sicily, would have put them into, and also having pulled them down, to have the principality of all Greece now secure unto themselves.

III. Whereupon Agis their king went out with a part of his army the same winter from Decelea, and levied money amongst the confederates for the building of a navy; and turning into the Melian gulf on an old grudge, took a great booty from the Ceteans, which he made money of, and forced those of Pthiotis, being Achaïans, and others in those parts, subjects to the Thessalians, the Thessalians complaining and unwilling, to give him hostages and money; and the hostages he put into Corinth, and endeavoured to draw them into the league. But the Lacedæmonians imposed on the states confederate the charge of building one hundred galleys, [that is to say,] on their own state, and on the Bœotians, each twenty-five; on the Phœceans and Locrians, fifteen; on the Corinthians, fifteen; on the Arcadians, Sicyonians, and Pellenians, ten; and on the Megareans, Troezenians, Epidaurians, and Hermionians, ten; and put all things else in readiness, presently with the spring to begin the war.

IV. The Athenians also made their preparations, as they had designed, having got timber, and built their navy this same winter, and fortified the promontory of Sunium, that their corn boats might come about in safety, and abandoning the fort in Laconia, which they had built as they passed by for Sicily, and generally, where there appeared expense upon any thing useless, they contracted their charge.

V. Whilst they were on both sides doing thus, as if they were preparing for the commencement of the war, there came to Agis this winter, about their revolt from the Athenians, first the ambassadors of the Eubœans. But he accepting the motion sent for Alcámenes, the son of Sthenelaidas, and for Melanthon, from Lacedæmon, to go commanders into Eubœa; whom, when he was come to him with about three hundred freed men, he was now about to send over. But in the mean time came the Lesbians, also desiring to revolt, and by the means of the Bœotians, Agis changed his former resolution, and prepared for the revolt of Lesbos, deferring that of Eubœa, and assigned them Alcámenes, the same that should have gone into Eubœa, for their governor, and the Bœotians promised them ten galleys, and Agis other ten. Now this was done without acquainting therewith the state of Lacedæmon; for Agis, as long as he was about Deceleæ with the power he had, had the law in his own hands, to send what army, and whither he listed, and to levy men and money at his pleasure. And at this time the confederates of him (as I may call them) did better obey him, than the confederates of the Lacedæmonians did them at home; for having the power in his hands, he was terrible wheresoever he came.¹ And he was now for the Lesbians. But the Chians and Erythræans, they also desiring to revolt, went not to Agis, but to the Lacedæmonians in the city, and with them went also an ambassador from Tissaphernes, lieutenant to king Darius in the low countries of Asia. For Tissaphernes also instigated the Peloponnesians, and promised to pay their fleet. For he had lately begged of the king the tribute accruing in his own province for which he was in arrear, because he could receive nothing out of any of the Greek cities, by reason of the Athenians. And therefore he thought by weakening the Athenians to receive his tribute the better, and withal to draw the Lacedæmonians into a league with the king, and thereby, as the king had commanded, to kill or take alive Amorges, the bastard son of Pissuthnes,² who was in rebellion against him about Caria. The Chians therefore, and Tissaphernes, followed this business jointly.

VI. Calligetis, the son of Laophon, a Megarean, and Timagoras, the son of Athenagoras, a Cyzicene, both banished their own cities, and abiding with Pharnabazus, the son of Pharnaces, came also about the same time to Lacedæmon, sent by Pharnabazus, to procure a fleet for the Hellespont, that he also, if he could, might cause the Athenian cities in his province to revolt for his tribute's sake, and be the first to draw the Lacedæmonians into a league with the king, just the same things that were desired before by Tissaphernes. Now Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes treating apart, there was great canvassing at Lacedæmon, between the one side that persuaded to send to Ionia and Chios, and the other, that would have the army and fleet go first into the Hellespont. But the Lacedæmonians indeed approved best by much of the business of the Chians, and of Tissaphernes.

¹ εὐθὺς ἐκασταχόσσει δεινὸς παρῆν, he came.

Bekker. αὐτὸς ἐκασταχόσσει, Duker.—² See b. i. 115. and iii. 31.

He was immediately dreaded wherever

For with these co-operated Alcibiades, hereditary guest and friend of Endius, the Ephor of that year, in the highest degree: insomuch as in respect of that guesthood the family of Alcibiades received a Laconic name; for Endius was called Endius Alcibiades.¹ Nevertheless the Lacedæmonians sent first Phrynīs, a man of those parts, to Chios, to see if the galleys they had were so many as they reported, and whether the city were otherwise so sufficient as it was said to be, and when the messenger brought back word that all that had been said was true, they received both the Chians and the Erythræans presently into their league, and decreed to send them forty galleys, there being at Chios, from such places as the Chians named, no less than sixty already. And of these, at first, they were about to send out ten, with Melancridas for admiral; but afterwards, upon occasion of an earthquake, for Melancridas they sent Chalcideus, and instead of ten galleys, they went about the making ready of five only in Laconia. So the winter ended, and nineteenth year of this war, written by Thucydides.²

YEAR XX. A. C. 412. OLYMP. 91-92. 4-1.

VII. In the beginning of the next summer, because the Chians pressed to have the galleys sent away, and feared lest the Athenians should get notice what they were doing, (for all their ambassadors went out by stealth,) the Lacedæmonians send away to Corinth three Spartans, to will them with all speed to transport their galleys over the isthmus to the other sea towards Athens, and to go all to Chios, as well those which Agis had made ready to go to Lesbos, as the rest. The number of the galleys of the league which were then there being forty, wanting one.

VIII. But Calligetus and Timagoras, who came from Pharnabazus, would have no part in this fleet that went for Chios, nor would deliver the money, twenty-five talents,³ which they had brought with them to pay for their setting forth, but made account to go out with another fleet afterwards by themselves. But Agis, when he saw the Lacedæmonians meant to send first to Chios, resolved not of any other course himself, but the confederates assembling at Corinth, went to counsel upon the matter, and concluded thus: that they should go first to Chios, under the command of Chalcideus, who was making

¹ The name of Endius' father was Alcibiades, to whom Clinias being guest, for that cause gave the name of Alcibiades to his son, this Alcibiades Clinias.

² What we find from Thucydides on the subject of the Persian in the fifth and sixth chapters, implies the strongest contradiction of the report transmitted by later writers, of a treaty of peace, by which the court of Persia gave up all claim upon the Grecian towns in Asia, and engaged that no Persian troops should come within three days' march of the western coast. Of the in-

tent of the several satrapies, or of the powers, privileges, and duties of the satraps, we are little informed. We learn, however, from Xenophon, (*Hel. iii. c. 1. s. 5.* and *c. ii. s. 10.*) that Caria was the proper satrapy of Tissaphernes, and (*Anab. i. c. 1. s. 6.*) that Ionia was added to his command by the king's particular favour; but his authority, at least in the absence of other officers, was often extended over Sardis, and great part of Lydia. See *Mitford*, note *c. xix. s. 2.*

³ £4,848 15s.

ready the five galleys in Laconia ; and then to Lesbos, under the charge of Alcamenes, intended also to be sent thither by Agis ; and lastly into Hellespont, in which voyage they ordained that Clearchus, the son of Ramphias, should have the command. And they concluded to carry over the isthmus, first the one half of their galleys, and that those should presently put to sea, that the Athenians might have their minds more upon those, than on the other half to be transported afterwards. For they determined to pass that sea openly, contemning the weakness of the Athenians, in respect they had not any navy of importance yet appearing. As they resolved, so presently they carried over one and twenty galleys.

IX. But when the rest urged to put to sea, the Corinthians were unwilling to go, before they should have ended the celebration of the Isthmian holidays, then come. Hereupon Agis was content that they for their parts should observe the Isthmian truce ;¹ and that he should take the fleet upon himself as his own. But the Corinthians not agreeing to that, and the time passing away, the Athenians got intelligence the easier of the practice of the Chians, and sent thither Aristocrates, one of their generals, to accuse them of it, and the Chians denying the matter, he commanded them, for their better credit, to send along with him some galleys for their aid, due by the league : and they sent seven. The cause why they sent these galleys, was the many not acquainted with the practice, and the few and conscious not willing to undergo the enmity of the multitude, without having strength first, and their not expecting any longer the coming of the Lacedæmonians, because they had so long delayed them.

X. In the mean time the Isthmian games were celebrating, and the Athenians (for they had word sent them of it²) came and saw ; and the business of the Chians grew more apparent. After they went thence they took order presently that the fleet might not pass from Cenchræa undiscovered. And after the holidays were over, the Corinthians put to sea for Chios, under the conduct of Alcamenes. And the Athenians at first with equal number came up to them, and endeavoured to draw them out into the main sea. But seeing the Peloponnesians followed not far, but turned another way, the Athenians went also from them ; for the seven galleys at Chios, which were part of this number, they durst not trust, but afterwards, having manned thirty-seven others, they gave chase to the enemy by the shore, and drove them into Peiræus, in the territory of Corinth ; this Peiræus is a desert haven, and the utmost upon the confines of Epidauria. One galley that was far from land the Peloponnesians lost, the rest they brought together into the haven. But the Athenians charging them by sea with their galleys, and withal setting their men on land, mightily troubled and disordered them, brake their galleys upon the

¹ Those who in time of war attended the celebration of the Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian games, had *ἀδειαν*, and *ἀσφάλειαν*.
² *ἐπηγγέθησαν γὰρ αἱ σπονδαί*, Bekker. Duker omits *αἱ σπονδαί*. For the truce had been proclaimed.

shore, and slew Alcameas their commander; and some they lost of their own.

XI. The fight being ended, they assigned a sufficient number of galleys to lie opposite to those of the enemy, and the rest to lie under a little island not far off, in which also they encamped, and sent to Athens for supply. For the Peloponnesians had with them for aid of their galleys, the Corinthians the next day, and not long after divers others of the inhabitants thereabouts. But when they considered that the guarding of them in a desert place would be painful, they knew not what course to take, and once they thought to have set the galleys on fire; but it was concluded afterwards to draw them to the land, and guard them with their land-men, till some good occasion should be offered for their escape. And Agis also, when he heard the news, sent unto them Thermon, a Spartan. But the Lacedæmonians having been advertised of the departure of these galleys from the isthmus, (for the Ephors had commanded Alcameas, when he put to sea, to send word by a horseman,) were minded presently to have sent away the five galleys also that were in Laconia, and Chalcideus the commander of them, and with him Alcibiades; but afterwards, as they were ready to go out, came the news of the galleys chased into Peiræus: which so much discouraged them, in respect they stumbled in the very entrance of the Ionic war, that they purposed now, not only not to send away those galleys of their own, but also to call back again some of those that were already at sea.

XII. When Alcibiades saw this, he persuaded Endius, and the rest of the Ephors again not to fear the voyage, alleging that they would make haste and be there before the Chiaus should have heard of the misfortune of the fleet, and that as soon as he should arrive in Ionia himself, he could easily make the cities there revolt,¹ by declaring to them the weakness of the Athenians, and the diligence of the Lacedæmonians, wherein he should be thought more worthy to be believed than any other. Moreover to Endius he said, that it would be an honour in particular to him that Ionia should revolt, and the king be made confederate to the Lacedæmonians by his own means, and not to have it the mastery of Agis; for he was at difference with Agis.² So having prevailed with Endius and the other Ephors, he took sea with five galleys, together with Chalcideus of Lacedæmon, and made haste.

XIII. About the same time came back from Sicily those sixteen galleys of the Peloponnesians, which having aided Gylippus in that war, were intercepted by the way about Leucadia, and evil entreated by twenty-seven galleys of Athens, that watched thereabouts, under the command of Hippocles, the son of Menippus, for such galleys as

¹ *καὶ αὐτὸς ὄντι ἤν, Bekker. ὄραν, Duker.* And that he himself, if he could reach Ionia, would easily persuade the cities to revolt.

² No mention is here made of the cause of the difference between Agis

and Alcibiades. *Plutarch* informs us, that the latter had been intriguing with Tenidæ, the wife of the former, and had a son by her, called Leotyichides. See *Life of Alcibiades*.

should return out of Sicily, for all the rest, saving one, avoiding the Athenians, were arrived in Corinth before.

XIV. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, as they sailed, kept prisoner every man they met with by the way, to the end that notice might not be given of their passage; and touching first at Corycus in the continent, where they also dismissed those whom they had apprehended, after conference there with some of the conspirators of the Chians, that advised them to go to the city without sending them word before, they came upon the Chians suddenly and unexpected. It put the commons into much wonder and astonishment; but the few had so ordered the matter beforehand, that an assembly chanced to be holden at the same time, and when Chalcideus and Alcibiades had spoken in the same, and told them that many galleys were coming to them, but not that those other galleys were besieged in Peiræus, the Chians first, and afterwards the Erythræans, revolted from the Athenians. After this they went with three galleys to Clazomenæ, and made that city to revolt also. And the Clazomenians presently crossed over to the continent, and there fortified Polichna, lest they should need a retiring place from the little island wherein they dwelt. The rest also, all that had revolted, fell to fortifying and making preparation for the war.

XV. This news of Chios was quickly brought to the Athenians; and they conceiving themselves to be now beset with great and evident danger, and that the rest of the confederates, seeing so great a city to revolt, would be no longer quiet in this their present fear, decreed that those one thousand talents,¹ which through all this war they had affected to keep untouched, forthwith abrogating the punishment ordained for such as spake or gave their suffrages to stir it, should now be used, and therewith galleys not a few manned; and they decreed also to send thither out of hand, under the command of Strombichides, the son of Diotimus, eight galleys, of the number of those that besieged the enemy at Peiræus; which having forsaken their charge to give chase to the galleys that went with Chalcideus, and not able to overtake them, were now returned; and shortly after also to send Thrasucles to help them with twelve galleys more, which also had departed from the same guard upon the enemy. And those seven galleys of Chios, which likewise kept watch at Peiræus with the rest, they fetched from thence, and gave the bond-men that served in them their liberty, and the chains to those that were free. And instead of all those galleys that kept guard upon the galleys of the Peloponnesians, they made ready other with all speed in their places, besides thirty more, which they intended to furnish out afterwards. Great was their diligence, and nothing was of light importance that they went about for the recovery of Chios.

XVI. Strombichides in the mean time arrived at Samos, and taking into his company one Samian galley, went thence to Teos, and entreated them not to stir. But towards Teos was Chalcideus also coming with twenty-three galleys from Chios, and with him also the

¹ £193,750. See b. ii. 24.

land forces of the Clazomenians and Erythræans. But Strombichides having been advertised of it, put forth again before his arrival, and standing off at sea,¹ when he saw the many galleys that came from Chios, he fled towards Samos; but they followed him. The land forces the Teans not at the first admitting after this flight of the Athenians, they brought them in. And these for the most part held their hands for awhile,² expecting the return of Chalcideus from the chase; but when he staid somewhat long, they fell of themselves to the demolishing of the wall built about the city of Teos by the Athenians towards the continent; wherein they were also helped by some few Barbarians that came down thither, under the leading of Otages, deputy lieutenant of Tissaphernes.

XVII. Chalcideus and Alcibiades, when they had chased Strombichides into Samos, armed the mariners that were in the galleys of Peloponnesus, and left them in Chios; instead of whom they manned with mariners of Chios both those and twenty galleys more, and with this fleet they went to Miletus with intent to cause it to revolt. For the intention of Alcibiades, who was acquainted with the principal Milesians, was to prevent the fleet which was to come from Peloponnesus, and to turn these cities first, that the honour of it might be ascribed to the Chians, to himself, to Chalcideus, and (as he had promised) to Endius, that set them out, as having brought most of the cities to revolt, with the forces of the Chians only, and of those galleys that came with Chalcideus. So these for the greatest part of their way undiscovered, and arriving, not much sooner than Strombichides and Thrasicles, who now chanced to be present with those twelve galleys from Athens, and followed them with Strombichides, caused the Milesians to revolt. The Athenians following them at the heels with nineteen galleys, being shut out by the Milesians, lay at anchor at Lada, an island over against the city. Presently on the revolt of Miletus, was made the first league between the king and the Lacedæmonians by Tissaphernes and Chalcideus as follows:

XVIII. "The Lacedæmonians and their confederates have made a league with the king and Tissaphernes on these articles:—Whatsoever territory or cities the king possesseth, and his ancestors have possessed, the same are to remain the king's:—Whatsoever money or other profit redounded to the Athenians from their cities, the king and the Lacedæmonians are jointly to hinder, so as the Athenians may receive nothing from thence, neither money nor other thing.—The king and the Lacedæmonians, and their confederates, are to make joint war against the Athenians. And without consent of both parts, it shall not be lawful to lay down the war against the Athenians, neither for the king, nor for the Lacedæmonians and their confederates.—If any shall revolt from the king, they shall be enemies to the Lacedæmonians and their confederates. And if any

¹ ὁ Στρομβιχίδης ἐξανήγετο, Bekker.

προανήγετο, Duker. Strombichides being acquainted with it beforehand, off.

² ἐπίσχον μὲν οἱ πεζοί, Bekker.

οἱ πολλοί, Duker. And the infantry held

“ shall revolt from the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, they shall in like manner be enemies to the king.”

XIX. This was the league. Presently after this the Chians set out ten galleys more, and went to Anæa, both to hearken what became of the business at Miletus, and also to cause the cities thereabouts to revolt. But word being sent them from Chalcideus to go back, and that Amorges was at hand with his army, they went thence to the temple of Jupiter; and being there, they descried sixteen galleys more, which had been sent out by the Athenians under the charge of Diomedon, after the putting to sea of those with Thrasicles, on sight of whom they fled, one galley to Ephesus, the rest towards Teos. Four of them empty the Athenians took, the men having got on shore; the rest escaped into the city of Teos. And the Athenians went away again towards Samos. But the Chians putting to sea again with the remainder of their fleet, and with the land forces, caused first Lebedus to revolt, and then Eræ. And afterwards returned both with their fleet and land-men, every one to his own.

XX. About the same time the twenty galleys of Peloponnesus which the Athenians had formerly chased into Peiræus, and against which they now lay with a like number, suddenly forced their passage, and having the victory in fight, took four of the Athenian galleys, and going to Cenchrea, prepared afresh for their voyage to Chios and Ionia. At which time there came also unto them from Lacedæmon, for commander, Astyochus, who was now admiral of the whole army. When the land-men were gone from Teos, Tissaphernes himself came thither with his forces, and demolishing the wall, as much as was left standing, went his way again. And not long after the going away of him, came thither Diomedon with ten galleys of Athens, and having made a truce with the Teians that he might also be received, he put to sea again, and kept the shore to Eræ, and assaulted it; but failing to take it, departed.

XXI. It fell out about the same time that the commons of Samos, together with the Athenians who were there with three galleys, made an insurrection against the great men, and slew of them in all about two hundred. And having banished four hundred more, and distributed amongst themselves their lands and houses, (the Athenians having now, as assured of their fidelity, decreed them their liberty,) they administered the affairs of the city from that time forward by themselves, no more communicating with the Geomori,¹ nor permitting any of the common people to marry with them.

XXII. After this, the same summer, the Chians, as they had begun, persevering in their earnestness to bring the cities to revolt, even without the Lacedæmonians, with their single forces, and desiring to make as many fellows of their danger as they were able, made war by themselves with thirteen galleys against Lesbos, which was according to what was concluded by the Lacedæmonians, namely, to go thither in the second place, and thence into the Hellespont.

¹ The nobility of Samos, so called, for that they shared the land amongst them.

And withal, the land forces both of such Peloponnesians as were present, and of their confederates thereabouts, went along by them to Clazomenæ and Cyme; these under the command of Eualas, a Spartan, and the galleys of Deiniadas, a man of the parts thereabouts. The galleys putting in at Methymna, caused that city to revolt first.¹

XXIII. Now Astyochus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, having set forth as he intended, from Cenchrea, arrived at Chios. The third day after his coming thither, came Leon and Diomedon into Lesbos with twenty-five galleys of Athens; for Leon came with a supply of ten galleys more from Athens afterwards. Astyochus, in the evening of the same day, taking with him one galley more of Chios, took his way toward Lesbos, to help it what he could, and put in at Pyrrha, and the next day at Eressus; where he heard that Mitylene was taken by the Athenians, even with the shout of their voices. For the Athenians coming unexpected, entered the haven,² and having beaten the galleys of the Chians, disembarked, and overcame those that made head against them, and won the city. When Astyochus heard this, both from the Eressians, and from those Chian galleys that came from Methymna with Eubulus, which having been left there before, as soon as Mitylene was lost, fled, and three of them chanced to meet with him, (for one was taken by the Athenians) he continued his course for Mitylene no longer, but having caused Eressus to revolt, and armed the soldiers he had aboard, made them march toward Antissa and Methymna by land, under the conduct of Eteonicus; and he himself with his own galleys, and those three of Chios, rowed thither along the shore, [toward Antissa and Methymna,] hoping that the Methymnæans, on sight of his forces, would take heart and continue in their revolt. But when in Lesbos all things went against him, he re-embarked his army,³ and returned to Chios. And the land-men that were aboard, and should have gone into Hellespont, went again into their cities. After this came to them six galleys to Chios of those of the confederate fleet at Cenchrea. The Athenians, when they had re-established the state of Lesbos, went thence and took Polichna, which the Clazomenians had fortified in the continent, and brought them all back again into the city which is in the island, save only the authors of the revolt; for they got away to Daphnus. And Clazomenæ again returned to the obedience of the Athenians.

XXIV. The same summer those Athenians that with twenty galleys lay in the isle of Lada before Miletus, landing in the territory of Miletus at Panormus, slew Chalcideus, the Lacedæmonian commander, that came out against them but with a few; and set up a

¹ It seemeth that something is here wanting, and supplied thus by Fran. Porta, [Then the Chians leaving four galleys here for guard of the place, went to Mitylene with the rest, and caused that city also to revolt.] Bekker has two lines here, which are omitted by Duker.

² ἀπροσδόκητοι, κατασχόντες, Bekker. In Duker the comma is put before ἀπροσδόκητοι. The Athenians, contrary to expectation, entering the haven, &c.

³ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ στρατὸν πεζόν, Bekker. Duker omits πεζόν, his land forces.

trophy, and the third day after departed, but the Milesians pulled down the trophy, as erected where the Athenians were not masters. Leon and Diomedon, with the Athenian galleys that were at Lesbos, made war upon the Chians by sea, from the isles called Oinussa, which lie before Chios, and from Sidussa and Pteleum, forts which they held in Erythræa, and from Lesbos. They that were aboard were men of arms of the roll compelled to serve in the fleet. With these they landed at Cardamyle; and having overthrown the Chians that made head in a battle at Bolissus, and slain many of them, they recovered from the enemy all the places of that quarter. And again they overcame them in another battle at Phanæ, and in a third at Leuconium. After this, the Chians went out no more to fight; by which means the Athenians made spoil of their territory, excellently well furnished. For except it were the Lacedæmonians, the Chians were the only men that I have heard of, that had joined advisedness to prosperity, and the more their city increased, had carried the more respect in the administration thereof to assure it. Nor ventured they, now to revolt, (lest any man should think, that in this act at least they regarded not what was the safest,) till they had many and strong confederates, with whose help to try their fortune; nor till such time as they perceived the people of Athens (as they themselves could not deny) to have their estate, after the defeat in Sicily, reduced to extreme weakness. And if through human misreckoning they miscarried in ought, they erred with many others, who in like manner had an opinion, that the state of the Athenians would quickly have been overthrown. Being therefore shut up by sea, and having their lands spoiled, some within undertook to make the city return unto the Athenians; which though the magistrates perceived, yet they themselves stirred not, but having received Astyochus into the city with four galleys that were with him from Erythræa, they took advice together how, by taking hostages, or some other gentle way, to make them give over the conspiracy. Thus stood the business with the Chians.

XXV. In the end of this summer, a thousand five hundred men of arms of Athens, and a thousand of Argos,¹ (for the Athenians had put armour upon five hundred light-armed of the Argives,) and of other confederates a thousand more, with forty-eight galleys, reckoning those which were for transportation of soldiers, under the conduct of Phrynichus, Onomacles, and Scironidas, came to Samos, and crossing over to Miletus, encamped before it. And the Milesians issued forth with eight hundred men of arms of their own, besides the Peloponnesians that came with Chalcideus, and some auxiliary strangers with Tissaphernes, Tissaphernes himself being also there with his cavalry, and fought with the Athenians and their confederates. The Argives, who made one wing of themselves, advancing before the rest, and in some disorder, in contempt of the enemy, as

¹ The beginning of this sentence is from Athens a thousand heavy-armed pointed thus in Bekker: In the end Athenians and a thousand five hundred of this summer there sailed to Samos Argives.

being Ionians, and not likely to sustain their charge, were by the Milesians overcome, and lost no less than three hundred of their men; but the Athenians, when they had first overthrown the Peloponnesians, and then beaten back the Barbarians and other multitude, and not fought with the Milesians at all, (for they, after they were come from the chase of the Argives, and saw their other wing defeated, went into the town,) sate down with their arms, as being now masters of the field, close under the wall of the city. It fell out in this battle, that on both side the Ionics had the better of the Dorics; for the Athenians overcame the opposite Peloponnesians, and the Milesians the Argives. The Athenians, after they had erected their trophy, the place being an isthmus, prepared to take in the town with a wall; supposing if they got Miletus, the other cities would easily come in.

XXVI. In the mean time it was told them about twilight, that the fifty-five galleys from Peloponnesus and Sicily were hard by, and only not already come. For there came into Peloponnesus out of Sicily, by the instigation of Hermocrates, to help to consummate the subversion of the Athenian state, twenty galleys of Syracuse, and two of Selinus, and the galleys that had been preparing in Peloponnesus being then also ready, they were, both these and the other, committed to the charge of Theramenes, to be conducted by him to Astyochus the admiral, and they put in first at Eleus, an island over against Miletus. And being advertised there, that the Athenians lay before the town, they went from thence into the gulf of Iäsus, to learn how the affairs of the Milesians stood. Alcibiades coming on horseback to Techiussa, of the territory of Miletus, in which part of the gulf the Peloponnesian galleys lay at anchor, they were informed by him of the battle; for Alcibiades was with the Milesians and with Tissaphernes present in it, and he exhorted them, unless they meant to lose what they had in Ionia, and the whole business, to succour Miletus with all speed, and not to suffer it to be taken in with a wall.

XXVII. According to this they concluded to go the next morning and relieve it; but Phrynichus, when he had certain word from Lerus¹ of the arrival of those galleys, his colleagues advising to stay and fight it out with their fleet, said that he would neither do it himself, nor suffer them to do it, or any other, as long as he could hinder it. For seeing he might fight with them hereafter, when they should know against how many galleys of the enemy, and with what addition to their own, sufficiently, and at leisure made ready, they might do it; he would never, he said, for fear of being upbraided with baseness, be swayed to hazard battle; for it was no baseness for the Athenians to let their navy give way on occasion; but by what means soever it should fall out, it would be a great baseness to be beaten; that he would not only dishonour the state, but also cast it into extreme danger, seeing that since their late losses it hath scarce been fit, with their strongest preparation, willingly, no nor urged by precedent necessity to undertake, how then without constraint to seek out

¹ Lerus, *Bekker*; commonly put *Derus*; one of the Sporades. See *Herod.* v. 125.

voluntary dangers? He therefore commanded them with all speed to take aboard those that were wounded, and their land-men, and what utensils they brought with them, but to leave behind what they had taken in the territory of the enemy, that their galleys might be the lighter, and to put off for Samos, and thence when they had all their fleet together to make out against the enemy as occasion should offer. As Phrynichus advised this, so he put it in execution, and was esteemed a wise man, not then only but afterwards, nor in this only, but in whatsoever else he had the ordering of. Thus the Athenians presently in the evening, with their victory imperfect, dislodged from before Miletus, and from Samos, the Argives in haste and in anger for their overthrow, went home.

XXVIII. The Peloponnesians setting forth betimes in the morning from Teichiussa, put in at Miletus, and staying there one day, the next day they took with them those galleys of Chios, which had formerly been chased together with Chalcideus, and meant to have returned to Teichiussa, to take aboard such necessaries as they had left on shore. But as they were going, Tissaphernes came to them with his land-men, and persuaded them to set upon Iäsus, where Amorges the king's enemy then lay. Whereupon they assaulted Iäsus on a sudden, and (they within not thinking but they had been the fleet of the Athenians) took it. The greatest praise in this action was given to the Syracusians. Having taken Amorges, the bastard son of Pisuthnes, but a rebel to the king, the Peloponnesians delivered him to Tissaphernes, to carry him, if he would, to the king, as he had order to do; Iäsus they pillaged, wherein, as being a place of ancient riches, the army got a very great quantity of money, the auxiliary soldiers of Amorges they received, without doing them hurt, into their own army, being for the most part Peloponnesians; the town itself they delivered to Tissaphernes, with all the prisoners, as well free as bond, on composition with him at a Daric stater¹ a head, and so they returned to Miletus. And from hence they sent Pædairitus,² the son of Leon, whom the Lacedæmonians had sent thither to be governor of Chios, to Erythræa, and with him the bands that had aided Amorges by land, and made Philip governor there, in Miletus. And so this summer ended.

XXIX. The next winter Tissaphernes, after he had put a garrison into Iäsus, came to Miletus, and for one month's pay (as was promised on his part at Lacedæmon) he gave to the soldiers through the whole fleet after, an attic drachma³ a man by the day. But for the rest of the time he would pay but three oboles,⁴ till he had asked the king's pleasure; and if the king commanded it, then he said he would pay them the full drachma. Nevertheless on the contradiction of Hermocrates, general of the Syracusians, (for Theramenes was but slack in exacting pay, as not being general, but only to deliver the

¹ £1 12s. 3½d.

² Sometimes written Pædiritus.

³ Seven-pence three farthings of our money.

⁴ Three-pence halfpenny farthing.

This diminution of their stipend proceeded from the counsel which Alcibiades gave to Tissaphernes, as is hereafter declared.

galleys that came with him to Astyochus,) it was agreed, that but for the five galleys¹ that were over and above, they should have more than three oboles a man. For to fifty-five galleys he allowed three talents a month, and to as many as should be more than that number, after the same proportion.

XXX. The same winter the Athenians that were at Samos, for there were now come in thirty-five galleys more from home, with Charminus, Strombichides, and Euctemon, their commanders, having gathered together their galleys, as well those that had been at Chios, as all the rest, concluded, distributing to every one his charge by lot, to go lie before Miletus with a fleet; but against Chios to send out both a fleet and an army of land-men. And they did so. For Strombichides, Onomacles, and Euctemon, with thirty galleys, and part of those one thousand men of arms that went to Miletus, which they carried along with them in vessels for transportation of soldiers according to their lot, went to Chios, and the rest remaining at Samos with seventy-four galleys, were masters of the sea, and went to Miletus.

XXXI. Astyochus, who was now in Chios, requiring hostages in respect of the treason, after he heard of the fleet that was come with Theramenes, and that the articles of the league with Tissaphernes

¹ The original note of *Hobbes* on this passage is as follows: "If they had been five galleys less; that is, but fifty, as they were fifty-five, their pay had been four oboles a man, at three talents to the fifty galleys for a month. Qu. How many men paid in a galley? it seems but eighteen." On which *Smith* makes the following remarks. "There is manifestly a fault here: for *τρία*, three, in the original, should be read *τριάκοντα*, thirty, talents a month. Mr. *Hobbes* hath taken the pains to compute, and finds that the Peloponnesian ships carried eighteen men apiece. What? only so small a crew as eighteen men for a ship of war with three banks of oars? or, where the complement was perhaps two hundred, did *Tissaphernes* only pay a tenth part of that number? *Xenophon*, in the first book of his Greek history, enables us to set all to rights. *Lysander* is negotiating with *Cyrus* for an increase of pay. *Cyrus* insists upon the former agreement made by *Tissaphernes*, that every ship should receive but thirty minæ a month. The daily pay of each was of course one minæ, or one hundred drachmas: whence it appears, that, at three oboli, or half a drachma a man, the pay of sixty ships, each carrying two hundred men, would be just thirty talents. Thirty talents, there-

fore, paid to fifty five ships for a month, was two talents and a half above three oboli a day. And hence it seems pretty clear that the complement of a Peloponnesian ship of war was two hundred men.

I have another proof at hand, which will confirm what hath already been said, and serve at the same time to ascertain the number of men on board a ship of war. In the sixth book *Thucydides* says, the Egesteans brought to Athens sixty talents, as a month's pay for sixty ships. He says also, that in the Sicilian expedition the daily pay of the Athenian seamen was raised to a drachma a man. Now a talent a month, reckoning thirty days to the month, is two minæ a day; and two minæ are just two hundred drachmas. Hence it is plain, the complement of an Athenian ship was two hundred men; and, according to the former computation, that of a Peloponnesian ship was, as might reasonably be expected, exactly the same. This is a farther confirmation that there is a mistake in the printed copies of the original, as was said above; where, instead of three talents, which amount but to £581 5s. sterling, should have been read thirty talents, amounting in English money to £5,812 10s."

were mended, gave over that business : and with ten galleys of Peloponnesus, and ten of Chios, went thence and assaulted Pteleum, but not being able to take it, he kept by the shore to Clazomenæ; here he summoned those within to yield, with offer to such of them as favoured the Athenians that they might go up and dwell at Daphnus; and Tamos, the deputy-lieutenant of Ionia, offered them the same. But they not hearkening thereunto, he made an assault on the city, being unvalled, but when he could not take it, he put to sea again, and with a mighty wind was himself carried to Phocæa and Cyme, but the rest of the fleet put in at Marathussa, Pele, and Drymussa, islands that lie over against Clazomenæ. After they had staid there eight days in regard of the winds, spoiling and destroying and partly taking aboard whatsoever goods of the Clazomenians lay without, they went afterwards to Phocæa and Cyme, to Astyochus.

XXXII. While Astyochus was there, the ambassadors of the Lesbians came to him, desiring to revolt¹ from the Athenians, and as for him, they prevailed with him, but seeing the Corinthians and the other confederates were willing, in respect of their former ill success there, he put to sea for Chios. Whither after a great tempest, his galleys, some from one place and some from another, at length arrived all. After this, Pedaritus, who was now at Erythræa, whither he was come from Miletus by land, came over with his forces to Chios. Besides those forces he brought over with him, he had the soldiers who were of the five galleys that came thither with Chalcidæus, and were left there to the number of five hundred, and armour to arm them. Now some of the Lesbians having promised to revolt, Astyochus communicated the matter with Pedaritus and the Chians, alleging how meet it would be to go with a fleet and make Lesbos to revolt; for that they should either get more confederates, or failing, they should at least weaken the Athenians. But they gave him no ear; and for the Chian galleys, Pedaritus told him plainly he should have none of them.

XXXIII. Whereupon Astyochus taking with him five galleys of Corinth, a sixth of Megara, one of Hermione, and those of Laconia which he brought with him, went towards Miletus, to his charge; mightily threatening the Chians in case they should need him, not to help them. When he was come to Corycus in Erythræa, he staid there; and the Athenians from Samos lay on the other side of the point, the one not knowing that the other was so near. Astyochus, upon a letter² sent him from Pedaritus, signifying that there were some certain Erythræan captives, dismissed from Samos, with design to betray Erythræa, went presently back to Erythræa, so little he missed of falling into the hands of the Athenians. Pedaritus also went over to him, and having narrowly inquired touching these seeming traitors, and found that the whole matter was but a pretence, which the men had used for their escape from Samos, they acquitted them and de-

¹ βουλόμενοι αὐτοῖς ἀποστῆναι, Bekker. Duker omits αὐτοῖς. Wishing to revolt again.

² ὑπὸ νύκτα ἐπιστολῆς, Bekker. Duker omits ὑπὸ νύκτα. A letter having come by night from Pedaritus.

parted, one to Chios, the other as he was going before, towards Miletus.

XXXIV. In the mean time the army of the Athenians being come about by sea from Corycus to Argnum, lit on three long boats of the Chians, which when they saw, they presently chased. But there arose a great tempest, and the long boats of Chios with much ado recovered the harbour. But of the Athenian galleys, especially such as followed them furthest, there perished three, driven ashore at the city of Chios; and the men that were aboard them were part taken, and part slain; the rest of the fleet escaped into a haven called Phœnicus, under the hill Mimas; from whence they got afterwards to Lesbos, and there fortified.

XXXV. The same winter Hippocrates setting out from Peloponnesus with ten galleys of Thurium, commanded by Dorieus, the son of Diagoras, with two others, and with one galley of Laconia, and one of Syracuse, went to Cnidos; this city was now revolted from Tissaphernes: and the Peloponnesians that lay at Miletus hearing of it, commanded that (the one half of their galleys remaining for the guard of Cnidos) the other half should go about Triopium, and help to bring in the ships which were to come from Egypt; this Triopium is a promontory of the territory of Cnidias, lying out into the sea, and consecrated to Apollo. The Athenians on advertisement hereof, setting forth from Samos, took those galleys that kept guard at Triopium; but the men that were in them escaped to land. After this, they went to Cnidos, which they assaulted, and had almost taken, being without wall; and the next day they assaulted it again; but being less able to hurt it now than before, because they had fenced it better this night, and the men also were got into it that fled from their galleys under Triopium, they invaded and wasted the Cnidian territory, and so went back to Samos.

XXXVI. About the same time Astyochus being come to the navy at Miletus, the Peloponnesians had plenty of all things for the army. For they had not only sufficient pay, but the soldiers also had store of money yet remaining of the pillage of Iäsus, and the Milesians underwent the war with a good will. Nevertheless the former articles of the league made by Chalcideus with Tissaphernes seemed defective, and not so advantageous to them as to him. Whereupon they agreed to new ones in the presence of Theramenes, which were these:

XXXVII. "The agreement of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates with king Darius and his children, and with Tissaphernes, for league and amity, according to the articles following:—Whatsoever territories or cities belong to king Darius, or were his father's, or his ancestors', against those shall neither the Lacedæmonians go to make war, nor any way to annoy them; neither shall the Lacedæmonians, nor their confederates, exact tribute of any of those cities; neither shall king Darius, nor any under his dominion, make war upon, or any way annoy the Lacedæmonians, or any of the Lacedæmonian confederates.—If the Lacedæmonians, or their confederates, shall need any thing of the king, or the king of the

“ Lacedæmonians, or of their confederates, what they shall persuade each other to do, that if they do it, shall be good.—They shall, both of them, make war jointly against the Athenians and their confederates; and when they shall give over the war, they shall also do it jointly.—Whatsoever army shall be in the king’s country, sent for by the king, the king shall defray.—If any of the cities comprehended in the league made with the king, shall invade the king’s territories, the rest shall oppose them, and defend the king to the utmost of their power.—If any city of the king’s, or under his dominion, shall invade the Lacedæmonians, or their confederates, the king shall make opposition, and defend them to the utmost of his power.”

XXXVIII. After this accord made, Theramenes delivered his galleys into the hands of Astyochus, and putting to sea in a fly-boat, is no more seen. But the Athenians that were now come with their army from Lesbos to Chios, and were masters of the field and of the sea, fortified Delphinium, a place both strong to the landward, and that had also a harbour for shipping, and was not far from the city itself of Chios. And the Chians, as having been disheartened in divers former battles, and otherwise, not only not mutually well affected, but jealous one of another; for Tydeus and his accomplices had been put to death by Pedaritus for Atticism, and the rest of the city was kept in awe, but by force, and for a time stirred not against them. And for the causes mentioned, not conceiving themselves, neither with their own strength, nor with the help of those that Pedaritus had with him, sufficient to give them battle, they sent to Miletus to require aid from Astyochus. Which when he had denied them, Pedaritus sent letters to Lacedæmon, complaining of the wrong. Thus proceeded the affairs of the Athenians at Chios. Also their fleet at Samos went often out against the fleet of the enemy at Miletus; but when theirs would never come out of the harbour to encounter them, they returned to Samos, and lay still.

XXXIX. The same winter, about the solstice, went out from Peloponnesus towards Ionia those twenty-seven galleys, which at the procurement of Calligetis of Megara, and Timagoras of Cyzicus, were made ready by the Lacedæmonians for Pharnabazus. The commander of them was Antisthenes, a Spartan. With him the Lacedæmonians sent eleven Spartans more to be of council with Astyochus, whereof Lichas, the son of Arcesilaus, was one. These had commission, that when they should be arrived at Miletus, besides their general care to order every thing to the best, they should send away these galleys, either the same, or more, or fewer, into the Hellespont to Pharnabazus, if they so thought fit, and to appoint Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, that went along in them for commander. And that the same eleven, if they thought it meet, should put Astyochus from his charge, and ordain Antisthenes in his place: for they had him in suspicion for the letters of Pedaritus. These galleys holding their course from Malea through the main sea, and arriving at Melos, lighted on ten of the galleys of the Athenians, whereof three they took, but without the men, and fired them. And after this,

because they feared lest those Athenian galleys that escaped from Melos, should give notice of their coming to those in Samos, (as also it fell out,) they changed their course, and went towards Crete, and having made their voyage the longer, that it might be the safer, they put in at Caunus,¹ in Asia. Now from thence, as being in a place of safety, they sent a messenger to the fleet at Miletus for a convoy.

XL. The Chians and Pedaritus about the same time, notwithstanding their former repulse, and that Astyochus was still backward, sent messengers to him, desiring him to come with his whole fleet to help them, being besieged, and not to suffer the greatest of their confederate cities in all Ionia to be thus shut up by sea, and ravaged by land, as it was. For the Chians having many slaves, more than any one state, except that of the Lacedæmonians, whom for their offences they the more ungently punished because of their number, many of them, as soon as the Athenians appeared to be settled in their fortifications, ran over presently to them, and were they, that knowing the territory so well, did it the greatest spoil. Therefore the Chians said he must help them, whilst there was hope and possibility to do it, Delphinium being still in fortifying, and unfurnished, and greater fences being in making, both about their camp and fleet. Astyochus, though he meant it not before, because he would have made good his threats, yet when he saw the confederates were willing, he was bent to have relieved them.

XLI. But in the mean time came the messenger from the twenty-seven galleys, and from the Lacedæmonian counsellors that were come to Caunus. Astyochus therefore esteeming the wafting in of those galleys, whereby they might the more freely command the sea, and the safe coming in of those Lacedæmonians, who were to look into his actions, a business that ought to be preferred before all others, presently gave over his journey for Chios, and went towards Caunus. As he went by the coast, he landed at Cos Meropidis, being unwall'd, and thrown down by an earthquake which had happened there, the greatest verily in man's memory, and rifled it, the inhabitants being fled into the mountains; and overrunning the country, made booty of all that came in his way, saving of freemen; but those he dismissed. From Cos he went by night to Cnidos; but found it necessary, by the advice of the Cnidians, not to land his men there, but to follow, as he was, after those twenty galleys of Athens, wherewith Charminus, one of the Athenian generals gone out from Samos, stood watching for those twenty-seven galleys that were come from Peloponnesus, the same that Astyochus himself was going to convoy in. For they at Samos had had intelligence from Miletus of their coming, and Charminus was lying for them about Syme,² Chalce,³ Rhodes, and the coast of Lycia: for by this time he knew that they were at Caunus.

XLII. Astyochus therefore desiring to out-go the report of his

¹ A city of Caria. See Herodotus, I. 172. Livy, xlv. 25. Now called *Sophiano*.

² See Herod. I. 174.

³ This island sometimes called *Chalcia*; now *Charci*.

coming, went as he was to Syme, hoping to find those galleys out from the shore. But a shower of rain, together with the cloudiness of the sky, made his galleys to miss their course in the dark, and disordered them. The next morning, the fleet being scattered, the left wing was manifestly descried by the Athenians, whilst the rest wandered yet about the island; and thereupon Charminus and the Athenians put forth against them with twenty galleys, supposing they had been the same galleys they were watching for from Caunus. And presently charging, sunk three of them, and hurt others, and were superior in the fight, till such time as (contrary to their expectation) the greater part of the fleet came in sight, and enclosed them about. Then they betook themselves to flight, and with the loss of six galleys, the rest escaped into the island of Teutlussa,¹ and from thence to Halicarnassus. After this, the Peloponnesians putting in at Cnidos, and joining with those seven and twenty galleys that came from Caunus, went altogether to Syme, and having there erected a trophy, returned again, and lay at Cnidos.

XLIII. The Athenians, when they understood what had passed in this battle, went from Samos with their whole navy to Syme. But neither went they out against the navy in Cnidos, nor the navy there against them. Whereupon they took up the furniture of their galleys at Syme, and assaulted Loryma, a town in the continent, and so returned to Samos. The whole navy of the Peloponnesians being at Cnidos, was now in repairing and refurnishing with such things as it wanted; and withal, those eleven Lacedæmonians conferred with Tissaphernes (for he also was present) touching such things as they disliked in the articles before agreed on, and concerning the war, how it might be carried for the future, in the best and most advantageous manner for them both. But Lychas was he that considered the business most nearly, and said, that neither the first league, nor yet the latter by Theramenes, was made as it ought to have been.² And that it would be a very hard condition, that whatsoever territories the king and his ancestors possessed before, he should possess the same now; for so he might bring again into subjection all the islands, and the sea, and the Locrians, and all as far as Bœotia; and the Lacedæmonians instead of restoring the Grecians into liberty, should put them into subjection to the rule of the Medes. Therefore he required other and better articles to be drawn, and not to stand to these. As for pay, in the new articles they would require none. But Tissaphernes chafing at this, went his way in choler, and nothing was done.

XLIV. The Peloponnesians solicited by messengers from the great men of Rhodes, resolved to go thither, because they hoped it would not prove impossible with their number of seamen, and army of land soldiers, to bring that island into their power; and withal, supposed themselves able, with their present confederates, to maintain their

¹ Sometimes put Teuglussa; by Pliny, former words. But Lichas said, that Seutlusa. neither of the treaties was made properly,

² οὐτε τὰς Χαλκιδίως, οὐτε τὰς Θερραμίδους, Bekker. Duker omits the three neither, neither that formed by Chalcideus, nor that by Theramenes.

fleet without asking money any more of Tissaphernes. Presently therefore the same winter, they put forth from Cnidos, and arriving in the territory of Rhodes at Cameirus, first frightened the commons out of it, that knew not of the business; and they fled. Then the Lacedæmonians called together both these, and the Rhodians¹ of the two cities Lindus and Iëlysus, and persuaded them to revolt from the Athenians. And Rhodes turned to the Peloponnesians. The Athenians at the same time hearing of their design, put forth with their fleet from Samos, desiring to have arrived before them, and were seen in the main sea too late, though not much. For the present they went away to Chalce, and thence back to Samos, but afterwards they came forth with their galleys divers times, and made war against Rhodes from Chalce, Cos, and Samos. Now the Peloponnesians did no more to the Rhodians but levy money amongst them, to the sum of thirty-two talents,² and otherwise for fourscore days that they lay there, having their galleys hauled ashore, they meddled not.

XLV. In this time, as also before the going of the Peloponnesians to Rhodes, came to pass the things that follow. Alcibiades, after the death of Chalcideus, and battle at Miletus, being suspected by the Peloponnesians; and Astyochus having received letters from them from Lacedæmon to put him to death, (for he was an enemy to Agis, and also otherwise not well trusted,) retired to Tissaphernes, first for fear, and afterwards to his power hindered the affairs of the Peloponnesians; and being in every thing his instructor, he not only cut shorter their pay, insomuch as from a drachma³ he brought it to three oboles, and those also not continually paid; advising Tissaphernes to tell them how that the Athenians, men of a long continued skill in naval affairs, allowed but three oboles to their own, not so much for want of money, but lest the mariners, some of them growing insolent by superfluity, should disable their bodies by spending their money on such things as would weaken them, and others should quit the galleys with the arrear of their pay in their captain's hands for a pawn;⁴ but also gave counsel to Tissaphernes to give money to the captains of the galleys, and to the generals of the several cities, (save only those of Syracuse,) to give way unto it. For Hermocrates, the general of the Syracusians, was the only man that in the name of the whole league stood against it. And for the cities that came to require money, he would put them back himself, and answer them in the name of Tissaphernes, and say, namely to the Chians, that they were impudent men, being the richest of the Grecian states, and preserved by strangers, to expect nevertheless, that others for their liberty should

¹ The city of Rhodes was not then built. *Ῥοδίους ἐπισαν ἀποστῆναι*, Bekker. In Duker, there is a comma at *Ῥοδίους*. Then the Lacedæmonians having called together these, and those from the two cities, Lindus and Iëlysus, persuaded the Rhodians to revolt from the Athenians.

² Six thousand two hundred pounds

sterling.

³ Six oboli, or seven-pence three farthings.

⁴ *οἱ δὲ τὰς ναῦς ἀπολείπουσιν οὐχ ὑπολιπόντες*, Bekker. *οἱ δὲ, τὰς ναῦς ἀπολιπόντες*, Duker. And others would leave the ships, not leaving the pay which was due to them as a pawn.

not only venture their persons, but maintain them with their purses. And to other states, that they did unjustly, having laid out their money before they revolted that they might serve the Athenians, not to bestow as much or more now upon themselves. And told them that Tissaphernes, now he made war at his own charges, had reason to be sparing; but when money should come down from the king, he would then give them their full pay, and assist the cities as should be fit.

XLVI. Moreover he advised Tissaphernes not to be too hasty to make an end of the war, nor to fetch in the Phœnician fleet which was making ready; nor take more men into pay,¹ whereby to put the whole power both by sea and land into the hands of one: but to let the dominion remain divided into two, that the king, when one side troubled him, might set upon it with the other. Whereas the dominion both by sea and land being in one, he will want by whom to pull down those that hold it, unless with great danger and cost he should come and try it out himself. But thus the danger would be less chargeable, (he being but at a small part of the cost,) and he should wear out the Grecians one against another, and himself in the mean time remain in safety. He said further, that the Athenians were fitter to partake dominion with him than the other, for that they were less ambitious of power by land; and that their speeches and actions tended more to the king's purpose: for that they would join with him to subdue the Grecians, that is to say, for themselves, as touching the dominion by sea; and for the king, as touching the Grecians in the king's territories. Whereas the Lacedæmonians on the contrary were come to set them free. And it was not likely but that they that were come to deliver the Grecians from the Grecians, will (if they overcome the Athenians) deliver them also from the Barbarians. He gave counsel, therefore, first to wear them out both, and then, when he had clipped, as near as he could, the wings of the Athenians, to dismiss the Peloponnesians out of his country. And Tissaphernes had a purpose to do accordingly, as far as by his actions can be conjectured: for hereupon he gave himself to believe Alcibiades as his best counsellor in these affairs, and neither paid the Peloponnesians their wages, nor would suffer them to fight by sea, but pretending the coming of the Phœnician fleet, whereby they might afterwards fight with odds, he overthrew their proceedings, and abated the vigour of their navy, before very puissant, and was in all things else more backward than he could possibly dissemble.²

XLVII. Now Alcibiades advised the king and Tissaphernes to this whilst he was with them, partly because he thought the same to be indeed the best course; but partly also to make way for his own return to his country: knowing that if he destroyed it not, the time would one day come, that he might persuade the Athenians to recal him. And the best way to persuade them to it, he thought, was this;

¹ ἢ "Ἐλλῆσι πλείοσι, Bekker. μελήσει πλείοσι, Duker. Or giving pay to more Grecians.

² At the end of the section Bekker

adds *ξυνεπολίμει*. And in other things he was more evidently backward in giving his assistance in war, than to be able to escape observation.

to make it appear unto them that he was powerful with Tissaphernes. Which also came to pass. For after the Athenian soldiers at Samos saw what power he had with him, the captains of galleys and principal men there, partly upon Alcibiades' own motion, who had sent to the greatest amongst them, that they should remember him to the best sort, and say that he desired to come home, so the government might be in the hands of a few, not of evil persons, nor yet of the multitude that cast him out; and that he would bring Tissaphernes to be their friend, and to war on their side; but chiefly of their own accords had their minds inclined to the deposing of the popular government.

XLVIII. This business was set on foot first in the camp, and from thence proceeded afterwards into the city. And certain persons went over to Alcibiades out of Samos, and had conference with him, and when he had undertaken to bring to their friendship, first Tissaphernes, and then the king, in case the government were taken from the people, (for then he said the king might the better rely upon them,) they that were of most power in the city, who also were the most toiled out, entered into great hope, both to have the ordering of the state at home themselves, and victory also over the enemy. And when they came back to Samos, they drew all such as were for their purpose into an oath of conspiracy with themselves, and to the multitude gave it out openly, that if Alcibiades might be recalled, and the people put from the government, the king would turn their friend, and furnish them with money. Though the multitude were grieved with this proceeding for the present, yet for the great hope they had of the king's pay, they stirred not. But they that were setting up the oligarchy, when they had communicated thus much to the multitude, fell to consideration anew, and with more of their accomplices, of the things spoken by Alcibiades. And the rest thought the matter easy, and worthy to be believed; but Phrynichus, who yet was general of the army, liked it not; but thought (as the truth was) that Alcibiades cared no more for the oligarchy than the democracy, nor had any other aim in it, but only by altering the government that then was, to be called home by his associates. And said, they were especially to look to this, that they did not mutiny for the king,¹ who could not very easily be induced (the Peloponnesians being now as much masters at sea as themselves, and having no small cities within his dominions) to join with the Athenians, whom he trusted not, and to trouble himself, when he might have the friendship of the Peloponnesians, that never did him hurt. As for the confederate cities to whom they promise oligarchy, in that they themselves do put down the democracy, he said, he knew full well, that neither those who were already revolted would the sooner return to, nor those that remained be ever the more confirmed in their obedience thereby; for they would never be so willing to be in subjection, either to the few, or to

¹ ὅπως μὴ στασιάζωι τῷ βασιλεῖ, easy for the king, the Peloponnesians
Bekker. ὅπως μὴ στασιάζωσι τῷ βα- being now equally with them on the
σιλεῖ, Duker. That they should not sea, &c.
revolt; but he thought that it was not

the people, as they would be to have their liberty, which side soever should give it them. But would think that even those who are termed the good men,¹ if they had the government, would give them as much to do as the people, being contrivers and authors to the people, of doing those mischiefs against them, out of which they make most profit to themselves; and that if the few had the rule, then they should be put to death unheard, and more violently than by the former, whereas the people is their refuge, and moderator of the others' insolence. This, he said, he was certain that the cities thought, in that they had learned the same by the actions themselves. And that, therefore, what was yet propounded by Alcibiades, he by no means approved.

XLIX. But those of the conspiracy there assembled, not only approved the present proposition, but also made preparation to send Pisander and others ambassadors to Athens, to negotiate concerning the reduction of Alcibiades, the dissolution of the democracy, and the procuring for the Athenians the friendship of Tissaphernes.

L. Now Phrynichus knowing that an overture was to be made at Athens for the restoring of Alcibiades, and that the Athenians would embrace it; and fearing lest being recalled he should do him a mischief, (in regard he had spoken against it,) as one that would have hindered the same, betook himself to this course. He sends secret letters to Astyochus the Lacedæmonian general, who was yet about Miletus, and advertised him that Alcibiades undid their affairs, and was procuring the friendship of Tissaphernes for the Athenians, writing in plain terms the whole business, and desiring to be excused if he rendered evil to his enemy, with some advantage to his country. Astyochus had before this laid by the purpose of revenge against Alcibiades, especially when he was not in his own hands, and going to him to Magnesia, and to Tissaphernes, related to them what advertisement he had received from Samos, and made himself the appeacher, for he adhered (as was said) to Tissaphernes for his private lucre, both in this, and in divers other matters, which was also the cause that concerning the pay, when the abatement was made, he was not so stout in opposing it as he ought to have been. Hereupon Alcibiades sends letters presently to those that were in office at Samos, accusing Phrynichus of what he had done, and requiring to have him put to death. Phrynichus, perplexed with this discovery, and brought into danger indeed, sends again to Astyochus, blaming what was past, as not well concealed, and promised now to be ready to deliver to him the whole army at Samos, to be destroyed; writing from point to point (Samos being unwall'd) in what manner he would do it; and saying, that since his life was brought in danger, they could not blame him, though he did this or any other thing, rather than be destroyed

¹ *Κάλοι καγαθοί*. The best men of the aristocracy, a difference from the oligarchy, which was of the richest sort only. For the good men, who in the democracy are the people's mi-

nions, and put the people upon all they do, will do the same things themselves, when they have the sovereignty in their hands.

by his most deadly enemies. This also Astyochus revealed to Alcibiades.

LI. But Phrynichus having had notice betimes how he abused him, and that letters about this from Alcibiades were in a manner come, he anticipates the news himself, and tells the army, that whereas Samos was unwall'd, and the galleys rid not all within, the enemy meant to come and assault the harbour; that he had sure intelligence hereof, and that they ought therefore with all speed to raise a wall about the city, and put garrisons into other places thereabouts. Now Phrynichus was general himself, and it was in his own power to see it done. They then fell to walling, whereby Samos (which they meant to have done howsoever) was so much the sooner walled in; but not long after came letters from Alcibiades, that the army was betrayed by Phrynichus, and that the enemy purposed to invade the harbour where they lay. But now they thought not Alcibiades worthy to be believed, but rather, that having foreseen the design of the enemy, he went about out of malice to fasten it upon Phrynichus, as conscious of it likewise. So that he did him no hurt by telling it, but bare witness rather of that which Phrynichus had told them of before.

LII. After this Alcibiades endeavoured to incline and persuade Tissaphernes to the friendship of the Athenians; for though Tissaphernes feared the Peloponnesians, because their fleet was greater than that of the Athenians, yet if he had been able, he had a good will to have been persuaded by him; especially in his anger against the Peloponnesians after the dissension at Cnidos, about the league made by Theramenes, (for they were already fallen out, the Peloponnesians being about this time in Rhodes,) wherein that which had been before spoken by Alcibiades, how that the coming of the Lacedæmonians was to restore all the cities to their liberty, was now verified by Lichas, in that he said, it was an article not to be suffered, that the king should hold those cities which he and his ancestors then or before had holden. Alcibiades, therefore, as one that laboured for no trifle, with all his might applied himself to Tissaphernes.

LIII. The Athenian ambassadors, sent from Samos with Pisander, being arrived at Athens, were making their propositions to the people, relating to them summarily the points of their business, and principally this; that if they would call home Alcibiades, and not suffer the government to remain in the hands of the people in such manner as it did, they might have the king for their confederate, and get the victory of the Peloponnesians. Now when many opposed that point touching the democracy, and the enemies of Alcibiades clamoured withal, that it would be a horrible thing he should return by forcing the government, when the Eumolpidæ¹ and Ceryces² bear witness

¹ *Eumolpida*, a family descended from Eumolpus, the author at Athens and Eleusis of the mysteries of Ceres. This family had the chief authority in matters that concerned those rites.

² *Ceryces*, heralds in war; ambassa-

dors in peace. *Suidas*. They pronounced all formal words in the ceremonies of their religion, and were a family descended from Ceryx, the son of Mercury.

against him concerning the mysteries for which he fled, and prohibited his return under their curse, Pisander at this great opposition and querimony stood out, and going amongst them, took out one by one those that were against it, and asked them whether, now that the Peloponnesians had as many galleys at sea to oppose them as they themselves had, and confederate cities more than they, and were furnished with money by the king and Tissaphernes, the Athenians being without, they had any other hope to save the state, but by persuading the king to come about to their side? And they that were asked having nothing to answer, then in plain terms he said to them, “this you cannot now obtain, except we administer the state with more moderation, and bring the power into the hands of a few, that the king may rely upon us. And we deliberate at this time, not so much about the form, as about the preservation of the state; for if you dislike the form, you may change it again hereafter. And let us recal Alcibiades, who is the only man that can bring this to pass.”

LIV. The people hearing of the oligarchy, took it very heinously at first; but when Pisander had proved evidently, that there was no other way of safety in the end, partly for fear, and partly because they hoped again to change the government, they yielded. And they ordered, that Pisander and ten others should go and treat, both with Tissaphernes and with Alcibiades, as to them should seem best. Withal, on the accusation of Pisander, against Phrynichus, they discharged both Phrynichus and Scironidas his fellow-commissioner of their command, and made Diomedon and Leon generals of the fleet in their places. Now the cause why Pisander accused Phrynichus, and said he had betrayed Iäsus and Amorges, was only this, he thought him a man unfit for the business now in hand with Alcibiades. And Pisander, after he had gone about to all those combinations, (which were in the city before, for obtaining of places of judicature and of command,) exhorting them to stand together, and advise about deposing the democracy; and when he had despatched the rest of his business, so as there should be no more cause for him to stay there, took sea with those other ten, to go to Tissaphernes.

LV. Leon and Diomedon arriving the same winter at the Athenian fleet, made a voyage against Rhodes. And finding there the Peloponnesian galleys drawn up to land, they disembarked and overcame in battle such of the Rhodians as made head; and then put to sea again and went to Chalce, and after this they made sharper war upon them from Cos; for from thence they could better observe the Peloponnesian navy when it should put off from the land. In this while there arrived at Rhodes, Xenophontidas, a Laconian, sent out of Chios from Pedaritus, to advertise them that the fortification of the Athenians there was now finished, and that unless they came and relieved them with their whole fleet, the state of Chios must utterly be lost. And it was resolved to relieve them. But Pedaritus in the mean time, with the whole power, both of his own auxiliary forces,

1 οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν γινώσκειν, Bekker. οὐκ, Duker. This we cannot now obtain.
3 H

and of the Chians, made an assault upon the fortification which the Athenians had made about their navy, part whereof he won, and had got some galleys that were drawn on land. But the Athenians issuing out upon them, first put to flight the Chians, and then overcame also the rest of the army about Pedaritus, and slew Pedaritus himself, and took many of the Chians prisoners, and much armour.

LVI. After this the Chians were besieged both by sea and land more narrowly, and great famine was in the city; but Pisander and the other Athenian ambassadors that went with him, when they came to Tissaphernes, began to confer about the agreement. But Alcibiades (for he was not sure of Tissaphernes, because he stood in fear too much of the Peloponnesians, and had a purpose besides, as Alcibiades himself had taught him, to weaken both sides yet more) betook himself to this shift: that Tissaphernes should break off the treaty, by making to the Athenians exorbitant demands. And it seemed that Tissaphernes and he aimed at the same thing; Tissaphernes for fear, and Alcibiades for that when he saw Tissaphernes not desirous to agree, though the offers were never so great, he was unwilling to have the Athenians think he could not persuade him to it, but rather, that he was already persuaded and willing, and that the Athenians came not to him with sufficient offers. For Alcibiades being the man that spake for Tissaphernes, though he were also present, made unto them such excessive demands, that though the Athenians should have yielded to the greatest part of them, yet it must have been attributed to them, that the treaty went not on. For they demanded first, that all Ionia should be rendered, then again, the adjacent islands, and other things which the Athenians stood not against; in fine, at the third meeting, when he feared now plainly to be found unable to make good his word, he required, that they should suffer the king to build a navy and sail up and down by their coast, wheresoever, and with what number soever of galleys he himself should think good. Upon this the Athenians would treat no longer, esteeming the conditions intolerable, and that Alcibiades had abused them; and so went away in a rage to Samos.

LVII. Presently after this, the same winter, Tissaphernes went to Caunus, intending both to bring the Peloponnesians back to Miletus, and also (as soon as he should have agreed to new articles, such as he could get) to give the fleet their pay; and not to fall directly out with them, lest so many galleys wanting maintenance, should either be forced by the Athenians to fight, and so be overcome, or emptied of men, the business might succeed with the Athenians according to their own desire without him. Besides, he was afraid, lest looking out for maintenance, they should make spoil in the continent. In consideration and foresight of all which things, he desired to counterpoise the Grecians, and sending for the Peloponnesians, he gave them their pay, and now made the third league as followeth:

LVIII. "In the thirteenth year of the reign of Darius, Alexippi-
 "das being Ephor in Lacedæmon, agreement was made in the plain
 "of Mæander, between the Lacedæmonians and their confederates
 "on one part, and Tissaphernes and Hieramenes, and the sons of

“Pharnaces on the other part; concerning the affairs of the king; and of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates.—That whatsoever country in Asia belongeth to the king, shall be the king’s still; and that concerning his own countries, it shall be lawful for the king to do whatsoever he shall think meet.—That the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall not invade any the territories of the king to harm them; nor the king the territories of the Lacedæmonians, or their confederates.—If any of the Lacedæmonians or their confederates shall invade the king’s country to do it hurt, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall oppose it; and if any of the king’s country shall invade the Lacedæmonians or their confederates, to do them hurt, the king shall oppose it.—That Tissaphernes shall, according to the rates agreed on, maintain the present fleet till the king’s fleet arrive.—That when the king’s navy shall be come, the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall maintain their own navy themselves, if they please; or if they will have Tissaphernes to maintain it, he shall do it; and that the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, at the end of the war, repay Tissaphernes whatsoever money they shall have received of him.—When the king’s galleys shall be arrived, both they and the galleys of the Lacedæmonians and their confederates, shall make the war jointly, according as to Tissaphernes and the Lacedæmonians and their confederates shall seem good. And if they will give over the war against the Athenians, they shall give it over in the same manner.”

LIX. Such were the articles. And after this Tissaphernes prepared for the fetching in of the Phœnician fleet, according to the agreement, and to do whatsoever else he had undertaken, desiring to have it seen, at least, that he went about it.

LX. In the end of this winter the Bœotians took Oropus by treason, having in it a garrison of Athenians. They that plotted it were certain Eretrians, and some of Oropus itself, who were then contriving the revolt of Eubœa; for the place being built to keep Eretria in subjection, it was impossible, as long as the Athenians held it, but that it would much annoy both Eretria and the rest of Eubœa. Having Oropus in their hands already, they came to Rhodes, to call the Peloponnesians into Eubœa. But the Peloponnesians had a greater inclination to relieve Chios, now distressed; and putting to sea, departed out of Rhodes with their whole fleet. When they were come about Triopium, they descried the Athenian fleet in the main sea, going from Chalce, and neither side assaulting the other, they put in, the one fleet at Samos, the other at Miletus; for the [Peloponnesians] saw they could not pass to relieve Chios without a battle. Thus ended this winter, and the twentieth year of this war, written by Thucydides.

YEAR XXI. A. C. 411. OLYMP. 92. 1.

LXI. The next summer, in the beginning of the spring, Dercylidas, a Spartan, was sent by land into Hellespont with a small army to work the revolt of Abydus, (a colony of the Milesians;) and the

Chians at the same time, whilst Astyochus was at a stand how to help them, were compelled by the pressure of the siege to hazard a battle by sea. Now whilst Astyochus lay in Rhodes, they had received into the city of Chios, after the death of Pedaritus, one Leon, a Spartan, who came along with Antisthenes, as a private soldier, and with him twelve galleys that lay at the guard of Miletus, whereof five were Thurians, four Syracusians, one of Anara, one of Miletus, and one of Leon's own. Whereupon the Chians issuing forth with the whole force of the city, seized a certain place of strength, and put forth thirty-six galleys against thirty-two of the Athenians, and fought. After a sharp fight, wherein the Chians and their associates had not the worst; and when it began to be dark, they retired again into the city.

LXII. Presently after this, Dercylidas being now arrived in Hellespont from Miletus by land, Abydus revolted to him and to Pharnabazus; and two days after revolted also Lampsacus. Strombichides having intelligence of this, made haste thither from Chios, with four and twenty sail of Athenians, those being also of that number which transported his men of arms. And when he had overcome the Lampsacens that came out against him, and taken Lampsacus, being an open town, at the first shout of their voices, and made prize of all the goods they found, and of the slaves, he placed the free men there again, and went against Abydus. But when that city neither yielded, nor could be taken by assault, he crossed over from Abydus to the opposite shore, and in Sestus, a city of Chersonesus, (possessed heretofore by the Medes,) he placed a garrison for the custody of the whole Hellespont.

LXIII. In the mean time not only the Chians had the sea at more command, but Astyochus also; and the army at Miletus having been advertised what passed in the fight by sea, and that Strombichides and those galleys with him were gone away, took heart. And Astyochus going to Chios with two galleys, fetched away the galleys that were there, and with the whole fleet now together, went against Samos. But seeing they of Samos, by reason of their jealousy one towards another, came not against him, he went back again to Miletus. For it was about this time that the democracy was put down at Athens. For after that Pisander and his fellow-ambassadors that had been with Tissaphernes, were come to Samos, they both assured their affairs yet better in the army, and also provoked the principal men of the Samians to attempt with them the erecting of the oligarchy: though there were then an insurrection amongst them against the oligarchy. And withal, the Athenians at Samos, in a conference amongst themselves, deliberated how, since Alcibiades would not, to let him alone; (for indeed they thought him no fit man to come into an oligarchy,) but for themselves, seeing they were already engaged in the danger, to take care both to keep the business from a relapse, and withal to sustain the war, and to contribute money, and whatsoever else was needful, with alacrity, out of their private estates, and no more to toil for other than themselves.

LXIV. Having thus advised, they sent Pisander with half the

ambassadors presently home to follow the business there, with command to set up the oligarchy in all cities they were to touch at by the way; the other half they sent about, some to one part of the state, and some to another. And they sent away Diotrepes to his charge, who was now about Chios, chosen to go governor of the cities upon Thrace. He, when he came to Thasus, deposed the people. And within two months at most after he was gone, the Thasians fortified their city, as needing no longer an aristocracy with the Athenians, but expecting liberty every day by the help of the Lacedæmonians. For there were also certain of them with the Peloponnesians, driven out by the Athenians; and these practised with such in the city as were for their purpose, to receive galleys into it, and to cause it to revolt. So that it fell out for them just as they would have it, that that estate of theirs, was set up without their danger, and that the people were deposed that would have withstood it. Insomuch as at Thasus it fell out contrary to what those Athenians thought who erected the oligarchy; and so in my opinion it did in many other places of their dominion. For the cities now grown wise, and withal resolute in their proceedings sought a direct liberty, and preferred not before it that outside of a well-ordered government, introduced by the Athenians.

LXV. They with Pisander, according to the order given them, entering into the cities as they went by, dissolved the democracies, and having in some places obtained also an aid of men of arms, they came to Athens, and found the business for the greatest part despatched to their hands by their complices before their coming. For certain young men combining themselves, had not only murdered Androcles privily, a principal patron of the popular government, and one that had his hand the farthest in the banishment of Alcibiades; whom they slew for two causes, for the sway he bare amongst the people, and to gratify Alcibiades, who they thought would return, and get them the friendship of Tissaphernes; but had also made away divers men unfit for their design, in the same manner. They had withal an oration ready made, which they delivered in public, wherein they said, that there ought none to receive wages but such as served in the wars, nor to participate of the government more than five thousand; and those such as by their purses and persons were best able to serve the commonwealth.

LXVI. And this with the most carried a good shew, because they that would set forward the alteration of the state, were to have the managing of the same. Yet the people and the council of the bean¹ met still, but debated nothing, save what the conspirators thought fit. Nay, all that spake were of that number, and had considered before what they were to say. Nor would any of the rest speak against them for fear, and because they saw the combination was great; and if any man did, he was quickly made away by one convenient means or other, and no inquiry made after the deed-doers, nor justice prose-

¹ The senate or council of five hundred, made by lot, in which lot they used white and black beans.

cuted against any that was suspected. But the people were so quiet, and so afraid, that every man thought it gain to escape violence, though he said never a word. Their hearts failed them because they thought the conspirators more than indeed they were: and to learn their number, in respect of the greatness of the city, and for that they knew not one another, they were unable. For the same cause also was it impossible for any man that was angry at it, to bemoan himself, whereby to be revenged on them that conspired. For he must have told his mind, either to one he knew not, or to one he knew and trusted not. For the populars approached each other, every one with jealousy, as if they thought him of the plot. For indeed there were such amongst them as no man would have thought would ever have turned to the oligarchy; and those were they that caused in the many that diffidence, and by strengthening the jealousy of the populars one against another, conferred most to the security of the few.

LXVII. During this opportunity, Pisander and they that were with him coming in, fell in hand presently with the remainder of the business. And first they assembled the people, and delivered their opinion for ten men to be chosen with power absolute, to make a draught of laws, and (having drawn them) to deliver their opinion at a day appointed, before the people, touching the best form of government for the city. Afterwards, when that day came, they summoned the assembly to Colonus, (which is a place consecrated to Neptune, without the city, about two furlongs off.) And they that were appointed to write the laws, presented this, and only this, that it should be lawful for any Athenian to deliver whatsoever opinion he pleased, imposing of great punishments upon whomsoever should either accuse any that so spake of violating the laws, or otherwise do him hurt. Now here indeed it was in plain terms propounded, that not any magistracy of the form before used, might any longer be in force, nor any fee belong unto it, but that five Prytanes might be elected, and these five choose a hundred, and every one of this hundred take unto him three others. And these four hundred entering into the council-house, might have absolute authority to govern the state as they thought best, and to summon the five thousand as oft as to them should seem good.

LXVIII. He that delivered this opinion was Pisander, who was also otherwise openly the forwardest to put down the democracy; but he that contrived the whole business, how to bring it to this pass, and had long thought upon it, was Antiphon, a man for virtue not inferior to any Athenian of his time, and the ablest of any man, both to devise well, and also to express well what he had devised, and though he came not into the assemblies of the people, nor willingly to any other debates, because the multitude had him in jealousy for the opinion they had of the power of his eloquence; yet when any man that had occasion of suit, either in the courts of justice, or in the assembly of the people, came to him for his counsel, this one man was able to help him most. The same man, when afterwards the government of the four hundred went down and was vexed of the people, was heard plead for himself, when his life was in question for that

business, the best of any man to this day. Phrynichus also shewed himself an earnest man for the oligarchy, and that more eminently than any other, because he feared Alcibiades, and knew him to be acquainted with all his practices at Samos with Astyochus; and thought in all probability, that he would never return to live under the government of the few; and this man in any matter of weight appeared the most sufficient to be relied on. Also Theramenes, the son of Agnon, an able man, both for elocution and understanding, was another of the principal of those that overthrew the democracy. So that it is no marvel if the business took effect, being by many and wise men conducted, though it were a hard one; for it went sore with the Athenian people, almost a hundred years after the expulsion of the tyrants, to be now deprived of their liberty, having not only not been subject to any, but also for the half of this time, been inured to dominion over others.

LXIX. When the assembly, after it had passed these things, no man contradicting, was dissolved, then afterwards they brought the four hundred into the council-house in this manner. The Athenians were evermore, partly on the walls, and partly at their arms in the camp, in regard of the enemy that lay at Declea. On the day appointed, therefore, they suffered such as knew not their intent to go forth as they were wont. But to such as were of the conspiracy, they quietly gave order, not to go to the camp itself, but to lag behind at a certain distance, and if any should oppose what was in doing, to take arms and keep them back. They to whom this charge was given, were the Andrians, Tenians, three hundred Carystians, and such of the colony of Ægina whom the Athenians had sent thither to inhabit, as came on purpose to this action with their own arms.¹ These things thus ordered, the four hundred, with every man a secret dagger, accompanied with one hundred and twenty young men of Greece, (whom they used for occasions of shedding blood,²) came in upon the counsellors of the bean, as they sat in the council-house, and commanded them to take their salary³ and be gone, which also they brought ready with them for the whole time they were behind, and paid it to them as they went out.

LXX. And the rest of the citizens mutinied not, but rested quiet, but the four hundred being now entered into the council-house, created Prytanes⁴ amongst themselves by lot, and made their prayers and sacrifices to the gods, all that were before usual at the entrance upon the government.⁵ And afterwards, receding far from that course,

¹ See b. ii. 27.

² This seems to be the import of the historian's phrase. He calls them ἑλληνες νεανίσκοι; thus marking that they were different people from the ordinary armed attendants of the Athenian magistracy, who were always Barbarians, generally Scythians. *Mitford*.

³ The stated salary for a senator of Athens was a drachma, or seven-pence three farthings a day.

⁴ Πρυτάνεις. These were presidents in the council of the five hundred, in number fifty, and in turns moderated and put the question in that council, and also in the assemblies of the people.

⁵ On the first day of the year, in the month Hecatombæon, it was customary to offer sacrifices, called εὐαγγέλια, and to offer up prayers for the good of the state, at the altars of Jupiter and Minerva, which were in the Senate house.

which in the administration of the state was used by the people, saving that for Alcibiades' sake they recalled not the outlaws, in other things they governed the commonwealth imperiously. And not only slew some, though not many, such as they thought fit to be made away, and imprisoned some, and confined others to places abroad, but also sent heralds to Agis, king of the Lacedæmonians, who was at Decelea, signifying that they would come to composition with him, and that now he might better treat with them, than he might before with the inconstant people.

LXXI. But he not imagining that the city was yet in quiet, nor willing so soon to deliver up their ancient liberty, but rather, that if they saw him approach with great forces, they would be in tumult, not yet believing fully but that some stir or other would arise amongst them, gave no answer at all to those that came from the four hundred touching the composition; but having sent for new and great forces out of Peloponnesus, came down himself not long after, both with the army at Decelea, and those new comers, to the Athenian walls, hoping that they would fall into his hands according to his desire, at least the more easily for their confusion, or perhaps, at the very first shout of their voices; in respect of the tumult that in all likelihood was to happen, both within and without the city. For, as for the long walls, in regard of the few defendants likely to be found upon them, he thought he could not fail to take them. But when he came near, and the Athenians were without any the least alteration within, and had with their horsemen which they sent out, and a part of their men of arms, and of their light-armed, and of their archers, overthrown some of his men that approached too near, and got some arms and bodies of the slain; rectified thus, he withdrew his army again, and himself, and such as were with him before, staid in their place at Decelea; but as for those that came last, after they had staid awhile in the country, he sent them home again. After this the four hundred, notwithstanding their former repulse, sent ambassadors to Agis anew, and he now receiving them better, by his advice they sent ambassadors also to Lacedæmon, about an agreement, being desirous of peace.

LXXII. They likewise sent ten men to Samos to satisfy the army, and to tell them, that the oligarchy was not set up to any prejudice of the city or citizens, but for the safety of the whole state, and that they who had their hands in it were five thousand, and not four hundred only; notwithstanding that the Athenians by reason of warfare and employment abroad, never assembled, of how great consequence soever was the matter to be handled, so frequent as to be five thousand there at once. And having in other things instructed them how to make the best of the matter, they sent them away immediately after the government was changed, fearing (as also it fell out) lest the seafaring multitude would not only not continue in this oligarchical form themselves, but (the mischief beginning there) would depose them also.

LXXIII. For in Samos there was a commotion about the oligarchy already, and this that follows happened about the same time

that the four hundred were set up in Athens. Those Samians that had risen against the nobility, and were of the people's side, turning when Pisander came thither, at the persuasion of him, and of those Athenians in Samos that were his complices, conspired together to the number of three hundred, and were to have assaulted the rest as populars; and one Hyperbolus, a lewd fellow, who, not for any fear of his power, or for any dignity, but for wickedness of life, and dishonour he did the city, had been banished by ostracism, they slew;¹ abetted therein, both by Charminus, one of the commanders, and by other Athenians that were amongst them, who had given them their faith; and together with these they committed other facts of the same kind, and were fully bent to have assaulted the popular side; but they having got notice thereof, made known the design, both to the generals Leon and Diomedon, (for these being honoured by the people, endured the oligarchy unwillingly,) and also to Thrasybulus² and Thrasyllus, whereof one was captain of a galley, and the other captain of a band of men of arms, and to such others continually as they thought stood in greatest opposition to the conspirators; and required of them, that they would not see them destroyed, and Samos alienated from the Athenians by the only means of which their dominion had till this time kept itself in the state it is in. They hearing it, went to the soldiers, and exhorted them one by one not to suffer it, especially to the Paralians, who were all Athenians, and free men, come thither in the galley called Paralos, and had always before been enemies to the oligarchy. And Leon and Diomedon, whensoever they went forth any whither, left them certain galleys for their guard. So that when the three hundred assaulted them, the commons of the Samians, with the help of all these, and especially of the Paralians, had the upper hand, and of the three hundred slew thirty; but three of the chief authors they banished, and burying in oblivion the fault of the rest, governed the state from that time forward as a democracy.

LXXIV. The Paralos, and in it Chæreas, the son of Archestratus, a man of Athens, one that had been forward in the making of this change, the Samians and the soldiers despatched presently away to Athens, to advertise them of what was done; for they knew not yet that the government was in the hands of the four hundred. When they arrived, the four hundred cast some two or three of these of the Paralos into prison; the rest, after they had taken the galley from them, and put them aboard another military galley, they commanded to keep guard about Eubœa. But Chæreas by some means or other getting presently away, seeing how things went, came back to Samos, and related to the army all that the Athenians had done, aggravating

¹ This was the person whom the ostracism made in some measure famous, and who made the ostracism quite infamous. Plutarch has repeated the story thrice. See *Life of Nicias*; also the *Nubes* of Aristophanes.

² Thrasybulus, whose name now occurs for the first time, acts a very high-

spirited and noble part in the close of this history; but the glory of his life was in ridding Athens soon after of *thirty tyrants* at a blow, for which he was rewarded with a wreath of olive, the most honourable recompense his grateful countrymen could bestow upon him. *Smith*. See *Corn. Nepos*.

it to the utmost; as that they punished every man with stripes, to the end that none should contradict the doings of those that bore rule; and that their wives and children at home were abused; and that they had an intention farther to take and imprison all that were of kin to any of the army who was not of their faction, to the intent to kill them if they of Samos would not submit to their authority. And many other things he told them, adding lies of his own.

LXXV. When they heard this, they were ready at first to have fallen upon the chief authors of the oligarchy, and upon such of the rest as were partakers of it; yet afterwards, being hindered by such as came between, and advised them not to overthrow the state, the enemy lying so near with their galleys to assault them, they gave it over. After this, Thrasybulus, the son of Lycas, and Thrasyllus, (for these were the principal authors of the change,) determining now openly to reduce the state at Samos to a democracy, took oaths of all the soldiers, especially of the oligarchicals, the greatest they could devise, both that they should be subject to the democracy, and agree together, and also that they should zealously prosecute the war against the Peloponnesians and withal be enemies to the four hundred, and not have to do with them by ambassadors. The same oath was taken by all the Samians that were of age, and the Athenian soldiers communicated with them their whole affairs, together with whatsoever should succeed of their dangers. For whom and for themselves they made account there was no refuge of safety, but that if either the four hundred, or the enemy at Miletus overcame them, they must needs perish.

LXXVI. So there was a contention at this time, one side compelling the city to a democracy; the other, the army, to an oligarchy. And presently there was an assembly of the soldiers called, wherein they deprived the former commanders, and such captains of galleys as they had in suspicion of their charge, and chose others, both captains of galleys and commanders, in their places, of whom Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were two. And they stood up and encouraged one another, both otherwise and with this, that they had no cause to be dejected for the cities revolting from them; for they at Athens being the lesser part had forsaken them, who were not only the greater part, but also every way the better provided. For they having the whole navy, could compel the rest of the cities subject to them to pay in their money as well now as if they were to set out from Athens itself. And that they also had a city, namely, Samos, no weak one, but even such a one, as when they were enemies, wanted little of taking the dominion of the sea from the Athenians. That the seat of the war was the same it was before; and that they should be better able to provide themselves of things necessary, having the navy, than they should be that were at home in the city. And that they at Athens were masters of the entrance of Peiræus both formerly by the favour of them at Samos, and that now also, unless they restore them the government, they shall again be brought to that pass, that those at Samos shall be better able to bar them the use of the sea, than they shall be to bar it them of Samos. That it was a trifle, and worth

nothing which was conferred to the overcoming of the enemy by the city, and a small matter it would be to lose it, seeing they had neither any more silver to send them, (for the soldiers shifted for themselves,) nor yet good direction, which is the thing for which the city hath the command of the armies. Nay, that in this point they erred who were at Athens, in that they had abrogated the laws of their country, whereas they at Samos did both observe the same themselves, and endeavour to constrain the other to do so likewise. So that such of them in the camp as should give good counsel, were as good as they in the city. And that Alcibiades, if they would decree his security and his return, would with all his heart procure the king to be their confederate. And that which is the main thing, if they failed of all other helps, yet with so great a fleet they could not fail of many places to retire to, in which they might find both city and territory.

LXXVII. When they had thus debated the matter in the assembly, and encouraged one another, they made ready, as at other times, whatsoever was necessary for the war. And the ten ambassadors who were sent to Samos from the four hundred, hearing of this by the way at Delos, whither they were come already, staid still there.

LXXVIII. About the same time also the soldiers of the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus murmured amongst themselves, that Astyochus and Tissaphernes overthrew the state of their affairs, Astyochus in refusing to fight, both before, when their own fleet was stronger, and that of the Athenians but small, and also now, whilst they were said to be in sedition, and their fleet divided; and in expecting the Phœnician fleet in fame not in fact to come from Tissaphernes; and Tissaphernes, in that he not only brought not in that fleet of his, but also impaired theirs, by not giving them their pay, neither fully nor continually; and that they therefore ought no longer to delay time, but to hazard battle. This was urged principally by the Syracusians.

LXXIX. Astyochus and the confederates, when they heard of the murmur, and had in council resolved to fight, especially after they were informed that Samos was in a tumult, putting forth with their whole fleet, to the number of one hundred and twenty-one sail, with order given to the Milesians to march by land to the same place, went to Mycale. But the Athenians being come out from Samos with their fleet of eighty-two galleys, and riding now at Glaucæ, of the territory of Mycale, (for in this part toward Mycale, Samos is but a little way from the continent,) when they descried the Peloponnesian fleet coming against them, put in again to Samos, as not esteeming themselves a sufficient number to hazard their whole fortune on the battle. Besides they staid for the coming of Strombichides from Hellespont to their aid, (for they saw that they of Miletus had a desire to fight,) with those galleys that went from Chios against Abydus; for they had sent to him before. So these retired into Samos; but the Peloponnesians putting in at Mycale, there encamped, as also did the land forces of the Milesians, and others of the country thereabouts. The next day, when they meant to have gone against Samos, they received news that Strombichides with his galleys was arrived

out of Hellespont, and thereupon returned presently to Miletus. Then the Athenians on the other side, with the addition of these galleys, went to Miletus, being now one hundred and eight sail, intending to fight; but when nobody came out against them, they likewise went back to Samos.

LXXX. Immediately after this, the same summer, the Peloponnesians, who refused to come out against the enemy, as holding themselves with their whole fleet too weak to give them battle, and were now at a stand how to get money for the maintenance of so great a number of galleys, sent Clearchus, the son of Rhamphias, with forty galleys, (according to the order at first from Peloponnesus,) to Pharnabazus. For not only Pharnabazus himself had sent for, and promised to pay them, but they were advertised besides, by ambassadors, that Byzantium had a purpose to revolt. Hereupon these Peloponnesian galleys having put out into the main sea, to the end that they might not be seen as they passed by, and tossed with tempests, part of them, (which were the greatest number,) and Clearchus with them, got into Delos, and came afterwards to Miletus again; (but Clearchus went thence again into the Hellespont by land, and had the command there,) and part under the charge of Elixus, a Megarean, (which were ten sail,) went safely through into the Hellespont, and caused Byzantium to revolt. And after this, when they of Samos heard of it, they sent certain galleys into Hellespont to oppose them, and to be a guard to the cities thereabouts; and there followed a small fight between them, of eight galleys to eight, before Byzantium.

LXXXI. In the mean time, they that were in authority at Samos, and especially Thrasybulus, who after the form of government changed was still of the mind to have Alcibiades recalled, at length, in an assembly, persuaded the soldiers to the same; and when they had decreed for Alcibiades, both his return and his security, he went to Tissaphernes and fetched Alcibiades to Samos, accounting it their only means of safety, to win Tissaphernes from the Peloponnesians to themselves. An assembly being called, Alcibiades complained of and lamented the calamity of his own exile, and speaking much of the business of the state, gave them no small hopes of the future time, hyperbolically magnifying his own power with Tissaphernes, to the end that both they who held the oligarchy at home, might the more fear him, and so the conspiracies dissolve, and also those at Samos the more honour him, and take better heart unto themselves; and withal that the enemy might object the same to the utmost to Tissaphernes, and fall from their present hopes. Alcibiades, therefore, with the greatest boast that could be, affirmed that Tissaphernes had undertaken to him, that as long as he had any thing left, if he might but trust the Athenians, they should never want for maintenance, no, though he should be constrained to make money of his own bed; and that he would fetch the Phœnician fleet now at Aspendus, not to the Peloponnesians, but to the Athenians. And that then only he would rely upon the Athenians when Alcibiades called home, should undertake for them.

LXXXII. Hearing this and much more, they chose him presently

for general, together with those that were before, and committed to them the whole government of their affairs. And now there was not a man that would have sold his present hopes, both of subsisting themselves, and being revenged of the four hundred, for any good in the world; and were ready even then, on those words of his, condemning the enemy there present, to set sail for Peiræus. But he, though many pressed it, by all means forbade their going against Peiræus, being to leave their enemies so near; but since they had chosen him general, he was, he said, to go to Tissaphernes first, and to despatch such business with him as concerned the war. And as soon as the assembly brake up, he took his journey accordingly, to the end that he might seem to communicate every thing with him, and for that he desired also to be in more honour with him, and to shew that he was general, and a man capable to do him good or hurt; and it happened to Alcibiades that he awed the Athenians with Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.

LXXXIII. When the Peloponnesians that were at Miletus heard that Alcibiades was gone home, whereas they mistrusted Tissaphernes before, now they much more accused him. For it fell out, that when at the coming of the Athenians with their fleet before Miletus, they refused to give them battle, Tissaphernes became thereby a great deal slacker in his payment, and besides that he was hated by them before this for Alcibiades' sake, the soldiers now meeting in companies apart, reckoned up one to another the same matters which they had noted before; and some also men of value, and not the common soldier alone, recounted this withal, how they had never had their full stipend, that the allowance was but small, and yet not continually paid; and that unless they either fought, or went to some other place where they might have maintenance, their men would abandon the fleet, and that the cause of all this was in Astyochus, who for private lucre gave way to the humour of Tissaphernes.

LXXXIV. Whilst these were upon this consideration, there happened also a certain tumult about Astyochus. For the mariners of the Syracusians and Thurians, by how much they were a multitude that had greater liberty than the rest, with so much the stouter importunity they demanded their pay. And he not only gave them somewhat an insolent answer, but also threatened Dorieus, that amongst the rest spake for the soldiers under himself, and lifted up his staff against him.¹ When the soldiers saw that, they took up a cry like seamen indeed all at once, and were running upon Astyochus to have struck him; but foreseeing it he fled to an altar, and was not stricken, but they were parted again. The Milesians also took in a certain fort in Miletus, built by Tissaphernes, having privily assaulted it, and cast out the garrison that was within it. These things were by the rest of the confederates, and especially by the Syracusians, well approved of, but Lichas liked them not; saying, it behoved the Milesians, and the rest dwelling within the king's dominion, to have obeyed Tissaphernes in all moderate things, and till such time as the

¹ The staff, *βακτηρία*, was among the Grecian generals a mark of distinction.

war should have been well despatched, to have courted him. And the Milesians for this, and other things of this kind, were offended with Lichas, and afterwards, when he died of sickness, would not permit him to be buried in that place where the Lacedæmonians then present would have had him.

LXXXV. Whilst they were quarrelling about their business with Astyochus and Tissaphernes, Mindarus comes in from Lacedæmon to succeed Astyochus in his charge of the fleet, and takes the command on himself; but Astyochus departed. But with him Tissaphernes sent a Carian, named Gaulites, one that spake both the languages,¹ both to accuse the Milesians about the fort, and also to make an apology for himself, knowing that the Milesians went principally to exclaim upon him, and that Hermocrates went with them, and would bewray how Tissaphernes undid the business of the Peloponnesians with Alcibiades, and dealt on both hands. For he was continually at enmity with him about the payment of the soldiers' wages; and in the end, when Hermocrates was banished from Syracuse, and other commanders of the Syracusan fleet, namely, Potamis, Miscon, and Damarchus, were arrived at Miletus, Tissaphernes lay more heavy upon him, being an outlaw, than before, and accused him amongst other things, that he had asked him money, and because he could not have it, became his enemy. So Astyochus and Hermocrates, and the Milesians, went their way to Lacedæmon; but Alcibiades by this time was come back from Tissaphernes to Samos.

LXXXVI. And those ambassadors of the four hundred, who had been sent out before to mollify and to inform those of Samos, came from Delos, now, whilst Alcibiades was present, and an assembly being called, they offered to speak. But the soldiers at first would not hear them, but cried out to have them put to death, for that they had deposed the people; yet afterwards with much ado they were calmed, and gave them hearing. They declared, that the change had been made for the preservation of the city, not to destroy it, nor to deliver it to the enemy; for they could have done that before now, when the enemy during their government assaulted it. That every one of the five thousand was to participate of the government in their turns. And their friends were not, as Chæreas had laid to their charge, abused, nor had any wrong at all, but remained every one quietly upon his own; but though they delivered this and much more, yet the soldiers believed them not, but raged still, and declared their opinions, some in one sort, some in another, most agreeing in this, to go against Peiræus. And now Alcibiades appeared to be the first and principal man in doing service to the commonwealth. For when the Athenians at Samos were carried headlong to invade themselves, (in which case most manifestly the enemy had presently possessed himself of Ionia and Hellespont,) it was thought that he was the man that kept them from it. Nor was there any man at that time able to have held in the multitude but himself. He both made them to desist from the voyage, and turned off from the ambassadors those that were

¹ Both Greek and Persian.

in their own particular incensed against them; whom also he sent away, giving them their answer himself: that he opposed not the government of the five thousand, but willed them to remove the four hundred, and to establish the council that was before of five hundred. That if they had frugally cut off any expense, so that such as were employed in the wars might be the better maintained, he did much commend them for it. And withal, he exhorted them to stand out, and give no ground to their enemies; for that as long as the city held out, there was great hope for them to compound; but if either part miscarry once, either this at Samos, or the other at Athens, there would none be left for the enemy to compound withal. There chanced to be present also the ambassadors of the Argives, sent unto the popular faction of the Athenians in Samos, to assist them. These Alcibiades commended, and appointed to be ready when they should be called for, and so dismissed them. These Argives came in with those of the Paralos that had been bestowed formerly in the military galley by the four hundred, to go about Eubœa, and to convey Læspodias, Aristophon, and Milesias, ambassadors from the four hundred to Lacedæmon; who, as they sailed by Argos, seized on the ambassadors, and delivered them as principal men in deposing of the people, to the Argives, and returned no more to Athens, but came with the galley they then were in to Samos, and brought with them these ambassadors from the Argives.

LXXXVII. The same summer Tissaphernes, at the time that the Peloponnesians were offended with him most, both for the going home of Alcibiades, and divers other things, as now manifestly Atticizing, with purpose, as indeed it seemed, to clear himself to them concerning his accusations, made ready for his journey to Aspendus for the Phœnician fleet, and willed Lichas to go along with him; saying that he would substitute Tamos his deputy-lieutenant over the army, to pay the fleet whilst himself was absent. This matter is diversely reported, and it is hard to know with what purpose he went to Aspendus, and yet brought not the fleet away with him. For it is known that one hundred and forty-seven sail of Phœnicians were come forward as far as Aspendus, but why they came not through, the conjectures are various. Some think it was upon design (as he formerly intended) to wear out the Peloponnesian forces, (for which cause also Tamos, who had that charge, made no better, but rather worse, payment than himself.) Others, that having brought the Phœnicians as far as Aspendus, he might dismiss them for money; (for he never meant to use their service.) Some again said it was because they exclaimed so against it at Lacedæmon, and that it might not be said he abused them, but that he went openly to a fleet really set out. For my own part, I think it most clear, that he brought not those galleys in, that he might wear out, and balance the Grecians. Consuming them, in that he went thither and delayed the time; and equalizing them, in that bringing them to neither, he made neither party the stronger. For if he had had a mind to end the war, it is manifest he might have been sure to have done it. For if he had brought them to the Lacedæmonians, in all reason he had given them the victory,

who had a navy already, rather equal than inferior to that of their enemies. But that which hurt them most, was the pretence he alleged for not bringing the fleet in, for he said they were not so many sail as the king had ordained to be got together. But sure he might have ingratiated himself more in this business, by despatching it with less of the king's money, than by spending more. But whatsoever was his purpose, Tissaphernes went to Aspendus, and was with the Phœnicians, and by his own appointment the Peloponnesians sent Philip, a Lacedæmonian, with him with two galleys, as to take charge of the fleet.

LXXXVIII. Alcibiades, when he heard that Tissaphernes was gone to Aspendus, goes after him with thirteen galleys, promising to those at Samos a safe and great benefit, which was, that he would either bring those Phœnician galleys to the service of the Athenians, or at least hinder their coming to the Peloponnesians, knowing, as is likely, the mind of Tissaphernes by long acquaintance, that he meant not to bring them on, and desiring, as much as he could, to procure him the ill-will of the Peloponnesians, for the friendship shewn to himself and to the Athenians, that he might thereby the better engage him to take their part. So he presently put to sea, holding his course for Phaselis and Caurus upwards.

LXXXIX. The ambassadors of the four hundred being returned from Samos to Athens, and having related what they had in charge from Alcibiades, how that he exhorted them to hold out, and not give ground to the enemy, and that he had great hopes to reconcile them to the army, and to overcome the Peloponnesians; whereas many of the sharers in the oligarchy were formerly discontented, and would gladly, if they could have done it safely, have quitted the business, they were now a great deal more confirmed in that mind. And already they had their meetings apart, and did cast aspersions on the government, and had for their ring-leaders some of the heads of the oligarchicals, and such as bare office amongst them, as Theramenes,¹ the son of Agnon, and Aristocrates, the son of Scellias,² and others, who, though they were partakers with the foremost in the affairs of state, yet feared, as they said, Alcibiades and the army at Samos; and joined in the sending of ambassadors to Lacedæmon,³ because they were loath, by singling themselves from the greater number, to hurt the state: not that they dismissed the state into the hands of a very few; but said that the five thousand ought in fact to be assigned, and not in voice only, and the government to be reduced to a greater equality. And this was indeed the form pretended in words by the four hundred. But the most of them through private ambition fell upon that, by which an oligarchy made out of a democracy is

¹ This Theramenes was deeply concerned in all the subsequent revolutions at Athens. He put the finishing hand to the peace with the Lacedæmonians, after the taking of Athens by Lysander, (A.C. 404.) when they demolished their long walls, and gave up their shipping. He was afterwards

nominally one of the *thirty* tyrants; by whom he was put to death.

² Scellias, Bekker; commonly put Sicelias.

³ σπουδῇ πᾶν. These words are omitted by Duker. They very anxiously sent the ambassadors to Lacedæmon.

chiefly overthrown. For at once they claimed every one, not to be equal, but to be far the chief. Whereas in a democracy, when election is made, because a man is not overcome by his equals, he can better brook it. But the great power of Alcibiades at Samos, and the opinion they had that the oligarchy was not likely to last, was it that most evidently encouraged them; and thereupon they every one contended, who should most eminently become the patron of the people.

XC. But those of the four hundred that were most opposite to such a form of government, and the principal of them, both Phrynichus (who had been general at Samos, and was ever since at difference with Alcibiades) and Aristarchus, a man that had been an adversary to the people, both in the greatest manner, and for the longest time; and Pisander and Antiphon, and others of the greatest power, not only formerly, as soon as they entered into authority, and afterwards when the state at Samos revolted to the people, sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon, and bestirred themselves for the oligarchy, and built a wall in the place called Eetioneia, but much more afterwards, when their ambassadors were come from Samos, and that they saw not only the populars, but also some others of their own party, thought trusty before, to be now changed. And to Lacedæmon they sent Antiphon and Phrynichus, with ten others, with all possible speed, as fearing their adversaries, both at home and at Samos, with commission to make a peace with the Lacedæmonians on any tolerable conditions whatsoever or howsoever, and in this time went on with the building of the wall in Eetioneia with greater diligence than before. The scope they had in this wall, as it was given out by Theramenes, the son of Agnon, was not so much to keep out those of Samos, in case they should attempt by force to enter into Peiræus, as at their pleasure to be able to let in both the galleys and the land forces of the enemies. For this Eetioneia is the pier of the Peiræus, close unto which is the mouth of the haven; and therefore they built this wall, so to another wall, that was built before to the continent, that a few men lying within it, might command the entrance. For the end of each wall was brought to the tower upon the very mouth of the haven, as well of the old wall towards the continent, as of the new which was built within it to the water. They built also an open ground-gallery,¹ an exceeding great one, and close to their new wall within Peiræus, and were masters of it, and constrained all men, as well to bring thither their corn, which they had already come in, as to unload there whatsoever should come in afterward, and to take and sell it from thence.

XCI. These things Theramenes murmured at long before, and when the ambassadors returned from Lacedæmon, without compounding for them all in general, he gave out, that this wall would endanger the undoing of the city. For at this very instant there happened to be riding on the coast of Laconia, forty-two galleys, (amongst which were some of Tarentum, some of Locri, some Italians, and some

¹ Στοά.

Sicilians,) set out from Peloponnesus at the instance of the Eubœans, bound for Eubœa, and commanded by Agesandridas, the son of Agesander, a Spartan;¹ which Theramenes said were coming, not so much towards Eubœa, as towards those that fortified in Eetioneia, and that if they were not looked to, they would surprise the city. Now some matter might indeed be gathered also from those that were accused, so that it was not a mere slander. For their principal design was to retain the oligarchy, with dominion over their confederates; but if they failed of that, yet being masters of the galleys, and of the fortification, to have subsisted free themselves; if barred of that, then, rather than to be the only men to suffer death under the restored democracy, to let in the enemy, and without either navy or fortification, to have let what would have become of the city, and to have compounded for the safety of their own persons.

XCII. Therefore they went diligently on with the fortification, wherein were wickets and entries, and back-ways for the enemy, and desired to have it finished in time. And though these things were spoken but amongst a few before, and in secret, yet when Phrynichus, after his return from his Lacedæmonian embassy, was by a certain watchman wounded treacherously in the market-place, when it was full, as he went from the council-house, and not far from it fell instantly dead; and the murderer escaped; and that one of his accomplices, an Argive, taken by the four hundred and put to the torture, would confess no man of those named to him, nor any thing else, saving this, that many men used to assemble at the house of the captain of the watch, and at other houses; then at length, because this accident bred no alteration, Theramenes and Aristocrates, and as many other, either of the four hundred, or out of that number, as were of the same faction, proceeded more boldly to assault the government. For now also the fleet being come about from Laconia, and lying upon the coast of Epidaurus, had made incursions upon Ægina. And Theramenes thereupon alleged, that it was improbable that those galleys, holding their course for Eubœa, would have put in at Ægina, and then have gone back again to lie at Epidaurus, unless they had been sent for by such men as he had ever accused of the same; and that therefore there was no reason any longer to sit still. And in the end, after many seditious and suspicious speeches, they fell upon the state in good earnest. For the soldiers that were in Peiræus, employed in fortifying Eetioneia, (amongst whom was also Aristocrates, captain of a band of men, and his band with him,²) seized on Alexicles, principal commander of the soldiers under the four hundred, an eminent man of the other side, and carrying him into a house, kept him in hold. As soon as the news hereof was brought unto the four hundred, (who chanced at the same time to be sitting in the council-house,) they were ready all of them presently to have taken arms, threatening Theramenes and his faction. He to purge himself was ready to go with

¹ Agesandridas, the son of Agesander, Bekker; commonly put Hegesandridas, the son of Hegesander.

² τὴν αὐτοῦ φυλὴν ἔχων, Bekker. φυλακὴν, Duker. And having his own tribe with him.

them, and to help to rescue Alexicles, and taking with him one of the commanders, who was also of his faction, went down into Peiræus. To help him went also Aristarchus, and certain horsemen of the younger sort. Great and terrible was the tumult. For in the city they thought Peiræus was already taken, and him that was laid in hold slain, and in Peiræus they expected every hour the power of the city to come upon them. At last, the ancient men stopping them that ran up and down the city to arm themselves, and Thucydides of Pharsalus, the city's host, being then there, going boldly and close up to every one he met, and crying out unto them, not to destroy their country, when the enemy lay so near waiting for an advantage, with much ado quieted them, and held their hands from spilling their own blood. Theramenes coming into Peiræus, (for he also had command over the soldiers,) by his exclaiming, made a shew of being angry with them; but Aristarchus, and those that were of the contrary side, were extremely angry in good earnest. Nevertheless the soldiers went on with their business, and repented not a jot of what they had done. Then they asked Theramenes, if he thought this fortification were made to any good end, and whether it were not better to have it demolished. And he answered, that if they thought good to demolish it, he also thought the same. At which word they presently got up, both the soldiers, and also many others of Peiræus, and fell to digging down of the wall. Now the provocation that they used to the multitude was in these words: that "whosoever desired " that the sovereignty should be in the five thousand instead of the " four hundred, ought also to set himself to the work in hand." For, notwithstanding all this, they thought fit as yet to veil the democracy with the name of the five thousand, and not to say plainly, "whosoever will have the sovereignty in the people," lest the five thousand should have been extant indeed, and so a man by speaking to some or other of them, might do hurt to the business through ignorance. And for this cause it was, that the four hundred would neither let the five thousand be extant, nor yet let it be known that they were not. For to make so many participant of the affairs of state, they thought was a direct democracy, but to have it doubtful, would make them afraid of one another,

XCIII. The next day the four hundred, though out of order, yet met together in the council-house, and the soldiers in Peiræus having set at large Alexicles, whom they had before imprisoned, and quite rased the fortification, came into the theatre of Bacchus near to Munychia, and there sat down with their arms, and presently, according as they had resolved in an assembly then holden, marched into the city, and there sat down again in the Anaceum.¹ To this place came to them certain men elected by the four hundred, and man to man reasoned and persuaded with such as they saw to be of the mildest temper, both to be quiet themselves, and to restrain the rest; saying,

¹ The temple of Castor and Pollux, who were called *Ἀνακτες*. In this place slaves were exposed to sale.

that not only the five thousand should be made known who they were, but that out of these such should be chosen in turns, to be of the four hundred, as the five thousand should think good; and entreating them by all means, that they would not in the mean time overthrow the city, and force it into the hand of the enemy. Hereupon the whole number of the men of arms, after many reasons alleged to many men, grew calmer, and feared most the loss of the whole city. And it was agreed betwixt them, that an assembly should be held for making of accord, in the temple of Bacchus, at a day assigned.

XCIV. When they came to the temple of Bacchus, and wanted but a little of a full assembly, came news that Agesandridas with his forty-two galleys, came from Megara along the coast towards Salamis; and now there was not a soldier but thought it the very same thing that Theramenes and his party had before told them, that those galleys were to come to the fortification, and that it was now demolished to good purpose. But Agesandridas, perhaps upon appointment, hovered upon the coast of Epidaurus, and thereabouts; but it is likely, that in respect of the sedition of the Athenians, he staid in those parts with hope to take hold of some good advantage. Howsoever it was, the Athenians, as soon as it was told them, ran presently with all the power of the city down to Peiræus; less esteeming their domestic war, than that of the common enemy, who was not now far off, but even in the haven. And some went aboard the galleys that were then ready, some launched the rest, and others ran to defend the walls and mouth of the haven.

XCV. But the Peloponnesian galleys being now gone by, and got about the promontory of Sunium, cast anchor between Thoricus and Prasizæ, and put in afterwards at Oropus. The Athenians with all speed, constrained to make use of tumultuary forces, such as a city in time of sedition might afford, and desirous with all haste to make good their greatest stake, (for Eubœa, since they were shut out of Attica, was all they had,) sent a fleet under the command of Thumochares¹ to Eretria. Which arriving with those galleys that were in Eubœa before, made up the number of thirty-six sail; and they were presently constrained to hazard battle. For Agesandridas brought out his galleys from Oropus, when he had first there dined. Now Oropus is from Eretria about threescore furlongs of sea. Whereupon the Athenians also, as the enemy came towards them, began to embark, supposing that their soldiers had been somewhere near unto the galleys; but it fell out that they were gone abroad to get their dinner, not in the market, (for by set purpose of the Eretrians, to the end that the enemy might fall upon the Athenians that embarked slowly, before they were ready, and force them to come out and fight, nothing was there to be sold,) but in the outmost houses of the city. There was beside a sign set up at Eretria to give them notice at Oropus at what time to set forward. The Athenians, drawn out by this device, and fighting before the haven of Eretria, made resistance nevertheless

¹ Thumochares, Bekker; commonly put Timocharis.

for awhile, but afterwards they turned their backs and were chased ashore. Such as fled to the city of the Eretrians, taking it for their friend, were handled most cruelly, and slaughtered by them of the town; but such as got to the fort in Eretria, holden by the Athenians, saved themselves: and so did so many of their galleys as got to Chalcis. The Peloponnesians, after they had taken twelve Athenian galleys with the men, whereof some they slew, and some they took prisoners, erected a trophy; and not long after, having caused all Eubœa to revolt, save only Oreus,¹ (which the Athenians held with their own forces) they settled the rest of their business there.

XCVI. When the news of that which had happened in Eubœa was brought to Athens, it put the Athenians into the greatest astonishment that ever they had been in before. For neither did their loss in Sicily, though then thought great, nor any other at any time, so much affright them as this. For now, when the army at Samos was in rebellion, when they had no more galleys, nor men to put aboard, when they were in sedition amongst themselves, and in continual expectation of falling together by the ears, then in the neck of all, arrived this great calamity; wherein they not only lost their galleys, but also, which was worst of all, Eubœa, by which they had received more commodity than by Attica. How then could they choose but be dejected? But most of all they were troubled, and that for the nearness, with a fear lest upon this victory the enemy should take courage, and come immediately into Peiræus, now empty of shipping, of which they thought nothing wanting, but that they were not there already. And had they been any thing adventurous, they might easily have done it, and then had they staid there and besieged them, they had not only increased the sedition, but also compelled the fleet to come away from Ionia, to the aid of their kindred and of the whole city, though enemies to the oligarchy; and in the mean time got the Hellespont, Ionia, the islands, and all places even to Eubœa, and as one may say, the whole Athenian empire, into their power. But the Lacedæmonians, not only in this, but in many other things, were most commodious enemies to the Athenians to war withal. For being of most different humours, the one swift, the other slow, the one adventurous, the other timorous, the Lacedæmonians gave them great advantage, especially when their greatness was by sea. This was evident in the Syracusians, who being like them in condition, warred best against them.

XCVII. The Athenians, upon this news, made ready notwithstanding twenty galleys, and called an assembly, one then presently in the place called Pnyx, where they were wont to assemble at other times,² in which having deposed the four hundred, they decreed the sovereignty to the five thousand, of which number were all such to be as were charged with arms; and from that time forward to pay no man for magistracy, with a penalty on the magistrate receiving the salary, to be held for an execrable person. There were also divers

¹ See Liv. xxviii. 5. Now called *Oreo*.

² Aristophanes, *Acharn.* 19, 20, mentions, that in his days assemblies, called by the Athenians *κυριαὶ ἐκκλησίαι*, were wont to be held in this place.

other assemblies held afterwards, wherein they elected law-makers,¹ and enacted other things concerning the government. And now first, (at least in my time,) the Athenians seem to have ordered their state aright; which consisted now of a moderate temper, both of the few and of the many. And this was the first thing, that after so many misfortunes past, made the city again to raise her head. They decreed also the recalling of Alcibiades, and those that were in exile with him; and sending to him, and to the army at Samos, willed them to fall in hand with their business.

XCVIII. In this change, Pisander and Alexicles, and such as were with them, and they that had been principal in the oligarchy, immediately withdrew themselves to Decelea; Aristarchus alone (for it chanced that he had charge of the soldiers,) took with him certain archers of the most barbarous,² and went with all speed to Cœnoe. This was a fort of the Athenians, in the confines of Bœotia, and (for the loss that the Corinthians had received by the garrison of Cœnoe,) was by voluntary Corinthians, and by some Bœotians by them called in to aid them, now besieged. Aristarchus, therefore, having treated with these, deceived those in Cœnoe, and told them, that the city of Athens had compounded with the Lacedæmonians, and that they were to render up the place to the Bœotians, for that it was so conditioned in the agreement. Whereupon believing him, as one that had authority over the soldiery, and knowing nothing because besieged, upon security for their pass, they gave up the fort. So the Bœotians received Cœnoe; and the oligarchy and sedition at Athens ceased.

XCIX. About the same time of this summer, when none of those whom Tissaphernes, at his going to Aspendus, had substituted to pay the Peloponnesian navy at Miletus, did it; and seeing neither the Phœnician fleet nor Tissaphernes came to them; and seeing Philip, that was sent along with him, and also another, one Hippocrates, a Spartan, that was lying in Phaselis, had written to Mindarus, the general, that the fleet was not to come at all, and in every thing Tissaphernes abused them; seeing also that Pharnabazus had sent for them, and was willing, upon the coming to him of their fleet, for his own part also, as well as Tissaphernes, to cause the rest of the cities within his own province to revolt from the Athenians; then at length Mindarus hoping for benefit by him, with good order and sudden warning, that the Athenians at Samos might not be aware of their setting forth, went into the Hellespont with seventy-three galleys, besides sixteen which the same summer were gone into the Hellespont before, and had overrun part of Chersonesus. But tossed with the winds, he was forced to put in at Icarus, and after he had staid there through ill weather some five or six days, he arrived at Chios.

¹ The general way of appointing these officers was by lot. Their number was one thousand and one. Their business was not, as the name *Nomothetæ* might imply, to make laws, since that belonged to the supreme power lodged in the people, but to inspect such as were already made, to reconsider such as were

thought to be grievous, and regularly to report such as ought to be continued or ought to be repealed.—See *Smith*.

² Probably some of those servants of the state at Athens called *ροῖόται*, who were almost Barbarians, and sometimes were called Scythians.

C. Thrasyllus having been advertised of his departure from Miletus, he also put to sea from Samos, with five and fifty sail, hastening to be in the Hellespont before him. But hearing that he was in Chios, and conceiving that he would stay there, he appointed spies to lie in Lesbos, and in the continent over against it, that the fleet of the enemy might not remove without his knowledge; and he himself going to Methymna, commanded provision to be made of meal, and other necessities, intending if they staid there long to go from Lesbos and invade them in Chios. Withal, because Eresus was revolted from Lesbos, he purposed to go thither with his fleet, if he could, to take it in. For the most potent of the Methymnæan exiles had got into their society about fifty men of arms out of Cyme, and hired others out of the continent, and with their whole number, in all three hundred, having for their leader Anaxander,¹ a Theban, chosen in respect of their descent from the Thebans,² first assaulted Methymna, but beaten in the attempt by the Athenian garrison that came against them from Mitylene, and again in a skirmish without the city driven quite away, they passed by the way of the mountain to Eresus, and caused it to revolt. Thrasyllus therefore intended to go thither with his galleys,³ and to assault it. At his coming, he found Thrasybulus there also before him, with five galleys from Samos: for he had been advertised of the outlaws coming over; but being too late to prevent them, he went to Eresus, and lay before it at anchor. Hither also came two galleys of Methymna, that were going home from the Hellespont; so that they were in all threescore and seven sail, out of which they made an army, intending with engines, or any other way they could, to take Eresus by assault.

CI. In the mean time Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet at Chios, when they had spent two days in victualling their galleys, and had received of the Chians three Chian tessaracostes,⁴ a man, on the third day put speedily off from Chios, and kept far from the shore, that they might not fall amongst the galleys at Eresus. And leaving Lesbos on the left hand, went to the continent side, and putting in at a haven in Crateri, belonging to the territory of Phocæa, and there dining, passed along the territory of Cyme, and came to Arginusæ⁵ in the continent over against Mitylene, where they supped. From thence they put forth late in the night, and came to Harmatus, a place in the continent over against Methymna, and after dinner going a great pace by Lectus, Larissa, Hamaxitus, and other the towns in those parts, came before midnight to Rhætium: this now is in Hellespont. But some of his galleys put in at Sigeum, and other places thereabouts.

CII. The Athenians that lay with eighteen galleys at Sestus, knew

¹ Anaxander, Bekker; commonly put Anaxarchus.

² See a long note on this in Mitford's Greece, ch. xix. sec. 8.

³ ἐν αὐτὴν πᾶσαις ταῖς ναυσὶ, Bekker. Duker omits πᾶσαις ταῖς. Thrasyllus sailing to it with all his ships.

⁴ A tessaracoste seems to have been a coin amongst the Chians, and the fortieth part of some other greater coin; but the exact value is not known.

⁵ According to Strabo, Arginusæ were small islands near to the continent.

other assemblies held afterwards, wherein they went by the fires, and enacted other things concerning the government by the many which (at least in my time,) the Athenians seem to do the same night, in all aright; which consisted now of a moderate consensus towards Elæus, and of the many. And this was the first decline the fleet of the misfortunes past, made the city again seen galleys that lay at Abycreed also the recalling of Alcibiades from the fleet of their friends with him; and sending to him, and saying that they went not out) but in to fall in hand with their business fleet with Mindarus, and chased by

XCVIII. In this change, out the most of them got to the contrary were with them, and they sent four of the hindmost were taken near immediately withdrew thence. The Peloponnesians took one with the men in her (for it chanced that he was on the ground at the temple of Protesilaus, and two tain archers of the mercenaries and set fire on a fourth abandoned upon the

This was a fort of the loss that the Athenians they besieged Elæus the same day with those was by volunteers which were with them, and with the rest, being in to aid them fourscore and six sail. But seeing it would not yield, with these

Athenians who had been deceived by their spies, and not imagining that the enemy's fleet could have gone by without their knowledge, and attended at leisure the assault of Eresus, when now they were gone, immediately left Eresus, and hasted to the straits of Hellespont. By the way they took two galleys of the Peloponnesians, that having ventured into the main more boldly in following the enemy than the rest had done, chanced to light upon the fleet of the Athenians; and the next day they came to Elæus and stood, and thither from Imbrus came to them those other galleys that had escaped from the enemy; and here they spent five days in preparation for a battle.

CIV. After this, they fought in this manner. The Athenians went by the shore, ordering their galleys one by one, towards Sestus; but the Peloponnesians also, when they saw this, brought out their fleet against them from Abydus. Being sure to fight, they drew out their fleets in length, the Athenians along the shore of Chersonesus, beginning at Idacus, and reaching as far as Arrhianæ, threescore and sixteen galleys; and the Peloponnesians, from Abydus to Dardanus, threescore and eight galleys.¹ In the right wing of the Peloponnesians were the Syracusians, in the other Mindarus himself, and those galleys that were nimblest. Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had the left wing, and Thrasybulus the right; but the rest of the commanders every one the place assigned him. Now the Peloponnesians laboured to give the first onset, and with their left wing to overreach the right wing of the Athenians, and keep them from going out, and to drive those in the middle to the shore, which was near; the Athe-

¹ ἐπὶ τῆς Ἰμβροῦ καὶ Λήμνου, Bekker. ἐπὶ τῆς ἡπείρου καὶ Λήμνου, Duker. The greater number of them escaped to Imbrus and Lemnos.

² According to Bekker: the Athenians in some other editions are represented as having sixty-six; the Peloponnesians eighty-six.

who perceived it, where the enemy went about to cut off their put forth the same way that they did, and out-went them; wing of the Athenians was also gone forward by this time, point called Cynos-sema.¹ By means of this, that part of was in the midst became both weak and divided, especially was the less fleet; and the sharp and angular figure at Cynos-sema took away the sight of what passed at were on the other side. Peloponnesians therefore charging this middle part, both galleys to the dry land, and being far superior in fight, over them, and assaulted them on the shore. And to help either was Thrasybulus able, who was in the right wing, for multitude of the enemies that pressed him; nor Thrasyllus in the left wing, both because he could not see what was done for the promontory of Cynos-sema, and because also he was kept from it by the Syracusians and others lying upon his hands, no fewer in number than themselves. Till at last the Peloponnesians, bold upon their victory, chasing some one galley, some another, fell into some disorder, in a part of their army. And then those about Thrasybulus, having observed that the opposite galleys sought now no more to go beyond them, turned upon them, and fighting, put them presently to flight. And having also cut off from the rest of the fleet such galleys of the Peloponnesians of that part that had the victory, as were scattered abroad, some they assaulted, but the greatest number they put into affright unfoughten. The Syracusians also, whom those about Thrasyllus had already caused to shrink when they saw the rest fly, fled outright.

CVI. This defeat being given, and the Peloponnesians having for the most part escaped, first to the river Meidius,² and afterwards to Abydus; though the Athenians took but few of their galleys, (for the narrowness of the Hellespont afforded to the enemy a short retreat,) yet the victory was the most seasonable to them that could be. For having till this day stood in fear of the Peloponnesian navy, both for the loss which they had received by little and little, and also for their great loss in Sicily, they now ceased either to accuse themselves or to think highly any longer of the naval power of their enemies. The galleys they took were these: eight of Chios, five of Corinth, of Ambracia two, and two of Bœotia; of Leucas, Laconia, Syracuse, and Pellene, one apiece. Of their own they lost fifteen. When they had set up a trophy in the promontory of Cynos-sema, and taken up the wrecks, and given truce to the enemy to fetch away the bodies of their dead, they presently sent away a galley with a messenger to carry news of the victory to Athens. The Athenians, upon the coming in of this galley, hearing of their unexpected good fortune, were encouraged much after their loss in Eubœa, and after their sedition, and conceived that their estate might yet keep up, if they plied the business courageously.

¹ Called by Diodorus and others, the sepulchre of Hecuba. See Eurip. Hecuba, 1270.

² Meidius, Bekker; commonly put Pydus.

that the Peloponnesians were entering the Hellespont by the fires, by those which their own watchmen put up, and by the many which appeared on the enemy's shore, and therefore the same night, in all haste, as they were, kept the shore of Chersonesus towards Elæus, desiring to get out into the wide sea, and to decline the fleet of the enemy; and went out unseen of those sixteen galleys that lay at Abydus, (though these had warning before from the fleet of their friends that came on to watch them narrowly that they went not out) but in the morning, being in sight of the fleet with Mindarus, and chased by him, they could not all escape, but the most of them got to the continent, and into Lemnos;¹ only four of the hindmost were taken near Elæus; whereof the Peloponnesians took one with the men in her that had run herself on ground at the temple of Protesilaus, and two other without the men, and set fire on a fourth abandoned upon the shore of Imbrus.

CIII. After this, they besieged Elæus the same day with those galleys of Abydus which were with them, and with the rest, being now altogether fourscore and six sail. But seeing it would not yield, they went away to Abydus.

The Athenians who had been deceived by their spies, and not imagining that the enemy's fleet could have gone by without their knowledge, and attended at leisure the assault of Eresus, when now they knew they were gone, immediately left Eresus, and hastened to the defence of Hellespont. By the way they took two galleys of the Peloponnesians, that having ventured into the main more boldly in following the enemy than the rest had done, chanced to light upon the fleet of the Athenians; and the next day they came to Elæus and staid, and thither from Imbrus came to them those other galleys that had escaped from the enemy; and here they spent five days in preparation for a battle.

CIV. After this, they fought in this manner. The Athenians went by the shore, ordering their galleys one by one, towards Sestus; but the Peloponnesians also, when they saw this, brought out their fleet against them from Abydus. Being sure to fight, they drew out their fleets in length, the Athenians along the shore of Chersonesus, beginning at Idacus, and reaching as far as Arrhianæ, threescore and sixteen galleys; and the Peloponnesians, from Abydus to Dardanus, threescore and eight galleys.² In the right wing of the Peloponnesians were the Syracusians, in the other Mindarus himself, and those galleys that were nimblest. Amongst the Athenians, Thrasyllus had the left wing, and Thrasybulus the right; but the rest of the commanders every one the place assigned him. Now the Peloponnesians laboured to give the first onset, and with their left wing to overreach the right wing of the Athenians, and keep them from going out, and to drive those in the middle to the shore, which was near; the Athe-

¹ ἐπὶ τῇς Ἰμβροῦ καὶ Λήμνου, Bekker. ἐπὶ τῇς ἡπείρου καὶ Λήμνου, Duker. The greater number of them escaped to Imbrus and Lemnos.

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nians, who perceived it, where the enemy went about to cut off their way out, put forth the same way that they did, and out-went them; but the left wing of the Athenians was also gone forward by this time, beyond the point called Cynos-sema.¹ By means of this, that part of the fleet which was in the midst became both weak and divided, especially when theirs was the less fleet; and the sharp and angular figure of the place about Cynos-sema took away the sight of what passed there from those that were on the other side.

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CVII. The fourth day after this battle, the Athenians that were in *Sestus*, having hastily prepared their fleet, went to *Cyzicus*, which was revolted; and espying, as they passed by, the eight galleys come from *Byzantium*, riding under *Harpagium* and *Priapus*, set upon them, and having also overcome those that came to their aid from the land, took them. Then coming to *Cyzicus*, being an open town, they brought it again into their own power, and levied a sum of money amongst them. The Peloponnesians in the mean time going from *Abydus* to *Elæus*, recovered as many of their galleys formerly taken as remained whole. The rest the *Eleusians* had burnt. They also sent *Hippocrates* and *Epicles* into *Eubœa*, to fetch away the fleet that was there.

CVIII. About the same time also returned *Alcibiades* to *Samos* with his thirteen galleys from *Caunus* and *Phaselis*, reporting that he had diverted the Phœnician fleet from coming to the Peloponnesians, and that he had inclined *Tissaphernes* to the friendship of the Athenians, more than he was before. Thence manning out nine galleys more, he exacted a great sum of money of the *Halicarnasseans*, and fortified *Cos*. Being now almost autumn, he returned to *Samos*.¹ The Peloponnesians being now in *Hellespont*, the *Antandrians* (who are *Æolians*.) received into the city men of arms from *Abydus* by land through mount *Ida*, upon injury that had been done them by *Arsaces*, a deputy-lieutenant of *Tissaphernes*. This *Arsaces* having feigned a certain war, not declared against whom, had formerly called out the chiefest of the *Delians* (the which in hallowing of *Delos* by the Athenians were turned out, and had planted themselves in *Adramyttium*.) to go with him to this war. And when under colour of amity and confederacy he had drawn them out, he observed a time when they

¹ "After this, for some time every thing succeeded so well under *Alcibiades* and his active colleagues, that the *Lacedæmonians*, having received several defeats both by land and sea, and lost two hundred ships, were again necessitated to sue for peace. After such great services, *Alcibiades* returned triumphant to *Athens*. The whole city flocked down to the *Peiræus* to meet him. All strove to get a sight of *Alcibiades*; they caressed him, crowned him, cursed the authors of his exile, and hurried him away to an assembly of the people. There he harangued them for a time; then stopped and shed tears in abundance; then harangued them again. In short they undid all they had ever done against him; and *Alcibiades* for a time was all in all at *Athens*. Yet, in subsequent commands, he happened not to be successful; a crime which his countrymen very seldom forgave. He became a second time an exile from *Athens*. His great abilities

made him a continual terror both to foreign and domestic enemies. Yet now he persevered to serve his country by caballing in their favour, and advising them on critical occasions. Yet all in vain: *Lysander* was soon made master of the *Peiræus* and of *Athens*. *Alcibiades* retired into *Phrygia*, and was handsomely supported by the bounty of his friend *Pharnabazus*; who however was wrought upon at last, by the joint solicitations of his enemies, and the plea of its necessity for the service of the king, to undertake his destruction. The agents of *Pharnabazus* durst not attempt him in an open manner, but set fire to his house by night. By throwing in clothes to damp the flames, he got out safe. The *Barbarians* soon spied him, shot him to death with arrows and darts, then cut off his head, and carried it to *Pharnabazus*. I shall only add, that he was but forty years old when he was thus destroyed."—*Smith*.

were at dinner, and having hemmed them in with his own soldiers, murdered them with darts. And therefore for this act's sake, fearing lest he might do some unlawful prank against them also, and for that he had otherwise done them injury, they cast his garrison out of their citadel.

CIX. Tissaphernes hearing of this, (being the act of the Peloponnesians, as well as that at Miletus, or that at Cnidos; for in those cities his garrisons had also been cast out in the same manner,) and conceiving that he was deeply charged to them, and fearing lest they should do him some other hurt;¹ and withal not enduring that Pharnabazus should receive them, and with less time and cost speed better against the Athenians than he had done, resolved to make a journey to them in the Hellespont, both to complain of what was done at Antandrus, and to clear himself of his accusations, the best he could, as well concerning the Phœnician fleet, as other matters. And first putting in at Ephesus, he offered sacrifice to Diana.²

When the winter following this summer shall be ended, the one and twentieth year [of this war] shall be complete.

¹ For the reasons why Tissaphernes was thus afraid, see chap. 78, &c.

² Here breaks off abruptly the History of the Peloponnesian war, by Thu-

cydides. The adjustment of time annexed seems plainly to have been made by another hand.—*Smith*.

THE END.



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